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In this article, the author recounts the legislative history of the systemic risk exception from its creation in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA).
It has long been understood that deposit guarantees and too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policies create a moral-hazard problem they incentivize banks to take on too much risk by shielding depositors and shareholders from losses in excess of equity (“left-tail” outcomes) in American banking.1 Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991 to mitigate the moral-hazard problem by restricting forbearance and implicit subsidies for undercapitalized banks.