could, i think they were. but it is clear the test. sure, o and s structures made things, i think, work more effectively and effectively and there were not there at the beginning and it is good they were implemented and improved to continue —— and continue to improve over time. the other thing i would say is i think there is this perception that somehow, decisions are not being made in these forums. but my strong recollection is that they were. covid o and s with the places where an appropriate group of people came to discuss and deliberate for the prime minister to make his decision. there is obviously a trade—off between speed of decision—making and the number of people involved. it was ever thus. that's probably no perfect answer. ultimately, it is for the prime minister to figure out the right balance between those two things. broadly, i thought 0 and s structures did that. but decision—making is the reality of government. what would be normal as there would be a series of potentially bilateral meetings or a small group meeting leading up to the final decision meeting. i think thatis the final decision meeting. i think that is completely fine, every prime minister will have a different decision—making process that works for them. the previous prime minister i think had that, it allowed him time to digest the arguments. so there is nothing wrong with there being a series of meetings considering the same topic before final 0 and s or cabinet meeting to take the final decision. your answer at least at the start, mr sunak, it was heavily predicated upon the existence of covid o and s. but in the earlier period, particularly around the time of the first lockdown in those decisions in march and april, the evidence from a number of witnesses is to the effect that there was a circumvention of cabinet governance. a certain level of dysfunction, and i emphasise it is only evidence and these are all matters for my lady in due course. but witnesses have spoken about dysfunction in number 10 in the cabinet office. and how the system around the prime minister was not working well, to put it neutrally. that must have been something that was apparent to you as the occupant of number 11. you couldn't not have seen how number 10 was responding to this unprecedented crisis. 50. seen how number 10 was responding to this unprecedented crisis.— this unprecedented crisis. so, you described. — this unprecedented crisis. so, you described, people _ this unprecedented crisis. so, you described, people saying - this unprecedented crisis. so, you described, people saying about i described, people saying about dysfunction in number 10 or the cabinet office. obviously, i didn't work directly in number 10 other cabinet office so it is hard for me to comment on that, other than to say that interactions with number 10 and the cabinet office during this period felt fine to me. again, i go back to broadley, was i able to input advice to the prime minister when decisions were being made? i felt i was and didn't feel shut out or not able to participate. my recollection of that period, that early period was a series of not covid o and s, they were probably cobra meetings which involve groups of people considering these things. so lots of people around the table was my recollection. at the key moments on the 16th of march, the 9th of march. as far as i can remember at all of those points, there was a cobra meeting. i was probably at it. there were minutes that would circulate that forms part of the advice pack. deliberations were made, decisions were taken quite quickly and acted on in all of those key moments. so that is my general recollection of the period. you're absolutely right and as i have said, the formal task force structure and the o and s structure had not been established at this point, but things were moving so quickly and largely, as i'm sure we will get onto, the government and the prime ministerjust largely acted on the advice put front of him from sage with regard to what interventions to implement at what time. that is my strong recollection of this period and those three weeks or two weeks in march. the of this period and those three weeks or two weeks in march.— or two weeks in march. the public health considerations _ or two weeks in march. the public health considerations to _ or two weeks in march. the public health considerations to primacy l or two weeks in march. the public| health considerations to primacy in effect, which is why although the arguments about the likely impact of lockdown were made, they didn't assume anything like a comparable strength in terms of the overall... yes, you have said that before and i agree, the department of health were very clearly as per all the evidence the lead department leading the response. my strong recollection of this period is the advice would come in from sage, obviously that advice changed over the weeks which i'm sure we'll get into. but largely, my recollection is the government acted on the advice it was given regard to interventions and economic advice as you pointed to was provided, i would say notjust you pointed to was provided, i would say not just for you pointed to was provided, i would say notjust for information, that is to downplay it. but it was not driving the conversation and that's right the way you have described it. in a statement, you describe how you would in addition to these formal procedures, see the prime minister informally. but that no decisions of the significance were made in those situations and you state or major decisions were made within formal structures. but presumably, during these informal debates, covid was at least part if not the predominant part of the debate and how economically and fiscally, there were issues to be debated? yes. economically and fiscally, there were issues to be debated? yes, i think when — were issues to be debated? yes, i think when i _ were issues to be debated? yes, i think when i was _ were issues to be debated? yes, i think when i was talking _ were issues to be debated? yes, i think when i was talking about - were issues to be debated? yes, i. think when i was talking about that, i wasn't referring to this period. i didn't know the prime minister particularly well at this point in time when i became chancellor. that relationship grew over time with both of us living in the same building. so this went on for almost two years. so over the course of that period as we got to know each other better, there was clearly more opportunities, we might be sitting in the garden together at the weekend or something. as is completely normal. so it wouldn't be just covid because those types of conversations, by the point they were happening, there were other things as well. hat were happening, there were other things as well.— things as well. not 'ust covid, but alwa s things as well. not 'ust covid, but always with _ things as well. not 'ust covid, but always with an — things as well. notjust covid, but always with an economical - things as well. notjust covid, but always with an economical and - things as well. notjust covid, but i always with an economical and fiscal bent to it, that is of course your role, you with the chancellor of the exchequer. role, you with the chancellor of the exche . uer. , ., role, you with the chancellor of the exchequer-— exchequer. yes, i would say all our conversations _ exchequer. yes, i would say all our conversations will _ exchequer. yes, i would say all our conversations will work _ exchequer. yes, i would say all our conversations will work related, . exchequer. yes, i would say all our| conversations will work related, but we were also able to talk about things that were not work—related. my things that were not work—related. my conversations with him on policy would be predominantly based on economic and fiscal considerations. of course, they were debates about the matters which were the greatest consent of the government at the time, that's why you were discussing them with the prime minister. i mean, yes, ithink them with the prime minister. i mean, yes, i think you just work with colleagues is the assumption and if you happen to be is impossible not to see each other outside of a formal covid meeting, thatis outside of a formal covid meeting, that is just the practical reality being neighbours and sharing a garden and living in the same building. so it would be weird not to have had conversations about life, family, friends, work at the same time. but in terms of decision—making structures, as i am very clear, there was rigorous and proper debate and deliberation with colleagues in those structures after they were set up and even before that more generally, and that was my consistent view throughout. those debates and deliberations did happen throughout would notjust me, but other colleagues as well. i throughout would notjust me, but other colleagues as well.— other colleagues as well. i ask, as ou know other colleagues as well. i ask, as you know well. — other colleagues as well. i ask, as you know well, because _ other colleagues as well. i ask, as you know well, because of- other colleagues as well. i ask, as you know well, because of the - you know well, because of the article in the spectator. rishi sunak on what we weren't told, dated the 27th of august 2022. in which, the 27th of august 2022. in which, the author of the article says that you said that you tried not to challenge the prime minister in public or leave a paper trail. i would say a lot of stuff to him in private, this is of course on page eight if you want to see it in all its glory. this is all of course in the context of covid, the article is of course about your role in covid. and as i say, it says you tried not to challenge the prime minister in public or leave a paper trail. i would say a lot of stuff to him in private. the written record of everything, in general, people leak it and it causes problems. why if you were debating these hugely important topics with the prime minister wasn't important not to leave paper trail?— minister wasn't important not to leave paper trail? well, i think is the article _ leave paper trail? well, i think is the article says, _ leave paper trail? well, i think is the article says, that _ leave paper trail? well, i think is the article says, that is _ leave paper trail? well, i think is the article says, that is not - the article says, that is not something that i have said. i would say a lot of stuff to him in private and in fact, there is some written record of everything. so of course i had conversations with the prime minister. as i said, you share a garden, your neighbours can you live together, of course there would be conversations i would be having with him. —— and you live together. in terms of written records, i'm sure we will get onto it. multiple moments, i write to him with just so he could have it in one place, thoughts or analysis from me with regards perhaps to exit road maps or the two metre to one metre. or reopening travel. there is actually back lots of different bits of evidence that you have and that we have provided of when i did write him formally at particular points where i thought it made sense to lay out a set of arguments from me to him. ~ ., ., ~ ., out a set of arguments from me to him. ~ ., ,., out a set of arguments from me to him. a ., ., 4' . ,., . him. we will look at some, there are many bilateral— him. we will look at some, there are many bilateral meetings _ him. we will look at some, there are many bilateral meetings where - many bilateral meetings where formally, your officials and yourself and the prime minister and his officials met to talk about covid related issues and the other economic related issues you raise. it is just that what is the inquiry to make of the suggestion here, to which you do appear to lend your support, that there was a form of communication between the prime minister that was not recorded and was obviously of significance? weill. was obviously of significance? well, i think the point _ was obviously of significance? well, i think the point i _ was obviously of significance? well, i think the point i would _ was obviously of significance? -ii i think the point i would probably challenge is significance. i think it is genuinely impossible for every single conversation between two cabinet ministers who ever they are to be recorded. i mean, there are not civil servants following cabinet ministers through the division lobbies on a typical evening, where they might be chatting about something. or if i was having lunch with my family in the garden at the same time that the prime minister was an atypical weekend in downing street and we would obviously chatting at a barbecue or something —— on atypical weekend. it is impractical to think every conversation between two cabinet ministers could be recorded in that way and i think everyone would accept that. but i think that is obviously fine. because what is happening is when there are formal decisions to be made and formal conversations to be those are happening with officials, they are minuted, they are happening in cabinet committees or covid o and s or in bilateral meetings. and the decision itself is made in those forums and that is ultimately what matters, is the decision and how it was made and who fed into it and that's all a matter of public record and recorded correctly. i mean, i think it is implausible to think that every single conversation between two cabinet ministers could between two cabinet ministers could be recorded in that way. i mean, thatis be recorded in that way. i mean, that is just not practical or plausible. that isjust not practical or plausible-— that isjust not practical or alausible. �* ., ., plausible. all right. page three of the same article _ plausible. all right. page three of the same article and _ plausible. all right. page three of the same article and you - plausible. all right. page three of the same article and you may - plausible. all right. page three of| the same article and you may have something to say about what should be taken from this article generally. but on page three, you refer, in general terms, you refer to the conversation she had with the prime minister entered the debate that went on constantly around the prime minister as to what decisions should be taken. you say, a cost benefit calculation, a basic requirement for pretty much public health intervention, it was never made. at least, that is what the journalist said you were implying. i wasn't allowed to talk about the trade—off, says sunak. ministers were briefed by number 10 on how to handle questions about the side—effects of lockdown. the script was never not to ever acknowledge them, the script was, oh, there is no trade—off because doing this for our health is good for the economy. we need to be quite clear, don't we, that the reality was that the chancellor of the exchequer, yourself and hmt, took every opportunity to bring to the attention of the prime minister the potential consequences of the lockdown decisions and the fiscal and economic harm that would be done, that is very apparent, would you agree with that?— done, that is very apparent, would you agree with that? yes, that was my primary — you agree with that? yes, that was my primary responsibility. - you agree with that? yes, that was my primary responsibility. that - you agree with that? yes, that was my primary responsibility. that is l my primary responsibility. that is what we did. ii my primary responsibility. that is what we did-— my primary responsibility. that is what we did. if we look at 182359. this is an analytical— what we did. if we look at 182359. this is an analytical note - what we did. if we look at 182359. this is an analytical note which . this is an analytical note which expressly refers to it being a trade—off between continuing covid—i9 social—distancing and minimising foregone economic activity and other costs. was this a document produced by hmt dated the 22nd of april, provided to the quad group of ministers? that is to say the group of yourself, the first deputy prime minister, dominic raab, mr gove and mr hancock? whilst the prime minister was ill. so treasury document that expressly addresses the trade—off between continuing social—distancing and economic activity. social-distancing and economic activi . �* ., social-distancing and economic activi .�* ., ., ., ., activity. i'm not familiar with that document- _ activity. i'm not familiar with that document. so _ activity. i'm not familiar with that document. so i _ activity. i'm not familiar with that document. so i don't _ activity. i'm not familiar with that document. so i don't know- activity. i'm not familiar with that document. so i don't know if- activity. i'm not familiar with that document. so i don't know if it i activity. i'm not familiar with that document. so i don't know if it is| document. so i don't know if it is clear or not. document. so i don't know if it is clear or not-— document. so i don't know if it is clear or not. you may not know the individual document. _ clear or not. you may not know the individual document. i— clear or not. you may not know the individual document. i do - clear or not. you may not know the individual document. i do recall- individual document. i do recall because of— individual document. i do recall because of the _ individual document. i do recall because of the person - individual document. i do recall because of the person who - individual document. i do recall. because of the person who wrote individual document. i do recall- because of the person who wrote it, i worked with him in a previous guise and i don't think you did work at the treasury. i thought he was in at the treasury. i thought he was in a different department, so it is not obvious to me the document does come from the treasury or not. so i can't say that it does come from the treasury. my point, though, referring to the quote you had from the spectator article previously was not about the substance of the discussions that are happening in the government, which she rightly said and i was making the point about some of the consequences. again, notjust economic, but the other impacts in all other walks of life as well. the point was about the communication strategy —— which you rightly said. i can certainly sympathise actually with a communication strategy that wanted to simplify things because we were dealing with something that was again unprecedented. we didn't know how people would respond behave, comply. so the sense was a simpler communication strategy would be better for achieving that objective. and it was just better to focus on the health impacts because that would be the way to improve compliance. i have sympathy, that is a reasonable argument to make. but that argument that was made to achieve that aim came at the cost of not having from the beginning a broader conversation about the other impacts in other walks of life. and impacts in other walks of life. and impacts that may not be felt immediately, but would be felt the line. and that was just the approach of the communication strategy, that is what i was referring to in the spectator article. and again, it doesn't mean that it was wrong, by the way. because i think it is a reasonable position to have taken that it was better to have a simpler communication strategy that didn't talk about all those other things because we wanted people to comply with what we were asking them to do. reasonable position. i was making the point that i think you could have said actually, we could have had a broader conversation from the beginning about some of these things. that was the point i was making in the article. this document, i don't know or recollect. the article itself makes no reference to this being a communications issue, it quotes you as saying that the script was never to acknowledge them, it was that there was no trade—off because doing this for our health was good for the economy. but you say that was a question of communication. well, if ou can question of communication. well, if you can bring _ question of communication. well, if you can bring it— question of communication. well, if you can bring it back. _ question of communication. well, if you can bring it back. page - question of communication. well, if you can bring it back. page three i question of communication. well, if you can bring it back. page three of| you can bring it back. page three of 280042. you can bring it back. page three of 280042- and _ you can bring it back. page three of 280042. and it— you can bring it back. page three of 280042. and it is _ you can bring it back. page three of 280042. and it is the _ you can bring it back. page three of 280042. and it is the top _ you can bring it back. page three of 280042. and it is the top of- you can bring it back. page three of 280042. and it is the top of the - 280042. and it is the top of the page, mr sunak. 280042. and it is the top of the page. mr sunak-— 280042. and it is the top of the page, mr sunak. yes, that is talking about the communication _ page, mr sunak. yes, that is talking about the communication strategy i about the communication strategy because it is what you are allowed to talk about, it says very specifically. not my words, but the other�*s words, ministers were briefed by number 10 on how to handle questions about the side—effects of lockdown. that again is briefing before people do media appearances. and the script and a generic sense probably refers to the standard that number 10 produces and still produces to this day as a broadcast script or broadcast brief that has the government's overall public facing narrative. so that is very much what those comments are talking about. but very much what those comments are talking about-— talking about. but there was no doubt whatsoever _ talking about. but there was no doubt whatsoever as _ talking about. but there was no doubt whatsoever as far - talking about. but there was no doubt whatsoever as far as i talking about. but there was no doubt whatsoever as far as you | talking about. but there was no i doubt whatsoever as far as you could tell in the public�*s mind that as chancellor, you were warning of the economic and fiscal consequences of lockdown, that your position and hmt's lockdown, that your position and hmt�*s position was that there is a trade—off. if you make a decision to lock down, it is going to be enormously damaging. that was your rez on debtor, was it not? == enormously damaging. that was your rez on debtor, was it not?— rez on debtor, was it not? -- reason for being- — rez on debtor, was it not? -- reason for being- i — rez on debtor, was it not? -- reason for being. i wouldn't _ rez on debtor, was it not? -- reason for being. i wouldn't put _ rez on debtor, was it not? -- reason for being. i wouldn't put it _ rez on debtor, was it not? -- reason for being. i wouldn't put it like i for being. i wouldn't put it like that, but my constitutional position as chancellor of the exchequer was to make sure the prime minister had the analysis and the advice relating to the economic and fiscal implications of the decisions he was considering, of course that was my job, but of course, that is what i did. buti job, but of course, that is what i did. but i don't think it is controversial and i see now and the evidence has been submitted to the inquiry by many scientists from sage acknowledging... the chief scientific adviser, former adviser, said the benefits of imposing lockdowns had to be a pilot —— had to be balanced by policymakers against the social health and other economic detriments that they would cause. professor edmonds said policymakers had to weigh up many other ethical, logistical and economic constraints. and again, i can quote the previous chief science adviser said there were costs in other domains of life, economic, well—being, education, they needed to be analysed. so i don't think it is politically controversial to say that of course there are lots of other impacts. coming with those decisions. my particular responsibility was to make sure the economic ones were considered for the prime minister had an opportunity to consider them. that is a progression, sorry to interrupt. there is a separate question about how much it is appropriate to talk about those in public, which is what this refers to. ~ ., , . ., public, which is what this refers to. . ., , to. we need to be clear about this, mr sunak- — to. we need to be clear about this, mr sunak- you _ to. we need to be clear about this, mr sunak. you made _ to. we need to be clear about this, mr sunak. you made no _ to. we need to be clear about this, mr sunak. you made no bones i to. we need to be clear about this, i mr sunak. you made no bones about the fact that there was a trade—off, that there were huge, it is self—evident, devastating and societal effects from the lockdown decisions, that is obvious, the whole country knows that. the chancellor of the exchequer yourself make no bones about it. the treasury raised quite probably perhaps constitutionally, all the concerns that need to be raised. but you reject the suggestion, which appears to be given by this article, that that full debate, the nature of the trade—off wasn't properly identified, orat trade—off wasn't properly identified, or at least wasn't properly ventilated by you, perhaps because of briefings by number 10. i want to ask you whether that was in fact correct?— fact correct? sorry, i'm not sure i understand — fact correct? sorry, i'm not sure i understand the _ fact correct? sorry, i'm not sure i understand the question. - fact correct? sorry, i'm not sure i understand the question. did i understand the question. did ministers _ understand the question. did ministers brief view, or did number 10 brief you that you couldn't raise the obvious issue of the economic of the obvious issue of the economic of the economic and fiscal harm done by a lockdown decision, was that not a debate that was obvious to everybody and it was a debate in which he played a full part? has i and it was a debate in which he played a full part?— and it was a debate in which he played a full part? as i said, that debate was _ played a full part? as i said, that debate was certainly _ played a full part? as i said, that debate was certainly something i played a full part? as i said, that i debate was certainly something that happens in the deliberations, as we have previously been discussing, it didn't happen particularly extensively for the first lockdown because everything happened very quickly at that point and was driven largely by the public health advice. over time, that debate became i would say more a feature of the discussions, physically because we started to have more understanding and evidence of the impact on the short term at least of what lockdowns would doing all that natalie macro were doing in other domains are walks of life. —— other mp eyes were doing. from a communication strategy, understandably, reasonable people disagree, simplicity often important in the simpler message was justjust a focus on the public health side of it early on. and i think that evolved over time. if you compare what was said in press conferences in the autumn for example when these debates were happening, it had evolved by that period of time. early on, it was certainly not a feature. you can see that if you watch the press conferences. then when you get to the autumn, you have in the press conferences are much more open discussion about the fact there are these other things that policymakers have to take into account. these are not easy decisions, they are balanced decisions, they are balanced decisions, they are different types of impact. whether it is chris whitty or patrick vallance saying all the things i havejust whitty or patrick vallance saying all the things i have just said whitty or patrick vallance saying all the things i havejust said in press conferences in september and october, i don't think you would find those types of, that type of communication forming part of the message early on in the pandemic. that is probably fair to say. mi that is probably fair to say. all ri . ht, that is probably fair to say. all right, 236536 page one, an e—mail your principal private secretary elizabeth perryman, dated the 6th of june 2020. the subject, prime minister, is read out, friday baylor, is that short hand for the meetings you had bilaterally with the prime minister? —— friday bilateral. yes. non—pharmaceutical intervention easements, no action, just for information only. your principal private secretary says, following the inconclusive strategy meeting, the prime minister, and chancellor met and discussed the plan for easements of mpis on friday. no other minister included, it shows the strength of the chancellor's voice in these discussions. did you see this e—mail after the event, did you see the readout? ., ., �* , , , readout? no, iwouldn't typically see these readouts. _ readout? no, iwouldn't typically see these readouts. she - readout? no, iwouldn't typically see these readouts. she does i readout? no, i wouldn't typically i see these readouts. she does appear to be referring _ see these readouts. she does appear to be referring to _ see these readouts. she does appear to be referring to how— see these readouts. she does appear to be referring to how as _ see these readouts. she does appear to be referring to how as the - to be referring to how as the chancellor, because of your ability to meet bilaterally with the prime minister, your voice carried a particular strength, would you agree? particular strength, would you auree? �* ., , , ., agree? i'm not entirely sure i would auree on agree? i'm not entirely sure i would agree on any _ agree? i'm not entirely sure i would agree on any disproportionate i agree? i'm not entirely sure i would l agree on any disproportionate sense. it is completely normal for the prime minister to meet with the chancellor bilaterally. they do the same now in thisjob, previous prime minister did the same. that same now in this job, previous prime minister did the same.— minister did the same. that is not surprising- _ minister did the same. that is not surprising- so _ minister did the same. that is not surprising. so we're _ minister did the same. that is not surprising. so we're not _ minister did the same. that is not surprising. so we're not across i surprising. so we're not across purposes, there is no suggestion of any impropriety meeting with the prime minister bilaterally. you are the chancellor, he is the prime minister, it is a vital relationship to the workings of government. but i want to ask you assess the strength of your voice in those discussions on the issues which are directly concerned the pandemic, because of the debate about sage and the mpis and so on. has i the debate about sage and the mpis and so on. a ., ., , the debate about sage and the mpis and so on. a . ., , and so on. as i already said, i felt ialwa s and so on. as i already said, i felt i always had _ and so on. as i already said, i felt i always had the _ and so on. as i already said, i felt i always had the opportunity i and so on. as i already said, i felt i always had the opportunity to i i always had the opportunity to convey my thoughts and provide advice to the prime minister. i said that early on and that happens on a range of forums, whether in these bilateral meetings or through the small group meetings or the covid o and s, i have been consistent in my evidence i felt i always had the opportunity to provide the prime minister with advice. i wouldn't read anything particularly into the fact i had a bilateral meeting with him, i'm sure he was having bilateral meetings with other ministers as well, all part of how he would like to make decisions and that ultimately is a question for him. but for my part, of course i had the opportunity to feed in. {lin had the opportunity to feed in. on page two, we can see a reference to next steps. and after a list of next steps or actions which are envisaged to be taken, your principal private secretary says this. on monday, and just going to check where number 10 have got to and ensure on track for tuesday. until announced, you never know. that would appear on one reading to be a reference to an understanding held by her that there was a degree of backing and varying or changing position or perhaps just debate within number 10 which meant that until decisions were actually announced, there was a risk they might not be stock too. would you agree? == might not be stock too. would you auree? , ~ might not be stock too. would you auree? , ., . ., agree? -- stock too. i touched on it earlier that — agree? -- stock too. i touched on it earlier that decision-making - agree? -- stock too. i touched on it earlier that decision-making is i agree? -- stock too. i touched on it earlier that decision-making is a i earlier that decision—making is a process. and every prime minister will have a different process by which they want to make decisions. that will just be which they want to make decisions. that willjust be different depending on the personality style of the person in the job. depending on the personality style of the person in thejob. but my experience of the previous prime minister and i think entirely right it was that for big decisions, he would want to go over the arguments, test out different points of view. he might do some of that bilaterally with ministers, do some of it in smaller group meetings. and through that process, again, the same way you develop policy or i develop policies chancellor, that process of discussion, debate, reviewing evidence and analysis may change your mind on something. i don't think there is anything wrong of that on that. there are many development policy processes i have been involved with as chancellor and it might well be the case you come to a question with an intuitive view of what you think is right and over the course of a policy development process, going over the analysis, the evidence, hearing from people, you think, i did think that and it is clear now having reviewed everything that that wasn't right or we should do it a different way. i think that is entirely normal, particularly when you are dealing with something that is uncertain and unprecedented. it is not surprising that that happens and i don't necessarily think that it is a bad thing. it shows that someone is engaging with the process and hearing from different people before you get to a final decision meeting in the right format, covid o and s and cabinet, etc. i don't think it is necessarily as i said a bad thing that over the course of a process, the prime minister would want to hear different points of view before coming to a final decision and it may well be that during that process, you hear different things which challenge the thoughts you had before. g; ~ ' which challenge the thoughts you had before. 5: ~ ' ., , ., ., before. 236594, page one is another e-mail before. 236594, page one is another email from — before. 236594, page one is another e-mail from elizabeth _ before. 236594, page one is another e-mailfrom elizabeth perryman i before. 236594, page one is another e-mail from elizabeth perryman to l e—mailfrom elizabeth perryman to various recipients in the treasury. we can see at the bottom of that first page of the chancellor in particular wanted to thank you, the economic team, the health team and the covid team for all the work. the briefs meant the chancellor was well armed to challenge and scrutinise the proposal. i should say this is dated the 9th of october, prime minister. and had a level of detail beyond the rest of the room which allowed us to make and landauer points, but a great result. an outline of the wider discussion is below. but afterwards, there was a smaller prime minister and chancellor hoddle and the upshot is that no final decision has been taken on the mpis. over the page, please. the prime minister is — over the page, please. the prime minister is preparing _ over the page, please. the prime minister is preparing to _ over the page, please. the prime minister is preparing to do - over the page, please. the prime| minister is preparing to do nothing all close parks only. and then under the bulleted points, clearly there is a high risk that this underlines, is a high risk that this underlines, is unpicked, overfried in the weekend. so two questions, please, mr sunak. the reference to the fact that there was a huddle between yourself and the prime minister after the general debate appear to suggest that with this prime minister, there was an ability to get the last word in, to meet with him and influence his ultimate decision. and secondly, the reference to unwinding and unpicking a position which appears to have been agreed suggest this was