army, the pictures of that equipment being set on fire in the streets of mosul or not set on fire and instead driven over the border into syria to be used there in the war against bashar al assad, it is almost as viscerally wrenching, right, to see those images as it is to see those people reaching for the skids of the helicopter as it took off from the embassy roof in april of 1975. when the united states invaded iraq in 2003, under false presences, the bush administration and its supporters at the time, they played up what turned out to be false threats about the existing iraqi government and they aggressively played down any possible negative consequences of the u.s. invading iraq and toppling that government. there s been a certain amount of, frankly a kind of pop sociology in america that, you know, somehow, the shia can t get along with the sunni, and the shia in iraq just want to establish some kind of islamic
see those images as it is to see those people reaching for the skids of the helicopter as it took off from the embassy roof in april of 1975. when the united states invaded iraq in 2003, under false presences, the bush administration and its supporters at the time, they played up what turned out to be false threats about the existing iraqi government and they aggressively played down any possible negative consequences of the u.s. invading iraq and toppling that government. there s been a certain amount of, frankly a kind of pop sociology in america that, you know, somehow, the shia can t get along with the sunni, and the shia in iraq just want to establish some kind of islamic fundamentalist regime. there s almost no evidence of that at all. there are other differences that suggest that peacekeeping requirements in iraq might be much lower than historical experience in the balken suggests.
see those images, as it is to see those people reaching for the skids of the helicopter as it took off from the embassy roof in april of 1975. when the united states invaded iraq in 2003, under false pretences, the bush administration and its supporters at the time, they played up what turned out to be false threats about the existing iraqi government, and they aggressively played down any possible negative consequences of the u.s. invading iraq and toppling that government. there s been a certain amount of, frankly a kind of pop sociology in america that, you know, somehow, the shia can t get along with the sunni, and the shia in iraq just want to establish some kind of islamic fundamentalist regime. there s almost no evidence of that at all. there are other differences that suggest that peacekeeping requirements in iraq might be much lower than historical experience in the balkans suggests. there s been none of the record in iraq of ethnic militias fighting one another that