For those you have served i0z the government, you know how delicious that is. Jcrp÷ its necessary. We are welcomingczsoy i said in myv u. Remarks, we want to work with nonNuclear Weapon states as well asl fw Nuclear Weapon states and so were at this point open minded about who will be participating. Ihx n also want to sandnc y however that £n hope en,3f . Invigorate the work the p5 because we also think its very important that the Nuclear Weapon states develop some sophisticated simq9 9 ofigfod these mao2. In the last year, we have had success in establishing a pe7zs working group1cfgh that meets in 6rt vienna at the same time that working group b is thevx o÷ Verification Working Group that deals with a comprehensive test treaty and looks at technical verification issues in that i think its fine for the p5 to begin work n focussing on ctbt verification because that provides a lot of veryn Technical Information that can then in the future be broadened out in other directions so the V
So more than doubles. The International Panel on Climate Change has actually put more emphasis in this. If youre trying to hit a 550 target and you take ccs off the table, the cost goes up about 50 or really goes up between sort of 30 and 80 for 550. If you want to hit a 450 target the cost triples. Goes up between 200 and 400 . Thats a lot of money, and its just because in some markets coal with ccs is the cheap option. Not everywhere, maybe not in california, maybe not in arizona, but in a whole bunch of markets, in a whole bunch of places in the country and around the world, ccs with coal is the cheapest option for deep abatement, and if you get rid of that cheapest option, you have to replace it with something more costly or less efficient. The good news is weve made a lot of progress on this. This slide is actually a little old, but basically the lower two bars are stuff thats built and operating or will be operating soon because its being built. So right now were here at 2015, we
Point will the administrationa reconsider linking its own the size of the u. S. Stockpile with the size ofdnbym russias stockpile and just accept nuclear postureg recommended judgmentwaen the u. S. Can get ÷ by with a smallerd,xn arsenal┌n i believe the question about unilateral reductions and i will say as ive said repeatedlys9 4 includingb4azjw in public testimony that8 unilateral reductions are noax the table. not on the 7n i can say. Ja 4n h 4q< yes, good morning. Tim gent from the defense threat reductionq thank you for all your hard work madame secretary. As a member2xfn and treaty imply8 meanter, we sit back and look at somes 7 of the effect treaty year five, six, and out to 2018. As we see the likelihood of new sanctions being announced as early friday do you believero that the willing0rpw to sacrifice all. Zch the hard work that your office has done yc over thequq years aroundczm]p euu zm5 continue with sanctions or[zcwcl can remain separate and continue on separate paths t
I think its completely crazy were doing substantive work on the 17th of december. I cant imagine were holding real conferences here right the week before christmas, but we are, but thats because theres so much to talk about, and im so glad to have you all come. Thank you, thank you all for being here. My name is john hamre, im the president at csis. I wanted to say special thanks to Julio Friedmann who is a friend. We have known each other for many years. Hes fortunately in town serving in government more directly. Hes a government guy, hes out at Lawrence Livermore labs but were so pleased he can be here leading at a crucial time when we need to be thinking through a lot of important issues. For a very strange reason, recently i have been doing some personal reading on the history of philosophy, and i was recently reading about Thomas Robert maltous, a british cleric who in the early 18th century who was a very provocative philosopher because he had very dark views about the future of
Thats whats being put through a little bit of processing come easily removed, but the rest of it has to be stored in tanks, okay. So theres a couple sources of leakage here, of contamination. We have these trenches that were between the building, reactor buildings and the ocean, okay. Those have contamination in them and thats one possible source. But you had some leakage of these tanks. These tanks were bolted together. They were not welded, okay. And some of them have leaked. One has a late a significant amount, and a couple others, a Japanese Nuclear Regulation Authority sent out a report last week saying that one tank leaked approximate 300 tons of water, a lot. And they were relatively high readings of radiation that came out up some of those tanks. Whether that radiation actually makes it into the sea i dont know. That was the last surface radiation. The monitoring that the japanese have been doing, the radiation monitoring that theyve been doing of the sea, you know, near the ou