of summitry. i m more a fan of the approach were you in order to get a very comprehensive detailed agreement, it s got to be done at the envoy level rather than the leader level. you want to have an agreement more like the arms control treaties with the soviets which were hundred pages or more very intricate and very rigorous verification requirements. whether you have the president first reach an agreement and then the envoys detail it out, but you do not want to have unilateral concessions as we did in singapore. we need to have progress even on achieving a common definition of what denuclearization is. the special envoy admitted in january that we don t even have an agreed definition of denuclearization is from north korea despite repeated statements by secretary pompeo. paul: would you expect and think that at a minimum we need to get, the united states needs to get from north korea, at least a declaration of where the nuclear sites are and where the research sites are and on
of summitry. i m more a fan of the approach were you in order to get a very comprehensive detailed agreement, it s got to be done at the envoy level rather than the leader level. you want to have an agreement more like the arms control treaties with the soviets which were hundred pages or more very intricate and very rigorous verification requirements. whether you have the president first reach an agreement and then the envoys detail it out, but you do not want to have unilateral concessions as we did in singapore. we need to have progress even on achieving a common definition of what denuclearization is. the special envoy admitted in january that we don t even have an agreed definition of denuclearization is from north korea despite repeated statements by secretary pompeo. paul: would you expect and think that at a minimum we need to get, the united states needs to get from north korea, at least a declaration of where the nuclear sites are and where the research sites are and on
point, they went ahead and bombed those tunnels but nobody was able to actually go in and inspect if, in fact, they are not usable at this point. so there needs to be some sort of, i guess, policing behind it. where does that come into talks? well, i think there s a way to denuclearize, the verification requirements and would make everybody whole. very simple. i think what the north koreans would do in agreement, first step, give up one or two nuclear weapons, we would take some sanctions, some international body would give up and north koreans would give up icbm s, we inspect them. but we probably would need at least, julie, a thousand more inspectors to go into north korea, see how much nuclear material they have, how many bombs they have and then make sure they are all dismantled. that would take years and that s going to be a process. julie: remember back in september, they successfully
ford and bush sr. if we walk away we will walk awe way alone and probably in that situation be resigned to the worst of all possibilities a loss of international unity, a loss of international unity will almost certainly at least fray or unravel the sanctions regime. iran would get additional economic activity without the requirements of rolling back its nuclear program dramatically, without the unprecedented verification requirements we have put in place for the very, very long term. energy secretary ernest moniz, great to see you again, sir. thank you for being was. we ll be right back with more politics. james hoffa, the labor vote. (clicking noise)