we willjust listen in to these live pictures in manchester. so, that marks one minute, will everyone now please sit? in so, that marks one minute, will everyone now please sit? in this, the final open everyone now please sit? in this, the final open volume everyone now please sit? in this, the final open volume of- everyone now please sit? in this, the final open volume of my - everyone now please sit? in this, i the final open volume of my report, i the three topics. the radicalisation of salman abedi, the planning and preparation for the attack by salman abedi and hashim abedi, and whether it could have been prevented by counterterrorism policing. by hashem abedi. the role of the security service and the significance of the other two topics should not be underestimated. it is important that we understand as much as we can about the radicalisation of salman abedi so that similar signs can be recognised and appropriate action taken. it is also important that we know
and the messages had been sent to the security service, it would not have affected their view of salman abedi. i have not criticised that view taken by the security service but there is a learning point which could usefully be pursued which is that the attitude of the security service to those sort of messages might be informed by the considerations which doctor wilkinson applied. we know that salman abedi visited abdal raouf abdallah in prison and also that they communicated by phone, including an illegal phone which abdal raouf abdallah had in prison. it was apparent by the evidence that while they were known to the way of prisoners radicalising other prisoners, they paid little if any attention to the risk that such
prisoners who may have had a steer that my hero status to some we take the opportunity to radicalise visitors or encourage those who are already radicalised in your beliefs. there is no evidence that abdalraouf abdallah played any part in plotting the attack but it is likely, in my view, that he provided support for salman abedi s ideological beliefs and increased salman abedi s resolved to carry out the attack. it is important that the prison authorities do take notice of the risk that those in prison for terrorist offences such as encouraging others to go and fight abroad, may seek to radicalise visitors as well as other prisoners or at least support their radical views. the government s response to the risk of radicalisation is the prevent programme. a review of that programme by william shawcross has
of those abdal raouf abdallah with whom there were a number of messages sent between the two which was recovered as a counterterrorism policing investigation which resulted in the prosecution and conviction of the abdal raouf abdallah for terrorist offences. those messages talk of martyrdom. they were highly significant view of doctor wilkinson for demonstrating the influence over salman abedi and the influence over salman abedi and the development of his violent extremist mindset. salman abedi was not identified as one of the participants in this exchange of messages until after the attack and i have concluded on the balance of probabilities the messages were not passed to the security services by counterterrorism policing as they should have been. my investigation however have demonstrated that even if salman abedi had been identified