At the time of defendant’s trial for kidnapping and attempted human trafficking of a minor, the state was unable to find the victim, “Amy.” Over defendant’s objection, the trial court allowed the state to enter into evidence Amy’s testimony from defendant’s probable cause hearing. Where (1) after the probable cause hearing, the state increased the .
Even though the prosecution’s chemist relied upon raw data generated by other SBI analysts, the testifying chemist conducted his own independent analysis of the data in accordance with SBI procedures and methodology. An expert may base his opinion on the research of another analyst provided the expert performs his own independent analysis of the research. .
While it is improper for counsel to ask a witness whether he has in fact spoken the truth during his testimony, counsel does not improperly vouch for the credibility of a witness by merely providing the jury a reason to trust their witnesses. Here, the prosecutor asked whether a witness’s plea agreement and his agreement .
Even if the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion to strike his accomplice’s testimony, any such error was not prejudicial given the state’s other evidence that defendant was trafficking heroin. We find no prejudicial error in defendant’s convictions for trafficking by possession of 28 grams or more of heroin and trafficking by transportation of .
Defendant correctly notes that G.S. § 14-51.3 supplants the common law on all aspects of the law of self-defense addressed by its provisions; however, contrary to defendant’s argument, the aggressor doctrine is still intact pursuant to G.S. § 14-51.4(2). We find no error in defendant’s convictions for second-degree murder and manslaughter. In this case arising .