This paper assumes that success on false-belief tasks requires a kind of folk psychological know-how, i.e. gradable knowledge how to perform skilful social cognitive acts. Following Ryle (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1946, The Concept of Mind, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), it argues the folk psychological know-how required for success on a false-belief task cannot be reduced to conceptual knowledge as this would lead to an infinite regress. Within the skilled performance literature, Intellectualists (Stanley and Williams in Journal of Philosophy 98:411–444, 2001) have attempted to solve Ryle’s regress by appealing to automatic mechanisms similar in kind to some Theory-of-Mind explanations of folk psychology. Exploring this similarity, the paper examines the epistemic commitments of two recent pragmatic Theory-of-Mind accounts (Westra and Carruthers in Cognition 158:165–176, 2017; Fenici in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2020) of cross-cul
In the 20th century an unfortunate gulf opened up in philosophy between the "continental" and "analytic" schools. Even if you've never studied the subject, you might well have heard of this one split. But as the British moral philosopher Bernard.
Large language models (LLMs) represent a major advance in artificial intelligence (AI), and in particular toward the goal of human-like artificial general intelligence (AGI). It’s sometimes claimed…