Transcripts For CSPAN3 World War II And American Internationalism 20160813

Nations humanitarian awakening from oxford in 2013 and is working on a manuscript with the title of catastrophic diplomacy a history of the United States responses to Global National disasters. Thank you for agreeing to chair. Gen. Neller thank you for julia thank you for introducing me. I will introduce everyone in order. Our contributors was unable to make it, but i will read her comments in the order she appears the program, that is next. Our first speaker is a senior lecturer of American History at light chester. He is author of 2 books. The four freedoms on the eve before 14 published in 2014. The limits of internationalism, the American Association for the United Nations and u. S. Foreign policy 1941 to 1948 in 2009. He is the coeditor of the u. S. Public and american foreignpolicy that came out in 2010. His articles have appeared on diplomatic history, global society, the global of american studies, the global of transatlantic studies. He coedited with andrew priest next year with the University Press of kentucky. Andrew . Andrew thank you, everyone for coming out. What we wanted to do was to go broad in discussion this morning. What i wantednly to do. World war ii is often represented as a watershed in u. S. Foreign relations history. A time when the nation finally and fully engaged with global affairs. His position as a superpower and integrated itself into International Organizations. Numerous books and articles use the war and 1941 in 1945 in particular as a start and end turning point. However, based on my research and a lot of material that i have been reading over the last year or two, i want to urge as to be wary of treating the war as a watershed, a definitive break, a turning point. I want to focus on the need to be aware of continuity from the years, ands, the war the postwar years. Do not get me wrong. I do not want to minimize the significance of the war and the International System that develop. World war ii changed many things. I want to highlight the ways the war acted as a catalyst. The continuity between preand postwar continuity. Recentlyas written, from pearl harbor to post nuclear surrender, it was fuzzier around the edges than the usually imagine. Hammer this home, we were knocking around ideas for the roundtable, was firstly specific books that i have reviewed over several years. And also, a broader look at literature. Im trying to keep an eye on world war ii literature for the schaeffer guide, which is a challenge. One book that i reviewed started in 1945. It got me thinking about the use of 1945 as a starting point. The lack of wartime contentless striking. It started abruptly. Historical work start in 1945 because they adopt a cold war framework. Also perhaps all books and articles have to start somewhere. 1945 is so common that it made me think of the number of books on my shelf that start their. While many are excellent, i find myself questioning the idea that 1945 is always the ideal place to start. An idea was reiterated in online roundtable review yesterday for the latest book thinking small. The mainly post1945 story on Community Development was praise for starting in the 1930s rather than the media it. Ostworld war ii period the result of this, reviewer argued that the book helps us to understand the intellectual and conceptual roots of development thinking and practices. The idea of continuity through the war years was highlighted i another book that i reviewed. The empire of ideas. It emphasized roots and continuity of things that are often seen as postwar ideas in the years before the war. 1930s. With empire of ideas, the development of Public Diplomacy considerations. The prewar origin said wartime wartime tribulations come the activity was not simply an outgrowth of the cold war. World war ii was not the origin of the cold war, as it was argued 15 years ago. History does not begin in 1945. Work on Public Diplomacy relates to what ive done on the development of Public Affairs and machinery at home. What little work there had been on Public Affairs and works was a oneoff wartime activity. In fact, the idea was there in the 1930s. The war years accelerated ideas about how the government should work with the American Public to promote and create American Public policy. The ideas were carried into the postwar years, albeit with mixed results. This is a longer story. The origins of ideas, wartime acceleration, and cold war complications. Mythis point, i wondered if ofse of a fuzzier conception world war ii was a result in an increase in cultural approaches. Ideas rathers of than traditional considerations of diplomacy and military activity. All that might be true to an extent there are real problems with taking 1945 as the definitive turning point. Ive struggled with this while teaching. In particular, with my first year at u. S. History where ive struggled with the origins of the cold war. Where do you start . This is a big problem for me. You cant cover everything. I cant afford to have a lecture on the war. The 1930s, so at the moment i started in 1939. Unconditional surrender, before even getting to the 1944, but among 1945. The idea of starting in 1945 for me doesnt work. Even if it does, it runs the risk of relegating the origins of the war to the cold war again. It doesnt account for the growing tensions in the particular areas of disagreement. Appliese, the framework to the years immediately after 1945 as well as right before coming even in military and diplomatic terms, u. S. Public u. S. Occupations continue three years after 1945. The fuzzy framework applies just as much, if not more, to the american entry into world war ii as it does to the ending. The pearl harbor attack is even more definitive a start to the war than any concluding act. There are a number of issues that i would argue cannot be resolved with the firm line on december 7, 1941. Thinking of books, the one sitting on my table as i was working through these comments was one of the key historical text that we use, america in the world. It is subtitled the the oric of the pearl harbor attack came out of nowhere and changed everything. There is no justification for the choice of 1941 in the latest edition, the only justification for the choice in 1945 was since the start of the Second World War was a period that has preoccupied historians almost to the exclusion of other eras. The problem is you get into a cycle. Post1941 means everyone focuses on post1941 material. I would argue americas slow Movement Toward war in the years prior to 1941 makes it difficult. Or a number of pearl harbor you can understand the wartime political relationships, the international allies, the u. S. , domestic influence unless you start earlier than 1941. Most notably, the Atlantic Charter and the fact the United States has a joint decoration of work. You cannot understand angloamerican wartime planning unless you start earlier than pearl harbor given what actually occurs. You cannot understand the Economic Significance of wartime preparedness unless you start earlier than pearl harbor. As they highlight things like Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and many aspects of the cultural significance, the war years, unless you start below before the United States is actually at war. This, i put my hand up and jemima research. I am guilty of this, myself. My first book starts at pearl harbor and my second one in there. The first one does not end until 1948, i should add. Recognizing this as i was writing my second book, i felt i needed an epilogue that highlighted things very clearly what happened. Before i started writing about after pearl harbor. After 1941. What happens, they do not kind of appear for the great debate on the uber world war ii and finish into nothing. It is interesting that one reviewer in passport has already commented that i had that he wished i had expanded this section further. Many of the international is looking at the eve afford were two ended up in government rules. Organizationsivic many state and civic organizations. Wherever they ended up they sold away the United States acted against nazi germany in 1941 and 1940 as offering a template of how to deal with the soviet union after the war ended. Terms offfer in broader internationalism, arguments can be made about the need for the American World war that had been seen as part of the cold war rhetoric, but actually, you can chased the origins prior to 1941. It is something that the other speakers could come back to. Given that, i will again conclude my comments by urging historians to think about the ways that the war had left a thing break with the past, the year that accelerated preexisting trends, facilitating ideas as much as it did their creation. Saw evolution as much as revolution in Foreign Policy activity. Thank you. [applause] julia thank you, very much. As i mentioned in my wasoductory remarks, joyce unable to make it, but i will read her paper for her. She is an associate professor of history at metal berry college. Her interests are at the intersection of Foreign Affairs and National Politics. She is the author of asia first china and the eight making of american conservatism. That came out last year. Her work has appeared in the journal of american east asian relation. She is working on 2 projects, one on the modernization theory and its relationship to the peoples republic of china, and on diplomacy of u. S. Immigration policy after 1945. Here we go. That wanted me to tell you she wishes she was able to join us in person, but she was happy to be able to participate in this way. Joyce, as many have noted world war ii is typically earmarked as a watershed event that impacted american life. Some areas of National Development are much more strongly associated with the war and its aftermath. Others have yet to receive the degree of attention. This is true when it comes to National Politics. An established name in history are goofy is how modern liberalism dominated after 1945. An established team in how modern liberalism dominated after 1945. Bipartisan liberalism enjoyed successes as democrats and moderate republicans shoot to the core tenets of statecraft. Ethos ofoloring the the cold war through a grand strategy of containment which. Emained consistent for decades as world war ii prompted americas global power, it sparked different lands of nationalism. The conflict exercises influence on conservatism, particularly the rights approached of foreign relations. Toprompted conservatives rethink how they could craft an original nationalist agenda. Their political survival depended on it. Wasdefense of isolationism obsolete after pearl harbor. War demanded an ongoing commitment to active interventionism. As a conservative radio host said, world war ii made a complete change. He was certainly correct when it came to ideology. By adopting overseas conventions, conservatives cast aside strict antistatism and called for a federal defense state. It did not have a complete break. Rightwing internationalism was a demand for American Economy and for affairs. Unilateralism. Another was constitutional of ritualism, to keep a tight leash on the growth of executive power. That world war ii had amplified fdrs power and were wary of liberal president s wielding power because of the cold war. A regional perspective offers the clearest views on how world war ii catalyzed american conservatism. Exploring the changes by world war ii on the pacific rim. California as a major angle. The states second goldrush resuscitated the economy and drew thousands of residents for the defense industry. It did not and in 1945. The southern half of the state defense spending. Rather than process ideal liberalism, much of the electorate would make places like Orange County the cradle of the new right. Voters resented what they saw as federal entered errands in daily life. Even an aggressive stance on communist threat at home and abroad. If we consider conservatism in tandem the fourth after the war in asia, the rightwing ideology becomes more clear. In socalled loss of china 1949 offered in new strife for American Interest in the pacific. In the early 1950s it reinvigorated orientalism that of thechina as a ward United States, a reflection of democracy itself. The korean war and its ambiguous of the unitedoutcome showed that contat is him was not working that ism was not working. Conservative internationalism was the answer. Very cold water provides a goldwaters barry provides a microcosm. He trained at the airfield and flu supplies over the burma hump. He raised the campaign criticizing how democrats handle the korean war. A supporter of the regime in taiwan, he saw the exile as a proof in a flaw in Foreign Policy and insisted the latter protect the island sovereignty. His success as a conservative leader was an ability to sympathize with rightwing ideology for it audience that range from activists to institutionally leads. Asia was a central part of the foreignpolicy platform. He recalled wartime experiences as proof of what the allied chinese were capable of if given adequate american support. Such an argument was a natural fit from the sun belt, but it resonated with conservatives across the country. World war ii symbiosis of the homefront and war front foreshadowed conservatism approach to the cold war and east asian affairs. The brand of cold war internationalism blur the lines between the domestic and global. Most often identified as newrthyism it encompassed ideas such as expansion of the military, military spending, and insistence on a moral obligation to the global community. It balanced new with old. Conservatives declared what was best for the u. S. Was best for the world, and the nation should act accordingly. Unilateralism mattered at all levels of Foreign Policy. Certain practices born out of world war ii should not be carried into the new era. The United Nations was federalism out of control. Foreign aid was welfare writ large of a global seo. One of the fundamental teams is that of change versus continuity. Major developments to the right, yet the developments were simultaneous continuity and change. It advocated overseas intervention framed in terms of diplomatic isolationism and national selfinterest. America first for the new global era. The permanent internationalism borne out of work was not the marker of progressive politics. The state of National Politics suggest the conceptualization of American Power is present today. [applause] so, that brings us to the next presenter, Christopher Mcknight nichols. Professor ofciate history at Oregon State University where he is the director of the osus citizenship and crisis the initiative. In 2016 he will be 820162018 Andrew Carnegie fellow. He is also the author of promise in apparel, america at the dawn of the global age published in 2011. He is writing another book entitled republican revival coming with oxford University Press on conservative Foreign Policy and the last gasp of isolationism in the cold war. He is working on sweeping history as american isolationism. Coediting a book project on rethinking american strategy, forthcoming with oxford University Press. Christopher thank you for organizing this. I wish joyce were here that we could talk more. Start broad and narrow in on a couple of examples. Rum textbooks to monographs to the classroom, from textbooks to monographs to the classroom it is presented as a historical break for the modern u. S. Theyre married of course to seeing the war years for the. S. And world as epochal the war changed a lot about International Relations, politics, culture, and more. In terms of american political thought, particularly conservative visions of a croissant isolated american orientation to the world, i would argue it is woefully inadequate here the turning point case that we are familiar with. Not long after world war ii concluded, scholars of u. S. Foreign relations and political and economic history began drawing lines distinguishing between the postwar era, postworld war ii, those of us who are scholars about postworld war i think about that is being more particularly significant they distinguish the postworld war ii era and everything prior. The war was massively transformative, as a historian has observed. The war demolished the old order. Competing models for the future produced political turmoil coming even as they generated a new International System. We know the devastation was almost world shattering. 60 Million People were killed. American politics was often most often manifested, 36 million were europeans with tens of millions left as refugees wandering what one contemporary account called a blasted landscape of barren citizens and fields. The numbers do not do justice to the human suffering of the war. The nations that played dominant geopolitical roles like Great Britain were exhausted. The soviet union was expanded postwar reach ravaged by the war. 50 of the population was killed. The cities, industrial plants, and fields were raised. China and japan suffered casualties. Two u. S. Of march to loan among the nations that became stronger and richer than before the amongf merged alone the nations that came out stronger and richer than before. That is a transformative watershed event. In domestic politics we can go on. Two u. S. Insulated from devastation abroad was still shaking in terms of race, gender, class, labor, more. To and obligations developed, a new relationship starting from the new deal being transformed by the war effort. It was revitalized economically. Came out of the depression more unified. Wartime experiences at the homefront and of combat changed attitudes, assumptions, hopes, dreams. As was explained, Many Americans had to imagine the war itself and the consequences. Here is where we began to get an argument against the break. As americans, we began to imagine what a future might look like, it projected the past into the future. The lessons of the recent war and economic clock was in , we see aataclysm postworld war ii time in terms of insights gleaned from world war i and the years following the war, and what most americans out of as the wars tragic aftermath. My second point is that does not seem like an argument for world war ii as a Decisive Point of rupture. , the longh suggests shadow cast by world war i resented and imposing strategical and intellectual presence over the mindset and personalities and actions of actors in the middle of the 20th century. As the panelist puts in her book a new deal for the world, the ghost of woodrow come u. S. Intervention in world war i, the vision for the week, the International Relations and the u. S. Place in it loomed over the planning of the postworld war ii era in the International Order characterized by the un and other institutions that we know of. World war i was the reference that american policy planners were thinking of, not world war ii. We cannot discard the past. Those are lessons that we see being invoked. What i would like to say today in light of my latest book is that we disrupt the daredevil full report to as a watershed. Book chapters and categorizations of 1945 as a point of rupture often are taken to mark a triumph of internationalism. I would raise my hand to say that ive written along these lines myself. They tend to do more harm than good. Was it really a triumph of internationalism . What about the opponents of the regime, what they would call reach globally . As was provocatively argued in global republic, if we cast both wars as wars of choice and depict the steady rise of politics over International Society continuing on the 19th century and beyond, we must confront the fact that the u. S. Postworld war ii and not come to the International Table with a blank slate. So much history is premised on that point. U. S. Policy after 1945 or 1941 continue relying on powerful ways of what was argued from the victorian era. Based oni argue was longstanding american politics going back to 1796, 1823, the monroe doctrine, and jeffersons first inaugural, limits of u. S. Power and a new world ordered. Of thesehe genealogy ideas about balancing internationalism and isolationism, it is impossible to depict world war ii as a moment of rupture. One example, thinking to republican i should license them republican isolationism, which had been a part of politics in the 1920s and earlier, it was the japanese 1941lt on pearl harbor in that as a senator put it ended isolationism for any realist. As the paper indicated, isolationists came back after the war. The ideas did not dissipate. Though quiescent in war time, they were present in the postworld war ii era. They were vivid in speeches of robert half, who was a longtime hawkish isolationist and America First sympathizer. He would have been the presumptive candidate for the gop presidency in 1952 had Dwight Eisenhower not run. He was mr. Republican. Simply concluded by noting the historical record clearly demonstrates world war ii was transformative. It is difficult to entirely free ourselves from heinzthis topic from the hindsight of this topic. It is hard to free ourselves from the knowledge of what really happened in world war ii. Thinking of conservatives after the war, not only did roosevelt interventionalists kerry the day after world war ii and the arguments of people like taft and Herbert Hoover, they colonized our imaginations. As was argued, the combination of extravagant military expansionism and evil expanded my nazi germany and what it stood for had to be defeated militarily. We agree in hindsight with the interventionists. By reversing our thoughts of thisperiod we can develop more modes of analysis that neither begin or end with world war ii. Looking to the 20s or 30s against the backdrop of Lessons Learned from military intervention and peacemaking in world war i, the largely filled with sony and project for example, we can see how isolationists like pacifism and interventionism in that air and following world war ii were understandable and laughable in that moment. We can appreciate the broad range of noninterventionist have better, to stronger arguments to say this objectively. Arguments with broader appeal than the interventionists in 1941. Following this timeline and logic, after world war ii we can see hoovers and halfs positions as they continue to be popular. Presenting critiques of truman and Addison Global interventionism and international engagement. Another thing this serves to is from the 20s to the 40s to the 50s is that arguments for this divided world war ii. Times new and it should have been obvious before. Some of the most important american of internationalism coming out of world war ii were developed in the 1920s and 1930s on the right. Out of world war ii, the right not the left where advancing potent alternative visions for. He u. S. s role in the world if we cast off the colonized imagination of the history are y, maybe historyographb we can see better connections. Thank you, very much. [applause] our next presenter is trygve throntveit. He is the dean fellow for civic Minnesota College of human development. He has written several developments. Two books on American International and diplomatic history. William james and the quest for an ethical republic published in 2014 and power without victory, americanilson and the experiment in production with university of Chicago Press and should be coming out soon. In the spring of 2017, he will assume editorship of the good society, the journal of the field of studies, a transdisciplinary study into the character and discipline of independent and institutional designs to foster them. Thank you. Democratic interdependent. No problem. Questionng about the about whether world war ii was a turning point in history of u. S. Foreign relations, i was tempted to just say, nope. Whatrop the mic and see happened. Im fairly certain with this audience and michael panelists come, and my panelists, your incredulous responses would be more than i would have to offer. I would put my good friend in an awkward position of trying to save me. I would give my classic answer and say yes and no and see where it gets us. Economists answer, the lawyers answer, everyones answer. World war ii was a turning point in u. S. And human history. Any time million or 100 Million People die, nothing is ever the same. At least in the case of u. S. International relations, world war ii did not dark a turn in the direction that we often assume. States did not embrace it Second Chance to leave the world and multilateralis internationalism. World war ii marked the end of that approach as a contender for u. S. Grand strategy and a divisive turn to a different form of world engagement letter described as unilateralist or perhaps imperialist globalism. Contrary popular belief, multilateralist internationalism remained and William James would have called a live option through 1942 or 1943. It was hardly dominant, but it was a contender. Indeed, from 1916 to 1920s, and from 1940 to 1943, it might have been the dominant contender. At least for the affections of the American People and the endorsement of the policy elite. In the earlier time between 1916 and 1919 Woodrow Wilson drawing on tankers and advisers influenced by William James, developed an internationalist vision or u. S. Participation in World Affairs that was radical and practical. Bywas to lead the world moral and effective practical example, into an organization of governments committed to collaborative action on International Political issues and relinquishment of sovereignty over a few particular but essential matters. Above all, the decision to make or abstain from war. Why . To ensure that no state will selfishly or ignorantly endanger orers to advance narrow shortsighted interests. In short, the reason that our forebears federated themselves as the United States. There were many problems with the league of nations that emerged from wilsons consultations with his advisers and counterparts at the paris peace conference. Evils attributed to a league or done so unfairly and more the machineryrize the u. S. Government spearheaded after world war ii the antidemocratic character, and the structural deficiency as a r of security. Regarding thed territories and populations excluded from equal membership of the league. I would argue the un trustee system did not do any better. As far as membership goes, the league was remarkably democratic for its time, and later times. In the 1940s, influential policymakers, including franklin roosevelt, consider the league to democratic. For one thing, the Assembly Recommendations to the council and in some cases takeover functions. Despite a general unanimity rule covering Council Voting and voting throughout the league, the veto that each Council Member held could not be used by parties on the council involved in any dispute before it. There were other exceptions to the unanimity role, but this is crucial in comparing the leak to the United Nations. This fact israel he noted because the assumption is that the leagues history proved no collection of nations, regardless of the natures, can leton the political will to someone else maintain and secure peace or enforcement until a fullblown crisis errputs. This charge is also unfounded, or founded on shaky ground. It seems to escape the attention of the latterday critics that the leak was designed to include the United States of america, the greatest economic, moral, and military power at the moment of its creation. That the United States of america was absent. This is massively important. First, the league was designed with america at the center. In part so that france and britain were able to cooperate. Rehabilitated to germany and revitalize europe because of the structure of their economy. Wanted to keep germany prostrate because they had been invaded twice in a generation. The Defense Alliance that the United States negotiated to get france onboard was null and void when the United States did not join. When you dont have the United States, it is impossible to make sanctions effective. When you impose economics on anions aggressive state you give the United States access to all the without being able to disable to disable the aggressor nation and anyway. It is hard to see how the league could have succeeded when it was never tried in the manner that it was designed. The common response to that objection is that u. S. Abstention proves the futility of the concept, because no hegemonic power, especially in a democracy, will agree to such a system because the people will never submit to it. At least in the case of the United States. As i will this is not a universally applicable assumption. Americansajority of by all available indicator supported u. S. Membership in the league. Americas failure was due to politics and personalities and illnesses and all the contingent factors that historians have a politicalmind scientists about when explaining international affairs. Its common to think of the inner war period as one of isolation, but as others have shown, it was not until the Great Depression that we found evidence of overwhelming Popular Resistance to international internationalism searched again in the late 1930s and 1940s, giving the old will sony and fdr challenge the policy turns in the 1930s. He did not effectively challenge that turn as he might have. Did not believe in wilsons internationalist alternative, a system in which great powers relinquished certain privileges in the interest of longterm prosperity and stability for all. Nor can this be explained as a reflection of american popular to thert opinion evolution of the United Nations is the major example here. Instance, something struck me when chris was speaking prayed before pearl harbor in of americans favored some sort of participation by the United States in a postwar collective Security Organization. This was a viable idea. The main model that these people had in mind was wilsons model, which they felt had not been properly tried. Before anyone objects, i do realize that the soviet union was a major obstacle to recreating the kind of International Organization that wilson envisioned. Termst and control the for debate on the structure of postwar organization from the very beginning i despite many alternatives presented to him, he consistently acted to destroy the possibility of a renewed league of nations with the u. S. Statistical and normative commitments that wilson deemed necessary. In august 1941, fdr rejected drafts of the Atlantic Charter written up by his own advisors. For months before and after that time, leo, sumner welles, and cordell hall oversaw a group of ardent wilsonians of whom andrew knows a great deal who produced a draft of plans for a new world aday with the leagues best, most of my credit, and practical decisionmaking features. Finally to be made effective by u. S. Participation in such a system. In january 1943, fdr ironically denigrated the league for having no power to force aggressive states to behave. He believed that the four powers of the taylor alliance should be the four policemen of the world. In december 1940 through when has polskys group created the first proposal for a new world message thatt the any General Assembly should we week be weak. As popular than on u. S. Participation in collective Security Organization grew increasingly powerful, powerful enough to create wide public risks within the Republican Party in the runup to the 1944 to directfdr failed it into channels that would indeed ensure such a body of efficacy. At dumbarton oaks, the british and soviets arrived with only the most hastily and sketchily drawn plans for International Organization. The u. S. Defied the terms of discussion and so from the beginning, stalin assumed all were agreed on an ironclad veto and what would come to be called the security council, and he could focus on issues of Assembly Representation and territorial buffers against germany and other matters. They finally convinced fdr that some modification of the veto was a moral and practical necessity, the timing could not have been worse. Americas much cozier relations with britain and china, the two powers stall and more than a besides germany, had made him increasingly nervous. Sinceviets had been aware 1941 that the u. S. And britain have been cooperating on an atomic bomb. Now that the u. S. Had seemingly cemented a coalition with anticommunist powers, it was suddenly making noises about communist opinion. The veto issue was never satisfactorily resolved. Empty after fdrs death, truman took actions to alienate stalin. Stalin did much to alienate millions of people worldwide. As a result of the patterns that were separately on, no military Staff Committee came into force to coordinate the peacekeeping efforts of the un and the United States instead spearheaded nato. In reality, an alliance against moscow. None of this is to say that fdr started the cold war or singlehandedly crippled the United Nations. But it is to say that at a unique moment when internationalist sentiment in america was intense and u. S. Economic military, moral power was supreme, he refused to grasp the worlds Second Chance at a more cohesive, Effective Organization of interNational Politics. We will never know what might have happened had he done otherwise. Thank you. [applause] thank you very much. , back over toeast liz. She specializes in the history of International Law with a focus on human rights and institutions. She also holds a courtesy appointment in law. Was published by the belknap and print of harvard University Press and is in its fourth printing great it has garnered an award for the best first book in u. S. Foreign relations as well as the lecturer award and the award from the organization of american historians. In addition to her stanford doctorate, she has earned a jd from harvard law school. Held a fulbright tariff with the university of heidelberg, where she remains a permanent faculty affiliate. She also served as the visiting professor of human rights at the university of chicago. She is currently editing a volume on recent and grand strategy. Her current project on crimes against humanity or current project on crimes against humanity in history, law, and politics is under contract with. Lfred a knopf thank you. It might be a nice segue for the rest of you to think about questions you might pose. You see the time we have, and thats for questions. And use this time while im offering a few thoughts to think of a question of your own. We are very mindful on this that we are all comparatively junior in the grand scheme of things and there are experts in all of the. Arious facets of these topics we want to take advantage of the assembled knowledge and background that we are just honored to have in this room with us. Just a few points to begin with this current, the title of this panel. It prompts the usual kind of historians or whatever kind of response, or the sort of natural contrarians that we all are. If we werent, we would be doing something else, to say that its not a break, and this is on some level having arguments, that periodization is ones own way of making an intervention in a long, ongoing conversation. I remember when i was devising the dissertation that this book came out of that youve had such kind words about came from going to shafer meetings in the late 90s, where so many panels and so much of the scholarship seemed to be about post around when did the cold war begin, and the answer was always the same no matter what the periodization. The answer was, earlier than you think and here is why. To debate about whether its a catalyst or turning point or , its on some level a little bit of a sterile debate in the sense that when the wonderful image that jen rogers once offered to me of when he was commentating for me, he said, when you are on the train of history and your pulling into 1941,ation, march 1939 or passengers dont turn to each other and say, here we are, its world war ii. Their perspective, self evidently is informed i the earlier stop they have been to on the way march world war i, depression, momentous Life Experiences. N, marys of periodizatio saying no, you cant even say interwar era because of her wonderful ideas about wartime. Even the interwar era is a misnomer. I love it the way professor nichols put it, that this example of looking back to world war i and seeing the u. S. World war ii experience as a kind of do over, kind of opportunity for a do over, it has a certain intuitive fraction and yet in my own scholarship, before the dissertation i remember taking in terms of robert divine and others arguments saying americans woke up on the morning of pearl harbor and said, finally we will start listening to clark eichelberger, which is what we should have been all along and we are all internationalists now. It would have to be markup located than that, and so you get these different flavors of. Hange and continuity arguments i love this image of professor nichols. How does world war ii colonize this quote from John Steinbeck appears in his novel, and the recent restaging of it as a musical at Lincoln Center had this quote, projected where he iseen somedayhat someday these soldiers, these historical actors from this world war ii era are going to slip into the realm of the past, slip into the , justof purely archival as civil war veterans were doing and had pretty much just done or were in the last throes of doing for this world war ii generation. And what will that mean. That is our moment right now. And so that grip on our imagination is shaped i the Life Experience and the influence in Civil Society of this veteran generation. Ive advocated seeing them as an of cohort, not exclusively diplomats and Public Policy experts, but especially of ordinary citizens. Those whos fought in world war ii were young and coming of age during the depression and had a worldview that had been shaved to buy a more activist government, actively tackling some of these intractable social problems related to the Great Depression, and as an age cohorts everybody has different experiences, theres roughly 8 million of them. Seeing the devastation in europe and other places, and having this framework in their mind of programs with which they had been involved, many of them had been touched by the national as younginistration people and returning to the United States, and many of them benefiting from the g. I. Bill, which became a kind of platform for lifting at least a certain cohort, again, of male veterans, white veterans. We all know who was left out of the g. I. Bill. But into the middle class, with thenbroader worldview consolidated, and again, by these governmentsponsored programs. And so, its very difficult to measure the impact. I went back to these writers interviews with veterans and had graduate students coding how they talked about their experiences as an age cohort, but how do you measure, for instance, even if the socalled greatest generation participants werent necessarily the most later,leadership than the next generations Civil Rights Movement. Just even holding back from squelching it in the sense that you see interview after saying,w of these fats i grew up in rural new jersey, my father had an apple orchard, and i was sent down south for the first time in my life for my and there i saw a racism that really shocked me. Just her bring those experiences and then even if they of course many of them were quite conservative, but just holding from squelching the most active phase of the Civil Rights Movement that we think of is happening in the mid to late 60s. How would you possibly measure Something Like that . And yet, if you want to talk about catalyst or transformation, these are also other kinds of factors, as professor mao pointed out, and others, about looking at this very porous boundary between the home front and the war front. Is backing up again, as weve been urged to do, to talk about the very and thepicture, and transformation or catalyst that i see is really, again, this longer historical trajectory or you have all these preexisting ideas and firmly preexisting, before world war i, whether its about internationalism or efforts weof see in the world war ii era that are floating around, and in world war ii i work on human rights. This they dimension i talked about a lot, where youve got preexisting ideas that im working on the notion of crimes against humanity. I think its a 19th century idea. Institutions much more effectively, again, then in the world war i era, institutions like written woods, the United Nations. Notwithstanding the professor, caveats there which i certainly agree with and take to heart, but institutions that have a kind of stickiness, as our Political Science friends would say, to outlast the cold war, and then in the 1960s and 1970s, that idea, institution nexus is then able to plug into a more grassroots social Movement Type of nexus. And so, in my own specific field when people say, human rights, are they from the french revolution, are they from the 40s, from the 1970s you have different phases, and i think that world war ii phase is much earlier and well articulated, specifically about the work that all three of you are doing on what would traditionally be called isolationism versus internationalism, but ideas about interventionism, they plug into an institutional framework which, however flawed, however self interested thats what guess,them the legs, i where we are still looking back with our colonized imaginations and arguing about them today. So, thank you for coming out today. We hope that you have lots of questions. Asked to e been for questioners to come up to this microphone over here. Its not going to make you any louder. It feeds into the sound system. Dont let me down. Thank you very much. [applause] for those of you who would like to ask questions, please do so right now. Make me call on someone. Dont make me call on someone. My question is for chris generally. And say who you are. Tim sale, from southern massachusetts university. Hello, everyone. I would be interested in any perspective. The short version is world war i or world war ii. The long question is, dont you agree its world war ii because we start factoring if we include appeasement, memory of appeasement as part of world war ii, we see that framing the argument, 1940 seven, especially 1948 moving towards nato and 1949, fundamental transformation into american policy to now embrace entangling alliances. More important to create a continental commitment to europe that still remains today, how isnt that really the watershed . Do what you will. Thank you. Andrew has also written on the street i will begin to answer and give him all the tough aspects of your question. To continue down the line i argued in my paper, im not sure i entirely agree with this. Appeasement, i would argue, is a the 1920s and 1930s and a kind of idealistic peas activism and internationalism and a logic therein, which to go isk to periodization, embodied and problematically embodied in the interwarriors nomenclature. When we talk about the 1920s and 1930s as interwar years, we forget how genuinely idealistic the peace activism was, and it wasnt simply utopian. Appeasement in its moment was very popular. Americans were very favorable, even though there werent any formal diplomats there representing the usa. This i would argue is part of a longer con continuity. If you see this as a culmination of how do you deal with belligerent groups in the world short of war, and the kind of commitments to legal norms and moral suasion over more binding enforcement kinds of procedures, you can argue that instead of being a marker of the watershed, but rather a culmination of a flawed process that we know through hindsight but at the time was still a genuine Movement Towards solving the actuallyof modern war, you can depict appeasement as part of this longer peace and not in an off itself as a world war ii phenomenon. Ive written a lot about the impact in 1920 eight which braced together this diverse constituency in the u. S. Which continues to shock me. The Nobel Peace Prize winners come together, some of the arch conservative thinkers in american Foreign Policy. Most notably, the republican from idaho. How one wire they involved in this outlawry of war effort . The show this principle that suasion can trump belligerent the in the International System and even nonbinding pacts when agreed to by morally upright nationstates actually can have that kind of power in the world. In some ways, appeasement is in keeping with that. In other ways, i think we can problem and ties problematize the ties i just made. Because americans, if you are teaching or writing for american audiences, knows a little about world war i. That isnt to say its more important necessarily but when you look to the policy makers, read constituent letters, you find the lessons of world war i all over the 1920s and 1930s and world war ii context. The postwar planning in the work cantra seems like you disaggregate that from the world war i moment and historical memory and imagination. On the other hand, i think i agree with you that there is something distinct about the world war ii moment, especially if you go back to 1939. This is sort of what andrew was saying. You go to the late 1930s, you at least get a longer sense of the formation of that period. All the toughest parts of his question remain for you, andrew. Thank you very much. About world war i not being known, a colleague of mine was here. He had an american student ask him, can we assume because there was a were called was a war called world war ii that there was a world war i . That is not a joke. That was a question that was asked at a university. It does say a lot. The purpose of this panel was not to say world war ii more important than world war i. Have written that one down and we will do the next year. I agree with an awful lot of what chris said. I think on my comments, you basically said, when appeasement to nato. Toefining world war ii, 1948 1949. Lets go beyond the sort of rigid structures of where we are starting, pearl harbor and 1939, and ending with dday. Lets look a bit broader. Inent a little bit broader terms of bigger ideas about internationalism. You can go back much further. I suppose i was just encouraging everyone to get creative with their periodization, as liz was saying. I would say that you are right to see a massive shift from the period of appeasement to the founding of nato as a massive transformation in the character of the United States International Relations. One of the reasons its so is that i agree to a certain extent with chris that appeasement reflected a sort of ideological climate at the time, but it also was sort of forced upon britain and france because they were in a structure that had been crippled by american absence. But in just absence, many cases, outright instruction of the league of nations. And long before they realized what a danger was, that structure had been a viscera rated. Eviscerated. I think for that reason we have to see that period as this massively important turning point. As historians, we dont want to become to deterministic or too concerned just only with what did happen. I think sometimes we have to Pay Attention to lost causes and lost opportunities and look at how significant those were, and if you can make a compelling case that those were genuine forks in the road, that there were genuine alternatives and one or another was taken over others, i think it can help us humble,little bit more a little bit less deterministic, a little bit less likely to say, this is the way it played out because thats how it had to play out. I think one of the virtues of a panel like this is to get us to think outside of our sort of historical tautologies. The league failed. Why . Because it was a failure. True as far as that goes. There are so many hands. Good people come up to the mic, in the interest of keeping things in sitting along a bit. If you dont mind saying who you are, and may be just very briefly what youre working on right now, not what youre working on in general. I think that helps us answer your questions, and also maybe keep our answers a little more sustained succinct. Thank you. I work on american grand strategy and world war ii. Especially in relation to the mediterranean. Im also working on a global history of world war ii at the moment. It is taking up on chriss point about the complexities of the ice initial isolationist ideology. The likelihood is were going to have a republican candidate who is isolation isolationist candidate for the First Time Since the end of world war ii. Thinking about these complexities of ideology and politics and american foreignpolicy will be very interesting in the next few months. Main thing i wanted to ask thatt really strikes me one of the main ways in which world war ii colonizes our minds is to think of world war ii as a rarefied thing. In all of thek by comments have this element. There is this block like box called world war ii which things happen with and maybe they change a lot or they dont change a lot. Is there such a thing as world war ii . Is there a much broader shatters owned shatter zone of overlapping conflicts in other parts of the world which the United States increasingly, one way or another engages in an thatrentiated ways, produces ongoing outcomes and shapes intellectual discourse, and helps us to get away from at leastwar i post 21931 and manchuria, the end of the korean war. To try and disaggregate world war ii and thinking about questions im imagining julia has thoughts on this is the difference periodization of your work on catastrophes. Not yet. Parent of. My favorite course i ever taught was called trends were america transwar america. The continuities, the central debates and i dont think they are binary chris is right to emphasize that. Andy, so are you. These debates go on. They dont and when treaties are signed or not signed. I think its really fruitful to look at the period holistically in that way. Not to the exclusion of other periodizations either. Thats one of the things that can come out of a panel like this, the yes and no approach. What question are you asking . Some question,g world war ii is a turning point. If youre asking other questions, you dont want the fact the fact that world war ii happened between these dates to prejudge your answer. One problem we have history graphically is how chapters are constructed. The implication of the history as you lay it out is exactly right, that is to say i was reminded in your remarks, the way that frank sort of was provoking thought about world war ii, to ask the question, if the u. S. Did not enter the war, when we still have called a world war ii . Or where there have been some other is our language problematic here . I dont know that we can solve this. To look to the foreignpolicy debates of the 1930s from a lot of the actors ive been looking at, manchuria, two sino japanese wars, they are looking around the world and thinking the world is ascending into this cataclysm, how does the u. S. Stay out of an International Society which they dont think it has any role in. Theres a long tail to those. How long do we want to push that forward, these intensive debates about International Society and the u. S. s role in it, how it is structured, that set of questions, and the way that global cataclysm and economic cataclysm went handinhand in the 1930s. I dont know what we do with how we alter that periodization. Global crisis is one of the chapter titles depending on take your textbook or reference work to go from the 1930s to 1945 or 1953. The problem is also related to, are we finding too many continuities i choosing a long stretch of time here, or the age cohorts, where do we delimit that. We can encounter some concerns. Pushing up pushing back by pushing back against the perceived wisdom of the period ization as well. Creating a perfect black box of war. We simplify things for students before we go on and complicate them. I think world war iis particular place in the popular imagination is certainly in the u. S. And u. K. As the good war, makes it very hard to get out of that. Its not just in our own hands. That certainly makes that clear and coherent. Hard to chip away at. Different countries have their different size boxes. World war iihen began and they will unanimously say 1939. What im working on has very little to do with this panel. Its a history of global travel. Ontrol regimes and policy my question which might sound y innocent occurred to me i think it really applies to all the panel, this. Theres a general part of the question. The general part is, what does internationalism really mean after world war ii . Especially if you think specifically about a country that has only come up incidentally, although i think it should be front and center, which is the soviet union. I guess imwar ii, having a hard time seeing the option of internationalism, the way it was envisioned prewar, given this new state of affairs that you have even during world war ii but after world war ii, which, the soviet union is there is the other superpower. Inis in eastern europe, other parts of the world, and it becomes increasingly clear that we, the United States, are going to be in this new conflict, which is still undefined. It becomes evident later on. Wondering what internationalism really means except as a code word for American Interests, or the american conflict with the soviet union. Viewed one way. The soviets had their way of talking about internationalism, which was something which for americans was unacceptable. So, i guess its a twopart question. Inre is the soviet union your accounts, not just as an idea or as a kind of other but also as a geopolitical factor,nd then what does the option the lost cause of internationalism or even the pursuing of internationalism mean in the story . It does seem to be a pretty big change after world war ii. Yeah. Like i said, its a turning we oftenst not the one think. I think internationalism pretty much disappears after world war ii and hasnt really reared its head since. I think people assume that the kind of internationalism, the pursuit of an official and practical and effective political relationship amongst in which certain relinquished, or a certain amount of sovereignty is subsumed by the larger body the represents all the parts. No one has taken it seriously since world war ii, i dont think. I dont think fdr took it seriously. I think where the soviet union is in this story, and this will take a lot more research, but i think if you read inside the and you readd war some of the accounts about the 1942ions before is very key, stalin on cooperating with the United States. He knows his nation can survive another war and the current. Willof having partners cooperate to keep the frontiers of the soviet union and. Your doing that anyway. What he never does throughout ae process is push at all for type of organization that im arguing could have avoided the pitfalls of the league of nations. Those pitfalls being, it was designed properly but was oneing a major component, of the legs of the stool, so to speak. I think its not i dont think we can assume because a cold war arose, and because stalin was paranoid and because stalin also was a nationalist, that it would have been impossible to structure the United Nations differently. I think thats what happened, and there are specific reasons why that happens. And that they probably need to be explored more thoroughly. Both. Hink that answer is just apropos of the terminology, almost all of us in this room teach, right . A lot of our task with this material is to say, dont say isolationism versus internationalism. Its just so much better to say interventionism, because its not really isolationism. Even isolationists want trade. But interventionism is obviously something very different than what you are talking about. He teaches at the kennedy school. I think there is a philosophy of how can history help us in this thinking in time, ernie may kind of way, grapple with the andlems of modern world, that task itself on some level, controversial about being prejudiced, but we have a moment now where, as you say, president ial candidate is calling his philosophy America First, with really no sense that theres any kind of background to that term, and also the world war i, world war ii comments film, the of the madness of king george the third when it came to the United States, was just called the madness of king george because americans they thought was that americans would be concerned that they had missed one and two. Its funny, but its also important on some level to meet our constituencies where they are. I welcome some broader reflections on how we tackle those issues. Theres only so much we can do with counterfactuals. Archival he informed, thoughtful or if that is in itself a pipe dream. My sense is internationalism after world war ii is in the position to perceive isolationism as they interwarriors. It becomes about the Geographic Scope of american engagement. Internationalism becomes its a Second Chance to reject isolationism. Whats interesting in terms of in the moment, the nature of american engagement has been debated in the decades since. The Geographic Scope really hasnt to the same extent, but it is starting to be right now. Incumbent upon us, especially because we have cspan here, and lizs comments, to not be fast file about these definitions. Was there an isolationism in the postwar years is a wrong kind of question. Be careful as historians that these are plural. There are varieties of internationalism developing through this longer read were talking about an isolationism too. I tend to think about this as a constellation of ideas. Some are coming into focus more and some are not. If you think about continuity is the way you are describing it, isolation is the bogeyman of the specter of isolationism coming out of world war ii. You cant find anyone who does ascribes to a walled in u. S. What you do find his people pushing back against collective Security Organizations. They sound a lot more like the skeptics, or those pushing a limits of power vision before the war going well back, the same kind of arguments made about the league. U. S. Tol bind the commit its troops abroad against the nations best interests, and they take the korean war as an archetypal movement of this. What do they most want to do . They go back to washington and argue, hoover especially does this, they go back to washington and say, he did this right. Steer clear of these foreign tenements in europe. They have a whole different geographical alignment of what a conservative internationalism should be. Where should it commit its troops and material . Pull back the marshall plan. Dont rearm europe. Create a fortress america and a capacity to wait for in asia. Thats a really potent one that is different but has lots of continuities with the prewar kinds of claim. Gentlemen, the great lloyd ambrosia. Began to touch on the complex of issues i wanted to focus on. There an ironic aspect of arguing that world war ii is the turning point from american isolationism to American Internationalism, because that very terminology comes out of world war i. The term internationalism typically was identified with wilsons particular advocacy of the league of nations, and that particular form of internationalism, and voters who oppose that particular form were then labeled. They didnt labeled himself,hey were labeled isolationist basically was affirming that i, will sony war and definition when he said that internationalism didnt exist much after world war ii. That identified internationalism with will sony and internationalism. Weve all use the terms internationalism, isolationism. Increasingly we might be better off never to use the word isolationism. And think instead of vast varieties of internationalism, so that you might be an interventionist in a particular war, as an internationalist. But you also might be an internationalist opposing that particular kind of intervention. That makes you focus the question much more sharply so that you dont simply identify with a particular decision of a particular president to become involved at a particular time and place. Let me throw out for your consideration the question of may be never talking about and ill do again, my best to abide by that myself and then thinking in terms of internationalism. That also relates to other words you are using, like appeasement. The term appeasement was used as specifically by Winston Churchill in 1919 when he advocated making concessions to germany to get germany to sign onto the versailles treaty. It isnt an idea that originated in the 1930s. It was an idea applied in a particular way, and americans didnt have any problems with appeasement when the british appeased the United States, we thought it was a great concept. It was only when munich occurred and americans looked back that they began to attach a very different definition. What im suggesting is that appeasement, like isolationism, like internationalism, needs to be placed within a particular context. The, just in terms of continuity, discontinuity, Arthur Vandenberg after world war i was an advocate of the league of nations. Course, he had the famous quotation after pearl harbor that we are giving up on isolationism. People who dont go back to world war i assumed that he was an isolationist and had always been an isolationist. He had been an internationalist, just like Herbert Hoover or William Howard taft had been identified with the league of nations. What im really raising and asking you to comment on is how problematic it is to use broad concepts that might be applied in very different contexts with very different meanings. The professor raise this larger point, in addition to thinking about teaching, we have to use our words for something. Walking that line of using a kind of shorthand that might have a more general understanding and yet also kind of keeping our hat to various experts offstage to signal that contested, can be a very difficult line to navigate. We are among friends here, but in writing, that follows you around forever. If you have thoughts on that, wilson folks, that would be cool to hear. We just heard a very eloquent endorsement of two of my favorite things, namely very clear writing. And finishing my most recent manuscript, im constantly battling with the copy editor. I cant cut here because this has to be here, pragmatist internationalism, because i defined it using these exact words to chapters ago. And, the virtues of intellectual history. If youre reading Arthur Vandenberg in 1943 and you read whatever hes saying with no idea of the context of the debates surrounding it with no idea of how that person has used that particular freighted word correspondents or public statements, you are likely to get yourself into trouble. So, youre here. Yeah. Couldnt agree more with isolationism. 1937,ting a book on the 1941 years [inaudible] where it had been used by. Ctors from the time as a slur chris and i had this conversation before about whether he throughout this isolationism versus internationalism thing. It simplifies things to the you run its just the risk of losing out on any complexity. I think part of the problem there goes back to world war ii. Its not solely within our hands as historians. This is a phrase that gets thrown around in the press and used beyond campuses. While we can use what influence we have two try to be careful to use it, dont use it at all or use it specifically in this historical context. We are not alone. Someones got to stick up for you using these terms. Precisely on the grounds andrew just laid out, isolationism is out, its being used all the ame in the press, theres current likely president ial nominee whos being labeled as that, and its a great opportunity for us as scholars to come in and do exactly what trig said, add some historical nuance to that, give a sense of the etymology of this term, talk about what i was saying in terms of the plural rather than singular, the constellation of ideas, tracking the etymology back, and i was surprised to see how the term isolation was used debatesntiimperialist as something the u. S. Should aspire towards, as a reference to also thinking about quarantine logic in the 1860s is when it comes out as a medical term. Theres really interesting kinds of thoughts there that are embedded that we can use the term isolationism as historians there ishow something to maybe a fools errand it may be so far outside of our control as an epithet and something thought of as encapsulating a walden bounded u. S. I often say to audiences, i cant find a single thinking american or policy that made the case for a staunch isolationism the way the epithet form is thrown around. Nobody wanted a completely walden bounded u. S. No advocate of a socalled isolationist policy did that. What they wanted was cultural and commercial engagement with the world. Ybe thats all we need to do. If we can reconsolidate the constituent parts of an andationist Foreign Policy, different moments, different kinds of engagement with the world to go to the early republic, you can talk about unilateralism, a weak state in my be useful to think about this longer continuities, in the intellectual framework for Foreign Policy. If you can smuggle that into an interview or of ed, it gives us some hope. It is such a charged term that you can bring it forward. And its great with students. They come in thinking there is such a thing as the battle between the ostrich and eagle. The best way to explode that is that ostriches dont hide their head in the sand. Strategic and they are capable of delivering a really strong defensive kick, which is what Herbert Hoover and taft wanted. Theres no ostrich if theres no isolationism. Repopulating that with the actual historical record, it seems to me is still worth the project. The problem is doing its a singly for students and penetrating popular discourse. If we shy away from it, i think we just leave that debate to people who are a lot less wellinformed than chris, for example. Coming back to the point you made, the utility of using the term interventionism, thinking , whenintervention policymakers, individuals are willing to commit resources in terms of troops and armed engagement, but also it allows us to talk about different types of interventions. We might have a diplomatic intervention through diplomatic channels. My own work is on u. S. Disaster assistance, which many individuals who would be unwilling to commit to an armed military intervention elsewhere would be happy to commit the military to earthquakes, for example. This idea of interventionism and aree and when people willing to commit u. S. Troops, resources, a really useful way of thinking about it too. One other thing i wanted to point out, we have been debating about world war ii in world war i, which is more of a watershed. Its also part of what is coming out in this conversation is whether we should continue treating obviously world war i and world war ii do change things, but there are so many things that continue that didnt really have much to do with war. Wars changed certain things the way foreign aid could function and work, but the United States was responding to disasters before world war i. Watershed is often pointing us to things towards military watersheds towards grim International Diplomatic watersheds, but it depends what type of intervention we are talking about. Sometimes wars dont change everything. Thats probably a great note to end on. Five more minutes. Really . Yeah . Im a professor of history here at the university of san diego. , everyone, to the university of san diego. My Current Research book am working on is a history of francoamerican relations from the American Revolution to the im very interested in world war i and world war ii, and i teach a class on world war i and world war ii. I try to cram all of that into one class. My question is, right now my finally sent question is, is world war i and world war ii a 30 years war . My question is, could you help me fix that question and ask a new question to my students. Thank you. How about, which was more of a watershed, world war i or world war ii . [laughter] or, what is a watershed . Im not sure its a question that needs fixing. Was it a 30 years war, or just a heated argument with isolationist and interventionist actionable kind. I like the question, actually. Prof. Nichols my comments get away from that. I do see differences, i dont singularn get league characterizes that. Peace activists, black internationalists, you look to those internationalists, they are confronting that moment and thinking about how we stop it . Maybe thats from the question, thats want that is what you want students to think about. You could argue it is antiwar, are these the problematic moments that show the problems of trying to find peace International System and global capitalism of this era, or something along those lines. Maybe situated instead of war, maybe go with a piece orientation or new forms of connections. Just groping towards that. Think of the 20s and 30s as an era of trying to prevent the past war. If you stop that clock and 37 or 39 or 41, it looks dramatically different. Maybe you do a disservice on the way we are talking about in this panel, by book ending them in that way. You create to watersheds when you dont intend to. F. Irwin the question prof. Johnstone the question is was the 30 years war . Prof. Borgwardt im suggesting it was defined by piece. It can still be defined by peace. Is buying into a set of preconditions that front loads conflict. Prof. Johnstone even if you take the traditional way of looking at, and is a really good question. Gets students thing about historical inability. People in the interwar years didnt know they were in the interwar years. They thought that was going to be another war at some point, somewhere, but they didnt know there was going to be a world war ii coming. Prof. Nichols its awfully hard to prevent. Prof. Johnstone in terms of inevitability, its a really good one. And like to invite you to thank me. [applause] [laughter] and now, after that, i would like to invite you to invite me thank the panel. Thank you. [applause] [laughter] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2016] this evening at 6 00 eastern, on the civil war, a history professor at the university of massachusetts amherst talks about how photography can be used to turn the history of american slavery, both before and after the emancipation. Fair amount spend a of time with frederick douglas, who wrote extensively about photography. And about the power of self representation. Wrote about the power for africanamericans to be able to present themselves as they saw themselves. As they experience themselves and each other. Atday morning and 10 00 eastern, the first of the three 2000 president ial debates between democrat Vice President al gore and republican Texas Governor george w. Bush. Step one is to reform the system, to have the system, to have a system in place that leaves no child behind, to stop old business and asking how are you, if you are tend with put you here in 12 we put you here, and ask what do you know, and you dont know what you are supposed to know, will make sure you do early affords too late. Aarons auto have more choices with Charter Schools and Public School choice to send their kids to a safe school