those statements were very clear. first of all, the aim is not to go to military sites, and by the way it's not us it's iaea of course. the aim is to go to where -- is there suspicion of nuclear relevant activities. if they are on a military site doesn't matter. there is still the iaea access to those sites. >> i only have a few seconds left but i would hope that you would reconcile those statements for the public. >> we cannot control their statements. >> you stated the 24-day waiting period won't allow the regime to conceal any illegal activity. but as i read the agreement and many other have point t out the inspector's request to visit those sites could be delayed much longer than 24 days. i know you are not concerned about the 24-day period you believe that the iaea would be able to handle that but if you -- if you look at different parts in section q of annex 1 of the agreement, i think that we have the potential that we're looking at an 89-day delay. do you think that would be possible -- >> we certainly cannot allow for that. i did not say any illegal activity, i focused specifically or especially on activity with nuclear material as -- as my -- my real focus, number 1. number 2, is the iaea at any sign of lack of cooperation, they have to launch the process with their request for access then comes the 24 days. as i mentioned also there is an example in iran of a six-month delay and attempt to conceal, which did not work, they were caught red handed. >> you said you couldn't allow the 89 days. how many days after 24 would you allow? >> no it's the process has got to be profrment. that launches the 24-day clock, and that is the end. >> you would not allow anything past that? >> i would not. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you all for joining us. thank you for your intense work on all of this. secretary muniz you and i had a very long conversation about nuclear details, and what i would like you to discuss with the committee, specifically is the nuclear capabilities that iran have today are considerable and most experts have given it a two to three-month time frame to have enough material for a nuclear bomb. if left unchecked how quickly can they ramp up greater production to more highly enriched uranium, and then i would like you to describe what the ramp-up time would look like post 10 years. because i understand that you spent a lot of time identifying what can be changed and modified in the three existing facilities so they don't run a military risk, and so i would like that more fully described and obviously -- and the last point i want you to address -- is my constituents are very concerned about clandestine operations i would like you to address how you detect a clandestine enrichment facility during the agreement? >> quite a few questions, senator. the -- in terms of the current capacity well they have demonstrated the capacity to -- to enrich uranium, that's clear. but i do want to emphasize that they have also demonstrated that they have enriched to 20% enrichment. 20% is the cutoff that the iaea uses for low enriched and high-enriched uranium, but the point is the amount of work needed to get to 20% is nearly all the work you need to get to 90%, which would be weapons grade. so they have the capability as i already mentioned, they already have full cascades running of the next gin ration fy times more powerful disagreement will have those dismantled at the time of implementation. so what is critical is we are rolling them back in every dimension of their program for at least a considerable period. now in terms of the breakout time again, the president was very clear and our p5-plus-1 partners were very clear that a quantitative criterion for the negotiation was there had to be at least a one-year breakout time in terms of fissile material for at least ten years. we have accomplished that with this agreement. our lab scientists are fully behind this as are those of other countries. then that will roll off and after 15 years, at some point, depending on what they do then we can revert -- we may revert to the current kinds of breakout times for fissionable material. we still need to keep the lid on weaponization materials, and that was a notable improvement -- >> the agreement says they can't ever take the steps towards weaponization. >> can't take those steps. and that's the point where we will be much better off at that time than today, because we will still have enhanced verification procedures that can point our and other intelligence agencies to any violations. >> and after modification in iraq, is there any way you can reverse those modifications and make it a heavy water reactor again? >> it would provide in this language a breakout time of years? >> so online would be significant? >> they would need -- years of operation to get enough material to be relevant. and the iaea would detect that within months. >> and after modifications if they wanted to breach the agreement and try to get up and running again, does that take a significant amount of time? >> yes, because most of the sin try fujs and infrastructure will not only be stripped out completely but they will not even be stored there, they must be taken elsewhere. secondly we will have a major international presence the russians working with them on stable isotopes new science opportunities, if they kick everybody out you know. alarm bells go off. >> do our military options become better or worse after the agreement? >> if the agreement is implemented they become marginally better for the reason that under the agreement the facilities are -- we -- we learn more about them. many of them are dismantled so in that sense, that -- that purely technical military sense becomes somewhat easier. >> senator cotton. >> thank you, i want to discuss the two secret side deals when the iaea and iran. i had to travel to vienna last weekend to discover the existence of these side deals. the administration has now confirmed the existence. there is still lack of clarity about the content. >> secretary kerry have you read either of these side deals? >> no. >> have you read any previous drafts? >> no i haven't. >> on any form paper, tablet -- >> i have been briefed through our team that met with the iaea. >> did anyone on your team read the text of these agreements? >> i believe one person may have read it at the facility but doesn't have it. >> what is that person's name? >> i -- it's possible -- i don't know for sure but it's possible wendy sherman may have. but i don't know that for sure. >> secretary muniz have you read the text? >> no. >> on my medium? >> no. >> has anyone on your team at the department of energy? >> i'm not sure. i don't know. i think not, but i don't know about that. i can ask, in terms of the technical team maybe somebody saw something. >> secretary kerry as anyone else in the united states government reviewed the text of these agreements? >> not that i'm aware of. i don't think so. >> if under secretary sherman has read these agreements -- >> i don't know whether she read a summary or draft, i have no idea. i said i think, and i'm not sure. but i know she's briefing the senate very shortly, senator, so she'll be briefing in classified -- >> i have received several classified briefings about the deal and look forward to another one. but congress would like the text of these agreements as required by u.s. law. certain published reports starting yesterday, say that the content of the side deal that discusses the military base where detonators for nuclear devices may have been detonated allows iran to take their own samples to submit. can you confirm or deny that that is the content? >> i can't. but secretary muniz in his discussions made recommendations to them and i believe is satisfied that this can -- whatever the process is that the process will be able to proceed the answers we need. i don't know secretary muniz -- >> i would like to stick with you secretary kerry. why can't we confirm or deny the content of these agreements in public? why is this classified? it's not a sensitive u.s. government document? >> because we respect the process of the iaea and we don't have their authorization to reveal what is a confidential agreement between them and another country. >> the ayatollahs will know what they agreed to but not the american people? >> no not exactly. because we will share with you in the classified briefing what we understand the contents to be. but the iaea is an independent entity under the united nations, senator, as i know you know and i don't know even at this point what the law says about the united states requiring something which another entity's laws prohibit. so we have to see whether that's a conflict of law -- >> u.s. laws requires any deal between any party not just the united states be submitted to congress before the 60-day clock begins to stick. to the extent the iaea says it's unprecedented, i would say this deal is without precedent, and past precedence like deals like korea cannot be cited. could i have chart one, please? general dempsey this chart describes a particularly powerful kind of roadside bomb. are you familiar with what it shows? in >> i am senator. >> could you explain exactly what the bottom diagram shows of how it works. >> a copper cone is melted at super-high temperatures and essentially burns it way through the plate. >> the copper disk travels at about 6,000-feet per second. can i have chart two, please. so we can see what happens to a humvee when a ball of fire travels at 6,000-feet per second. is that familiar to you? >> yes, senator it is. >> do you know how many american troops were killed by such penetrate fors. >> that particular incident -- >> in general. >> several hundred. >> was iran an exclusive supplier of these -- >> yes. >> was the revolutionary guard corps the main perpetrators in iran. >> yes. >> secretary kerry those and [ inaudible ] will ultimately receive sanctions relief from this deal what should we say to the gulf shore moms and dads of the over 500 american troops that were killed by an iranian ball of fire traveling 6,000 feet per second. >> we should tell them first of all how extraordinarily grateful we are for the service of their loved ones. we should also make it very clear, that under the united states initiatives [ inaudible ] will never be relieved of any sanctions. it will also tell them what we intend to do which is to push back against iran's behavior; that we have a number of laws in place, requirements by which we will be able to prevent them from transferring these weapons. and we have already engaged, senator, in very forward-lanes initiatives to do that. we specifically turned around a convoy recently last month that was bringing weapons to yemen, and we will be crystal clear, and i will be even more clear when i meet with the gulf states about our united efforts to stop these activities. >> thank you. >> senator. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would like to start with secretary carter and chairman dempsey, in your accessment and without getting into specifics, which cannot be discussed in this open setting, is there any military response that would achieve the same goals as the agreement before us without embroiling the united states and our allies in a potentially devastating long-term war in the region in and i would like a yes or no answer. starting with secretary carter. >> well i'm sorry to -- be difficult on that. but i just need to understand the question a little bit more. you mean if there is no deal -- >> if there is no deal. >> and iran gets a nuclear weapon, then we have a serious -- >> well not even -- >> -- at that point but we would have to defend ourselves, our friends, our allies? the face of that reality. >> the reality is without this agreement iran can produce a nuclear bomb in two to three months. so without this agreement is is there any military strategy or response that would achieve the same goals as this agreement? more yes, more no. >> i'm going to have to say that there is a military response -- maybe this is responsive to your question senator -- there is a military option which i know you have been briefed on which has the effect, as i said earlier, of setting back the iranian nuclear program. it doesn't stop it forever, but it substantially sets it back. we have talked about that publicly for quite a while, we work on that -- >> mr. secretary -- >> that exists. >> the other part of my question is yes, we can have a military response that would set them back but would that response involve us in a -- basically a long-term war in that region? would that be -- highly likely outcome? >> iran would surely respond to such an attack so in a hypothetical situation in which that occurred which this deal is intended to make unnecessary, iran could respond for sure. >> chairman dempsey? >> one of my jobs senator is never let the nation run out of options, so we would not run out of options, but they would become increasingly costly. >> and long term? >> and long term. >> secretary kerry would you care to respond? >> i think general dempsey answered the question earlier when he said the deal is far more durable and provides a more durable option and longer term -- a period of time where it would be much more durable than the military option. i mean my -- look i think it's pretty clear that if iran were to start enriching or move back to its program, we have no inspectors no sanctions that are universal, the united states can have them but we have already seen sanctions don't get them to give up the program, so you are stuck with a situation of what will change the dynamic of their program, and the fact is then you are in as secretary carter and general defrp say have said, they will respond, and then we'll respond, and then it's back and forth. the question is where and how does that end? and does it accomplish the goal of getting rid of their program? we don't believe so. we believe this agreement accomplishes the goal and provides support on the continuing basis of the international community. >> thank you, let me go on. this is for secretary carter and again chairman dempsey, are you contemplating any changes in our force posture, assuming this agreement goes into effect and stays in effect? >> yes. that's a yes or no answer -- if i can say more. >> briefly. >> yes, we are doing a great deal in the gulf. that's what i was there talking to our gulf partners about. that's what we were talking at the gcc summit a few months ago. we're doing a great deal with israel, i mentioned the military defense, this is a dynamic region with or without a deal and -- ♪ and we have breaking news for you, afghan intelligence is confirming the death of mull la omar. they say they have credible evidence that the long-time head of the afghan taliban actually died in 2013 in pakistan. he headed the taliban in afc in the 1990s, but fled after the u.s.-lead invasion back in 20 20 -- 2011. mike viqueira is live in washington with more. mike what do we know? >> the white house says they will get back to us. still trying to confirm the reports that have been confirmed by the afghan government. afghan intelligence sources say that the man who lead the taliban back in the resistance to the soviet union, that's where he cut his teeth and became militarized, lead the taliban until the american invasion of afghanistan. last seen riding a bicycle in december of 2001, after fleeing kabul in the face of the on slot into that country. the question now is what kind of impact is this going to have on the negotiations between the afghan government lead by the newly installed president. negotiations are ongoing between the afghan government and the taliban as american troops continue their withdraw it has slowed somewhat, but the combat role is over. american troops roughly 10,000 of them still in afghanistan in an advisory role. i think we can expect the white house and we'll hear from them in their daily briefing and i think you can expect them to trumpet this news trumpet the effect of the partnership with nato and afghan forces but with the pakistani forces. as you reported call he died two years ago according to these reports. paul? >> mike you mentioned the obama administration is putting a lot of trust in this relatively knew afghan government but what does it say about our relationship that this happens more than two years ago. presumably they have known about it and they didn't tell us. >> i think it may say more about the relationship with the pakistani government. the afghan intelligence services confirmed this today that he was in fact dead. but obviously there has been a rocky road between the united states and pakistan over the last few years with accusations that the pakistanis have been far too close to the taliban. pakistan has initiated offensives to drive the taliban and other radical elements out of the so-called tribal areas, along the border with afghanistan, but that is a great question. a lot of the details have yet to emerge paul. >> mike stay with us. we're going to run a quick story in nicole johnson about his life and impact on the region. >> reporter: the americans has placed a multi-million dollars bounty on his head. the man who was the spiritual leader and military commander of the taliban. a reclusive private man for most of his life and this is one of the few photos of him. he began has a fighter battling against soviets during the 1980s. his confident described how he became the emir of afghanistan, self proclaimed. >> eventually the taliban chose him as a leader because he had [ inaudible ] people and we had some weapons to use. the second reason he was a famous [ inaudible ] person. >> reporter: his 30 fighters turned into thousands, as the taliban movement grow and took over afghanistan in 1996. under his command the taliban established security and order in a country ravaged by chaos and violence. but stability came at a cost the strict interpretation of islam meant harsh punishment meted out on the population. it is his alliance with al-qaeda leader osama bin laden during that time that became the driving force shaping much of afghanistan's fate. it was a close and mutually beneficial relationship. bin laden swore alliance to mulla. their bond came familiaral when bin laden's son married omar's daughter. but it was attack in the u.s. for which al-qaeda claimed responsibility that shifted the american attention firmly on to afghanistan and its leader. his alliance with bin laden rose to international prominence when the twin towers went down. omar said expelling bin laden would have violated the tradition of hospitality. it would a refusal that would cost the afghan people dearly. a united states coalition launched a full scale war with the aim to destroy al-qaeda and the taliban regime that harbored it. the u.s. did get rid of the taliban regime but failed to capture the leader. but he did not give up his political fight. he directed a war against the newly appointed government. the war wreaked havoc across afghanistan. roadside bombings targeting afghan security, and nato forces became their hallmark. it made the government's task virtually impossible. the karzai government did extend a hand to omar in november 2008 urging him to lay down his weapons in exchange for his safety. but he refused to cooperate. >> if i hear from him that he is willing to come to afghanistan, or to negotiate for peace, i, the president of afghanistan will go to any length to provide him protection. >> reporter: instead he is believed to have lived in hiding in the mownous regions on the afghan pakistan border for much of the time until his death. nicole johnston al jazeera. >> and just a brief reminder there, the long-time head and founder of the taliban in afghanistan confirmed dead actually died two years ago in pakistan. we're going to take a quick break, and be right back with more live coverage of the senate armed services committee hearing on the iran nuclear deal. ♪ recapping our breaking news story we have been telling you about, afghan intelligence now confirming dhaet of mulla omar. they say they have credible evidence that the long-time head of the afghan taliban died in 2013 in pakistan. he was any head of the taliban in the 1990s, but fled after the u.s. invasion in 2011. we will keep you updated as we learn more. back to our coverage this morning, though of the senate armed services committee hearing on the iran nuclear deal. libby casey is on capitol hill where she has been following it all morning. libby we have been watching this for hours now. what stands out to you the most? >> we're definitely seeing partisan lines drawn. tom cotton just had a round of questioning. a freshmen senator. freshmen usually listen more than they talk in the senate but not this guy. he is very critical of this negotiated deal and you heard some intense back and forth between senator cotton and members of the administration. senator cotton focusing on something we have heard a lot about this week. side deals, we calls them with the

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