it was an extremely unpopular decision that wanted to protect his constitutional rights. and for ensuring that here is something unpopular. we can t protect his rights. yet, when you were asked why you feel how you do know, on the independent counseling statute, you feel differently than you did in the 1990s. and you mentioned it to senator feingold that you feel differently because of 9/11. and that the president needs to be given more reign, i guess, to focus on national security issues. i am trying to square that. i think that your explanation of how you ruled this case is admirable. i m not sure about your
justice burger, who had been appointed. it was a moment where the president of the united states was ruled against by the supreme court, including two of his appointees. the hamdan case before speeds came back to me, justice kennedy, and 2008, ruling against president bush. in a wartime case. and so to my hamdan case, i do look at that as a case where the rule of law protects all who come into court, regardless of who you are. no one is above the law. the president is subject to many legal restraints in terms of the official capacity, the war effort, and i think my decisions have shown that independence in a variety of areas. thank you. let me shift gears in my final couple of minutes to technology. we struggle here in congress
whatever he wanted. the genius of our system, our separation of powers and the separation of powers, there has to be constraints. you mentioned constraints, some of them yesterday, what kind of constraints the president has. still, the president has immense powers. largely because we have conceded too much from the article one branch to the article two branch. but when we talk about presidential power now, i was struck by a conversation you had yesterday with senator feinstein. i wanted to explore it a bit. you mentioned as a point of pride, and i think it is a point of pride, that you have ruled in the case, after 9/11, this is one of the drivers for usama bin laden.
i understand that you did not rule that the cfpb could be that it was so unconstitutional that it had to be eliminated. but that it s a structure needed to be changed in regards to the authority to replace the director. could you first of all just describe your reasoning in that case a little bit, and that i have one follow-up question. that decision in my view followed from the other case that chief justice roberts had written for the court. the cfpb was also structured differently from the normal agency, and of the supreme court, speaking through roberts, had made clear that independent agencies that were a novel, not historically rooted in structure, were problematic constitutionally. and the single director head of an agency was something novel, not something that traditionally occurred in independent
and in the supreme court now about certain applications of the nondelegation document. but congress can delegate probably. there are limits. it has to be an intelligible principle. that is the praise that the supreme court has used. now, what that means in practice has been decided under a series of cases applying the principle over time, built on one another, and that is what the court applies to figure out, whether a delegation has gone too far. this brings in the issue of independent agencies as well. i know you have talked about that a lot as well. humphrey s executor is the case that sets the standard, correct? as to what is an appropriately constitutional created independent agency? that is correct. the 1935 decision upheld where the heads of the agency s