rule, the scientific impact was what was described by sage as a continuum not an absolute rule and that litigants could be put into place when it's not possible to adhere to two metre rule at all times. so the science lent towards and in favour of the two metre rule but it recognised itself that it was a movable feast that they could be mitic and is put into place and that it was a policy choice for the government and it was a matter for government and it was a matter for government to decide. yes government and it was a matter for government to decide.— government and it was a matter for government to decide. yes and i 'ust no back to government to decide. yes and i 'ust go back to important i government to decide. yes and i 'ust go back to important points, i government to decide. yes and i 'ust go back to important points, the h go back to important points, the world health organization... i don't want to ask — world health organization... i don't want to ask you _ world health organization... i don't want to ask you about _ world health organization... i don't want to ask you about what - world health organization... i don't want to ask you about what support| want to ask you about what support was for it in policy terms but it's obvious the government was entitled to produce that policy but also there was a risk but that it was a risk which the government was entitled to run.— risk which the government was entitled to run. also worth bearing in mind that _ entitled to run. also worth bearing in mind that the _ entitled to run. also worth bearing in mind that the chief _ entitled to run. also worth bearing in mind that the chief medical - in mind that the chief medical officer sat on the review panel that published the final recommendation about moving to one metre plus. we do need to remember that. the review panel included chief medical officer and it was their recommendation to move to one metre plus or one metre with mitigations that the prime minister accepted. the with mitigations that the prime minister accepted.— with mitigations that the prime minister acce ted. ~ u, minister accepted. the chief medical officer was on _ minister accepted. the chief medical officer was on the _ minister accepted. the chief medical officer was on the review _ minister accepted. the chief medical officer was on the review panel- minister accepted. the chief medical officer was on the review panel and l officer was on the review panel and the review panel recommended that they would be that reduction but the chief medical officer position himself was, there is a risk that it is a matter of a government not need to resolve the degree to which that risk is entered into by virtue of this policy decision. he never said in terms of the epidemiological risk of you with the government going ahead with the two metre reduction to one metre rule with my blessing. that's just not what occurred. my that's just not what occurred. ij�*i recollection that's just not what occurred. m recollection is that's just not what occurred. m1: recollection is different and i'm looking at my witness statement to jog my looking at my witness statement to jog my memory but the review panel, i was not involved in the work of the review panel, it was chaired by the review panel, it was chaired by the permanent secretary to number ten and included the chief scientific adviser and the chief medical officer in the chief economic adviser. it says here and i am quoting from the report, the guidance should change to state that two metres or one metre with risk mitigation are acceptable and that businesses should set out mitigations they will introduce. the review was a _ mitigations they will introduce. the review was a policy review which the government was entitled to implement, that is common ground surely. it was a policy decision which the government could take and date. {iii which the government could take and date. . ., , �* which the government could take and date. , �* �*, ., date. of course. but it's an important _ date. of course. but it's an important point. _ date. of course. but it's an important point. my - date. of course. but it's an - important point. my recollection of it was the prime minister deliberately established a panel to bring together the input from the science advisers, the medical officer as well as the economic analysis, considered them together to come up with recommendation and i think the report and its conclusions said the guidance should change. so thatis said the guidance should change. so that is a recommendation jointly from the panel as i read it which is different to what you said but i'm just quoting from the panel summary of recommendations. in just quoting from the panel summary of recommendations.— of recommendations. in that debate an important — of recommendations. in that debate an important part — of recommendations. in that debate an important part perhaps _ of recommendations. in that debate an important part perhaps as - of recommendations. in that debate an important part perhaps as equall an important part perhaps as equal as the economic considerations was the question of risk. the siege meeting and the coronavirus meeting and the cofidis meeting on the 22nd ofjune made plain that obviously in that decision was a balance between the transmission risks and the economic consequences of not doing it and covid s to which you would a party, you were present in that meeting, was made aware that the potential for higher occupancy effects risk. it's an obvious point. the question of transmission and risk for something that had to be debated and it was resolved in favour of the economic opening up. do you agree?— do you agree? maybe it would be helful if do you agree? maybe it would be helpful if we _ do you agree? maybe it would be helpful if we bring _ do you agree? maybe it would be helpful if we bring up _ do you agree? maybe it would be helpful if we bring up paragraph | do you agree? maybe it would be i helpful if we bring up paragraph 257 of my witness statement. that contains the panel's summary of its conclusions and there is a specific point in paragraph c where it says mitigations can reduce the risk at one metres so that it is broadly equivalent to being two metres apart. and then the paragraph the is the bit i was quoting from saying the bit i was quoting from saying the panel concludes the guidance should change and again this was a panel i was not involved in that contained scientific and medical advice alongside economic advice and it went to the prime minister and not to me and he acted on the recommendation and rightly brought together all sides of the debate. there is no doubt that the review panel made a policy recommendation and it was instituted, the point is and it was instituted, the point is a different one. in making that decision the government was assisted ijy decision the government was assisted by expert scientific advice on the risk. in the very nature of that decision there was a balance between the transmission risk and economic consequences. that is what the debate was all about. so i'm simply asking you to recognise that in that debate an important consideration but ultimately not the winning consideration was what risks are attendant upon such a social distancing change? do you agree? i wasn't privy to the deliberation of the panel. all i can point it was a letter i sent to the prime minister which you have an evidence which explained my specific point of view about the economics. i explained my specific point of view about the economics.— about the economics. i understand that the in your _ about the economics. i understand that the in your witness _ about the economics. i understand that the in your witness statement j that the in your witness statement it makes plain that the panel considered the risk, risk is an important consideration. that review of course took place as you know and was published on the 24th ofjune. on the 8th ofjuly you presented your plan forjobs to the cabinet and mr hancock said in evidence on the 30th of november that it was at that cabinet meeting on the 8th of july that he had about the eat out to help out scheme for the first time. the scheme was announced on the same day, the 8th ofjuly, as part of the plan forjobs. given that the eat out to help out scheme encouraged the coming together of different households in indoor spaces, why was that plan not put by the treasury in front of sage, in front of the secretary of state for health and the chief medical officer for the consideration of the very same issue of the absolute risk of transmission? the same issue of the absolute risk of transmission?— same issue of the absolute risk of transmission? the first thing to say is wh do transmission? the first thing to say is why do eat _ transmission? the first thing to say is why do eat out _ transmission? the first thing to say is why do eat out to _ transmission? the first thing to say is why do eat out to help _ transmission? the first thing to say is why do eat out to help out - transmission? the first thing to say is why do eat out to help out at - is why do eat out to help out at all. ., , ., ., ., , all. no, there is a method to my madness- _ all. no, there is a method to my madness- i'm — all. no, there is a method to my madness. i'm asking _ all. no, there is a method to my madness. i'm asking you - all. no, there is a method to my madness. i'm asking you why . all. no, there is a method to my madness. i'm asking you why in| all. no, there is a method to my - madness. i'm asking you why in light of the obvious issue of risk of transmission inherent in any scheme that encouraged households to come together did the treasury not consult with sage, the cmo, the secretary of state for health or anybody else outside number ten? because it out to help out had been designed specifically in the context of the safe lifting of mpi is that had already been signed off as part of the plan which had reopened hospitality, indoor hospitality. that had already been part of the approved plan. eat out to help out only operated within that context andindeed only operated within that context and indeed they were a significant range of mpi is in place including social distancing, covid secured guidance, table service, contactless ordering, one—way systems, all of which have been put in place but the overall reopening of indoor hospitality had already been implanted and as we discussed before modelled and involved scientists and eat out to help out was designed to operate within that context of the safe lifting of mpi. this was a micro—policy to make sure that capacity which the scientists had already said was part of an overall package which could be safely delivered was actually used and it was done very much in the context. in the same way that other economic decisions like a vat cut for hospitality or for low decisions like a vat cut for hospitality orfor low or decisions like a vat cut for hospitality or for low or anything else wouldn't ordinarily be cleared with medical advisers, knows this because we had already made the collective decision to reopen indoor hospitality and this was a policy that sat beneath that. in addition to the obvious _ that sat beneath that. in addition to the obvious economic- that sat beneath that. in addition to the obvious economic policy i that sat beneath that. in addition - to the obvious economic policy which was to encourage consumption in the hospitality sector, to encourage people to use restaurants and preserve the jobs of women in the lower paid and people from ethnic backgrounds, it's obvious that the plan was designed with a meritorious consideration in mind. but it is also part of that plan was it not to address what you had called the fear, the fact data showed that our country was far and away the least likely to get back to normal and to promote what you've described in your article is an optimistic counter narrative. you wanted to bring about a change in behaviour, to encourage more people than had previously gone to restaurants, to encourage people to come together. that was part of the policy objective was it not?- that was part of the policy objective was it not? they are one and the same- _ objective was it not? they are one and the same. my _ objective was it not? they are one and the same. my primary - objective was it not? they are one| and the same. my primary concern objective was it not? they are one - and the same. my primary concern was protecting millions ofjobs of particularly vulnerable people who worked in this industry. all the data, all the evidence, all the polling all the input from those company suggested unless we did something, many of those jobs would have been a risk with devastating consequences for those people and their families. consequences for those people and theirfamilies. that is consequences for those people and their families. that is why independent think tanks had recommended doing some things at this and other countries has done things like this because everyone was grappling with the same issue of how to ensure those jobs are safeguarded. that was the primary driver for what we were doing. find driver for what we were doing. and all that material, _ driver for what we were doing. and all that material, internationally, the material from all that material, internationally, the materialfrom industry bodies and the like, all referred to the balance inherent in any scheme to encourage households to come together in greater numbers. the issue of risk of transmission. putting aside its obvious economic advantage and putting aside the obviously good policy reasons for encouraging restaurant use in the context of restaurants which were already covid safe, there was no getting away from the fact that an issue for you and the treasury was willing to have an impact on transmission? it's the elephant in the room. it couldn't be avoided could it? ., ., ., could it? no. you made the point, it was about covid _ could it? no. you made the point, it was about covid secure _ could it? no. you made the point, it was about covid secure openings. i was about covid secure openings. indoor hospitality had been opened as part of the road map and not openedin as part of the road map and not opened in a casual way, it had been opened in a casual way, it had been opened with a significant set of restrictions including social distancing which limited and reduced significantly the typical occupancy of a restaurant with one—way systems, signage, screens, shift work, contactless payments. there was 55 pages of government guidance for the hospitality industry supplemented by 100 pages of guidance from the trade association including the need for individual risk assessments so there was an extraordinary amount of work that had gone into the safe reopening of hospitality in a way that it was not previously and it was a different set of hospitality and within that context this policy was designed to ensure the capacity that was available and that had deemed to be safe would actually be used in order to safeguard the jobs of some vulnerable people. the to safeguard the jobs of some vulnerable people. the minutes of the meeting _ vulnerable people. the minutes of the meeting of— vulnerable people. the minutes of the meeting of covid _ vulnerable people. the minutes of the meeting of covid s _ vulnerable people. the minutes of the meeting of covid s which - vulnerable people. the minutes of the meeting of covid s which you i the meeting of covid s which you attended on the 22nd ofjune make clear that professor chris whitty in the context of the debate about the reduction from two metres to one metre rule said the most risky areas of the package were indoor hospitality and the prospect of reopening schools in september. so there was a clear flag to the issue of transmission in the context of indoor hospitality. why did the treasury not raise expressly the scheme for eat out to help out in the covid s meeting of the 16th of july, the meeting on the 22nd of july, the meeting on the 22nd of july, the meeting of the 6th of august, all of which were concerned with transmission risk, august planning, self isolation period, schools, nothing about it out to help out. why was that question mark? ., help out. why was that question mark? . , ., , , mark? that illustrates my point because what _ mark? that illustrates my point because what people _ mark? that illustrates my point because what people have - mark? that illustrates my point i because what people have missed mark? that illustrates my point - because what people have missed in this conversation is that there was almost a month between the announcement of the doubt to help out and its commencement. a month for people to raise concerns they may have had and actually it's precisely in those three meetings you mentioned on the 16th ofjuly, the chief medical officer in the minutes talked about to significant risk things, schools and winter. he did not mention it had to help out. on the 22nd ofjuly the agenda item is august planning and again it was not raised by the chief scientific adviser or chief medical officer. on the 6th of august again four minutes show returning to schools was a single risky element of the government plan. those three meetings all happened after the announcement of a doubt to help out and all of them involved the chief scientific adviser and the chief medical officer and they considered specifically the forthcoming risks and end up none of those meetings was it raised by them as an issue andindeed was it raised by them as an issue and indeed the pps to the prime minister has also been specific in his evidence of this inquiry that he doesn't recall representation is being made to them to revisit the policy. i know he has been a lot of commentary on this point but there was almost a month between announcement and commencement as i've outlined my reasons why we implanted the policy and what we thought it was the right thing to do and i believe it was the right thing to do in the context of the safe reopening that had already been agreed, but none of those moments in those meetings, there was plenty of opportunity for people to have raised it out there with me or the prime minister and i don't recall and the do not suggest it was raised at all in the three meetings you mentioned. at all in the three meetings you mentioned-— at all in the three meetings you mentioned. ., , , mentioned. those meetings were raised by you _ mentioned. those meetings were raised by you and _ mentioned. those meetings were raised by you and your _ mentioned. those meetings were raised by you and your own - mentioned. those meetings were i raised by you and your own witness statement as examples of meetings were no concerns were raised but do you accept that the issue of eat out to help out was never raised by you or your department at those meetings or your department at those meetings or at any other earlier meeting and that by the date of those meetings the scheme had already been announced following the cabinet on the 8th ofjuly and announced to the public the same day? but the 8th ofjuly and announced to the public the same day?— the 8th ofjuly and announced to the public the same day? but why would i raise it as a — public the same day? but why would i raise it as a risk— public the same day? but why would i raise it as a risk when _ public the same day? but why would i raise it as a risk when i _ public the same day? but why would i raise it as a risk when i didn't - raise it as a risk when i didn't believe that it was because it was designed in the context of the safe reopening. the onus is surely on the people who now believe it was a risk to have raised it at the time when something could have been done about it if they felt strongly. i am very clear that i don't believe it was because hospitality had been deemed to be safe to reopen with a considerable come hundreds of pages of guidance, changes of practice and had been recommended by think tanks and had been done by countries elsewhere. this was a very reasonable and sensible policy intervention to help safeguard those jobs in that safe reopening. that was my view. i didn't believe it was a risk. i believed it was the right thing to do. if others are suggesting they didn't they had ample opportunity to raise those concerns in forums where i or the prime minister were and they didn't. why didn't you tell the secretary of state for health before the 8th of july that you were planning to announce a scheme to eat out and help out? why didn't you bearing in mind this was a scheme to encourage households to come together and you had been debating at the same time the reduction in the two metre to one metre rule, say to the cmo we have this plan, it is to encourage the economy to open up and help the hospitality sector, there are very strong public policy reasons in support of it but it's obvious there are transmission risks is of course they were, but our position is it's all right, we are simply going to have to do this in the greater good. but you never raised the toll with anybody outside number ten. $5 but you never raised the toll with anybody outside number ten. as would be completely — anybody outside number ten. as would be completely normal— anybody outside number ten. as would be completely normal for— anybody outside number ten. as would be completely normal for all— be completely normal for all economic policies before fiscal events, i would not have discussed the vat cut on the hospitality sector with the secretary of state for health or the stamp duty cut all the grants, these were all either market sensitive economic issues. those are all fiscal measures, eat out scheme encouraged more people and additional numbers from different households to come together in restaurants to eat. it wasn'tjust together in restaurants to eat. it wasn't just a fiscal together in restaurants to eat. it wasn'tjust a fiscal issue. it was a behavioural matter. was it one that was applied across the whole the uk? yes but so were many of the economic interventions. the point remains, indoor hospitality and all the points you made about people coming together and eating was already part of the main plan, had already been part —— collectively agreed and announced. it had been sent to the country restaurants were safe to visit with all the extra secure systems that had been put in place. that was the message. so much so that the cabinet office ran a national campaign entitled enjoy some are safely and backed it with considerable funding and national advertising partnered with brand—name companies because of the overall approach was to tell the country it was now safe to return to doing these activities because we have made progress on the virus, because we had track and trace, because we had track and trace, because we had the jvc, because we had all this covert secure guidance. that was the very clear message backed by a national advertising campaign, it'sjust not backed by a national advertising campaign, it's just not would backed by a national advertising campaign, it'sjust not would be normal to discuss individual fiscal measures with people that sat within that context. d0 measures with people that sat within that context-— that context. do you acknowledge that context. do you acknowledge that the evidence _ that context. do you acknowledge that the evidence from _ that context. do you acknowledge that the evidence from professors chris whitty, sir patrick balance, sirjonathan van tam, is unanimous that had they been consulted they would have advised it was highly likely to increase transmission and whilst of course it's a policy matter over which they wouldn't have had the whip hand, it was an issue on which they would have expected to be consulted given the behavioural aspect of the scheme, the bringing together of more people from different households. do you acknowledge that? but different households. do you acknowledge that? but they've not said that to me. _ acknowledge that? but they've not said that to me. they _ acknowledge that? but they've not said that to me. they had - acknowledge that? but they've not said that to me. they had ample . said that to me. they had ample opportunity to raise those concerns between the announcement of the scheme and its implementation and none of them chose to do so in any forum they were in. all of them have said on the record as the evidence conclusively demonstrates that this was in no way responsible for a second wave which was predicted by the cmo and csa as early as my first conversation in march. that the cmo and csa as early as my first conversation in march.— conversation in march. that is a different issue _ conversation in march. that is a different issue and _ conversation in march. that is a different issue and we - conversation in march. that is a different issue and we are - conversation in march. that is a | different issue and we are going conversation in march. that is a i different issue and we are going to address that in a moment. the scheme itself, was approach to the attention of the devolved administrations? did you consult with them in any way before the scheme was imposed and introduced in the other four nations?— the other four nations? again, that wouldn't have _ the other four nations? again, that wouldn't have been _ the other four nations? again, that wouldn't have been ordinary - the other four nations? again, thatj wouldn't have been ordinary policy. it wasn't on things like the fellow schemer of the support that we did. they are announced in the normal way. they are announced in the normal wa . , ., ., , way. on the question of impact it is absolutely right _ way. on the question of impact it is absolutely right that _ way. on the question of impact it is absolutely right that you _ way. on the question of impact it is absolutely right that you make - way. on the question of impact it is| absolutely right that you make plain that whilst there is some slim evidence to suggest there was a correlation between the take—up of the scheme and new cases of covert, there is evidence a paper prepared by hmrc to suggest there was no correlation to some local authorities with very high it out to help take out which had low cases and some of the local authorities with high take—up had higher take—up of the covered virus. so the evidence doesn't significantly support the proposition there was an impact on infection rates. nevertheless, why was the scheme not extended? �* .., , nevertheless, why was the scheme not extended? �* .. , ., , nevertheless, why was the scheme not extended? �* , ., , ., , extended? because it was always desi . ned extended? because it was always designed to _ extended? because it was always designed to be — extended? because it was always designed to be temporary. - extended? because it was always designed to be temporary. a - designed to be temporary. a submission from hm revenue and customs entitled help out extension dated the 26th of august said this is a submission concerning the possible extension of the doubt to help out scheme. we have been some concerns that opening up the hospitality sectors contributed to the rising rate of infection that have led to local towns. so the rising rate of infection that have led to local towns. so was one issue and one _ have led to local towns. so was one issue and one concern _ have led to local towns. so was one issue and one concern at _ have led to local towns. so was one issue and one concern at the - have led to local towns. so was one issue and one concern at the time l issue and one concern at the time the debate was had run the extension that they was in fact or might have been an impact on infection rates? no, the primary motivation was that it was meant to be a temporary intervention because in order to and this is standard economic policy, in order to elicit a behavioural response you want something to be temporary because otherwise you don't elicit the behavioural response you are hoping to achieve. as a general rule the treasury was always wary of temporary things that cost money becoming permanent because that comes with significant fiscal applications so the idea was clearly to have something that was temporary to elicit the behavioural response. 50 temporary to elicit the behavioural resonse. .,, ., response. so it was about behavioural _ response. so it was about behavioural response, - response. so it was about behavioural response, it | response. so it was about - behavioural response, it wasn't just behavioural response, it wasn'tjust about the fiscal support for the sector? ., �* , about the fiscal support for the sector? . �* , , about the fiscal support for the sector? , ,, sector? that's exactly right because in order to safeguard _ sector? that's exactly right because in order to safeguard the _ sector? that's exactly right because in order to safeguard the jobs - sector? that's exactly right because in order to safeguard the jobs of - sector? that's exactly right because in order to safeguard the jobs of 2 l in order to safeguard the jobs of 2 million people working in the sector you need people to go and use those businesses and all the evidence and analysis and general view of everyone was it was unlikely that was to happen because people were not likely to return to those old behaviours and this was designed to help encourage them to do so in a safe way. you can't safeguard those jobs without people being in the businesses will be have the money to keep those jobs and employ those people. that's the whole point. mr hancock told this inquiry that he had received feedback that the scheme was causing problems in our intervention areas and he said he told hmt about those concerns and that mr bean from the time he said it at the end of august in the context of the debate about whether or not they should be an extension, are you aware the secretary of state for health who buy your own word didn't know in advance of the cabinet meeting on the 8th ofjuly of the scheme, expressed concerns latterly to your department about the risk of transmission? ida. latterly to your department about the risk of transmission?- the risk of transmission? no, i'm not sure i— the risk of transmission? no, i'm not sure i have _ the risk of transmission? no, i'm not sure i have any _ the risk of transmission? no, i'm not sure i have any record - the risk of transmission? no, i'm not sure i have any record of- the risk of transmission? no, i'm not sure i have any record of that but i do know he had said there has been and you focus on this one item is evidence the inquiry. he said himself that has been undue on this one item, those were his words to the inquiry, and i have no recollection of him raising that or any record of him doing so with him at the time. any record of him doing so with him at the time-— at the time. scientific advice, it is obvious _ at the time. scientific advice, it is obvious that _ at the time. scientific advice, it is obvious that throughout - at the time. scientific advice, it is obvious that throughout the l is obvious that throughout the pandemic sage which consisted of highly distinguished experts and contributors gave enormous time and energy over hundreds of meetings in the service of the government. do you agree with that? yes the service of the government. do you agree with that?— the service of the government. do you agree with that? yes and i make that same point _ you agree with that? yes and i make that same point in _ you agree with that? yes and i make that same point in my _ you agree with that? yes and i make that same point in my witness - that same point in my witness statement and i am grateful to them for everything they did. you statement and i am grateful to them for everything they did.— for everything they did. you see in the article in _ for everything they did. you see in the article in the _ for everything they did. you see in the article in the spectator - for everything they did. you see in the article in the spectator that . for everything they did. you see in the article in the spectator that a i the article in the spectator that a lady was planted on sage, the sage people didn't realise it was a treasury personal calls, and in the article you describe her which meant you were alerted early to the fact the all—important minutes of sage often edited out dissenting voices. it's difficult to know how much of thatis it's difficult to know how much of that is journalistic flourish but would you accept that everybody who attended sage or the identity of everybody was known to sage that ran sage because they all had to give their identities and their phone numbers for the purposes of the calls that took place. it numbers for the purposes of the calls that took place.— calls that took place. it wasn't a - arent calls that took place. it wasn't apparent to — calls that took place. it wasn't apparent to me _ calls that took place. it wasn't apparent to me and _ calls that took place. it wasn't apparent to me and some - apparent to me and some conversations with them that they did realise that the point was there was someone there was feeding back information which was incredibly helpful and you have shed some of it before. ., , helpful and you have shed some of it before. ., a ., ., ., before. vanessa mcdougall who was a member of your _ before. vanessa mcdougall who was a member of your department - before. vanessa mcdougall who was a member of your department at - before. vanessa mcdougall who was a member of your department at the . member of your department at the time was encouraged to attend and if facts are patrick vallance had encouraged the attendance of somebody from treasury on sage in correspondence with sir tom scholar who was the permanent secretary in your department. you also say that for a year, government policy and the fate of millions was being decided by half explained graphs cooked up by outside academics. that wasn't a reference to sage, was it? sorry, where is that? _ reference to sage, was it? sorry, where is that? it _ reference to sage, was it? sorry, where is that? it is _ reference to sage, was it? sorry, where is that? it is page - reference to sage, was it? sorry, where is that? it is page six. - reference to sage, was it? sorry, where is that? it is page six. uki where is that? it is page six. uk government _ where is that? it is page six. uk government policy _ where is that? it is page six. uk government policy and - where is that? it is page six. uk government policy and the - where is that? it is page six. uk government policy and the fate | where is that? it is page six. uk i government policy and the fate of millions was being explained by half explained graphs cooked up by outside academics.— explained graphs cooked up by outside academics. there is not my words, to outside academics. there is not my words. to be _ outside academics. there is not my words, to be cleared. _ outside academics. there is not my words, to be cleared. why - outside academics. there is not my words, to be cleared. why would i outside academics. there is not my i words, to be cleared. why would they turn u- in words, to be cleared. why would they turn up in that — words, to be cleared. why would they turn up in that article... _ words, to be cleared. why would they turn up in that article... that - words, to be cleared. why would they turn up in that article... that is - words, to be cleared. why would they turn up in that article... that is a - turn up in that article... that is a cuestion turn up in that article... that is a question for _ turn up in that article... that is a question for the _ turn up in that article... that is a question for the journalist. - turn up in that article... that is a | question for the journalist. whilst question for the “ournalist. whilst the — question for the “ournalist. whilst the science was — question for the journalist. whilst the science was highly _ question for the journalist. whilst the science was highly complex i question for the journalist. whilst i the science was highly complex and uncertain, and obviously not susceptible to clear outcomes, would you agree that the advice given by sage words, over the entirety of the pandemic, given in good faith and at the upper limits of all of the professional abilities cushion mug yes, i make that same point in my witness statement.— yes, i make that same point in my witness statement. having considered this, and there'll_ witness statement. having considered this, and there'll be _ witness statement. having considered this, and there'll be some _ this, and there'll be some reflections looking back at this time with regard to sage, i think there are some things that