Than 200,000 complete suits of uniforms to its soldiers in the field just in that time period. I do have to note a few qualifications. It was not always the most perfect system. The Southern Railroad network as it deteriorated often meant that Raw Materials and finished products would be delayed in either reaching the factories or reaching the destination points. It also meant that some alternate materials had to be used instead of the preferred all woollen outer garments, the confederates had to reply very extensively all on what was commonly called jean cloth, a mixture of wool and cotton, what was often called negro cloth. In the antebellum cloth this cloth was used to produce clothing for slaves in the south. In the production of shoes, teen agricultural south had a shortage of leather and could not make two standard infantry footwear that jefferson brogan or jefferson booty. That had been developed in the United States army in the 1850s. The southern style shoe had to produced a l
If the British Forces simply sailed up the potomac, everybody would know that washington was the ultimate party. Coburn recommends that the force be split up, one squadron sail up the Potomac River and threaten the capitol and the city of alexandria, the main force is going to go up the Pawtuxet River into southern maryland. The advantage was that it would shield the ultimate british intention it might mean an attack on washington, it could also mean the british were simply chasing after Commodore Joshua Barney who was the american commander of the chess peak flotilla, who had a flotilla of barges and the rivers flowing into it. He had been trapped in the Pawtuxet River, he was further up river than the british, and the british could use barneys presence. Its what the british commanders, general ross and admiral alexander dock run agree to do. This weekend a panel of historians as they discuss the bu burning of washington. Thats sunday at 6 00 and 10 00 p. M. Eastern, all right here on
Rebuild these huge wooden spans. So thats where the real mastery logistics comes into play. One more question over here. General hood has been undergoing a bit of a reevaluation recently. It seemed to me that his plans. Once he took over as commander of the army of tennessee were fairly good plans on paper, its just that his army couldnt execute them for one reason or another. Could you comment briefly on hoods generalship as the commander of the army of tennessee . Sure. Hood is doesnt certainly doesnt have the mastery of logistics that sherman does. That becomes painfully evident during the Tennessee Campaign in 1864. But hoods operating under some pretty severe handicaps. Not only his own physical handicaps, he also has the command structure with a lot of generals who are woefully inexperienced at their division and core level of command. They just they dont execute hoods orders, and dont carry out his plans the way he had envisioned them. I think the other important factor is that
Libraries, and there are lots of things that you can dig out of that volume. But by the spring of 1862, the powder works quickly constructed by incorporating the industrial capacity of much of the south by having the individual parts of the factory produced in different places, including some of the incorporating wheels, the big what you can kind of think of as grinding wheels in nashville, the drive shaft in the incorporating House Building which was in segments, which is almost 300 feet long, was cast in segments in chattanooga, and then shipped by rail to augusta and assembled in the complex. There was a refinery for refining, removing impurities from the principal component of gunpowder at that time, potassium nitrate. And then large cooling magazines, and also storage magazines. And the complex was laid out essentially so that all the materiel progressed from downstream to upstream, and the finished product, and also the most dangerous part of the product was also located furthest
New book will be coming out the world war ii memoirs of major russell. To ourive our attention speaker, dr. Lawrence kaplan. [applause] thank you. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Discussing civil war artillery today, if it were possible, john tidball, who is one of theidered foremost experts on the topic, would be speaking to you today. Tidball died in 1906, thats not possible. The will be discussing topic based on his writings, which i edited, and were the title the Artillery Service in the war of the rebellion by Westholme Publishing in 2011. The main point that tidball makes is that Field Artillery was most effective in the civil war when it provided mass. Tration and he argues convincingly that the inability of the army to organize its Field Artillery prior to the battle of contributedille significantly to its defeat in a number of major battles. Byill illustrate his points book. G excerpts from his writings. Tidballs first, a word about john tidball. He was a career army off