The United States and North Korea coexist today in an antagonistic, high-risk stalemate. The Kim Jong Un government, feeling besieged by a “hostile” U.S. policy and fearing the potential for regime change, has centered its national defense strategy on strengthening deterrence through nuclear weapons. Facing this intractable nuclear threat, the Biden administration has reinforced a coercive, pressure-based approach that relies on diplomatic isolation, military deterrence and economic sanctions to contain, if not change, North Korea’s defiant behavior.
After initially expressing "concern" over North Korea's July 4thmissile launches, China's unwillingness to work towards serioussanctions on North Korea provides further proof that Beijing haslittle interest in restraining Pyongyang. What are we to make ofthe disconnect between Chinese rhetoric and action? In many ways,it reflects a disconnect between the Chinese People's LiberationArmy (PLA)-which almost certainly does not share any real concernsabout North Korea's missile provocations-and Chinese diplomats, whohave largely been kept out of the loop.
The events of September 11 have made the eradication of terrorismthe most immediate and important goal of the United States, butNorth Korea remains a profound threat and challenge to peace andstability in East Asia, and indeed the world. Therefore, theUnited States should proceed with great caution before removingNorth Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
China's main interest is to prolong the six-party talks so that theworld will accept a nuclear North Korea just as it has accepted anuclear India and Pakistan. The U.N. must adopt punitive measuresagainst North Korea, such as economic sanctions, and the UnitedStates should be prepared to fall back on the ProliferationSecurity Initiative framework should China block Security Councilaction.