of the article 2 interests the balancing of marbury and to the extent that the court is reaching policy considerations of the court those are decisively outweighed by the sort of the republic shattering consequences of subjecting chief executives in an endless cycle to prosecution once they leave office. the founders were very much against that and deeply concerned with that, and you can see it in hamilton s writings in federalists 67, 68, and 69, and you can see that in the other writings of the meaning of the constitution. do you think that we should it occurred to me. do you think that we should take any cognizance of the fact that when they wrote that george washington was the president, and albeit a very, very strong executive that congress was
are inherent in marbury versus madison are like delivering a seal when requested, because there is a separate statute, and the secretary of the state had two of the hats on and he was on one hand the direct agent of the president, and that could never be examinable by the courts, but on the other hand, the original statute had imposed all of the purely ministerial duties that had to do with the recordkeeping and delivering of documents and if you had a land deed that had a seal on it, and the person asked for it no, discretion at all, but the take-care clause, there is no statute that could impose on the president, a, a mandatory duty to engage, and the notion that when the president is meeting with the department of justice and enforce federal fraud statutes and that being ministerial strikes me as insupportable. well, i think that you are missing what i am asking. which is, i think that it is
merits. let me ask you about marbury versus madison and what is your interpretation of the progeny or the case, itself? so, our interpretation is more in line of judge pan and yours, in that it does not erect an unreviewable power of the presidency and sort of the prime example of that is the steel seizure case, the youngstown case, and that is president truman closing steel mills, and the court coming in to review that. we see it all of the way through to the present, and so it is hard to see any world in which the court just says, you know, we can t intervene here. we do see the judge henderson s distinction between ministerial a acts and the discretionary call, because it is something that i
conduct in the later krarticlesn the acquittal which is the strongest case of double jeopardy, but if there is unrelated well, you just made a statement of he is only prosecuted for crimes while in office. and so that is why i am asking about leaving office and then thereafter being prosecuted for something different. the point is actually that the best reading is impeach and convicted for the prosecution. and if he were impeach and then removed from office and then concon vi convingt convicted for something else unrelated to office, that is under marbury. i want to confirm. your position is that if president trump had been convicted after his impeachment trial on incitement of insurrection and he had been
is he trying to go around another way? if you get the president saying don t regard supreme court decisions as law of the land, you have a new form of government, not separation of power. presidents get to nominate supreme court justices. but once they speak, that s it. 1803 decision by marshall still stands. steve: sure. decider of what is constitutional is, you cited marbury, u.s. supreme court, regardless of what people think or they do not like what the supreme court is saying, that is elections have consequences. bill: right, elections have consequences, the court is the final word. the worry is biden has been critical supreme court decisions, which is fine issue