the japanese. the same night they began decoding a long 14-part message from tokyo to diplomats in washington. it finally reaches the president and which makes absolutely clear the japanese intent and upon finishing reading this roosevelt says this means war. oliver: but he still doesn t know that it means war at pearl hush. and it certainly doesn t say at pearl harbor. up next, a japanese pilot tells war stories what he was told before the attack on pearl harbor and the truth he learned after the war.
day. direction finders located in the submarines and invasion forces and the carriers all for city. towards hawaii. the lieutenant told war stories investigates a different story. of course, no radio. not at all. radio equipment was sealed up so that it couldn t be touched. on 27 november the navy sent this message to admiral kimmel this dispatch is to be considered a war warning. an aggressive move by japan is expected within the next few days. army generals short and mack arthur received a similar message from the war department but it stated if hostilities cannot be avoided the united states desires that japan commit the first over the act. neither of the messages specified pearl harbor. they were expecting this attack in the far east thousands of miles from pearl harbor. the day after the famous
when i first started intercepting the japanese were using a character code. nine characters and a period. they stopped using that code completely and started using a five digit code which the navy promptly named jm 25. oliver: to maintain security, yamomodo changed the code. even with the number of people that we had there was no way that could have been broken in time to read anything prior to pearl harbor. oliver: war stories investigates tracked down boris who remembers that august of 41 was a strange time in jo pan. he had been living in tokyo for go years as part of a special u.s. navy program. the naval at the embassy sent a message to washington saying they should go. we you saw the war coming on. oliver: but there was one problem. the japanese refused to let him
it was seen by the new director of naval intelligence, captain theodore wilkinson and the chief of army intelligence, general sherman miles. they reported to admiral stark and general george marshall both of how many would ever deny seeing the message. shockingly, admiral kimmel never received it. is seemed to them prepostorrous that the japanese would attempt to attack the powerful bastion of american might, the fleet at pearl harbor. president roosevelt sends
navy department were dispatched to go reenforce. as it is even now even politics can get in the way of intelligence sharing. kimmel never knew that general short had not gone on full alert while short thought that admiral kimmel had launched long distance aerial reconnaissance around the island of oahu which he had done. and so this was a great mistake that arose out of the old divisions between the army and the navy. by 6 december japan and the united states were in a collision course for war. that evening a troubled fdr left his dinner guests early, retired to his study and drafted this letter. in an unprecedented move, he directed this effort for peace. this message was held up by the japanese.