public confidence, what can be done about travel restrictions and proportionality, the seriousness of the crisis by the 4th of february doesn't appear to be reflected in that debate. i doesn't appear to be reflected in that debate-— that debate. i think it is a seriousness _ that debate. i think it is a seriousness of _ that debate. i think it is a seriousness of a - that debate. i think it is a seriousness of a crisis - that debate. i think it is a | seriousness of a crisis that that debate. i think it is a i seriousness of a crisis that it became but it wasn't apparent at that time. there had been a cabinet meeting on the 31st of january in which, if i remember correctly, the chief medical officer as well as a health secretary and the health secretary, and at that time the advice was the probability of the worst case, reasonable worst case was about io%. and so what you see here is a good summary of a brief discussion. the purpose of the meeting was a bilateral about the manifesto plans for health care, as you will see from the remainder. and the focus at that time, and i think this is reflected in the cobra minutes around that time, was very much around travel restrictions and essentially trying to impede the virus from reaching the united kingdom. following the meeting... following the meeting you entered into a what's of debate with the secretary of the dhs e where you debate the accuracy of a figure for the deaths that would occur under a reasonable worst case scenario. you say this. 600,000 deaths, twice in a but i was given yesterday, we are most end up with stupid decisions being taken in an informal meeting. what a stupid decisions are you referring to there? i what a stupid decisions are you referring to there?— what a stupid decisions are you referring to there? i don't recall exactl . referring to there? i don't recall exactly- i _ referring to there? i don't recall exactly. ithink... _ referring to there? i don't recall exactly. ithink... i— referring to there? i don't recall exactly. ithink... igenerally. exactly. ithink... i generally don't. my concern would have been numbers moving around. three and 3000 deaths is an extraordinary number and every single one of those is an individual tragedy —— 300,000 deaths. so it wasn't a question of 300 was in any sense less significant than six, but it was that if numbers kept moving around, how much confidence could be having what we were being told. i don't recall exactly what the decision might have been. the recall exactly what the decision might have been. recall exactly what the decision miaht have been. , ,, ., ., might have been. the impression that that observation _ might have been. the impression that that observation gives _ might have been. the impression that that observation gives is _ might have been. the impression that that observation gives is that - might have been. the impression that that observation gives is that you - that observation gives is that you were concerned with decisions that you might construe as being an overreaction being taken or that there was a decision being taken to respond to the crisis that you felt was inappropriate. i respond to the crisis that you felt was inappropriate.— respond to the crisis that you felt was inappropriate. idon't know. i susect it was inappropriate. idon't know. i susr>ect it might _ was inappropriate. idon't know. i suspect it might have _ was inappropriate. idon't know. i suspect it might have been - suspect it might have been frustration at numbers moving around and the risk therefore that decisions were not being taken in an orderly way if we were being told different things. i don't recall exactly what it might have been. i wouldn't... i wouldn't have expected a substantive decision about managing the virus to be different on the basis of whether it was three and 2000 600,000 in the reasonable worst case. it would have been more a question of knowing frankly whether we had any confidence about what we were being told —— 300,000 or 600,000. you what we were being told -- 300,000 or 600,000-— or 600,000. you yourself draw a clear distinction _ or 600,000. you yourself draw a clear distinction between - or 600,000. you yourself draw a clear distinction between the - clear distinction between the substantive decision making process which you describe as stupid decisions being taken, and the issue about the correctness of the figures themselves. so the reference to decisions on the face of this communication is not a reference to the validity of the figures, it is to do with the decisions that may be taken as a result of the figures which the government were being provided with. it is which the government were being provided with.— provided with. it is possible that this is a very _ provided with. it is possible that this is a very brief _ provided with. it is possible that this is a very brief whatsapp - this is a very brief whatsapp exchange where i'm clearly expressing some frustration. i genuinely have no recollection of what the decisions might have been so these might have been significant decisions, they might have been insignificant, i simply don't know. in relation to the figures, the reasonable worst case scenario under the government's own national security risk assessment process, with which you are extremely familiar, but 820,000 deaths. that was the reasonable worst case scenario for the worst type of flu pandemic. correct. so why, given that fact, and given that the government was aware that the infection fatality rate of coronavirus was likely to be around i% coronavirus was likely to be around i% and that the majority of the population would be infected, where hugh so sceptical concerning mr cummings's assertion that the reasonable worst case scenario for the number of deaths was higher than that which you presumed it to be. i would have been sceptical at almost any random piece of information entering into a meeting that i haven't seen properly analysed. so i don't think that any significant decision would have been different, whether the number were 300, 600 are the eight and 22 which you refer, because all of them require extraordinary measures —— 820,000. i genuinely can't remember the basis for this but looking at that and knowing the kind of conversation i might have had with him, i would have been worried that a sudden change of number would have triggered an ill considered decision. has triggered an ill considered decision-— triggered an ill considered decision. �* , . , , ., triggered an ill considered decision. �* , . ,, ., ., decision. as it happened, and as of course a government _ decision. as it happened, and as of course a government year, - decision. as it happened, and as of course a government year, the - course a government year, the infection fatality rate was around i%. with a infection fatality rate was around i%. with a population of the united kingdom being what it is, the absence of control, community spread and i am assuming that between 50 to 80% of their population will become infected, i% of that is indeed in the ballpark of the figures at mr cummings was referring to. so why... was there a basis? what was a mathematical basis for questioning his approach? did you sit down and work out what the figures might be based on the infection fatality rate in the infection rate? ida. based on the infection fatality rate in the infection rate?— in the infection rate? no, as the first message — in the infection rate? no, as the first message says, _ in the infection rate? no, as the first message says, that - in the infection rate? no, as the first message says, that is - in the infection rate? no, as the first message says, that is twice the number i was given yesterday so presumably someone doing all of that analysis would have given me the number of 300 and as you see in the response, the chief medical officer, according to the response, for the reasonable worst case was one to three and with housing. i wouldn't have felt qualified to make a simple arithmetic comparison because a lot would have depended on which cohort of the population was infected by the virus and whether it was possible to protect quarantine protect those most at risk. this is a reasonable _ protect those most at risk. this is a reasonable worst _ protect those most at risk. this is a reasonable worst case - protect those most at risk. this is a reasonable worst case scenario | a reasonable worst case scenario based on population figures. that was a number _ based on population figures. that was a number i _ based on population figures. that was a number i was _ based on population figures. trust was a number i was given presumably from the experts. fin was a number i was given presumably from the experts.— from the experts. on the 5th of february. _ from the experts. on the 5th of february. the _ from the experts. on the 5th of february, the next _ from the experts. on the 5th of february, the next day, - from the experts. on the 5th of february, the next day, there l from the experts. on the 5th of- february, the next day, there was a cobra. there were a number of ministers in attendance and there were a number of officials from number ten, were a number of officials from numberten, if were a number of officials from number ten, if we go over the page i think we can see two officials from number ten. think we can see two officials from numberten. page think we can see two officials from number ten. page five, think we can see two officials from numberten. page five, paragraph two. it provides that update given by the chief medical officer. on average individuals who had died as average individuals who had died as a result of the novel coronavirus had spent between seven to ten days in hospital before dying. the two high risk groups appear to be the elderly, those with illnesses and the fidelity estimate remained at two to 3%. so in fact quite high, although it doesn't say whether that is the infection fatality rate or the case fatality rate. they are different,. this cobra meeting is notable for the absence of any sophisticated debate about the absence of control, control mechanisms to stop the spread of the virus from the united kingdom once it leaves china. he would say presumably that level of information were simply not provided by the expert who where providing information to cobra. i expert who where providing information to cobra. i don't know. i think information to cobra. i don't know. i think the — information to cobra. i don't know. i think the experts _ information to cobra. i don't know. i think the experts would _ information to cobra. i don't know. i think the experts would have - i think the experts would have provided quite extensive information. these cobras tended to have quite an extensive pack as part of the reading for them stop the crypt, the situation update, and that would contain the latest sage advice and analysis. i recall those extensive documents and i think some of them have been referenced by the inquiry. so my presumption is not that the information was there, but that the information was there, but that the information was there, but that the focus of the cobra was on the immediate measures to be taken and at that stage in early february it was still very much on travel. there was a cabinet meeting on the 6th of february. the prime minister cautioned against the economic damage that would be caused by political overreaction to the crisis. we can see the attendees on the first page. summing up, i can't recall which page it is on, the prime minister said that confidence was contagious as well as a virus and it was important the government remained measured in its response. there we go, thank you. the prime minister said that confidence was also contagious and it was important the government remained measured in its response. the secretary health and social care taken right tone. this had been true up bovine spongiform encephalitis. the tenor of this had been true up bovine spongiform encephalitis. the tenor of that this had been true up bovine spongiform encephalitis. the tenor of that cabinet this had been true up bovine spongiform encephalitis. the tenor of that cabinet meeting this had been true up bovine spongiform encephalitis. the tenor of that cabinet meeting therefore appears to have been, it is all right, we mustn't overreact, play a cautious, we mustn't damage confidence and we mustn't cause economic damage. rather than focusing on the seriousness of the virus itself. focusing on the seriousness of the virus itself-— focusing on the seriousness of the virus itself. ., , ., virus itself. you see how the prime minister summed _ virus itself. you see how the prime minister summed that _ virus itself. you see how the prime minister summed that up - virus itself. you see how the prime minister summed that up following virus itself. you see how the prime i minister summed that up following a cabinet discussion. i think this goes the point i made earlier. i'm just trying to explain it. this foreground, background point. if you book earlier in that cabinet minute, it is still the case that the scientific advice is essentially suggesting that the worst case scenario is unlikely, very unlikely, so that undoubtedly would have informed the way ministers were thinking about this. in the prime minister in that summary is trying to balance the tensions. you minister in that summary is trying to balance the tensions.— to balance the tensions. you said that the members _ to balance the tensions. you said that the members of _ to balance the tensions. you said that the members of the - to balance the tensions. you said that the members of the cabinet| to balance the tensions. you said - that the members of the cabinet were focusing _ that the members of the cabinet were focusing on— that the members of the cabinet were focusing on the worst case but if there _ focusing on the worst case but if there worst case is 800,000 deaths, bad case _ there worst case is 800,000 deaths, bad case could be 500,000 deaths. so i'm bad case could be 500,000 deaths. so i'm not— bad case could be 500,000 deaths. so i'm not understanding why is a focus on the _ i'm not understanding why is a focus on the reasonable worst case scenariu _ on the reasonable worst case scenario. how about a fairly predictable scenario? i scenario. how about a fairly predictable scenario? i think that is riaht, predictable scenario? i think that is right. and _ predictable scenario? i think that is right. and i— predictable scenario? i think that is right, and i think _ predictable scenario? i think that is right, and i think there - predictable scenario? i think that is right, and i think there is - predictable scenario? i think that is right, and i think there is a - is right, and i think there is a question about, as mr keith touched on earlier, about whether focusing on earlier, about whether focusing on reasonable worst case skews the analysis and discussion. one of the things we tried to do in the national security arena was to look at a range of scenarios. you can do to many because it becomes unmanageable. we would look out with reasonable worst case, essentially a best case and then our mate, minimum, acceptable if you like in order to do that but i think we do need to look at the way we address some of these crises. i don't think... the point i was making was not that cabinet was focused on reasonable worst case. the cobra process clearly was and in terms of the measures that might need to be taken. cabinet was essentially briefed not on a scenario but on what the situation was at that time and the probability that something like the reasonable worst case were still very unlikely. as you say, had that briefing suggested that the probability of a quarter of the number of casualties were significantly higher, i think that would have changed the way ministers would have changed the way ministers would have changed the way ministers would have thought about it. but would have changed the way ministers would have thought about it.— would have thought about it. but no one ut to would have thought about it. but no one put to their— would have thought about it. but no one put to their ministers, - would have thought about it. but no one put to their ministers, don't - one put to their ministers, don't think— one put to their ministers, don't think about _ one put to their ministers, don't think about the reasonable worst case scenario, think about us, me, what _ case scenario, think about us, me, what is _ case scenario, think about us, me, what is the — case scenario, think about us, me, what is the probability of this virus — what is the probability of this virus coming to the uk and causing a lot of— virus coming to the uk and causing a lot of unnecessary deaths? isn't that their— lot of unnecessary deaths? isn't that their probability factor to be looking _ that their probability factor to be looking at, not the reasonable worst case scenario?— case scenario? exactly, you put it very well- — case scenario? exactly, you put it very well- i _ case scenario? exactly, you put it very well. i think _ case scenario? exactly, you put it very well. i think we _ case scenario? exactly, you put it very well. i think we are - case scenario? exactly, you put it very well. i think we are making l case scenario? exactly, you put it i very well. i think we are making the same point that there was too much focus, including on the briefings to cabinet on the reasonable worst case, ratherthan cabinet on the reasonable worst case, rather than from their deep experts, here is what i think is hap —— here is what i think will happen. it is the same dichotomy reflected in that briefing in the second cobra, this is a reasonable worst case scenario, however, in reality the real scenarios are the following. and that dividing line blurred throughout the course of this time. ., , ., blurred throughout the course of this time. . , ., ., ., ~' this time. indeed and if you look at, it this time. indeed and if you look at. it was _ this time. indeed and if you look at. it was set — this time. indeed and if you look at, it was set out _ this time. indeed and if you look at, it was set out in _ this time. indeed and if you look at, it was set out in that - this time. indeed and if you look. at, it was set out in that meeting, but not in those terms, in some of the cabinet and other meetings of that ilk. ., ~ , ., , . the cabinet and other meetings of that ilk. ., ~ y., , . . that ilk. thank you very much. we will break now. _ that ilk. thank you very much. we will break now. i _ that ilk. thank you very much. we will break now. i shall— that ilk. thank you very much. we will break now. i shall return - that ilk. thank you very much. we will break now. i shall return at i will break now. i shall return at 11:30am — will break now. i shall return at 11:30am. ., ., ., . �* �* will break now. i shall return at 11:30am. ., . ., . �* �* , 11:30am. you are watching bbc news. and that was — 11:30am. you are watching bbc news. and that was live _ 11:30am. you are watching bbc news. and that was live coverage _ 11:30am. you are watching bbc news. and that was live coverage from - 11:30am. you are watching bbc news. and that was live coverage from the i and that was live coverage from the covid inquiry here in london. and we'vejust been watching covid inquiry here in london. and we've just been watching testimony from lord mark said well, the former head of the uk civil service here in the uk between april 2018 and september 20 20 —— sedwill. this was a crucial time because this was a point when the pandemic first emerged unlike so many were trying to deal with or handle the crisis. so large sedwill left the government backin so large sedwill left the government back in september 2020 and it was reported that it was because of clashes between himself and the prime minister's former chief adviser dominic cummings. we have been watching his testimony to the cobit inquiry. he was being questioned by hugo keith —— the covid inquiry. here is a summary of what lord sedwill had to say. one key point was how decisions were made during the pandemic and he talked about the relationship between the cabinet and the prime minister borisjohnson and he said, he had concerns that cabinet was not as fully participative in the decision—making process as it should have been and he said he raised these concerns with the prime minister. just to remind you, this is a key focus of the covid inquiry, how decisions were made during the pandemic. and then there were questions about his thoughts, about the johnson questions about his thoughts, about thejohnson government, and they said when thejohnson government first took power, this was after the december 2019 elections, he said he felt it was more like an opposition party coming into power after a general election rather than the continuation of a government and he said that there were changes of personalities when borisjohnson became prime minister. asked about the experience of the government itself, lord sedwill said there were some experienced ministers pointing to the levelling up secretary michael gove. and there were questions also about how prepared the government was at this point in preparing for a possible pandemic and he said we should have been able to do better when it came to controlling the virus. he said the government at the time did not have the proper plan on how to deal with the proper plan on how to deal with the government. you are watching bbc news, live coverage from the covid inquiry. wejust news, live coverage from the covid inquiry. we just want to point due to the bbc live page. at the moment we have and live page that has been running for the past few hours with analysis and reports from the covid inquiry there and then we have reports fromjim inquiry there and then we have reports from jim reed, our health reporter. he says lord sedwill, the former top civil servant, said, ok... here he is giving us a summary of what theirformer ok... here he is giving us a summary of what their former civil servant had to say. just to a reminder, this is live coverage from the covid inquiry that we had there from lord sedwill. he was speaking to... he was giving his testimony there to the covid inquiry and just an up some —— summary of what he had to say. a key focus had been on the decision—making in cabinet during the first few months of the covid inquiry. he told hugo keith, the inquiry. he told hugo keith, the inquiry lawyer, that he had concerns about the fact that that cabinet whilst not as fully participative in the decision—making process as it should have been. he said he raised his concerns with the former prime minister borisjohnson. he also said that he thought the government, when it came into power, that thejohnson government was more like an opposition party coming into power after a general election and that was because of the nature of the brexit process. he said there was a change of personalities when the government came into power. the inquiry didn't go on to question lord sedwill on some other points that came up during the past few days of the inquiry, one of those was his comments about how to promote herd immunity. there had been statements that he had put about encouraging people to hold the equivalent of chickenpox parties. that was an attempted said to encourage herd immunity. we are going to cross to our correspondent who was following lord sedwill�*s testimony. a key point, he was talking about decision—making within cabinet. he was making that final decision. this will be a key finding for the inquiry going forward. stand for the inquiry going forward. and the swear for the inquiry going forward. fific the swear words... that for the inquiry going forward. e"ic the swear words... that was pervading the upper echelons of government at the time but the key thing is how the structures where working and in a sense how with the decisions made. i think we got a bit of that today. mark sedwill in his role as cabinet secretary, it was his job to coordinate across the different departments within government only talked about how a number of the departments within government where essentially vertical structures, they existed on their own, the treasury, their health, transport, education. and it was his role to link all of those and that got really important during the pandemic but it wasn'tjust a help decision that had a massive impact on all those other departments, so it is quite interesting. one of the things he mentioned was he felt he had at times to remind borisjohnson to basically use his cabinet colleagues and the different cabinet ministers in decision—making, that he wasn't participative in using cabinet in a way that maybe he should have done. so i think that cuts to some of the issues of how the structures were in place and how they were used. another point, his decision not to call certain cobra meetings, especially at the start of the pandemic. there were questions whether lord sedwill made the right decisions. i whether lord sedwill made the right decisions. . ,., , whether lord sedwill made the right decisions. . , �* ., decisions. i am sorry, i can't hear what ou decisions. i am sorry, i can't hear what you are _ decisions. i am sorry, i can't hear what you are saying. _ decisions. i am sorry, i can't hear what you are saying. can - decisions. i am sorry, i can't hear what you are saying. can you - decisions. i am sorry, i can't hear i what you are saying. can you repeat the question?— the question? there were questions about whether _ the question? there were questions about whether lord _ the question? there were questions about whether lord sedwill - the question? there were questions about whether lord sedwill made i the question? there were questions. about whether lord sedwill made the right decision in not calling for a cobra meeting, i understand, right at the beginning of the pandemic. the explanation for that that he gave was that sometimes cobra meetings were used for presentational reasons, for public communications reasons, that they were called and the public were able to see that different government departments were acting on a certain issue. he explained that firstly that in essence thought that the early cobra meeting was called by matt hancock to make them look good and he was concerned that would have and he was concerned that would have a detrimental effect on what the public thought about the virus because of course at that particular moment there was a sense in downing street and out in the public that their virus wasn't, we had no idea how important it would be and these are a number of the questions we keep coming back to in this inquiry, at what point government officials and departments were taking the virus seriously. so the timing of that. i think it probably reflects on something we talked about yesterday, where there was optimism bias, where there was a sense of not worrying people unduly before they understood exactly how important the virus was. as it happened, a cobra meeting did happen a few days later he said because he felt there were credible reasons for all the departments and government to start talking about covid, but i think it gives you a sense of the feeling in government at the time that this virus was necessarily the top priority and not scaring the horses not panicking people but it was a huge issue. just not panicking people but it was a huge issue-— huge issue. just to take a step back, the _ huge issue. just to take a step back, the conversations, - huge issue. just to take a step back, the conversations, the l back, the conversations, the analysis around the inquiry at the moment has been possibly... you had the ministers, politicians on one hand and the civil service on the other and perhaps there might be a trading blame between the two of them and we had in his testimony lord sedwill referring to helen mcnamara, the other civil servant during the covid pandemic, who gave her testimony last week. so we kind of see him referring and echoing of her statements, of see him referring and echoing of herstatements, perhaps of see him referring and echoing of her statements, perhaps pitting them against the ministers in the government. it against the ministers in the government.— against the ministers in the covernment. . , , ., government. it has been a huge theme ofthe government. it has been a huge theme of the whole — government. it has been a huge theme of the whole inquiry, _ government. it has been a huge theme of the whole inquiry, how _ government. it has been a huge theme of the whole inquiry, how the - government. it has been a huge theme of the whole inquiry, how the civil - of the whole inquiry, how the civil servants worked with their politicians, are the politicians and advisers worked on this triangle of how it worked or indeed didn't work and helen mcnamara painted this very chaotic picture of downing street for her testimony last week. she talked about how there was misogyny and bullying at the highest level, how some women felt that they were invisible and therefore not only was at a deeply unpleasant place to work but it also had an impact on how decisions were made because certain people were being heard at the decision—making table so issues were missed out, issues for women, but notjust women, issues missed out, issues for women, but not just women, issues for ethnic minorities are people from different socioeconomic backgrounds. i think thatis socioeconomic backgrounds. i think that is it. i think this is the whole point of this inquiry, according to exactly how those structures worked. yes, we have heard from civil servants over the last couple of weeks and that advisers, and it was described today as temporary civil servants but in essence a slightly different camp because they are brought in and come and go with the politicians. we will hear from the politicians, and go with the politicians. we will hearfrom the politicians, including borisjohnson and rishi sunak as well as the likes of matt hancock towards the end of this part of the inquiry so that will be probably the beginning of next month so we have a lot of criticism being fired at those positions but they will have their day here at the inquiry in a few weeks' time. there are more questions to come for lord sedwill specifically around these comments that were made when apparently he said that there should be the equivalent of chickenpox parties to promote herd immunity. yes, the suggestion that he was making, suggesting a chickenpox party. that was quite early on in the pandemic, i think that was early february when he is reported to have made those remarks. the idea was on the likes of the sort of thing my mum would have done at my age in essence to get people to catch these diseases, so, chickenpox or you build up your immunity so that when you are older it doesn't affect you so bad. because chickenpox is good for kids but damaging the parents. so perhaps coronavirus could be treated in the same way. in essence, let rip was was one of the phrases that was used. people could capture and build up what was known as a herd immunity, so most of the violation got it but it was an immunity was built up so it was —— most of the population got it but the immunity was built up as a population. that language now sounds horrendous given what we know. in the inquiry they spoke about the benefit of hindsight and perhaps at the time there was this months understanding. i think it's what is trying to get to it at what point

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