complex, there s a lot of people reflecting on that 20 s years later and saying what was our strategy? what were we attempting to do? the intelligence was flawed going into iraq and there wasn t a very good end state other than to depose sadam hussein as a dictator, the biggest lesson i think a lot of people if they haven t learned they should, is don t go to war unless you have a very good strategy for what you re attempting to do and you have a very good preliminary end state for what you want to accomplish. neither one of things were done in iraq, and just like the russians, also, i would harken back i was the war planner in the pentagon when that war was planned. and actually stood up and said, there are not enough forces for this kind of operation and our end state, objectives are not very clear. truthfully, i think we learned a lot from that. but our soldiers also fought valiantly and i think separate the war from the warriors
kate, that is the question of the day. first, if i can comment on what susan just said, there will most definitely be not just a military after-action review of the last 20 years, but i m certain there will be an interagency review. and the critical part of that, if i may, is to make sure it s a bipartisan and calm effort to determine what we did right and what we did wrong. there was certainly a lot of things we did right as well as many of the things that we did wrong during our time in afghanistan. now, to answer your second question, i actually have a letter to myself in my desk drawer that when i was the war planner in 2002 when we were in the pentagon, in the joint staff, i had to brief a couple of key leaders in the department of defense about what going into iraq would cause us. in that long four-page letter i wrote to myself which i haven t chonin except my wife, there were some things that talked about the future of american
north korea s solid fuel rockets? does it change the equation. it does provide a degree of efficiency and mobility and gives you less warning than do a liquid fuel rockets but they ve been moving in this direction for years. again, it s another thing that we watch. because it reduces our warnings, if you will. but we have very good intelligence on north korea. we work closely with our partners, the south koreans who are capable ally as well. these are all things it s my responsibility along with the intelligence community to keep a close eye on. do you think this is just a cycle that kim jong un goes through thi this saber rattlingd it s kind of what happens every christmas. i ve been watching north korea since 1994 when i was a war planner in the pacific on the army staff. i ve seen these efforts, these plays, if you will, how north korea acts, whether him or his father. the important thing is to pay
they will range death and destruction on the capital city. then whatever follows that, are they going to engage japan, launch any kind of other attack? and it will start the war that will probably end his regime. so we do have options, but all of them are bad. the best option of course is not to have to fight. if we can get through some sort of diplomatic effort. if we think that the north koreans are going to diplomatically remove their nuclear weapons, i think that s not going to happen. general hertling, we had ambassador baucus on earlier, saying that he believes china would get involved, they wouldn t just stand by and watch a conflict get under way on their border without getting involved. do you think that s a possibility? i think that s probably very true, and he knows it more than most having been the ambassador at one time. anderson, if i can say something else. sure. when i was the war planner in the pentagon right before we went into iraq, one of the tasks i had was
caused yourself a little bit of trouble. the current administration has achieved great things over the last seven to ten days in terms of diplomatic action and informational action. to have the leader of that administration using the bellicose language that a lot of the world sees in a very different way than many americans do, causes some challenges when you re talking about a strategic event with dire circumstances on the peninsula of korea. as we re focusing on this one area of the world, one of the jobs i had as a war planner in the pentagon many years ago was to say what s going on in the rest of the world. this is one of three or four major issues that the united states is involved in. if you put all your focus in one area where this was a conflict we ve always known for the last several decades would consume america s strength and power, and to put all our focus on this one area when we have very many