thought the case was wrongly decided in the first instance would run counter to the ability to function as a corner stone of the rule of law in this context. is it your argument that a case can never be overruled simply because it was e egregiously long? i think at the least the state would have to come forward with changed circumstance or some kind of materially new argument, and mississippi hasn t done so really? suppose plessi versus ferguson was reargued. nothing had changed. would it not be sufficient to say that was an egregiously wrong decision on the day it was handed down, and now it should be overruled? it certainly was egregiously wrong on the day it was handed down, but what the court said to brown and casey was that what had become clear is that the factual premise that underlei the decision, was mistaken. and
as an american institution. that s what they re saying. so we re looking at it for that, but we are looking too, and that they say is a reason why. a reason why when you get a case like that, you better be damn sure that the normal stari considerations overruling are really there in spades double, triple, quadruple, and then they go through and show their knowledge. okay? what s the paradox? maybe you think i ve just made an argument that there isn t one, but really, in my head, i m thinking i m not sure. there may be one, and i don t know if you ve ever thought about this. i don t know if you ever have when that occurred to you. i don t want to overrule the i wouldn t want the court to overrule the staridecisis section of casey.
circumstance since roe and casey. contraceptives were in 1992 and they recognized it would deeply implicate the interests of women. even on the facts the state is mistaken here. a contraceptive failure rate in this country is about 10% using the common methods. that means women using contraceptives, approximately one in ten will experience an unplanned pregnancy in the first year. about half the women with unplanned pregnancies were on contraceptives in the month it occurred. i think the idea that contraceptives could make the need for abortion dissipate is just contrary to the factual reality. you also mentioned or maybe it was your co-counsel, that life changes for women after 15 weeks. that s exactly right, justice. i think this is responsive to the questions being asked about. the impact of enforcing a
squarely addressed viability, because the government had made the argument that viability no, no, i appreciate that casey addressed it. but that s different than saying it was at issue. it said it was the central principal of roe because it was pretty much all that was left after they were done dealing with the rest of us. the regulations in casey had no applicability or not depending on where viability was. if they didn t say anything about viability, it s like what justice blackman said in when discussing among his colleagues, which is good reason not to have papers out that early, is that they don t have to address the line drawing at all in roe. and they didn t have to address the line drawing at all in casey. i disagree. the undo burden test incorporates the viability line. that was what the court was
0 standard of self-has proved difficult to administer and that is relevant to the analysis. and i want to give you an opportunity to respond. yes, your honor. the first point i d like to make is the undue burden test is not at issue in this case. that is the test that applies to regulations, not prohibitions. and the state has conceded that this is a prohibition. that s the title of this law. an act to prohibit abortion after 15 weeks. the only thing at issue in this case is the viability line, and the viability line has been enduringly workable. the lower federal courts have applied it consistently and uniformly for 50 years, and the fifth circuit here below had no difficulty striking down this law unanimously, 3 -0. it s been an exceedingly workable standard. if i may return to your question, sir chief justice, a reasonable possibility standard would not be workable. it would ultimately boil down to an argument that states can prohibit a category of women from exercising the consti