Izibility of security. And in every document that nato puts out, we talk about this again and again about indivisibleity of security. Saying all that, the Alliance Still goes at Great Lengths to endorse and support and embrace arms control. And the reciprocity aspect of that. Even the most die hard official within any government in the alliance that believes that we should eliminate all Nuclear Weapon weapons they do it only in the official context of reciprocity and quid pro quo that we would not eliminate our Nuclear Weapons, would not reduce our Nuclear Posture except in a process of discussion and negotiation with russia. In the last summit the alliance again stated that they looked forward to developing various transparency and confidencebuilding ideas with russia and the federation in the context of a nato council with the goal of developing detailed proposals and increasing mutual understanding. They continue to believe that this partnership between nato and russia, based on the
System combat for wmd. They sponsor strategic dialogues. And the grant was awarded for the fiscal year 2014, right. So in about october 2013 things were a lot different than they are today in terms of the u. S. Russia relationship. The objectives initially were to explore really verification modalities. If you were actually able to sit down, officially with the russians and negotiate an armed control agreement to limit Nonstrategic Nuclear weapons, how would you go about it and what verification would you think about. Of course, this changed over time. And initially the First Agreement was to sort of set the groundwork and the second meeting was supposed to look at very hardcore issues of an agreement. Instead, what we had was russias annexation of crimea, the u. S. State Department Verification Compliance Report where the First Official alleviations of russian violations of the treaty and we had sanctions as well know and implementation was moving along. Maybe a little bit more slowly
Izibility of security. And in every document that nato puts out, we talk about this again and again about indivisibleity of security. Saying all that, the Alliance Still goes at Great Lengths to endorse and support and embrace arms control. And the reciprocity aspect of that. Even the most die hard official within any government in the alliance that believes that we should eliminate all Nuclear Weapon weapons they do it only in the official context of reciprocity and quid pro quo that we would not eliminate our Nuclear Weapons, would not reduce our Nuclear Posture except in a process of discussion and negotiation with russia. In the last summit the alliance again stated that they looked forward to developing various transparency and confidencebuilding ideas with russia and the federation in the context of a nato council with the goal of developing detailed proposals and increasing mutual understanding. They continue to believe that this partnership between nato and russia, based on the
Izibility of security. And in every document that nato puts out, we talk about this again and again about indivisibleity of security. Saying all that, the Alliance Still goes at Great Lengths to endorse and support and embrace arms control. And the reciprocity aspect of that. Even the most die hard official within any government in the alliance that believes that we should eliminate all Nuclear Weapon weapons they do it only in the official context of reciprocity and quid pro quo that we would not eliminate our Nuclear Weapons, would not reduce our Nuclear Posture except in a process of discussion and negotiation with russia. In the last summit the alliance again stated that they looked forward to developing various transparency and confidencebuilding ideas with russia and the federation in the context of a nato council with the goal of developing detailed proposals and increasing mutual understanding. They continue to believe that this partnership between nato and russia, based on the
System combat for wmd. They sponsor strategic dialogues. And the grant was awarded for the fiscal year 2014, right. So in about october 2013 things were a lot different than they are today in terms of the u. S. Russia relationship. The objectives initially were to explore really verification modalities. If you were actually able to sit down, officially with the russians and negotiate an armed control agreement to limit Nonstrategic Nuclear weapons, how would you go about it and what verification would you think about. Of course, this changed over time. And initially the First Agreement was to sort of set the groundwork and the second meeting was supposed to look at very hardcore issues of an agreement. Instead, what we had was russias annexation of crimea, the u. S. State Department Verification Compliance Report where the First Official alleviations of russian violations of the treaty and we had sanctions as well know and implementation was moving along. Maybe a little bit more slowly