i ll just say for most of my experience when i was in afghanistan the input that i got from our commanders was that this year would be different. we ll be able to do things better but i got a completely different assessment when i went to the mess hall and ate with the shoulders and marines and folks on the ground who said i don t trust these folks we re with. i don t know if they ll fight. they don t show up. they get their paycheck but they don t show up. now there may have been instances where they performed and i know you ve highlighted some of those. my questions from a strategic standpoint did we just become fixated on some tactical performance from our forces and their forces and forget to measure the afghan security forces institutional health as a fighting force that could sustain a fight even though they are in an incredibly weak economy and cultural issues? clearly questions that we have to drill deep on.
i ll just say from my experience, especially when i was in afghanistan, the input that i got from our commanders was that this year s going to be different, we re going to be able to do things better. but i got a completely different assessment when i went to the mess hall and ate with the soldiers and marines and folks on the ground who said, i don t trust these folks that we re with. i don t know if they re going to fight. they don t even show up. they get their paycheck, but they don t show up. did we just become fixated perhaps on some tactical performance from our forces, their forces and forget to measure the afghan security force s institutional health as a fighting force that could sustain a force even though they re in an incredibly weak economy and a whole host of complicated cultural issues? clearly questions deep on.
0 why wasn t action taken to secure the kabul airport or retake bagram then? thank you, senator. you re right, the tempo had picked up significantly, yet the taliban continued to make advances. our entire chain of command, myself, the chairman, general mckenzie routinely engaged the afghan leadership to encourage them to solidify their defensive plans, to make sure they were providing the right logistics to their troops and further stiffen their defenses, to no avail. to compound that, president ghani continued to make changes in the leadership of the military and this created further problems for the afghan security forces. i don t mean to interrupt you, but my time is lapsing. this gets to the overestimation, i think the overly optimistic assessment, because even as late as july you re still encouraging the afghan special forces, you re expecting the ghani government to remain. in december of 2019, the washington post reported that the u.s. military commanders privately express
0 retake bagram then? thank you, senator. you are right, the tempo had picked up significantly. the taliban continued to make advances. our entire chain of command, myself, the chairman, general mckenzie, routinely engaged in after began leadership to encourage them to solidify their defensive plans, to make sure they were providing the right logistics to their troops and stiffen their defenses to no avail. and to compound that, president ghani continued to make changes in the leadership of the military and this created further problems for the afghan security forces. mr. secretary i don t mean to interrupt but my time is lapsing. this gets to the overestimation, i think the overly optimistic assessment. even as late as july you are still encouraging the afghan special forces, you are expecting the ghani government to remain, but that was not the case. in december of 2019 the washington post reported the u.s. military commanders privately expressed a lack of confidence that the a
0 thank you, senator. you re right, the tempo upped significantly, the taliban continued to make advances. our entire chain of command, myself, the chairman, general mckenzie, routinely engage the afghan leadership to encourage them to solidify their defensive plans, to make sure they were providing the right logistics to their troop, and further stiffen their defenses. to no avail. to compound that, president ghani continued to make changes in the leadership of the military, and this created further problems for the afghan security forces. mr. secretary, i don t mean to interrupt you but my time is elapsing. so this gets to the overestimation that i think the overly optimistic assessment. even as late as july you re still encouraging the afghan special forces. you re expecting the ghani government to remain, but that was not the case. in december of 2019 the washington post reported that the u.s. military commanders privately expressed a lack of confidence that the afghan army a