flow it back confuses me. if they have troubles controlling the pressure on the surface, there are valves that are variable in the way they can open them that they can put on top to help control that so i don t understand why they re not agreeing to flow the well. bob, the testimony coming out of new orleans, you know, i think people get used to the idea there are so many inspections that they have to go through, inspections for their cars, inspections for construction at their homes and things like that, it s just routine stuff, inspections. and there is nothing ever important that s done there. it turns out the information we re getting in these hearings is that there was a lethal disregard for safety. there was an absolute deadly disregard for safety that was building in the processes and the checks that they were not doing and the checks that they were doing on this system the day before. right. and days before this was happening. this seems to me to be the most condemning in
rules are about saving lives. they are not about following some needless detailed government or industry regulations. if you don t do them, people can die. and by not doing them in this particular instance, this company did kill people. this was industrial homicide by not following the accepted practices on these platforms. wasn t it? well, that s the direction this is going, lawrence. during the bush administration years especially but even in years before then the rules began to be even though the rules were very strict, they were all self-reported and self-regulated. there is very little in the way of actual inspection by authorities or third parties to certify that what the companies were doing was correct and so that s how you got into the situation where the blowout preventer was not inspected for five years before this happened. bob cavnar, oil and gas industry expert, thanks for your time tonight.
die. and by not doing them in this particular instance, this company did kill people. this was industrial homicide by not following the accepted practices on these platforms. wasn t it? well, that s the direction this is going, lawrence. during the bush administration years especially but even in years before then the rules began to be even though the rules were very strict, they were all self-reported and self-regulated. there is very little in the way of actual inspection by authorities or third parties to certify that what the companies were doing was correct and so that s how you got into the situation where the blowout preventer was not inspected for five years before this happened. bob cavnar, oil and gas industry expert, thanks for your time tonight. great talking to you, lawrence. coming up, lindsay lohan is behind bars. is she the latest victim of childhood stardom?
learned that the blowout preventer was years past its inspection date and bp officials knew it was leaking days before the blowout but kept drilling anyway. joining us once again tonight, former oil executive bob cavnar who now writes about the industry at daily hurricane.com. welcome back. we heard bush administration officials today saying that it was impossible, just impossible for them to imagine an event like this. now, when the key piece of technology is called a blowout preventer, that certainly suggests the possibility of a blowout, doesn t it? that s exactly right, lawrence. blowout preventers have been called blowout preventers since they were invented in 1922 by two oil men in houston and they ve been used for that purpose all these years. i think what you re seeing here, what we re beginning to see in this extended testimony is the evidence of the complacency
flow it back confuses me. if they have troubles controlling the pressure on the surface, there are valves that are variable in the way they can open them that they can put on top to help control that so i don t understand why they re not agreeing to flow the well. bob, the testimony coming out of new orleans, you know, i think people get used to the idea there are so many inspections that they have to go through, inspections for their cars, inspections for construction at their homes and things like that, it s just routine stuff, inspections. and there is nothing ever important that s done there. it turns out the information we re getting in these hearings is that there was a lethal disregard for safety. there was an absolute deadly disregard for safety that was building in the processes and the checks that they were not doing and the checks that they were doing on this system the day before. right. and days before this was happening. this seems to me to be the most condemning in