in united states versus savage the prosecutor asked for 49 months. you imposed 37. that was a 24% reduction. and in united states versus stewart the prosecutor asked for 97 months. you imposed 57. that was a 41% reduction. every single case, 100% of them when prosecutors came before you with child pornography cases you sentenced the defenders to substantially below not just the guidelines, which are way higher, but what the prosecutor asked for on average of these cases 47.2% less. now, you said you made sure the voice of the children was heard. do you believe in a case like united states versus hawkins where the prosecutor asked for 24 months and you sentenced the offender to only 3 months, do you believe the voice of the children is heard when 100% of
minimum of 60 months and you imposed 60 months because you had no discretion. in united states versus nickerson there was a mutual agreement of the parties to 120 months and that s what you imposed. in every other case, united states versus chasen, the prosecutor asked for 78 to 97 months. you imposed 28 months. 28 months is a 64% reduction. in united states versus cooper the prosecutor asked for 72 months. you imposed 60 months. that was a 17% reduction. in united states versus downs the prosecutor asked for 70 months. you imposed 60. that was a 14% reduction. in united states versus hawkins the prosecutor asked for 24 months. you imposed 3 months. that was an 88% reduction.
united states versus hess, a mandatory of 60 months. you had no discretion. united states versus nickerson, there was a mutual agreement to 120 months. that s what you imposed. in every other case, united states versus chazin, the prosecutor asked for 78 to 97 months. you imposed 28 months. 28 months is a 64% reduction. in united states versus cooper, the prosecutor asked for 72 months. you imposed 60 months. that was a 17% reduction. in united states versus downs, the prosecutor asked for 70 months. you imposed 60. that was a 14% reduction. the united states versus hawkins, the prosecutor asked for 24 months. you imposed three months.
the time you re sentencing child those in possession of child pornography to far below what the prosecutor s asking for? yes, senator, i do. could you explain how? i will. a couple of observations. one is that your chart does not include all of the factors that congress has told judges to consider including the probation office s recommendation in these cases. well, judge, we don t have those the committee has not been given the probation officer s recommendation. we would welcome them. mr. chairman, i would love to see those the second thing i would say is that i take these cases very seriously as a mother, as someone who as a judge has to review the actual evidence in these cases and based upon
0 stems back decades and that is concerning. you wrote your note on the harvard law review on sex crimes. your note is your major academic work on the law review and yours is entitled prevention versus punishment: towards a principled distinction in the restraint of released sex offenders. and in it you argue, and i quote, a recent spate of legislation purports to regulate released sex offenders by requiring them to register with local law enforcement officials, notify community members of their presence, undergo dna testing and submit to civil commitment for an indefinite term. at many courts and commentators herald these laws as valid regulatory measures, others reject them as punitive enactments that violate the rights of individuals who have already been sanctioned for their crimes. under existing doctrine the constitutionality of sex offender statutes depends upon their characterization as essentially preventative rather than punitive. and what you go on to explain is if they