chief chairman mark milley said. the mirror imaging of the building of the afghan national army based on american doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. that may have been overly dependent upon us, our presence, contractors and higher-tech systems in order to fight a counterinsurgency war. that s one area that needs to be how did we miss an army that quick and that fast in 11 days. things like legitimacy of the government, corruption, parasitic nature of the police forces. he really went there, general. what do you think the lessons are? first of all, good morning, kate. there are a lot of lessons. i agree with clarissa that i thought the testimony was very candid and very frank.
national army based on american doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. that made a military that may i will await full evaluation may have been fully dependent on us and contractors and higher tech systems in order to fight a counter insurgency war. we need to explore that. the intel. how did we miss the collapse of an army and government in 11 days? other factors not strictly military. things like legitimacy of the government. corruption, parasitic nature of the police forces. a whole series of 10 or 20 i wrote down just a week or two that need to be looked at comprehensively over time. we know where the former president of afghanistan is today? and how much money he took with him? do we have any idea?
on american doctrine, tactics, and that is a military that may, i will wait full evaluation, but they may have been present on us and higher tech systems to fight a counter insurgency war. another is the intel. how did we miss a collapse that big. but things like corruption, the paracidic nature of the police forces. we need to look at it very seriously and comprehensively overtime. do we know where the former president of afghanistan is today and how much money he took with him? secretary austin, do you have
0 why wasn t action taken to secure the kabul airport or retake bagram then? thank you, senator. you re right, the tempo had picked up significantly, yet the taliban continued to make advances. our entire chain of command, myself, the chairman, general mckenzie routinely engaged the afghan leadership to encourage them to solidify their defensive plans, to make sure they were providing the right logistics to their troops and further stiffen their defenses, to no avail. to compound that, president ghani continued to make changes in the leadership of the military and this created further problems for the afghan security forces. i don t mean to interrupt you, but my time is lapsing. this gets to the overestimation, i think the overly optimistic assessment, because even as late as july you re still encouraging the afghan special forces, you re expecting the ghani government to remain. in december of 2019, the washington post reported that the u.s. military commanders privately express
0 retake bagram then? thank you, senator. you are right, the tempo had picked up significantly. the taliban continued to make advances. our entire chain of command, myself, the chairman, general mckenzie, routinely engaged in after began leadership to encourage them to solidify their defensive plans, to make sure they were providing the right logistics to their troops and stiffen their defenses to no avail. and to compound that, president ghani continued to make changes in the leadership of the military and this created further problems for the afghan security forces. mr. secretary i don t mean to interrupt but my time is lapsing. this gets to the overestimation, i think the overly optimistic assessment. even as late as july you are still encouraging the afghan special forces, you are expecting the ghani government to remain, but that was not the case. in december of 2019 the washington post reported the u.s. military commanders privately expressed a lack of confidence that the a