And the other socalled revisionist theory, is that it was done to intimidate the russians, specifically in europe. In revisionists view is used any discussion of geopolitics, is specially the emerging conflict with russia. The revisionist view is a [inaudible]ological seriously, both views share the same assumption. Wouldhe United States pursue no longterm assumption except to win the war. The truth is, if one does not understand strategy, one cannot understand why any of the leaders acted the way they did, except in the most professional way. Perspective,term world war ii itself was the culminating stage in century long struggle among japan, russia and china for control of northeast asia. Japan had one that struggle and help control for half a century. Had not playedes a major role in it. 1985, was summer of poised to play a decisive. With japan asked him ending feet and china passed continuing weakness, the question was how the United States and soviet union would in one way or another shape the future structure of northeast asia . View, trumans decision to drop the atomic bomb was a preemptive act. Place a to put in geopolitical structure that went far beyond the immediate objective of defeating japan. Undeniable to shorten the war and save lives. But it was also to create the basis for a longterm american jiminy in the system. That required defeating the soviets to win control over northeast asia. Presidency,g the truman initiated an exhaustive review of the agreement fdr had made. The review to place in the context of rapidly deteriorating relations with moscow as soviet forces surge toward berlin, prod, and the enough. Fdr committed the united dates with the establishment of friendly government around the border of the soviet union. According to the 1939 map, that meant only poland and romania. It is part of the general strategy to crush and occupied germany, he also agreed to shift shift s some to borders. This had the consequence of not only assuring the soviet domination of poland and romania for soviete door penetration into Central Europe. 1945, theing of prosoviet czech president was convinced to transfer the eastern tip of czechoslovakia, some times called eastern riviera to the soviet union. The annexation of that small piece of turf gave the soviets a direct border on hungary for the first time and a strong position in Central Europe extending all the way to the end. Suffice it to say truman was alarmed at the soviet unions expanding demands would find similar expression in the far east. Meetingwhy in his first on april 21, truman emphasize repeatedly the need for the. Utual observation of agreement good relations, he said, could not be a oneway street. Reply that yet never been talked to that way in truman snapped carry out your agreement and you will not get talk to like that. Truman worried that what soviet forces entered the war against they would flout the agreements made with japan just as they were flouting them with europe. Concern was the specific yell to agreement. Yalta agreement. They would enter on condition that five things happen that the status quo would be preserved in Outer Mongolia, that the manchuria port would be thatnationalized and russia and china would jointly operate the southeastern that the cureall islands would be handed over. Not beencheck had consulted about this, despite the clear violation about the manchuria. The soviet union stood ready to include a tree with china. Gainly, fdr said he would concurrence. The secret agreement reflected solutionnd ingenious to a conflict of interest between the United States and soviet union over china. Longterm soviet strategy had been to establish offer zones around the states as was occurring in eastern europe. Wereia, the buffer zone sent john come Outer Mongolia, manchuria, korea and the cureall islands. Had established a state in Outer Mongolia and established states and were poised to take a state take a playbook. Japans the United States for close to half a century had espoused an open door which meant support for chinas territorial integrity. They were indirect conflict over fdr promisedwhich to return to china. The solution to the conundrum was to propose in return for stalins commitment to territorial in equity, he would guarantee the preeminent interest in manchuria would be safeguarded. They would control manchuria after the were after the war. The cement that was supposed to bind us together was the alliance between the soviet union and a commitment to enter into a Coalition Government with sharon kaisheks government. The united dates would encourage and support both negotiations. Its important to realize only a handful of men knew about the secret agreement at yalta. It would not be made public for itear, but in retrospect, was propolicy. It also appears there was more to the agreement and was it on a per. Understanding, just like the pursuit against germany. Although the joint invasion of has neverme island made it explicit, fdr possible tensions were clear. Through an expansion of land lease, the united date provided the soviet union with the trucks, planes, locomotives, transportation equipment, some invasion of manchuria and transferred 149 ,hipped to the soviet union including training naval personnel. The early end of the war brought termination but had it continued, the eight programs would have continued. Twowar Department Proposed options for the soviet occupation of japan. These options clearly indicated fdrs intent. If the war ended and the strategy carried out, the position the russians would have ,cquired the far east are combined with the control of half of europe, would have made the soviet union the dominant player on the landmass of a Global Player equal to the United States. They would have one the struggle for northeast asia, seizing mantra, korea and half of japan. They would have been able to incorporate the industrial plant , making siberia. Moreover, the stronger the soviet position would be at the end. It is no wonder truman concluded this was a bad bargain. Fdr had given away too much. Especially as it became increasingly evident that it was no longer necessary. Faced isenge truman how to wiggle out of fdrs commitment, especially yalta. Themut violating any of and the solution lay on the agreements themselves. The only specific territorial changes fdr committed the united weres to weres ocalan they were theoretically limited by the joint use agreement and soviet control of Outer Mongolia was reaffirmed. But fdr made no formal written commitment for the invasion and occupation of japans home islands. Nor had he made any formal written commitment about korea. Fdr, churchill, and shank kaishek agreed korea would become independent. By the time of yalta, the independents or korea had morphed to three powers which included the soviet union but not great britain. , unlike the written commitment and yalta agreement concerning Outer Mongolia, manchuria and the cureall islands, the absence of any formal limit for homeland japan and korea were trumans way out of fdrs dad bargain. Truman would adhere scrupulously to the written commitment but alter the informal understanding and the atomic bomb would be the key to success. As trumans review continued, it that the Japanese Navy and air force ceased to andt as a viable force commence massive incendiary bombing against most cities, leaving them in ruins. The u. S. Navy commenced a blockade as a country, bombarding its coastal cities. Submarines had cut off all access. Japan was prostrate. Word came the japanese were seeking to end the war. Extending peace deal to the vatican, the United States, zurich and to the russians in moscow. Was most are not was the information that the atomic bomb would be available for use by early august. There is some confusion here about the bomb. Many authors argued they tried to use the bomb at hot stem after he learned of the trinity, implying it was a lastminute decision and not part of an integrated strategy. At best, that is only half true. Manhattan project scientist devised to bombs a uranium version with a gun trigger detonator and a plutonium version detonated by an implosion. By february of 1945, or scientist were confident the uranium bomb, little boy, would work and would not require tests. They more complicated implosion type plutonium bomb, called fat man, would require testing, which was scheduled for early july. In the meantime, preparations were underway to can dig your aircraft, train aircrews, 74 days, construct operatorys on which to assemble the bomb. By midmay thomas in 1800 officers from the 509th group had arrived and knew nothing except they were going to conduct a special mission. The 509th was in place only weeks after the president had been believed briefed about the bomb. When, as part of trumans review, the secretary of war briefed him on the manhattan anject, the president set up interim committee to determine whether, when, and where the bomb could be used. Met,e time the committee the capability to deliver weapons was already in place. Include thembers under secretary of the navy, the systems secretary, william clayton, scientific advisors and the chief of staff. Ands was very distrustful supported the use of the bomb without it for me. The marshall impose the use of the bomb and suggested in forming moscow about it. Simpson also thought that information about the bomb should be shared. Scientific opinion was mixed with a strong segment opposed. Determineds, it was to bombs would be available by august. The Committee Recommended and truman agreed the bomb should be used with out warning and without informing the soviet union. Is the atomic bomb played a central role in trumans plans. Haddecision to use the bomb it made while Harry Hopkins was in moscow on may 26, june 6. His mission was first and foremost a growing postwar european dispute. He would confirm arrangements for the soviet entrance into the war in japan. Condition. New that condition was china would have to sign a treaty legalizing the delta accord before the soviets would go into war against japan. Stalin thought he had some leverage over the United States, but he quickly dropped the conditions when he found out otherwise. Stalin agreed to be a party to the trustees. As to japan, he confirmed the formula and confirmed that soviet forces would move by august 8. He also told him that russia would expect to share the occupation of japan and he wanted an agreement with us and british. Yet noant there was of agreement on occupation. Truman would support with fdr committed the United States would do in writing, but would not support that which had not been committed to, namely the occupation of mainland japan and a trusteeship for korea. He and secretary burns cap that decision to themselves as arguments swirled among their advisors. The options as they evolved through midyear were either for invasion or bombing or blockade without an invasion. How are whether to use the atomic bond doesnt seem to have been part of it. Trumans advisors knew about it. Those who did oppose deal. A lot of these opinions would change. Marshall argued for continuity with fdr. The grand sense of strategy pursued since tehran meaning the division and occupation of japan with the a americans in the south and meeting in tokyo. Arepresident s top advisers the president top advisers. The secretary of war, simpson, secretary, admiral William Leahy truman all argued against invasion based on japanese peace dealers. And thatccept at the emperors prerogative be preserved. Admiral king, chester nimitz also argued against an invasion. The Simpson Group proposal to modify the Unconditional Surrender format might have a prompt and to the conflict, but at the cost of leading the japanese regime and without removing prospects for a resurgence of Japanese Military. A walk aid andor asian would have meant the continuation of the war for several more months. Most of all, it would have opened the door for were a strong soviet role in the to join us acclaimed stalin was party mandate. None of this address the postwar structure of the far east and the positions and it. President agreed to proceed with longstanding plans to invade japan, he and burns said about crafting a broader solution that included the use of the bomb. They thought by dropping the atomic bomb to end the war six months to a year sooner than only would an American Invasion be avoided at lives saved, but soviet participation would limited. If successful, and it was a big if, the united dates would control japan in the soviet union would the excluded. Expected to not keep the russians out of the war. That would have an impossible. Was a historic opportunity to settle a century long struggle among the japan come a china and russia for control over northeast asia and stalin was determined to seize it. Make no mistake about that. But truman was equally determined to live with the advanced to the asian mainland. And as we shall see as stipulated in the yalta agreement, to limit the soviet position in korea, truman sought its division, and to circumscribe the position in century a, he supported fdr plan fdrs plan for a coalition. They decided on this strategy without input. The final details were worked out aboard the uss augusta on the way to pot stem. Largegh truman took a entourage aboard the augusta, he and burns excluded every single one of their advisors except admiral leahy and three state department officials. Russianins, the top specialist and the director of european affairs. They were all excluded and would travel separately. Stem was going to be a highstakes poker game and truman had not one, but two aces and the whole to play. Have the power to bring the war to an earlier than planned and with at least one atomic bomb, but he had the emperors provisional willingness. S. Intelligence indicated the japanese were playing a risky and rangers game. Conference of june 8 a. The basic strategy for conducting the war. Their plan was to write a one front war against the United States and administer a decisive defeat. As frank notes, the emperors instinct remains that a military triumph must precede any diplomatic maneuver. The japanese were gambling they could keep the conflict at one front by enlisting the russians as mediators, even though they announced the neutrality treaty on april 5 and were moving through to the far east. The war council recognize the russians plan to expand their influence the far east by striking at the most opportune moment, but they did not expect that moment to arrive until late summer or early fall. Was looming before the japanese leadership was that they would suffer the fate of germany. The defeat, dismemberment and occupation of germany had to at theen uppermost emperors mind. The greatest danger japan faces not nearly destruction and defeat which were inevitable, but dismemberment. Name withtie was a on thebut was centered national policy. Its irreducible meaning was the integrity of the state structure. Be recovery from destruction and defeat, but not dismemberment. Everything depended on keeping the russians out. Hoping to ensure they adhered to clean to the terms of the neutrality pact which had a year , the japanese progressively increased the amount they were willing to pay to obtain soviet agreement for mediation. First, they offered extension extensive fishing rights. They offered to give up all of their mainland conquests. Finally, they offered a formal alliance altogether with soviet mediation. Its easy to question the japanese leaderships grasp of reality, but nevertheless, that was their approach. Stalin was noncommittal. Of course now we hate know he had no intention of committing. He had issued orders for entry into the war after his first conversation with Harry Hopkins on may 26. He wanted everything prepared by august 1 for use by august 20. To steal aplanning march on the United States. We planned to invade november. If truman understood the japanese leaderships main concern was preservation of he knew the status of the emperor was negotiable despite the attempt to identify the state. He knew he could of pain and end to the war at any time if he were willing to compromise. But this was the worst case and he would choose it if and only if the russian invasion of the main islands became unpreventable by any means. So the strategy was to use the atomic bomb to bring the war to an early end and accept the russian seizure within the terms of the delta agreement. It would limit the advance of korea and exclude them entirely from japan robber. He would fulfill the yalta commitments to the letter and demand stalin do the same. Establishould america. Position by taking the control of japan. Trumans plan would be complicated to execute because russia would impose their exclusion of japan. Enabled then what temperature save face and prompting him to save his country from catastrophe. From catastrophic defeat by warnging to a quick end a that was expected to last at least another half year and ensure japans dismemberment. At potsdam, truman initiates a pacific aspect of this tragedy broada strategy on a front. Most of what happened at potsdam am a discussion about the settlement of europe. Truman objected to a lot of things that fdr committed to at yalta, but ultimately caved. Cuburns negotiated with molotov and stalin a division of europe and germany. The russians were happy with it, but at the same time, presented stalin with a fait accompli in the far east. Both behind the scenes and in discussions with stalin, truman carefully positioned the United States during his first meeting with the soviet leader on july 17, truman asked for assurance that the open door would apply to all of manchuria and that it be internationalized as stipulated in yalta. This was a test of stalins intentions, because in treaty negotiations stalin demanded that china gave the soviets sole control in violation of yalta. Raising the issue of the open , because stalin aback with a new demand from an american president in ventura anin mancurahuria. Truman also wanted to know when the russian army would be ready to move. But stalins chief of staff were vague offering differing dates. This were two or three weeks ldter than what stalin to hopkins, but he was referring to move two or three weeks earlier. On july 21, leslie groves, the Manhattan Project manager, h ad sent a detailed report to truman on the astonishing power of the atomic bomb. Y all accounts, this news the president spirits and changed his whole attitude. It strengthened his belief that now his plan would work. Now he would have two bombs instead of one. That same day, he authorized joint chiefs of staff to alert that of the ants were moving far more rapidly than anyone expected. Stated that it might prove necessary to take action within the near future on the basis of japanese capitulation, possibly before intervention. Sent Chang Kaishek a message on the 23rd, hoping to drag out negotiations. He said i ask that you carry out the yalta agreement but i do not ask you make any concessions in excess of that agreement. Truman was playing both sides of this negotiation, indicating sovietcave into thends and to stalin that United States might have to get involved in manchuria if the russians try to steamroll the chinese. But the purpose was to july this to delay the soviet entry. The next day that great and on july 24, u. S. Soviet military staff met to to discuss areas of operation. The joint chiefs saw to limit soviet operations of the mainland while fencing off japan and dividing korea. This is when korea was divided. Woulds before dean rusk restate this division at the 38th parallel. The air force was to have virtually unlimited access over manchuria, while the navy would have freedom of navigation in the sea of japan, which they were already exercising. Numerous to say, the russians were not happy with these limitations and they saw to revise it needless to say. The same day, after the planned meeting, truman sauntered casually around to stalin without his interpreter and mentioned to him United States had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. Stalin displayed no surprise, saying simply he was glad to hoped they would make good use of it against the japanese. Truman went to his quarters and made the decision to drop the bombs on japan. He ordered the first bomb to be dropped as soon as possible after about 3 august when the conference would be over. Twoans fait accompli came days later. Without informing the russians or consulting them, the present released upon stem declaration on the evening of july 26. The most striking aspect of the declaration was the absence of stalins name from it. Coming out of a conference where the present, president , stalin and churchill had been conferring for a week, it is strongly suggested there had been disagreement among the big three. Worse. Churchill had left. It was said he left to await Election Results and that was true, but other explanations were possible and rumors were rife. The austin declaration was signed by truman and shanghai shack who had not attended but not stalin. The application was that stalin declined to sign the implication had declined to sign in order to uphold its treaty wea nowp knowa that stalin fully intended to sign the declaration. N. It wouldve strengthen his demand to participate in the occupation. But these were precisely the reasons why truman did not want his signature on the declaration. Ore importantly, the omission of stalins signature said to sent Japanese Military hope that the russians would adhere to the neutrality treaty, stay out of the war and mediate an end. The hot stamp declaration indicates a number of subtle but different offers to a number of his deterrence potsdamthe declaration. Minor islands as we determine. Inference is that if japan surrendered to the united ion would not be crushed and dismembered the way germany had been but kept intact. Sentence leahry scrapped for stalin. Which was the omission of any mention of the islands or japans northern territories. The northern territories were referredinor islands to in the declaration but distinct japanese territory. Separate from the other islands. The treaty between japan and russia of 1855 defined the islands as a string of islands. Southwests to the were japans northern territory. Neverefinition of was contested, but it would be violated. Finally, there is another element missing from the declaration. And that was the emperor himself was not mentioned. The last sentence of the declaration called upon the government of japan to proclaim Unconditional Surrender to all japanese of all Japanese Armed forces, referring only to the government of japan implied the emperor was a distinct entity separate and apart from the government and would receive separate consideration. There are four messages here. To the Japanese Military, that counted on soviet neutrality and mediation in their last ditch strategy, the absence of stalin s signature reinforced their view. To the socalled peace faction, promise of retaining the gr oup intact conveyed an equally powerful message to accept u. S. Terms. To the emperor, the omission of his name signaled he would couldue to reign if he deliver the surrender. And finally to stalin, there was a suggestion the northern territories were not to be considered sovereign japanese territory. View was counting on the kind of response he got from japan. Hed already made the decision to drop the bomb. To interpreting what ever the surrender terms. In just in case they caved completely, that same day of the 26thth, the jcs ordered macarthur and nimitz to be ready to move. Jcs sawan event immediate deployment of the u. S. Marines to several ports bordering on manchuria and korea. Counted on his inclusion in the declaration as a way out of overriding his treaty obligation on the neutrality pact, but he also faced a second impediment, one of his on making and that what his demand that Chang Kaishek signed the treaty before the russians go into the war against japan. Inlin added that condition his meeting with Harry Hopkins and was not stipulated in the yalta agreement which said only that the soviet union expressed a readiness to conclude a pact of friendship in alliance with china. Stalin was undoubtedly shocked at how easily truman had outmaneuvered him. But he had a counter move. He sent molotov to the Plenary Session in his place. And molotov passed on stalins proposal that the allies add ress a formal request to the soviet, and for its entry into the war on the grounds japan have rejected the potsdam declaration. Truman, taken by surprise, deferred a reply for two days. On july 31, he sent stalin the message, saying that as soon as word came from him that the treaty would china had been signed, he would send him a form letter requesting soviet entry. The invitation would be based on articles 103 and 106 of the proposed u. N. Charter and the moscow declaration of 1943. These were terms that stalin could hardly accept because they took the initiative of entry into the war away from him and place it into the hands of tank i scheck and truman. Events now moved rapidly. Against the worst case of a surprise soviet landing, somewhere in northern japan, truman saw to redirect American Driver power to land in the northern islands. On august 4, joint War Plans Committee issued a report. Due to altered signals of having heavy reinforcement, the plan is one of macarthur and nimitz to make alternate plans. The report concluded operations against extreme northern honshu and directly against tokyo are now under intensive study. It suggested that truman may have thought the russians might be able to get there before we could prevent it. Over hiroshimamb changed everything, fatally compromising the first part of the plan. A decisive battle against the United States. Even though some highly placed Japanese Military and scientific, science officials denied the bombs significance. The emperor directed urgently that japan moved to activate the second part, a request for soviet mediation. The japanese, of course, had been attending to ascertain towards attitude mediation, but especially since pot stamm, hoping the omission of stalins name from the declaration meant that the russians would remain notion. But they could not arrange a meeting with molotov until august 8. As soon as he entered that office, molotov cut him off before he could utter a word. And instead, shocking him, rejected the mediation and read the formal declaration of war against his country. The soviet declaration of war compromise the integrity and the dropping of the second atomic bomb the next day provided the exclamation point. It was a collapse of japans strategy that produced the decision to surrender. I emphasize the impact of the soviet declaration of war. It not only destroys japanese assumption of a one front conflict, but it also pretended japans dismemberment. Prime minister suzuki spoke to missvery. 30 said if we today, the soviet union will take not only manchuria and manchuria but also al kiot. Kito. This will destroy the foundation of japan. Suzuki was saying the only way was byerve their group surrounding to the United States before the russians got in. The japanese accepted the pot stamm terms the next day. 10. He potsdam terms august but continued to haggle over the role of the emperor, hoping beyond hope they could talk the United States into it. We know burns response. The emperor will be subject to the supreme allied commander. Nevertheless, the ball is now int japans court. And the continued refusals of japans military high command to admit defeat the russians were moving fast. Soviet forces were heading for ports on the northeast coast of korea, and engaging the japanese and fighting there back towards the southern tip of 11th the next day, the truman made two decisions. He ordered macarthur and nimitz to make advance arrangements to occupy seoul. Im eagerly following the surrender of japan if soviet forces had not gotten there before the immediately following the surrender of japan. He ordered the resumption of airstrikes against japan, but reoriented the strikes away from the incendiary bombing to precision strikes on petroleum and transportation systems. Then occurred what i think is one of the most extraordinary and complicated sequences of a war which led to japan surrender. On the 14th, after a fourday standoff, 20th air force carried out a 1000 plane attack on six targets. Two in western honshu. To interdict a rail link. Three work in similar targets northwest of tokyo. Sixth attacke carried out by the 315th bomb wing witch had received scant mention in history of the war. That was probably the most bizarre sequence in history. Missi was the last and longest Bombing Mission of theo war. Its target was an oil refinery. And the adjacent port located on the northwest coast upon shoe. Honchu. Obvious location for soviet forces to attempt a landing on honshu. Akita was the gateway to tokyo, and truman was determined to slam it shot. B28 bs took m an houroff from gua after the Japanese News Agency had announced japans capitulation, strongly suggesting that although the target was japanese, the objective was russian. As smith and mcconnell have general crawlspace, the commander of the Strategic Bombing command was apparently instructionnwritten from the chief of staff George Marshall to end the war as quickly as possible so that the soviet union would not gain a foothold in japan. Flew over29s okyo, Defense Command imposed a blackout on tokyo. The blackout occurred just as a few rightwing officers were attending a coup detat to try to find the emperors surrender for and destroyed so japan would not surrender. In the dark, they could not find it or they could not find the emperor, either. Was quashed by the next morning and the surrender solution played on the radio. 15ths successful airstrike had demonstrated shermans willingness to use american any sovietock attempt to enter japan, whether they intended to do it or not, but the mission also facilitated the surrender of japan and save the emperors life. Although japan now surrendered, the russians were still on the move. So for truman, the problem remain how to prevent them from gaining foothold in japan proper and limiting their advance in korea. The next day he issued general order number one. He declared all Japanese Forces in the main island of japan koreaislands adjacent, south of the 38th parallel, and the philippines shall surrender to the commanderinchief u. S. Armed forces. Left out of this order were both the northern territories and the islands. Stalin did not miss it. In a message to truman the next day, he offered what he called a few corrections. He accepted the division of korea. Insisted that all of the islands had to come into possession of the soviet union. But he troops in the northern part of the island to surrendered to the soviet troops. Said heing, stalin hoped that his modest suggestions would not meet with any objections. Trumans reply, he agreed to modify general order number one under islands would come soviet control, but he rejected stalins request it was his intention, he said, that Japanese Forces on all the islands of japan proper surrender to general macarthur. Japan was remain undivided and under american control. While there is more to be said about that, and i but i want you to know that truman was, h o realistic his concerns wee, we will never know but he wanted to make sure the russians would not gain a foothold in japan. But did stalin have the last laugh . On september 3, the day following the surrender ceremony aboard the missouri, stalin ordered soviet forces to take control of japans northern territories, claiming that they were simply the southern islands. And as the islands were to be handed over, then they should get the northern territories, too. Definition of the northern territories was a fiction in andh both the United States the soviet union but not the japanese. Ambiguitys american about the definition of the islands was more calculated and uninformed. Japanset possession of northern territories would become an obstacle to the full normalization of russian half in japanese russianjapanese ties from that time to the present. Let me conclude. There is no end of irony. Fdr had offered stalin control over manchuria, korea, and half of japan to come into the war against japan. The japanese offered stalin outright control of all their mainland conquests and in alliance to boot to stay out of the war and negotiate an end,. But stalin calculated he could get half of japan, too. Unfortunately for stalin, it failed to reckon with harry truman who not only prevented soviet entry into japan but also clawed back half of korea. Toman used the atomic bomb settle the control of northeast asia and put in place a geopolitical structure that ensured americas dominance of the pacific and in doing so he strategy not only to ensure american control over japan but to preserve japans territorial integrity. At the same time, he adhered to and thelution to china handover of the islands to the soviet union according to the yalta agreement. The results from a Strategic Point of you are with us still. Japan remains territorially integrated in a staunch ally of the United States. Korea remains divided by the republic of Korea Remains a staunch ally. The northern territories remain in russian hands and continue to be an impediment to full japanrussian relations. But finally, the United States remains the dominant power in the pacific. Although there are signs that that might be changing. Thank you. [applause] [speaking latin] so, i can understand why there are no questions. Yes, sir . If you dont mind are you arguing that truman felt or was briefed that conventional bombing was rent is as it was wouldrendous as it was swiftly save lives, and that therefore the jews in the decision to use the nukes was only about the sovs . Richard it was about ending the war quickly before the russians could be fully prepared to exercise their interests. Use of the nukes in trumans mind was to end the war quickly and save lives. Richard i agree with that but it was also [laughter] the soviet thing was important but secondary. The primary was to stop this war now. What was the objection from marshall and the others . Did they not believe that conventional weapons and a blockade would do it . Man. Rd marshall was fdrs he supported the pincer strategy, the same strategy in germany. Of the war continued for another six months to year, who doubts that the soviet union would not have enter japan proper . Entered japan proper . Who doubts . If the war continued for six months to year, the russians would have been there, japan wouldve been divided, there would have been a three power control commission for tilde. I for tokyo. I think it was ok for marshall. To china as well. Richard exactly. Manchuria would be a russian province. In fact, as late as 1949, stalin was proposing a division of china. They objected to the idea on the grounds that this would be a two china policy. The arguments between mao and stalin were already beginning at that time. A broader question because you look at trumans decisionmaking in other contexts as well. What was it about his experience or his character that enabled him to think so strategically in a way that in my judgment, i think yours is extraordinarily rare among World Leaders . Richard not that rare. The president s, but i do not believe president s sit in front of a map and make decisions. There are huge staffing operations they go on. Regulated,ions are and they make the decisions about the options. How do they mix together . Dominatione, soviet of northeast asia, say including northern japan, they would be there today if they had succeeded, according to fdr. They stole the northern territories. Would they have given back onto honshu . Too valuable. This is a longterm struggle, and i meant to bring one of trumans messages to the emperor and one of macarthurs statements to the emperor that spoke to that very point about how the United States saw japan fitting into a larger picture of northeast asia. So, they were thinking in those terms. Guts mind, truman had the to act on those terms. Getting back to who was on the augustine with truman and who was not, i dont remember the chronology here, but was Clark Clifford with truman at that point or did he come on to his radar later . Truth, ii tell you the dont know. I know truman took with him his entourage, his cronies, but none of his top advisers. Which i find absolutely extraordinary. Going into a major conference conference toar leave all of your advisers home tells me you have got Something Else in mind. Not a player with german at that point . With truman at that point . Richard no. Thank you. Richard last one. The revisionists and the Orthodox Jews on the subject at the beginning of your talk 70 years after the fact, do you think of another 70 years would have gotten more for consensus or we will still be fighting over this . [laughter] richard the subtext here is what kind of a world do we want to have, a world where we are friends with everybody or do we want to pursue american interests to whatever degree necessary . And there has always been a very strong element within the american Political Leadership that seeks to pursue detente with the larger party. In this case, detente with the soviets. We can see detente abdicates in every single decade from world war from the 1940s to today. And every single decade, there would be elements to reach a deal with the russians, press that reset button. Somebody has to learn from history. And that is why we are trying to promote these conferences, so that we can get a better understanding of what it has all been about. Thank you very much. [applause] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] in 2011, American History tv visited jamestown island, virginia, to learn about the jamestown rediscovery archaeology project, which in 1994, discovered and subsequently excavated remains of the original 1608 fort