dawning — for that change in approach, that dawning realisation over that weekend? was it the information from sa-e weekend? was it the information from sage irr— weekend? was it the information from sage in relation to the workings, and the — sage in relation to the workings, and the work done by imperial college? — and the work done by imperial college? was it of the cmo? was it mr cummings? what was the push, where _ mr cummings? what was the push, where was — mr cummings? what was the push, where was it coming from? the fact that ou where was it coming from? the fact that you cite — where was it coming from? the fact that you cite so _ where was it coming from? the fact that you cite so many _ where was it coming from? the fact that you cite so many examples - where was it coming from? the fact i that you cite so many examples shows there was a convergence of thinking in different institutions from different individuals about the need to act. i was not aware of niall ferguson's work until after that weekend, in fact, i don't think it was shared publicly until after that weekend. a great deal of weight has been placed on professor ferguson's work as influencing government decision making. i think it's fair to say that i and others had come to these conclusions before that. what weighed with me where the numbers. why was the drive such that it was, or the _ why was the drive such that it was, or the dawning realisation on the part of— or the dawning realisation on the part of various parts of government and the _ part of various parts of government and the people within it, not coming from the _ and the people within it, not coming from the dhs ee, the department of health, _ from the dhs ee, the department of health, the lead government department responsible for health? | department responsible for health? [ do department responsible for health? do believe department responsible for health? i do believe that that weekend, as i recall, the secretary of state for health was also, like me, keen on the exercise of greater caution when it came to dealing with the virus and was, like me, and advocates, i believe, for very uncomfortable restrictions on civil liberty to deal with the health emergency. the secretary of state himself engaged in what _ secretary of state himself engaged in what became of course the iockdown _ in what became of course the lockdown debate, the need for more stringent _ lockdown debate, the need for more stringent measures. but why wasn't institutionally the dhs ee its officials, its advisers, its civil servants— officials, its advisers, its civil servants responsible at that stage, the lead _ servants responsible at that stage, the lead government department for the lead government department for the response to the crisis not driving — the response to the crisis not driving the government machine forward — driving the government machine forward to— driving the government machine forward to this conclusion? i forward to this conclusion? believe it forward to this conclusion? i believe it was the case that the secretary of state and others within dhse would have been pressing up on number ten and the prime minister they need to act at that time as well. �* ., ., they need to act at that time as well. �* . ., ., , ,, well. i'm afraid i need to press ou. well. i'm afraid i need to press you- you _ well. i'm afraid i need to press you- you say — well. i'm afraid i need to press you- you say you _ well. i'm afraid i need to press you. you say you seen - well. i'm afraid i need to press you. you say you seen e-mails well. i'm afraid i need to press i you. you say you seen e-mails or you. you say you seen e—mails or communications from the dhse to the prime _ communications from the dhse to the prime minister saying, we are behind the curve, _ prime minister saying, we are behind the curve, we have missed a trick here, _ the curve, we have missed a trick here, we — the curve, we have missed a trick here, we are _ the curve, we have missed a trick here, we are delayed and there is an urgent _ here, we are delayed and there is an urgent need — here, we are delayed and there is an urgent need for more stringent measures— urgent need for more stringent measures and we need a change in strategy? — measures and we need a change in strate: ? ., , , . ., ., strategy? no, but my recollection of the conversations _ strategy? no, but my recollection of the conversations i _ strategy? no, but my recollection of the conversations i had _ strategy? no, but my recollection of the conversations i had around - strategy? no, but my recollection of the conversations i had around that| the conversations i had around that time was that the secretary of state was of that view, and i should say that i'm pretty certain that he would have communicated that in conversation with the prime minister. but again, i would conversation with the prime minister. but again, iwould not have been in all of those conversations and one of the reasons why i texted and e—mailed as i did was to alert people to my concerns and to hope that if they were, as i believe, if they were of similar mind to feel strengthened in their desire to push forward with this restrictions because they would know that they had my support. fin restrictions because they would know that they had my support.— that they had my support. on the 12th of march. _ that they had my support. on the 12th of march, as _ that they had my support. on the 12th of march, as we _ that they had my support. on the 12th of march, as we know - that they had my support. on the 12th of march, as we know there l that they had my support. on the i 12th of march, as we know there was self isolation or individual symptomatic for seven days. on the 16th of— symptomatic for seven days. on the 16th of march, cobra decided that there _ 16th of march, cobra decided that there needed to be more further stringent — there needed to be more further stringent measures and you will recall— stringent measures and you will recall the — stringent measures and you will recall the household isolation for 14 days, — recall the household isolation for 14 days, reduced contact, advice, over— 14 days, reduced contact, advice, over 70 _ 14 days, reduced contact, advice, over 70 is — 14 days, reduced contact, advice, over 70 is particularly must ensure they reduce — over 70 is particularly must ensure they reduce contact and there was a warning _ they reduce contact and there was a warning about the move to shielding imminently. on the 18th, cobra decided — imminently. on the 18th, cobra decided to close schools from the 20th, _ decided to close schools from the 20th. just — decided to close schools from the 20th, just in very general terms. did you _ 20th, just in very general terms. did you have any direct dealings with the — did you have any direct dealings with the prime minister during the course _ with the prime minister during the course of— with the prime minister during the course of that week as to whether or not those _ course of that week as to whether or not those more stringent measures heeded _ not those more stringent measures needed to— not those more stringent measures needed to be applied? i ask you this because _ needed to be applied? i ask you this because the evidence from mr cummings has been that there was a widespread view, he said pretty much everyone. _ widespread view, he said pretty much everyone, considered the prime minister— everyone, considered the prime minister to be oscillating in relation _ minister to be oscillating in relation to his response. what was your assessment of the prime minister's intense, state of mind as to whether— minister's intense, state of mind as to whether these measures should be countenanced? | to whether these measures should be countenanced?— countenanced? i think the prime minister found _ countenanced? i think the prime minister found these _ countenanced? i think the prime minister found these decisions i minister found these decisions difficult. it's not that he found decision—making difficult, it is that a decision to restrict freedoms in an unprecedented way went against his instincts and the principles that governed his political outlook. the prime minister at the time, mr johnson, was someone who was a liberal in so many senses and certainly someone who found the idea of restricting free association deeply difficult, deeply opposed to his worldview. and therefore, as i think everyone knows, to contemplate such a big measure with the inevitable costs was a decision of huge weight. i believe that the evidence was clear that such a decision was unavoidable. again, i'm sor to decision was unavoidable. again, i'm sorry to interrupt, _ decision was unavoidable. again, i'm sorry to interrupt, use _ decision was unavoidable. again, i'm sorry to interrupt, use a _ decision was unavoidable. again, i'm sorry to interrupt, use a decision. . sorry to interrupt, use a decision. you appear— sorry to interrupt, use a decision. you appear to be relating your decision— you appear to be relating your decision to the lockdown decision, i'm decision to the lockdown decision, i'm asking — decision to the lockdown decision, i'm asking about this stringently of the measures. the i'm asking about this stringently of the measures.— i'm asking about this stringently of the measures. . , , ., the measures. the measures were not taken lightly- — the measures. the measures were not taken lightly- in _ the measures. the measures were not taken lightly. in terms _ the measures. the measures were not taken lightly. in terms of _ the measures. the measures were not taken lightly. in terms of the - the measures. the measures were not taken lightly. in terms of the prime i taken lightly. in terms of the prime minister possibly making style, the oscillation referred to, it is in the nature of the way that boris johnson worked that he wanted to see thesis antithesis, that he wanted, he preferred gladiatorial decision—making rather than inquisitor. he wanted to see the three cases rehearsed in front of him or even rehearsed in his own mind. and i know that he would sometimes run argument a and r0 to collate daesh articulate it himself —— articulate it himself. for some people, that style of decision—making or that way of running meetings was difficult to take but i had known the prime ministerfor some time and minister for some time and appreciated ministerfor some time and appreciated this was the way he needed to process information in order to get to an outcome. and every political leader, every distinctive political leader will have their own way of operating that needs a certain amount of space and respect, even if you disagree. this was a public _ respect, even if you disagree. this was a public health emergency at its core _ was a public health emergency at its core by— was a public health emergency at its core. by that week, the evidence or rather— core. by that week, the evidence or rather the _ core. by that week, the evidence or rather the advice from sage, from the cmo, — rather the advice from sage, from the cmo, the gc essay, from the dhse, _ the cmo, the gc essay, from the dhse, from cabinet office, number ten was _ dhse, from cabinet office, number ten was to— dhse, from cabinet office, number ten was to use your words, unanimous. there was no real argument _ unanimous. there was no real argument as to whether, for good and obvious— argument as to whether, for good and obvious public health reasons, these reasons— obvious public health reasons, these reasons had to be contemplated, so there _ reasons had to be contemplated, so there wasn't really a thesis and antithesis— there wasn't really a thesis and antithesis position here, mr gove. all the _ antithesis position here, mr gove. all the public health advice on a public— all the public health advice on a public health crisis were pointing in one _ public health crisis were pointing in one direction, so on what basis couid _ in one direction, so on what basis could the — in one direction, so on what basis could the prime minister pushed back and say, _ could the prime minister pushed back and say, well, i've got material which _ and say, well, i've got material which does _ and say, well, i've got material which does point the other way. there _ which does point the other way. there was— which does point the other way. there was no public health material pointing _ there was no public health material pointing the other way, was there? the first— pointing the other way, was there? the first thing is just a few weeks beforehand... i’m the first thing is 'ust a few weeks beforehand. . ._ the first thing is 'ust a few weeks beforehand... �* . ~ ., ., beforehand... i'm talking about that week. beforehand... i'm talking about that week- quite — beforehand... i'm talking about that week. quite but _ beforehand... i'm talking about that week. quite but in _ beforehand. .. i'm talking about that week. quite but in order— beforehand... i'm talking about that week. quite but in order to - beforehand... i'm talking about that week. quite but in order to come i beforehand... i'm talking about that week. quite but in order to come asj week. quite but in order to come as ou week. quite but in order to come as you evidence _ week. quite but in order to come as you evidence shows, _ week. quite but in order to come as you evidence shows, i _ week. quite but in order to come as you evidence shows, i was - week. quite but in order to come as you evidence shows, i was in - week. quite but in order to come as you evidence shows, i was in a - you evidence shows, i was in a different position at that time, however in fairness to the prime minister, just a few weeks before, the point had been made that to impose these measures was... tao impose these measures was... too earl . impose these measures was... too early- yes. — impose these measures was. .. too early- yes. was— impose these measures was... too early. yes, was problematic. - impose these measures was... too early. yes, was problematic. and l impose these measures was... too early. yes, was problematic. and i | early. yes, was problematic. and i think he is — early. yes, was problematic. and i think he is the _ early. yes, was problematic. and i think he is the ultimate _ think he is the ultimate decision—maker and therefore i think he any prime minister, is entitled to test propositions and to think, is the restriction of liberty and the economic damage consequent upon lockdown worth inflicting on people in order to prevent the spread of this virus? i believe that the evidence was clear but i think it only fell to the ultimate decision—maker that they have a chance to reflect on the momentous nature of the decision and to consider arguments against it. i need to suggest to you because of the material which has been received and the _ the material which has been received and the evidence given that it wasn't — and the evidence given that it wasn'tjust a question and the evidence given that it wasn't just a question of testing imposing — wasn't just a question of testing imposing argument. the material was, as i imposing argument. the material was, as i have _ imposing argument. the material was, as i have suggested to you, and of course _ as i have suggested to you, and of course it's— as i have suggested to you, and of course it's a — as i have suggested to you, and of course it's a matter for you or one way in _ course it's a matter for you or one way in public— course it's a matter for you or one way in public health terms, the suggestion has been made that he didn't— suggestion has been made that he didn'tjust — suggestion has been made that he didn'tjust test the suggestion has been made that he didn't just test the opposing arguments, he was incapable of making — arguments, he was incapable of making a — arguments, he was incapable of making a decision or at least not sticking — making a decision or at least not sticking to — making a decision or at least not sticking to a decision that he had already— sticking to a decision that he had already made. is that a fair suggestion? would you say in light of yourm — suggestion? would you say in light of your... experience and closeness to the _ of your... experience and closeness to the government machine at that time? _ to the government machine at that time? |_ to the government machine at that time? , ., , ., to the government machine at that time? , ., . . . . time? i believe it was a reluctance to embrace _ time? i believe it was a reluctance to embrace a _ time? i believe it was a reluctance to embrace a decision _ time? i believe it was a reluctance to embrace a decision rather- time? i believe it was a reluctance to embrace a decision rather than| time? i believe it was a reluctance i to embrace a decision rather than an inability to stick to one, because again, the prime minister had a view that overreaction was often a greater danger. he also had a principled attachment to maximising individual liberty. therefore it was difficult for him, both from the point of view of his outlook on how to handle crises and the set of principles by which he guided his political life, it was difficult for him to contemplate something like this, especially when we had been told, as i sayjust weeks beforehand that these were measures that should only be applied for a limited period and at the right time. the prime minister eventually concluded this was the right thing to do... you are watching bbc news. you can carry on watching the covid inquiry on the bbc news website. it was the case that he was oscillating, i think it was the case that he was weighing things before coming reluctantly but firmly to a conclusion. coming reluctantly but firmly to a conclusion-— coming reluctantly but firmly to a conclusion. . , , , , conclusion. and this may we presume doesnt conclusion. and this may we presume doesn't denigrate _ conclusion. and this may we presume doesn't denigrate from _ conclusion. and this may we presume doesn't denigrate from your— conclusion. and this may we presume doesn't denigrate from your earlier i doesn't denigrate from your earlier evidence _ doesn't denigrate from your earlier evidence that the government machine as a whole _ evidence that the government machine as a whole may have acted too slowly? — as a whole may have acted too slowly? the prime minister, he took the ultimate decisions in that week and the _ the ultimate decisions in that week and the week after privately? yes, and the week after privately? yes, and again. — and the week after privately? yes, and again. the _ and the week after privately? yes, and again, the prime _ and the week after privately? 1a: and again, the prime minister is and the week after privately? 123 and again, the prime minister is the ultimate decision—maker but no prime minister takes decisions in a vacuum. my view, it is with the benefit of hindsight, is that we should have acted earlier but that means it is incumbent on all of us who believe that to look back and think, did we say or do enough sufficiently early in order to enjoin upon the prime minister the need for action? i mentioned briefly rory stewart. rory was only calling for the sorts of steps that we required in public on the 12th of march, again he was making it clear that we needed to act that day, that was the same day i shed the article privately —— shared the article. so the consensus for action became firmer and clearer in that second week of march, with the benefit of hindsight, if only two have been a and clearer in all our minds earlier, but i don't think one can single out the prime minister at the time for criticism. we