center. and matt kerner is deputy director for strategy in the skoe cough center strategy and security and professor at georgetown. richard, the premise of this deal, of this summit, seemed to be everybody else thinks we should do these summits bottom-up, you know, deputies and officials negotiating the minutia and then the formal perhaps ceremonial meeting between the two heads. donald trump said no, we re going to go top-down. what does this tell us, the failure of the summit, what does it say? it says bottom-up doesn t work. top-down also doesn t work for different reasons. it doesn t help when the president has too much confidence in his personal relationships and chemistry. foreign policy at the end of the day is not about is not about chemistry. there wasn t enough preparation. suchl summits should do the last 10% of the deal so left way too much up. actually needed something more fundamental at work here, fareed. which is simply i m not sure there is a deal. if the goal is
relations, former director of policy planning at the state department. robin wright is a contributing writer for the new yorker and fellow at the woodrow wilson center. and matt kerner is deputy director for strategy in the skoe cough center strategy and security and professor at georgetown. richard, the premise of this deal, of this summit, seemed to be everybody else thinks we should do these summits bottom-up, you know, deputies and officials negotiating the minutia and then the formal perhaps ceremonial meeting between the two heads. donald trump said no, we re going to go top-down. what does this tell us, the failure of the summit, what does it say? it says bottom-up doesn t work. top-down also doesn t work for different reasons. it doesn t help when the president has too much confidence in his personal relationships and chemistry. foreign policy at the end of the day is not about is not about chemistry. there wasn t enough preparation. summits should do the last 10% of th
using the dollars to freeze any business with iran. or consider when libya agreed in 2003 to disclose and dismantle all its weapons of mass destruction, which it basically followed through on. in return, the bush administration had promised to help libya gain security and respect among nations and pledge far better relations between the two nations. the u.s. suggested it would work to turn libya into a prosperous country. little of this happened, of course, and several years later, the obama administration had toppled the gadhafi regime. if the north koreans look back on their own history of negotiations with the u.s., they will recognize that they repeatedly lied, cheated and broke promises. now, washington s behavior is not nearly as duplicitous, but did make promises to pyongyang that were never kept. they agreed to have fuel monitored by inspectors in return, washington would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations and give the north two light water react
administration had promised to help libya gain security and respect among nations and pledge far better relations between the two nations. the u.s. suggested it would work to turn libya into a prosperous country. little of this happened, of course, and several years later, the obama administration had toppled the gadhafi regime. if the north koreans look back on their own history of negotiations with the u.s., they will recognize that they repeatedly lied, cheated and broke promises. now, washington s behavior is not nearly as duplicitous, but did make promises to pyongyang that were never kept. they agreed to have fuel monitored by inspectors in return, washington would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations and give the north two light water reactors, plus heavy fuel oil. north korea took most of the steps outlined, but as was