Its at this point a definitive history of the secret organization and its so thick i want to start with this one because if you are a normal reader you might think that its easier to get information and get you say i want to quote you here because it is pretty succinct that i began the project that research and writing a book that the secret organization that controlled other secret organizations was going to be a challenge and so it proved several people who figure prominently in the events described in this book to requests to be interviewed. So how hard is it or how hard was it and how long did it take . Guest it took three years of research and writing. Thats not counting my two decades plus as a reporter on the Security Issues prior to that in the previous books and just by osmosis its also not counting the time spent in the editing process after the three years were up. It was very difficult but obviously not impossible to find the people and the other published words or unpublis
So how hard was it to do this book, how long did it take . Guest it took three years of fulltime research and writing, obviously thats not counting my two decades plus as a reporter on military and National Security issues prior to that, you know, gaining a lot of that information of previous articles, previous books and its also not counting the time spent in the editing process after those three years were up. It was very difficult but, you know, obviously not impossible to find the people and, you know, in some cases the other publish works or unpublished works that could power the story of this organization from its roots in 1980 all the way to the fight of Islamic State. Joint special Operations Command is the command United States military secret special Operations Missions. It was formed in 1980 as a result of the failure of operation eagle claw which was the at the same time to rescue the american hostages in iran. The pentagon put together a Blue Chip Board of half a dozen ret
Their many years of experience and distinguished service. General norton schwartz, formern chief of sdtaff of the air force and president and ceo of his executives for National Security. Admiral james stavridis, former commander at u. S. European command and u. S. Southern and currently again at the Fletcher School of law and a diplomacy at tufts university, and frequent appearance on various liberal media outlets. Oe dr. Christopher lamb, Deputy Director of the i institute for National Strategic studies at the National Defense university. More than anything else that goldwaternichols act wouldsulti result of escanglating concern c the conflict and in the country about the effectiveness of u. S. Military operations. The vietnam war, and to the Hostage Rescue Mission in irannd and the flawed invasion of grenada all pointed to deep systemic problems in our defense enterprise and needed to be of bothor the saksake our war fighters at our National Security come in particular goldwaternicho
Goldwater nichols, the roles and chairmans of the joint chiefs of staff, and the commanders. This morning, we seek to understand how Goldwater Nichols has impacted the effectiveness of u. S. Military operations, and what reforms may be necessary. We are pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses, who will offer insights from their many years of experience and distinguished service. General norton schwartz, president and ceo of Business Executives for National Security. Admiral james, former european commander and u. S. Southern command or. Currently the dean of the Fletcher School of law and diplomacy at tufts university, and frequent appearances on various media outlets. Dr. Christopher lamb, director of the institute and the National Defense university. More than anything else, the Goldwater Nichols act was the result of escalating concern in the congress and the country by the effectiveness of u. S. Military operations in the vietnam war, the failure of the hostages in
Functional teams to achieve efficiencies and provide senior civilian and military leaders more timely recommendations. In previous hearings, our witnesses have observed better capitalizing on the gains achieved through those improvements may require significant changes to enter Agency National security structure and processes, as well as this was made by jim walker, the godfather, if you will, of the Goldwater Nichols. No matter how you transform the defense department, it is quite broken. And the problems that confront this nation require an interagency response. Being able to executed a National Security mission by itself is long going, we do not have the ability to integrate everything that exists. I think it is important to keep that in mind. And the chairman, again, let me commend him for beginning this process with the department of defense. I hope it is a catalyst on the issue for serious review by other committees and other agencies about how, together, we can improve security