you will be familiar with. that didn t mean that we didn t do contingency planning or game out or test the other propositions. and, just to be clear, that s something that was widely shared, that view, amongst nato allies. dominic raab. 0ur political correspondent ione wells is at westminster hi, my team. i think one of the key learnings that we got from mr rab there was what we have just learned today. essentially the central intelligence was operating on the central assessment that they were following that when us troops withdrew we would see a steady deterioration of the situation in afghanistan but that kabul was unlikely to fall this year. in other words, the intelligence they were following was not correct and that is a pretty strong can make admission we have heard there from the foreign secretary in a sponsor terms as we have had for some time. quite frosty the chair when tom tugendhat specifically press the pm on a key risk report from july that
convince the united states that it would be a better idea to withdraw in phases, where he tried to convince them to extend that deadline, he couldn t answer those basic questions, and, most tellingly of all, it was clear that, having had 18 months to prepare and four and a half months in which they had known that the 31st of august was the date by which all british troops, all british staff, all british nationals in the afghans who helped us would need to be evacuated, while some countries like france had put those measures and placements and months ago, his department had been the weakest link in a very weak chain and hadn t put in a very weak chain and hadn t put in place basic resources here in the uk in order to deal with the inevitable applications they d have to process. but inevitable applications they d have to rocess. . to process. but if the intelligence that the foreign to process. but if the intelligence that the foreign secretary - to process. but if the intelligence t
and the diplomatic assessment that s layered on top of that. there was a collective assessment through the jic? it was a collective assessment through the jic that you were referring to? it wasn t a particularly military assessment, is that correct? well, thele is there to provide the information, if you like, the raw intelligence that s distilled down, and then that is backed up by the military assessment, for example, on things like intent although, frankly, it s a cross cutting issue. my point is this. the central assessment that we were operating to and it was certainly backed up by both thele and the military is that the likely, most likely, most central proposition was that, given the troop withdrawal by the end of august, you would see a steady deterioration from that point, and that it was unlikely kabul would fall this year. that was the central assessment, and, of course, with all the usual caveats that
first tier interventions there were no american casualties, fewer than ten in the syria intervention, but in afghanistan, the initial military action was in conjunction with a local partner, that is the northern alliance, and by the time that was accomplished at the end of 2001, sporting the local partner and accomplishing what it wanted which was to oust the taliban and retake kabul, the taliban was gone and al-qaeda was gone. then we transformed the mission to make afghanistan into the kind of country which we thought it would become a highly centralised, where all the decisions were made in kabul, even hiring a local schools superintendent, and in kabul, or concentrated in the hands of the president and in a country that was
than no american casualties, fewer than ten in the syria intervention, but in afghanistan, the initial military action was in conjunction with a local partner, that is the northern alliance, and by the time that was accomplished at the end of 2001, sporting the local partner and accomplishing what it wanted which was to oust the taliban and retake kabul, the taliban was gone and al-qaeda was gone. then we transformed the mission to make afghanistan into the kind of country which we thought it would become a highly centralised, where all the decisions were made in kabul, even hiring a local schools superintendent, and in kabul, or concentrated in the hands of the president and in a country that was