the answer may surprise you. it is not permissible to fight alongside hamas, even if it's to liberate palestine, as they say. that is still nationalist. it's not a religious war. and a man charged with dozens of crimes takes on a man who's widely accused of being far too old for the job. how's the us election going? voters know both of these men very well. and right now, despite all of the court cases that donald trump is facing, they appear to be leaning towards him. israeli troops have cut gaza in two and have penetrated to gaza city. it sounds from the kind of thing that benjamin netanyahu and his allies have been saying, as though they're planning to stay there for the long haul. but how long is the long haul? and at what point does israel declare its mission finished? above all, what kind of political structure does it leave behind to govern gaza? and in the meantime, israel needs help in negotiating the release of the 220 or so hostages hamas has seized, and in setting up the so—called humanitarian pauses which are necessary to get food and water to the often terrified inhabitants of gaza. this is an area, after all, that's more densely populated than new york city, and every bomb and missile threatens people's lives. are there governments in the region which might prove to be useful go—betweens with hamas and israel? i asked frank gardner, the bbc�*s security correspondent, for more details. the country that could have a real influence here is qatar, because they host the hamas political leadership in the form of ismail haniyeh and his team. and they've got an awful lot of money. they've got a lot of money, but they know gaza as well. these are very high stakes for qatar because if it goes well and they're able to secure getting more of the hostages out and present themselves successfully as some kind of intermediary between hamas on the one hand and the us and israel on the other, then they will come out of it pretty well as a very useful diplomatic lever. but it's also risky for qatar because at the moment, hardly any hostages have come out. the big problem has been, hamas have said "we can let them out", the hostages, "but we need a ceasefire." and there is actually a very genuine reason for that. and of course, hamas want a ceasefire, notjust to stop the deaths of fellow palestinians, but also for military reasons, undoubtedly, they are under real pressure. but there's also a genuine reason, humanitarian reason, quite apart from the suffering of palestinian civilians to get 250 hostages or even just a batch of 50, to hand them, to get them out of the tunnels, hand them over to the international committee of the red cross and get them out of gaza. you can't have that in the middle of a bombing campaign with a50 targets being struck in 2a hours. so, you know, that has been the sticking point. when i was in lebanonjust the other day, i was picking up some quite interesting ideas that maybe netanyahu and the politics of netanyahu have reached their, their kind of final terminus and that israel will have to look in other directions, perhaps even back to a two—state solution. do you think there's any possibility of that? there is no way that you can have a lasting peace between 2.5 million palestinians in gaza and the state of israel, if there is no hope of an eventual palestinian state. and not one that is absolutely swiss cheese, with settlements all over it, it's going to have to be a contiguous... a clear... a contiguous state. i mean, the violence in the west bank, it's been overlooked because of what's going on in gaza, but it's the worst it's been for many years with really bad clashes, raids by settlers. i pity whoever�*s going to have to have to run the gaza strip, you know, it's probably going to be the palestinian authority. in the immediate short term, it'll probably have to be the idf, the israel defense forces. but they will need to hand over to somebody. you've got an entire bit of real estate full of very angry people. everyone will have somebody in their family or friends who's dead, severely injured, traumatised. i think blinken said that the pa would have to take over in gaza, but does it have those kind of, that kind of strength, that kind of ability? no, it doesn't. and that's why hamas came to power in the first place in the elections, because people were fed up with what they saw as the venal, corrupt and inefficient administration of the palestinian authority. and they're also not, as somebody put it, they're not going to want to be seen to taking over gaza on the tips of israeli bayonets, you know, after a very bloody, incredibly damaging military campaign that has killed over 10,000. they're not going to want to be seen as stooges of israel. so there's almost certainly going to have to be some kind of interim administration. i've talked to the israelis about this. i've asked, you know, "what is your plan for day two here?" and they've talked about maybe the egyptians, maybe the turks, maybe the un. this was one of the criticisms that, privately, senior american politicians and generals were making of the incursion into gaza. "don't," they were saying, "don't go into somewhere when you don't know "how you're going to get out of it." i think it's a symptom of the intense trauma that israel and israelis felt after the october 7th massacre. all the emphasis seems to have been on, we've got to finish off hamas and we'll worry about what happens after that. and, of course, it's not that simple because after hamas has got to come something. it's either... i mean, if you leave a vacuum, hamas will either regenerate itself, might call itself something different or you get something even more virulent. the israeli war cabinet considers that it's got its boot on the throat of hamas militarily right now, and it's in no mood to take that off until it has to, until the outrage and outcry from the rest of the world, eventually the united states, gets so loud that they have to pause. got to. and that will happen, won't it? i think it has to. i mean, the mounting global outrage at what is going on, i mean, i've no doubt that israel is hitting hamas targets, but they're killing so many people at the same time. there is enormous exponential amount of damage that is done, both in terms of human lives and livelihoods and the infrastructure around. it's going to take a lot of money and a lot of time to rebuild gaza. and it's going to have to be built in such a security paradigm that this doesn't happen again. the other day, benjamin netanyahu likened hamas to islamist extremist groups like al-qaeda and isis. but in fact, hamas is very different from the other groups and there are bitter divisions between them. hamas is regarded as an outlier, even a heretic group, by al-qaeda and isis. mina al—lami's job at bbc monitoring is to keep an eye on the messages and broadcasts of islamist groups. i asked her to explain the differences and the split between hamas and the others. jihadis in general, they think that hamas has multiple religious transgressions. they mostly criticise the group for its ties with iran. that is their biggest objection. then they accuse the group of having taken part in a democratic process, pointing to the elections, etc. and they say that any engagement with any kind of elections and democratic process, constitution, that is un—islamic. they also criticise the group for not implementing sharia law in the gaza strip, despite being in control of that strip. so these are the three main reasons whyjihadist group view hamas with suspicion. and in the latest conflict, al-qaeda and its various branches have come out with coordinated, quick messages in support of the 7th 0ctober attacks and reallyjust to tap into the muslim anger. now it's a very different situation with the so—called islamic state, or isis. is has, years ago, declared hamas as an apostate group that must be fought. so not only apostate, but it must be fought. and it has not changed its position after the 7th october attacks. it is not permissible to fight alongside hamas or any of the palestinian groups that exist there, because they say all of these are nationalist groups, they're fighting for a nationalist interest. even if it's to liberate palestine, as they say, that is still nationalist, it's not a religious war. i think a lot of people will have assumed that al-qaeda, islamic state, they've all kind of faded away. but it's not really true, is it? no, absolutely not. whatjihadists try to do in normal circumstances, they try to instil kind of anger in muslims, try to stir them enough for them to prompt a reaction, a violent reaction. they're trying to kind of create these circumstances or put propaganda in front of them in messages that you must do this. but they see now that there is fertile ground, people are already angry and they are trying to tap into that anger. i think what we're seeing also here, for example, on our tvs is we're seeing, to some extent, a sanitised version of what's happening in the gaza strip, whereas people in the arab world, they're watching the pan—arab channels. and you see a lot of very, very difficult images, daily images of suffering, death and destruction. and we see sometimes even a rare alignment these days of the viewpoints of what we're seeing on jihadist discussion forums and, you know, mainstream. not in terms of the violence, let's go out and kill people, but in terms of, for example, the credibility of the west, talking about human rights but there's indifference, as they say, indifference towards the suffering of civilians in gaza. so these, of course, now these narratives and these viewpoints are then taken and exploited injihadist messaging. and they're kind of putting out mirrors saying that, what you're saying, we're saying, we've been saying for years. so should we in western countries, should we be more worried now as a result of what's happening? the level of incitement is massive, it's daily and the messaging is going to multiple segments of society. it's going to ordinary muslims, it's going to clerics. that's one of the key targets, because jihadists know they don't hold any sway or kind of weight within muslim masses. so they're trying to get the scholars on board, institutions like al—azhar on board. they're saying, let's all come together and call for the same thing, call for mobilisation, call forjihad, because they know that their message will be heard. and they're also calling, addressing the rank and file in the armies in muslim countries. and they're saying, you have to do something, you have to disobey your governments and go and do something, because otherwise you are effectively protecting israel. and it's also, of course, going to the hardened jihadists around the world who are also being told, you have to move and you have to move now and you have to do something. and al-qaeda, groups like al-qaeda and is will want to carry out attacks that they think will kind of vindicate people. so i think this, they see it in general as an opportunity. and because of the circumstances, because of the context, i think, yes, there is, of course, an increased danger. isjoe biden now too old to be given a second term as us president? is donald trump, who's actually only three years younger, and has nearly 100 criminal charges hanging over him, likely to be any better? a lot of people in america and the wider world feel it's a pretty unattractive choice to have to make, and they wish that someone better could be a front runner. i got through to our north america editor, sarah smith, just as she was getting ready to leave her hotel room in new york, where she's been covering donald trump's latest court appearance. if you look at the six key battleground states where this election will be decided, in five of those states, donald trump has a pretty substantial lead overjoe biden making it likely, if the election were held today, that trump would win. now, of course, biden�*s team say polling a year away from an election is practically meaningless. anything could happen in that time. but what's different this time is that voters know both of these men very well. and right now, despite all of the court cases that donald trump is facing, they appear to be leaning towards him. that is pretty amazing. i mean, in this latest court case, he kind of undermined his own lawyer's position, didn't he? first former president ever to be on the stand as a defendant. but, of course, practically everything donald trump does these days is a historic first, it seems like. he was very antagonistic, sparring with thejudge, he was being told to keep his answers short, that this isn't a political rally, stop making campaign speeches. he called thejudge a fraud to his face. i mean, none of this is the behaviour we expect from a defendant. but, of course, this performance and it was really that, it was a performance, was much more to do with politics than it had to do with this case. he is risking a heavy penalty by antagonising the judge. but at the same time, this narrative that he's been running, that he's being victimised by these politically—motivated prosecutions, it's doing very well for solidifying his support among his base, for raising him millions and millions of dollars in campaign funds and seems to be doing pretty well with voters across the board. you might think thatjoe biden would be reconsidering his position, but there doesn't seem to be any sign of that at the moment, does there? no, no. no sign of that at all from joe biden or the white house. the issue voters say is the most important to them is the economy. now, if you look at the american economy, actually a lot of the statistics will tell you it's going pretty well. hmm. but every voter you meet will tell you that they don't feel that, that they feel worse off than they did when donald trump was president. and also that they think they would be financially better off if donald trump was president again. and then there'sjoe biden�*s age. i mean, he is going to be 81 in a couple of weeks�* time. and the vast majority of voters, over 70% of voters, say that they think he is now too old to be an effective president. you're heading off to ohio immediately after our interview. tell me why. i mean, what's the importance of the abortion question in ohio? there is a special referendum effectively, they call it a ballot initiative, which is asking whether voters want to guarantee abortion rights in the state constitution. and, of course, as you know, in the last 18 months since the supreme court overturned the constitutional right to an abortion, a lot of states have introduced restrictions, some of them total bans, some of them bans after 6 or 15 weeks of pregnancy. why it really matters is casting forward again to 202k. this is a motivating issue for voters. we'll see that in the turnout probably in ohio. and it's the one thing that plays well for democrats. it's the one thing thatjoe biden has got going for him that could potentially save him. if enough voters, suburban women, for instance, who are an absolutely key demograph, come out to the polls, motivated by saying, "i am going to vote for candidates who will support "my right to have an abortion," that could mean thatjust enough democrats come out to savejoe biden. and it's the only issue basically on which he's winning. if you look at the polling at the moment, people don't trust him on the economy, they don't trust him on foreign affairs, they don't trust him on a whole manner of things. but when it comes to abortion rights, that's when he scores well. it really doesn't matter how many charges are thrown against donald trump, he still may actually win the presidency. a large number of people, certainly all of trump's classic supporters, believe him, that he has done nothing wrong and he is genuinely being victimised by, byjoe biden, who has instructed the justice department to go after him. but there is one caveat. voters do say and the opinion polls say, if he is convicted of trying to overturn the 2020 election results, then they would switch their vote. the problems which immigration poses for wealthy european countries are many, varied and getting more expensive, not to say socially divisive. as a result, they're starting to cause rifts within the european union. italy's prime minister giorgia meloni has announced a scheme to build reception centres in albania for the thousands of people who are trying to get to italy by sea. germany's chancellor 0laf scholz, meanwhile, has negotiated a new set of measures with his coalition partners to try to curb the number of immigrants reaching germany, in particular from syria, afghanistan and turkey. among those measures is a plan to cut social benefits for asylum seekers, something which has been roundly criticised by the greens, who are an important part of mr schulz�*s coalition. i asked jessica parker, the bbc�*s new berlin correspondent, for more details. you're seeing a rising number of arrivals, irregular arrivals, illegal arrivals in germany. september this year saw the highest number of monthly illegal arrivals into germany since february 2016, which was, of course, around the height of the migration crisis. and the country could this year actually exceed the annual figures since that year as well. so certainly the country is looking at rising levels of irregular migration. and then also the alternative fur deutschland party, the far—right, anti—immigration party, really pointing at this issue and it's seen to sort of feed some of the recent electoral gains and the gains in the polls that they've been seeing. and the governing parties are trying to talk about potential solutions, speeding up deportations, for example. they've put checks on their external borders. but within the european union, you know, the european union is supposed to be a border—free zone within schengen, at least, and that's certainly not the case at the moment. we've been to see some of the checks on the polish border, for example, and then there's even talk as well about the possibility of looking at third country migration deals. how does the opposition to immigration show itself? hostility in the streets? i think you do see these kinds of demonstrations of unhappiness, discontent springing up in different parts of germany, for sure. and the afd�*s argument is that there is, particularly maybe in german cities, a failure of integration, and there isn't the kind of social cohesion that they would like to see. and actually, even in the coalition agreement, they talk about trying to improve integration in germany amongst migrant communities. but it's, i think, a sense at the moment of it's bubbling, it's brewing. all the politicians are deeply aware of it and scrambling around for answers to try and assuage that sense of anger and sense of loss of control. that's certainly something that you pick up on a lot. and, of course, it's happening at a time when the german economy is really looking rather, rather weak, isn't it? there is this sense of it flat—lining. and again, there's a wider debate, i think, about whether the european union single market is working as effectively as it could to try and generate growth. and germany, the largest economy within the eu, often seen as its engine. and if that engine isn't at full power, that then echoes throughout the bloc. and it always has been the main political engine too, and that seems to be fading. yeah, i think there's an interesting dynamic going on between germany and france. so, angela merkel in power for a very long time, the de facto leader of europe, people would say that about her. 0laf schulz hasn't really inherited that mantle. i think probably emmanuel macron, the french president, rather sees himself potentially as the de facto leader of eur