on assessments that are not accurate? i think in the case of working with other countries armies, it s important to have advisers with those units so you can do a holistic assessment of things that are doiflt measure. the morale factors, leadership. that s one key aspect. another part that s really important, and this is a lesson from vietnam and i think today is don t americanize the war. we learned that in el salvador or colombia, for example, where we did assist and help other countries armies fight insurgencies and we are quite effective. but there was their country, their army that bore the burden of all the fighting. and we had very few advisers. it was quite effective. now, every country is different. every war is different. it has to be evaluated on its own merits. those are key points worthying about. thank you, mr. chairman. thank you.
your military advice about leaving on august 31st versus staying to try to help additional americans leave. was it the unanimous recommendation of the joint chiefs that the august 31st date should be on received? and if so, why was that the military advice? it was. the joint chiefs plus general admiral and general donahue. the reason is risk to force, risk to the american citizens. on the 1st of september we were going to go to war again with the taliban, of that no doubt. and we were already in conflict with isis. so at that point in time, if we stayed past the 31st, which militarily is feasible but would have required an additional commitment of troops who would have had to clear kabul of 6,000 taliban already there. that s what would have happened
in my opening comment i m sorry, i was conducting an er meeting. i wasn t able to attend that. there s been four presidents, 20 commanders on the ground, seven or eight chairmen of the joint chief and dozens of secretaries of defense, et cetera, and outcomes like there are not determined in, you know, the last five days, the last 20 days or the last year for that matter. outcomes in a war like this, an outcome that is a strategic failure, the enemy is in charge in kabul. there s no way else to describe that. that outcome is active effect, 20 years, not 20 days but there s a huge amount of operational and strategic and tactical lessons that need to be learned from this. some of them in the military sphere, in the narrow military sphere and one of them is the mirror imaging of the building of the afghan army based on american doctrine, tactics,
collapsed so quickly? with that i ll yield back, mr. chairman. thank you very much, senator kaine. thank you, mr. chair. gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today. unfortunately, this morning s hearing is required due to the haphazard withdrawal of u.s. forces, american citizens, and many of our afghan partners. however, we want to thank the men and women in uniform that assisted the evacuation of those that were able to make it out and of course to those that have given their service and sacrifice over the past two decades of the global war on te terror. the loss of service members and abandonment of americans and afghan allies last month was an unforced, disgraceful humiliation that didn t have to happen. the president put a cheap political victory, a withdrawal time line, timed to the 20th anniversary of nine lech, on his
mission in afghanistan after 20 years. it took guts and was the right thing to do and should have been earlier. a virginia service member whose wife is expecting said to me recently irges so glad my baby is not being born into a country at war. some will point out that u.s. troops are still deployed, still in harm s way, still carrying out limited military strikes around the world. but to the families of those who have been deployed over and over again into iraq and afghanistan over the course of the last 20 years, they are relieved that america is now turning the page and rejecting the notion that we should be a nation in permanent war. second, the effort to evacuate more than 120,000 people to safety under chaotic circumstances was remarkable. i visited dallas expo center, the principal arrival point for about 80% of the afghans and visited ft. lee, the first of the eight forts that process