Introduction
Every construction project has at least one consultant appointed by a developer (also known as an employer of the project). While the types of consultant and their respective roles may differ from project to project, a consultant s role generally includes the certification of work and progress. In most instances, this also requires the consultant to certify the amount payable for work done and the amount payable by the employer to the main contractor. A payment certificate will be issued thereafter.
As cashflow is crucial for main contractors in any ongoing construction project, prompt and expeditious payments by the employer are often expected. However, if the main contractor is dissatisfied with the payment certificate, can the main contractor sue the consultant for negligence? The Court of Appeal addressed this question in a recent case commenced by PCP Construction Sdn Bhd against L3 Architects Sdn Bhd.(1) In its decision, the Court of Appeal unanimously upheld t
Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 provides the courts with broad powers to grant remedies as they deem necessary to bring an end to the complaints raised in an oppression action. In
Lee Kai Wuen v Lee Yee Wuen,(1) the Federal Court refused leave to appeal the Court of Appeal s decision which had found that the courts powers in an oppression action are broad and unfettered. This includes the power to order restitution to a company, a remedy traditionally seen as belonging to companies.
Facts
The subject company had two shareholders. The plaintiff (the majority shareholder) filed an oppression action against the other shareholder and a third party (the oppressors), anchored on, among other things, an allegation of misappropriation of company funds. According to the plaintiff, upon the hospitalisation and eventual death of the previous majority shareholder, the oppressors had conspired to have the creditors pay them monies which were supposed to be paid to the company. The plai
Yong Tshu Khin v Dahan Cipta Sdn Bhd & Other Appe
als,(1) seven motions were filed contesting the validity of the appointment of two judges and challenging their respective decisions.
Pursuant to Rule 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1995, the seven motions were filed in the apex court, requesting it to invoke its inherent power to review its decisions delivered in seven separate lawsuits. Interestingly, a common question arose from these motions premised on coram failure and further questions that were peculiar to the circumstances of each case. While the apex court dismissed all of the motions, its unanimous decision on coram failure is significant for ongoing and future cases.
Introduction
The Kuala Lumpur High Court has held that the appointment of the director of the Asian International Arbitration Centre (AIAC) is not justiciable in the Malaysian courts.
On 12 October 2020 the high court struck out two originating summonses against the former director of the AIAC, the late Vinayak Pradhan.(1)
The originating summonses were taken out by Prestij Mega Construction Sdn Bhd against the claimants in two separate adjudication proceedings. Prestij Mega sought to set aside the adjudication decisions on the grounds that, among other things, the appointments of the adjudicators were invalid. To this end, Prestij Mega sought declarations that: