month or days of the washington presidency, as he is thinking about this addresses? >> i think the most important place to start is washington really didn't want to stand for a second term at all. he had wanted to be in office for a couple of years and then hightail it as soon as he could. he didn't particularly like being president because he had to be away from home, he had so much stress and pressure on every single action that he took. he knew that every step would establish precedent for those who came after him. he did not like criticism. he was worried that this reputation that he had spent decades building would be damaged by a poor choice or a poor action. he also had a real commitment to be importance to him leaving office while he was alive. he felt very strongly that the american people needed to choose his successor, that it could not come through his death. that the process of transition and election and the peaceful transfer of power had to be learned and practiced and cultivated. he was determined to try to oversee that. that was his mindset leading up to 1796. he had set his mind quite firmly that by early 1796 he was leaving. he decided in february and march of 1796, while alexander hamilton was in philadelphia to argue a case in front of the supreme court, they had a conversation about this address. they got the process rolling. shared a series of drafts over the next several months and then sat on it until september, partly to keep the election season as short as possible. washington finally published it in the newspaper in september, to reach the maximum number of people. to make it clear that he was speaking to the people, not to congress or to a different branch of government. >> joseph ellis, we will be spending most of our time talking about the text itself, the kinds of themes that we find there. what would you add about the origins that led up to the creation of this document, that you might want to share about washington before 1796? >> i would venture to guess, john, as a student of modern presidentcy, you might contradict me. no president in american history did not want to be president more than george washington. not only did he not want a second term, he didn't want a first term. and when he was going up to new york, he felt like a prisoner going to jail. and he really meant it. if you read the washington correspondence during the presidential years, almost half of them have to do with mount vernon. that's where he wanted to be. he really did. all of the views of the presidency are shaped by a more 20th century conception of it's significance. washington did not regard the presidency as the capstone of his career. he regarded it as an epilogue, one that he wished he didn't have to do. the great thing he did was win the war. i think that's true of all four of the first four presidents. adams'great thing was before the revolution, to bring it into meaning. jefferson's was the declaration. madison's was the constitutional convention and the federalist papers. all of them didn't think about the presidency as the great moment in their lives. and washington was an aficionado of exits. in surrendering his sword, or even before that in newburgh, refusing to become dictator, and then a few months later in baltimore where the capital -- no, annapolis, excuse me, where the capital was. the surrender of his commission, when he did that, george the third said, it can't be. if he does that, he will be the greatest man in the world. he did, and for that moment, he was. what they were thinking, and jefferson writes about this right afterwards, he is there. i think jefferson actually wrote some of washington's speech in annapolis, as a matter of fact. i can't prove that. jefferson says that one man saved us from the fate that befalls most republics. they were thinking of caesar, they were thinking of cromwell. subsequently, we can think of napoleon, we can think of mao, we can think of castro, we can think of a variety of leaders who never want to leave office. i won't mention one who might still be alive in american politics. the precedent he sets, i really agree with the way lindsay put it, it's often discussed as the two term precedent. that is ratified as a constitutional amendment in 1951, i believe. the real precedent is in a republic, all the leaders, no matter how indispensable, are disposable. that you do not die in office like a monarch. that was the real precedent. i will conclude here, the dominant thing we need to remember is that this was not ever delivered as an address. now, both of our commentors already know that. it wasn't a speech, it was an open letter to the american people that first appeared in a philadelphia paper, and i think it's a new hampshire paper that gives at the title, the farewell address. the initial reaction to the address was, oh my god, he can't leave us. the american effort had not existed without him as its head. it was like the father saying to the children, you are on your own. and that was a trauma. nobody thought he was ever going to retire. they presumed he would just win elections until he died. and again, he couldn't wait to get back to the place where you are sitting, kevin >> john, joe referenced something, the stepping away from power in annapolis. you write about this in your book. this is not the first bit of advice that washington shared widely with the nation. could you tell us a little bit about washington back in 1783, and how he also shared his guidance to the nation? it's called the circular letter, i think. >> the circular address to the states. that was originally called his farewell address. >> really, i didn't know that! is that true? >> yeah. >> you're not making that up? >> nope. no, true story. and what's fascinating about that is there is broad continuity. but most importantly, with the power of the gesture itself, the simple act of voluntarily relinquishing power itself was revolutionary. and the quote that joe was referring to by jefferson is actually the epilogue to my book. i think it so perfectly crystallizes washington throughout his career, but particularly as it culminates in the farewell address. jefferson said, the moderation and virtue of a single character probably prevented this revolution from being closed as most other have been, by the subversion of the liberty it was intended to establish. and certainly, those were the stakes in 1783, as well. in the normal course of events, the military leader would displace the tyrant and then become a tyrant himself. so talk about the prevalence of ancient roman and greek precedent on this young republic, this was a real cincinnatus step he took. he was voluntarily relinquishing power to return to his farm. it wasn't a pose on his part. it was completely genuine. and the advice he gives in 1783 is very similar, albeit seen through the prism of political fights he saw as president and the fights over the ratification of the jay treaty and foreign policy. but he says, first of all, this is not a time of celebration. it's a time of real responsibility. the revolutionaries won, but now we have to establish the republic and show the world that we can establish a democratic republic on a scale never before seen. right? because, among other things, it was settled wisdom that a democracy couldn't exist. and if it could, it could work in a couple of swiss canton's. it would never work in a country as big as the 13 colonies. he warns about the need for national unity. he was fighting with the continental congress all throughout the war because they couldn't find a sense of collective resolve or focus on the common good. they didn't want to levy money to support the troops. he said that we need to have discipline and focus on a sense of unity. and to really think as citizens. one of the important points is independence and freedom can be a state of nature. liberty requires responsibility, and that is what lincoln--excuse me, i am just finishing a lincoln book right now. freudian slip. that's what washington said in the 1783 address. and again in 1796. >> one of the things i can do tonight, and i hope they can start this now, is bring up a few of the short quotations that people can pull out of the farewell address. this one, i would like to bring up because as we were just discussing, if you read down to the bottom there, he refers to the fact that he has given this kind of advice before. but you see phrases here, disinterested warnings of a parting friend, who can possibly have no personal motive to bias his council. he reminds us about the circular letter in 1783. this is the way that he begins. this is right after -- i don't remember the exact phrase, here perhaps i should stop? is that right? he has a few paragraphs, and then he says, here perhaps i should stop, but then he goes on for many paragraphs longer to give some serious advice to the american people. when you see phrases like this, disinterested warnings, a parting friend, is this -- how does this fit with washington as leader and as president as you've come to study him? >> washington really wanted to see himself as above party spirit or faction. he really did see himself as president for all of the american people. at least white american people. and he wanted to represent them, regardless of what their partisan identification was. that might be a little bit rose colored glassing the situation. he certainly had some partisan biases by the end of his presidency, which he didn't necessarily want to admit. because he felt like certain sides had been more critical of him, had stirred up domestic rebellions, things like that. things he really blamed on partisan spirit. but he wanted to see himself as above those things. and certainly, the most apolitical president we've had to be sure. leaving office, that gave him more credence to beenat. had he still disinterested because he would've been standing for a third term. by leaving office, he put himself in that elevated position where he could give that advice. he could claim, at least to be disinterested, even if people didn't necessarily agree with him. what's fascinating about the reception to this farewell address is that people who were inclined to think well of him saw that -- saw it as disinterested, as he had intended. those who were inclined to see him as a more political actor, like thomas jefferson, thought that it was very political. >> what would you add? how would you read that? >> i agree with what lindsey just said, and let me try to build on that a little bit. political parties, the founders as a group, including washington, all regarded political parties as evil vultures that were floating through the political atmosphere. jefferson even claimed, he said if i must go to heaven in a party, i would prefer not to go at all. they all talked that game. and washington believed in that game, and i think john adams is the only other president that did as well. they really regarded parties as a threat to the stability of the republic. and so in washington's second term -- political scientists think that the creation of political parties is one of the major contributions the founders made to political thought, because it disciplines dissent and creates the possibility of a legitimate opposition, which is a good thing. washington and adams were cognitively incapable of thinking of a political party as anything other than an evil intrusion. he could not see himself as the head of a party. you might think he is an anachronism. but he is a classical figure. and i would build on something, again, that lindsay said. in the second term, the aurora, the -- you will look up in textbooks and they will say, the opposing party that comes into existence is called the democratic republican party. wrong. it's not called the democratic republican party, it's called the republican party. the word democratic and democracy is an epithet in the 18th century. it means mob rule. democratic republican doesn't come into existence until 1860 with monroe. it's tricky, because that party morphs into the democratic party, but it's even worse than that. the federalists morph into the whigs and the whigs morph into the republicans. it's really tricky. but the aurora is the 18th century version of, john you might comment on this, fox news. and when they publish forged documents, forged british documents claiming that washington throughout the war was a traitor, he was trying to be benedict arnold and got beat to the punch by benedict arnold. this was just off the top stuff. and actually, among the people commenting on his farewell address was thomas paine, who hated him because he didn't think washington got him out of france fast enough. he said, we must all devoutly pray for his imminent death. the criticism he was getting -- >> which is pretty funny, by the way, because he was famously an atheist. >> that's true, he was. you mean paine, not washington. the level of partisanship in the 17 90s is comparable to what we are facing in washington now, okay? the press, and avalon, you have to listen to this. there was no rules for the press. all the news fit the print. washington stands firmly against that whole thing. he thinks if you have any problems, you can just vote me out in the next election. but the level of partisanship in the newspapers in the 17 90s's is scatological. washington really can't understand it. he just doesn't understand it. and i think he is hurt by it. i think that he survives the french and indian war, he should have been killed when he was a young man. he should have been killed several times in the course of the war for independence. he wasn't even wounded. but they wounded him in his second term. they really got to him. and he couldn't wait to get out of there. i know we want to move into the discussion of his attitude towards political partisanship. i think the context is what i described and this specific legislation, that it really explodes on. that is the jay treaty. and his defense of that. here, i will shut up on this, i promise you. the word is republic. and that means raes publica, the things of the public. the public is different from the people. the people are usually misinformed. they are foolish in their opinions. that is the reason democracy is not a positive term. the function of a leader is to act on public interest, even when it's unpopular. adams carries this two extremes. he is the guy that defends the british troops in the boston massacre. but he always thought, if what i do is really unpopular, it must be right. he could have won the election in 1890 by going to war with france and he refused to do it. he always said it was a proudest thing he ever did. the public is a big word here that we need to look at. and washington internalized that. it was the job -- one of the reasons the senate has a six-year term is supposedly to make them more likely to vote in the long term interest of the public. of course, that is the most partisan portion of the government. all right, i will shut up. but the public, he represents them. >> lindsay, when joe mentioned the aurora, you wanted to say something. >> yeah. one quick thing that i just wanted to highlight, when joe was talking about how wounded washington was, that was intentional on the part of the newspaper editors. the editor of the aurora delivered ten copies of his newspaper every day to the front steps of the presidents house, even though washington was not a subscriber. he did so intentionally to get under washington's skin. we know that it worked, because they write about in cabinet meetings and jefferson took several notes. so this kind of political warfare, they were trying to inflict was quite intentional. >> let's get a taste of washington on parties here, and we can further explore this. this is some of his language, and there is much more of it in the address. it serves always to distract the public councils and feeble the administration. it agitates the community. it kindles the animosity of one party against another, foments the occasional riot and insurrection. it opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which finds a facilitated access to the government itself, to the channels of party passions. john, first crack at some of this language here. >> leave it up for a second, because i think if you had to pick that headline today, this would be a particularly -- it agitates the community with ill founded jealousies and false alarms. and kindles the animosity of one party against another. it opens the door to foreign influence. we just had a riot and insurrection that was partisan in its nature. this calendar year, resulted in the worst attack on the capital since the war of 1812. it was fueled by misinformation and disinformation channels through partisan media and exacerbated by party figures who put party over country. it kindled the animosity of one party against another based on a lie. perpetrated by the then president. but amplified through partisan media. and also amplified via social media by some foreign actors who saw an interest in dividing america against itself. it is all there, folks. right there. george washington warned us, he predicted us. and so especially if anyone out there tries to -- another phrase from the farewell address, act like a pretended patriot. you know, act like they are more patriotic than anybody else, which is itself, washington would say, a sin against national unity. if they fed into that stuff that washington warned against, they are part of the problem. let's not pull any punches about that. washington made a very explicit warning, we just lived through evidence of it. so we could not be more relevant, and that's precisely why we need to be listening to the farewell address and now, today. because we are falling into the traps that he warned us about almost 250 years ago. >> john, quickly, you are the one who has looked at this most recently. when did they stop making it mandatory to read the farewell address before -- is at the full congress, or both houses, or just the senate? >> the senate still reads it every year. yes, it does. >> how ironic. >> well, yeah. i would argue the house is more partisan than the senate, although it's kind of a jump ball. what i thought you were going to say is, in the wake of the civil war, teaching the farewell address, memorizing it, is actually part of the core public school curriculum. so it is foremost in peoples minds, even though it is easier to memorize 272 word gettysburg address. it is in the wake of world war i, for a lot of interesting reasons, that it begins to fade. and then the original america first movement, the isolationist's in the run up to world war ii adopted the farewell address. it fundamentally creates a miss impression that it's an isolationist document. it was read at a german american nazi rally, but we will get into that later. >> we will get a foreign policy soon. -- john gives us a great way that this speaks the 21st century. how would this have been read in september 1796? like you said, there's an election just around the corner. >> yeah. as i think john alluded to in the very beginning, this was an intensely partisan atmosphere. when we think of the challenges we are facing today, in terms of misinformation and disinformation. party structure, nativism, fears about foreign interference. all the things that we fear today, they had not done it before. and as joe talked about, they were students of history and they knew that republics typically failed. let's not forget the constitution was actually a second chance. this government was already having a second chance of getting it right. there were some fears at this time that one misstep would lead to the nation's undoing. and washington shared that fear during the treaty debates that joe talked about. adams wrote in his letters back to abigail that he thought civil war was coming. he thought maybe the constitution would last another ten years, at most. that is really the vibe of this moment. one of the things that i think washington highlights in this party section of the farewell address is that the party animosity and intensity of the party spirit can lead us to forget the similarities, we have to one another. yes, we might have regional differences and sectional differences, but we actually have much more in common as americans than we do as federalists or as republicans. and that is a lesson we really need today. >> can i take it for a second? i think that we need to recover the historical context of the 18th century for our viewers. she is doing that right now. i am building on her book in this remark. if you read article two of the constitution of united states, i will bet you can't tell me what the president can do. the definition of the presidency isn't shaped by the constitution, it's shaped by washington's own administration. i always vote for him as number one president, even ahead of lincoln. he creates the republic that lincoln saves. but let me tell you, the average american in the 1780s and 90s lived out his or her life and died without a three hour horse ride. the mentality was local, not continental or national. and this is what underlay the perception that was strong, that we created a national government before we were a nation. and so it's what one historian called a constitution was a roof without walls. washington is the embodiment of a nation that doesn't exist. it's one of the reasons that he goes on the trip in his first two years to visit all of the states. somebody has got a book on it right now. what we need to remember is the united states in the 1780s and 90s was a plural noun. okay? jefferson will go to his grave believing that we are still a confederacy, not a nation. washington is an attempt to create -- and it's one of the reasons why in the address itself, he keeps trying to get hamilton to insert a long paragraph on a national university. and hamilton keep saying, what in heaven's name does this have to do with the document? he keeps saying, no, you've got to put it in. it ends up two sentences. when you read this, they are creating an institution where americans from all kinds of different states and sections can come together and interact and inter -marry. i don't think george washington university makes that plane, but the first institution that does that is west point, which comes into existence in 1803. >> washington is proposing a civic college, and purchases some land for it. that idea dies. and hamilton will go back and forth on it. he keeps concinving him to send it to congress, and that's where most of it goes. but if you look at the original farewell, which is at the american public library, they literally cut and paste that section. >> i think we are carrying too much on this, but john, if you look at that last address to congress, it's almost fdr. you know it i mean? i'm sorry. >> go on. >> you have to get beyond that, john. you know what i'm saying. it's a vision very close to what john quincy adams will have as president. and it's a vision of a nation state with fixed domestic and foreign policy in a robust way. in that view, washington is a member of a very small minority. and anybody that opposed it, he is a tory because he is attempting to recreate a monarchy. jefferson is the main guy that's doing this behind the scenes. douglas malone who spent 50 years writing about jefferson, they said that jefferson in the 17 90s, i don't really understand what he's doing. it's been 50 years, and you don't understand what he's doing? what he's doing is lying. what he's doing is treason. he is stabbing washington in the back. and i might be wrong, i've often said to students, i hope i was right. that jefferson wrote to martha when he became president, because he was only close to mount vernon. can i come see you? and she never answered, i don't think. but she said, washington said, i never want that man on my property. >> and it's right after washington's death in particular that martha has a very powerful statement about her distaste for jefferson. let me bring up a little more language here. we've already been talking about the union quite a bit, but it is all through this address, right? the word union, it appears so much you almost think you are reading abraham lincoln. it is all through this address. words like unity and union. here's a taste for it. the unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now dear to you. that word now also jumps out to me. it is justly so, for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independents, the support of your tranquility at home, your peace abroad, of your safety, your prosperity, of that very liberty which you so highly prize. this statement of union is powerful. this is not the only chunk of the address that touches on this. john, how do you take this? >> this is core, and it's a little bit what joe was just describing, which is that washington is building the creation of a nation. he is very conscious of the fact that he is creating a national character through the example of his character and decisions he makes as a president, which set the precedent, as lindsay writes about, for the american government. but it is a hard sell, because everybody still thinks of themselves as a virginian first, or a new yorker first, or a south carolinian first. so washington is trying to say, all the time that no, this works because of the federal government. it is the guarantor of your liberty. you are not safe from strife. you don't even necessarily have property rights unless we have a strong central government. you see even in that first constitutional convention, the constitution does not mention political parties. it does mention journalists, i'd like to point out, but it doesn't mention political parties. people show up to new york and they do the bill of rights, they are representing their constituencies and their conscience, not political parties. that is a later invention as has been discussed. i'm sure it will come up again. washington is constantly trying to say, look, all of our interesting differences are nothing if we cannot focus on what's unites us rather than what divides us. in that very early debate about the ratification of the constitution we see so many arguments we still see today. a debate about a largely urban vote saying we need a stronger central government to unite the nation to give them certain powers. primarily rural folks saying all of our interesting differences are nothing if we cannot focus on what's unites us rather than what divides us. in that very early debate about the ratification of the constitution we see so many arguments we still see today. a debate about a largely urban vote saying we need a stronger central government to unite the nation to give them certain powers. primarily rural folks saying no, a stronger central government is a threat to our way of life. that is a continuity in american debate that goes from the constitutional convention through today. i think washington, clearly on the side of a stronger central government, emphasizing that there is a balance to be struck. this is not all on one side of the ledger. the primary mission, the primary product is emphasizing the creation of a nation. full stop. >> lindsay, your thoughts on the washington with regards to the union. >> i would like to build off what john said, he talked about the importance of the constitution and what he's stating is you cannot have the nation without a strong central government. again, this is another incredibly relevant architect for the 20th century and especially in 2021, the goal is to have certain rules, the recognition of authority, the adherence to the rule of law which will actually safeguard our liberties. you don't get to just have a free-for-all of whatever it is you want to do. as a modern society we accept that we are supposed to stop for a red light. you are not allowed to drive drunk because that is a limitation we accept to preserve more of the liberties and the freedom and the safety of more american people. obviously they didn't have cars in 1786 when he was writing this but the concept is true. as a part of a free society, you have to accept certain limitations. this is incredibly relevant coming on the heels of the whiskey rebellion. it wrapped up less than two years prior to this address. he does actually allude to the whiskey rebellion in which he says there is a constitutionally mandated way where one can air your grievances. one can seek redress for the things that you don't like. the measures that you don't think are appropriate. unless the constitution is changed, obedience to the constitution is the true way of being an american. >> joe, let me ask you to address one specific thing washington spends quite a bit of time on in his discussion of union and unity, that is regionalism. he talks about the north, the south, the west. could you help people who are less familiar with the 18th century, what is he seeing when he looks to the north and south and particularly the west? what is that regional concern of his? >> the north south, the obvious issue is the threat of the civil war and the underlying issue there is slavery. later in the program i would like to say that i wish there was one thing he did talk about in the farewell address that he didn't, he said to jefferson, this is i think even before he was president that if there ever is a war between the north and the south you need to know i will be with the north. >> he says that to randolph. yeah. >> does he really? i think jefferson repeats it. i'm familiar with it through jefferson. he sends his kids, not his kids but to columbia rather than to william & mary. he becomes a trojan horse in the middle of virginia in some sense. that is that. the other thing is the west. you know, i think john was mentioning that first farewell address the circular letter of 1783, that is his most lyrical statement of all-time in terms of his vision for the republic. you can see it implied in the farewell address but you would have to know about it beforehand. that is, america's future is not with europe but to the west. lafayette says, come with me and we will do a grand tour. we will do paris, rome, we will do berlin. i don't think we'll do london. [laughs] he says, now, you come with me we will do detroit, we will do new orleans, we will do savannah. that is the future. that is the future out there. as a young man in the seven years war, he knows about what that is out there more than most other political leaders at the time. when you get to the louisiana purchase, it is funny because they think dinosaurs are out there, you know? mammoth and all that kind of thing. washington, i might be pushing this too much to diplomacy but i think washington believes we begin with the largest trust fund that any new nation has ever enjoyed. we have this geographic advantage as well, with both sides of the atlantic and the pacific. he's mostly concerned, obviously, with the atlantic but -- maybe john and lindsey can disagree with me, we can play this out as an argument. washington's definition of american exceptionalism is exactly the opposite of what most contemporary thinkers think of as american exceptionalism. in the contemporary view, which we saw after we won the cold war. the russians are gone! we can make the world safe for democracy as wilson believed. we have the model that works everywhere. washington said, our model is distinctive and unique and exceptional! for that reason, don't expect it to work in france, okay? the french revolution is probably going to fail. when the iraq war was going on, i was working on my biography of washington everyone wanted to know what washington would say about iraq. i said, he wouldn't know where iraq was. later, when they kept pressing the i said, he would say how did we become britain? >> [laughs] explain that one to me. i am pressing towards foreign policy, maybe you don't want to do that yet, kevin. >> let's go there now. >> the west is what drives him there. he believes that that is certainly the future for the next hundred years. >> okay, let's go to foreign policy. this is another small segment of a fairly lengthy discussion within the address. here is a taste. the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nation is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. so far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. here let us stop. this is washington at the end of his presidency, is this how washington presidency played out? did he exercise this kind of foreign policy vision as president across eight years? >> yeah, for the most part i think he did. he didn't want to be beholden to any one nation. he recognized that relying too much on one country for defensive support, for economic support, was asking for trouble. especially at a time when france a great bit and were essentially having a second 100-year war. they were constantly at each other's throughout. they usually pulled spain and others into the mix. the best way to get out of that was to not get too close to any one side. for example, in 1793 when france declares war on great britain, the united states and france did have treaties on the books. they had the treaty of amnesty in commerce and the treaty of defense left over from the revolutionary war. they decided that, actually at jefferson's encouragement, to interpret the treaty of defense and it's just that, a defensive treaty. it said that france in the united states were bound to support one another if they were attacked by their enemies. meaning great britain of course. but because france was the one that was on their door, they were not atacked and therefore according to jefferson's legal logic, the united states was not obligated to come to france's aide. which was convenient become the united states didn't really have an army or navy anyway with which to lend assistance. so this concept to try to balance these two global superpowers was really his main goal for the majority of his presidency. trying to not get too close, having too intensive relationship with either. >> it is one of my favorite moments in de toqueville's america, he praises washington to have the steadfastness to maintain the tragedy. insisting that no one else would have been able to do it. -- can you talk to us about the legacy of that? take us in past the 18th and into the 19th and 20th century? >> sure, well first of all the statement of neutrality between france and britain is itself revolutionary. washington, as joe was indicated, is really fixated on the fact that we have a strategic asset that is unlike any other. i joke in my book, it's a version of what bill rodgers used to say that america has the two best friends any country has ever had, they're called the atlantic and pacific ocean. we are insulated from the chaos of continental europe where they have been killing each other for centuries. that is a strategic asset. if particularly at the time where distance really inoculate that. he says, look, there is no way we are going to become a satellite for another nation. we have to become an independent nation. but he also says is we need at least another 20 years to build our own strength, military and economic, and then we can start making our own decisions rooted in our own interest and sense of justice. it is not an isolationist statement. it is just we are not a permanent alliance with other nations. we won't be a satellite for anyone else. we won't get dragged into foreign war, that would be a huge mistake. who we are now as a young nation that needs to build up strength. it would squander our greatest strategic advantage, which is our geographic isolation. this plays out through the 19th century. it is considered basically sacred. it is easily enforced by the distance. by the fact that the world is, you cannot attack america very easily, i'll be it it had happened but, we were fairly isolated. john hey, who was abraham lincoln's private secretary and secretary of state for mckinley and roosevelt said that american foreign policy can be summed up in two phrases. the golden rule and the monroe doctrine. the monroe doctrine that basically says we are going to stay out of your business, don't come into our sphere of influence. there are temptations to empire. what jill was saying is, look, we are a republic not an empire. that is four foundational founding fathers wisdom. late 19th century that starts to get strained. by the time we get into the debate over world war i, and i write about this in my book, it is really fascinating because the debate of what we are getting involved into wwi--and the ratification of the league of nations, are both conducted by two washington biographers. henry cabinet lodge. they're both arguing that they are defending the washingtonian tradition. capital of just doing it with a little bit more authenticity because he is saying, look, we have never got involved in a continental fight, why do we start now? wilson is saying that the ideals of washington are at stake. and a lot of the iconography, once we do get involved in the first world war, involves calling on washington's legacy. and then something really interesting happens, the world doesn't end. america turns the tide of the first world war fairly quickly. all of a sudden, it looks like maybe washington was not this perfect prophet. maybe we can get involved in foreign wars, do good, and promote democracy. it takes washington down a peg. in a significant way. now there is backlash during the first world war. when the second world war comes about, you see a group that was called the america first committee. some of them were antisemitic, some of them were isolationist's. but they used washington's farewell address as a real avatar to work against the united states getting involved in the second world war. this hits an absurd extent when they german bund hold a rally at madison square garden. this functions as an american at nazi party rally. there is a giant poster, flag, billboard of george washington in the background. the keynote address is all someone misappropriating the text of the farewell address. this is paid for by a foreign government. so it shows how you need to be careful of the misappropriation of documents. washington is warning against foreign influence in our politics. that is one of the reasons to stay out of this. here you have a foreign government, the nazis, misappropriating the farewell address to argue against getting involved in a foreign war. so by the way, that backfires a badly on them. but the legacy of the farewell address really starts to fall away for a time as a result of that association with the america first movement, the incorrect belief that it's an isolationist document and it's not. he's talking about a foreign policy of independents, of not squandering our strength. and no, we shouldn't start trying to export democracy or get involved in foreign fights. we should focus on strengthening ourself. but once we are strong as a nation, an independent nation, then we can make decisions based on our own perception of national interest and justice. that's different from isolationism. >> joe, in a recent book of yours, you have a long section on washington and his foreign policy vision writ large. looking not just at the farewell address but his actions across all of time as commander-in-chief in particular, both times. what is your read on the foreign policy vision of a washington? >> that there is a portion of his legacy that is no longer relevant. i hear, john, it's not really isolationism. but i don't think washington ever envisioned us -- he did envision us as a world power, but i think his vision of us as a world power was close to what john quincy adams would say. we do not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. but i've lost my train of thought. what did you ask me again? >> just foreign policy vision. >> it seems to me another dimension to washington's legacy that is very much alive. though different people that claim loyalty to it don't always agree about what we should do. that is the realistic tradition in american foreign policy. it has its origins in the mimelion dialogues of greece. in washington's terms, the nations act solely on the basis of interest and you should not expect them to act on any other grounds whatsoever. in some sense, all treaties or temporary until that interest might particularly change. but if you want to carry it into a contemporary american world, we care a lot about human rights but we are not -- and i think that the person that most embodies it in the late 20th century's george cannon and his doctrine of containment. and it is clear that what realism does well, you have to distinguish between what you can and should do and what you cannot and should not do. you cannot be an open-ended foreign policy. which regions of the earth our national security interests and which aren't? at least in my humble opinion, washington, if you could somehow bring him out like my readers do. if there's one place on the planet that you don't want to get involved, it's the middle east. it's one place in the middle east that is a graveyard for all western values, it is afghanistan. and so to bring it up to date, i think it'll be biden's decision to get us out. what he needs to do is not look for scapegoats but let's try to figure out how we made this mistake. i think in some sense, our own understanding of why britain makes the biggest mistake in its stagecraft history by making war on the united states in 1775, 76, we can understand that now in a way that we couldn't before. how does a recently arrived world power, revving with confidence, certain of its military and economic supremacy step into a quagmire that is a war that is both unwinnable and unnecessary. we should know about that. >> there is a lot i agree with, joe, but let me push back for debates sake. >> i see the grimace on your face so i know you're going to push back. >> but on two points. first of all, i think the core of what you are saying is exactly right. it can be summed up in a number of different ways. one of which is america is not a colonizing power, right? we are a republic not an empire. that doesn't mean we don't have interest as an independent nation, but we are not a colonizing power. if you look at our involvement in world war i and world war ii, that's another definition of american exceptionalism. but we beat back people who were not simply disrupting the balance of power but attacking free and allied nations. and then withdrew. >> world war ii, but not world war i. world war i was a mistake. >> you and the night commission can debate that but i won't get into that just yet. the only ground we ask is cemeteries to bury our dead. yes, in east germany, we have an air force base. we don't need to get to that level of detail right now. the parallel that intrigues me, though, is the case of the barbarry pirates which doesn't occur under washington. if we are attacked, what do you do? how far do you extend that? how far does the treaty with morocco apply? these are imperfect parallels, but what we've got given the aperture's of the time, and where it begins is we're attacked on 9/11. it's an unprecedented situation that washington couldn't have imagined. he also couldn't have imagined americans attacking the capitol, but that's a separate important conversation. >> i believe he could very easily imagine that. >> yeah, with a rebellion in the past. let me handed on to you in a second, but just to finish the thought regarding foreign policy. if you are attacked, then we responded the problem was we responded with an open ended commitment, rather than a more realist or -- we have a limited objective and then we are going to achieve that and get out. i think that is where the balance occurs, dealing with the different geopolitical realities today versus 1796. >> richard clark, who was under clinton and early bush, said it was as if after pearl harbor we had invaded mexico. i am going to disagree with you on some of this because i think that all of the energy and the angsty and anguish that was created by that event on september 11th was diverted into an unnecessary war. >> are you talking about iraq or afghanistan? >> both. >> i think you've got to draw distinction between the two. >> iraq was not containing nuclear weapons. iraq had nothing to do with al-qaeda. >> i agree with you on that. >> those were the rationales for invading iraq. >> i am going to take us back to 1796. i will keep us there for a few moments longer. we've had a great conversation, i hope you will have the time to answer a few questions of come in. i don't mean to keep you long, we've already learned a ton from you. but july who was running things behind the scenes has a few audience questions that want to come to. kate alison asks about where was it written, when was it written, and who helped write it? i've heard names. john, i will go to you first, as people who have helped write it. the where and the when, the where is quite interesting. >> the where is the executive mansion that exists in philadelphia, pennsylvania. washington begins writing his farewell address at the end of his first term. he does not want to have a second term. at that time, james madison's his closest aide, has not yet fallen under jefferson's sway and all of that. and then basically he is persuaded that the one thing -- washington is no longer president, we could have a civil war. he literally puts it away and puts it on the shelf, in a drawer. as he is ending his second term, hamilton is no longer treasury secretary. he is up in new york city. but washington begins corresponding. because jefferson and hamilton have formed the democratic or republican party, as joe corrects us, he brings adams in and starts corresponding. that is the primary collaboration. they bring john j in at the very end. to some extent, you get the federalist papers band back together to perform an on site edit with hamilton in new york. it's a process of back and forth. the play hamilton does a very good job of describing it. i interviewed lin manuel miranda about it for my book, which began before the play came out. i was delighted to find out it had a song with a farewell address, which is some of the actual lines. what lin manuel said was that he designed it so that hamilton would be delivering it as pros, and washington will turn into poetry. so some of the words or hamilton's, but it music and the spirit and the soul is washington's, and the public delivery. that is the process. among a whole string of partisan papers in pennsylvania, the philadelphia daily advertiser was not a partisan paper. it's not a federalist paper, notably. in part because it has congressional printing contracts. he chose a non partisan paper to publish. >> lindsey, you're the best person to ask for further elaboration. i've always wondered, why hamilton? in the sense that washington had so many people that he trusted and people he could work closely with. and yet hamilton somehow was at the very top of that. could you tell us about that? anything you'd add to the story? >> yeah. by 1796, washington had an abivalent relationship with the department secretary. i often affectionately refer to him as -- he didn't want to have cabinet meetings with them. he certainly didn't trust their abilities to the same degree that he trusted hamilton's. and frequently, still sought out advice on the annual addresses, on major moments during the presidency, and asking hamilton to draft things for him. one important element, though, that is specific to this. this is something he told hamilton when they first talked about it in march of 1796. washington sent him the draft. washington kept madison's first draft. and he insisted that the final includes paragraphs in the beginning. and it was a shot across the bow. washington was anticipating that madison and jefferson would be critical of this address. somehow, they would paint the address as an attempt to garner more power for the executive. so by including those paragraphs, drafted by madison, he was basically saying you knew about the farewell address. you participated in the drafting of the farewell address. so keep your mouth shut. it was very intentional, very savvy. and sure enough, madison was not publicly critical of the addresses. >> very briefly, i think the reason he picked hamilton is because hamilton had the most experience throughout seven years of the war, when he was writing jefferson. when you read the general orders which are boring as heck throughout the 1770s, they are signed by washington, but he didn't write them. most of those are written by hamilton or one of his other aides. what he called, pen men.o washington was insecure about his own lack of education. he once said jefferson went to william mary, madison went to harvard, washington went to war. that was his educational experience. he was conscious of his own lack of literacy. he wanted to surround himself with people who were well educated. that was hamilton, that was lawrence, lafayette. those were the people. >> let's go to another audience question. we have one from jim about some specifics here. let's get into the 18th century. how much of washington's foreign policy advice was driven by the fact that the spanish maintained the floridas, the louisiana territory, and the british held canada? we have talked about the oceans keeping america away from foreign powers. as jim reminds us, they were there. he wants to take a first down but this? the specifics of north american geopolitics. >> i will take a quick stab, i am pushing this hard so you guys can disagree. why is it called the continental army? why they called the continental congress? it's really only the coast. in some sense they are thinking continentally from the beginning. the border of the united states under washington ends at the mississippi. it was generally regarded, and james was outspoken about this but washington understood it too, the spanish were a declining european power. they were like a cow bird. a bird that sits in the nest until you can take over. spain is the perfect european nation to have a power over there because we know, as soon as the demographic wave hits them they will be gone. i don't think anybody could easily foresee the louisiana purchase, but there is this sense of manifest destiny before 1840s when it becomes a term. canada, now, remember at the time we are talking 1790. we sort of thought we were gonna get canada, and cuba. the war of 1812 we were supposed to win canada. of course, it didn't work out that way. it is a continental wide vision in certain people's heads. aaron burr, he goes all crazy off the record about it. i think the presumption was florida and most of the west would eventually come our way. >> lindsay, john, anything to add? >> with the demography doing it rather than war. >> i think that as joe said earlier, washington was a realist. he understood that in 1795, the united states signed this really important treaty with spain which gave the americans access to the mississippi river. it was a critical element to the western territory. they didn't have the ability to send their goods over the mountain regions like places like philadelphia or new york city. they desperately needed access to the water before there were trains and cars and that kind of thing. however, washington was very realistic about the fact that spain and france were playing off of each other. regularly, there were complaints about enslaved individuals heading towards florida. while there were goals about taking canada, that had not happened yet. so much of his foreign policy advice was not getting too close to one country because if you get too close to britain, and france is gonna get annoyed on the southern border. they may be more friendly to the self emancipated enslaved individuals. if we get too close to france, spain's gonna get too jealous and kind of access to the river. it is really this delicate dance of trying to hold all of the pieces together before the united states did have the entire continent and recognizing that as great as we thought we were in 1786, at this point we were still a relatively puny international power. very much subject to the whims of international superpowers. washington really understood that. >> john? >> look, i would just say that remember move to the european power thought that democracy would fail. they would get the chance to re-carve up the continent at that time. the whole jenet episode in washington second term, which was related to the ratification of the james treaty, jefferson and madison because they declare neutrality they say, if you declare neutrality it means you are really siding with the english. they play that game today to fact. the french revolutionary jacobeens disguises citizen after name. part of his deal is to either sway the u. s. back to their side or to build on the louisiana and destabilize the nation. there were a lot of adventuresome plots around that at the time. eventually even jefferson realized that jenet was a bad deal. janai got wind of the fact that he was about to get his head cut off and he retired to jamaica long island. >> and married to governor's daughter! >> correct. >> i knew neither of those things. [laughs] >> there is one topic that we barely touched on a few different times tonight. we have not explored it closely enough we do have an audience question coming in to help us explore that. brian hilton is asking, by george washington's last will and testament be a final farewell as a different kind. or an addendum to the final guest, particularly in respect to the issue of slavery. >> john, first thoughts? >> i explicitly say in my book that his last will and have meant should be considered as a coda to the farewell address. >> brian ought to read your book. [laughs] >> yeah, maybe. by all means if he hasn't he should. to washington's discredit, certainly by contemporary perspectives, the farewell address a silent on the issue slavery. washington, in his last will in testament which could be considered the ultimate farewell address, takes the decided and unusual among the founding fathers step of freeing his slaves. all be upon martha's death. there are 1 million different reasons why this is insufficient and emotionally unsatisfying by contemporary perspectives. all are so obvious we don't need to discuss it. it is a contradiction of the core promise and intention of america. that said, it is a revolutionary act that washington knows will be made public. there is a lot of math he doesn't do. for example, it sets of a dynamic where a lot of people are looking for martha die sooner rather than later but this is intended and written to be a public statement. there is a lot of drama around its drafting, which version he chooses, but notably the other founding fathers who follow him who are virginian, not named adams, who owned slaves they don't do this. they do not release their slaves upon their death. washington was making a very clear statement to the country. i 100% believe, and argue in my book, that in candidate should be considered the coda to the farewell address. where slavery finally issued -- >> i wish he could've had a paragraph in the farewell address that told his readers and americans that he intended to free his slaves. he sort of did. at that moment, trying to follow his thought process is not easy. he is committed to freeing his slaves once he can get money off the sale of his western land. he cannot get that sold. he keeps fudging it until 1799. he finally commits. he can only free the slaves which he owns. it's slightly less than half of the 317 slaves at mount vernon. i think pressure on him is martha. we can't prove this, but i think she is very reluctant to see the slaves freed. in part because they are all intermarried along the farms there. i think that washington is the greatest leader in american history. i think that slavery is america's original sin, and racism is its enduring toxic residue that we are still living with. must there a chance to end it? or put it on the road to extinction before the cotton gin came? before the numbers became impossible? was it a shakespearean tragedy and not a greek tragedy? yes. who could've most effectively moved in that direction? washington. he failed as a leader on this issue. that is a heck of a standard to apply, i agree with john in a sense that when we look back for the 21st century, our present perspective gives us an enormous advantage, but they knew, washington knew, that slavery was a contradiction to the values of the american revolution. he said! that he knew that! he knew, but he kept saying was, we got to wait. wait until 18 08 he said. that is when the slave trade will and. but it didn't. and some sense, i would've liked them to say, i would've liked the constitution to have said, we are not gonna attempt to end slavery in the states of the deep south now but let us all agree that the core principles of this republic cannot allow, permit, this to exist forever. a house divided cannot stand. by the way, a methodist minister uses that phrase in 1778. i think that's where lincoln got it from. >> lindsay, last word on this important subject? >> historian gordon reid said she thinks that george washington was deeply concerned that if he spoke out about slavery during his lifetime it would cause irreparable harm and divide the nation. whether or not that's true, i do not know, but that is certainly what he thought. that is why he didn't say anything during his lifetime. his will was certainly more than nothing. certainly more than what some people did. but it was less than others did. i think that in some ways it is a little bit, certainly not taking the easy road out because it wasn't but it also wasn't really taking a super principled stand. he enjoyed the labor and their time while they were still alive. i think the way i see it it was more than nothing but it certainly wasn't -- >> i think it is absolutely right. let's remember with we began with the union. his commitment to the union. if you raise the question of slavery at all in a frontal way, you would risk that. that is one he is most terrified of. keep it off the national agenda until, at some point in time, you can really face it squarely. until the republic is sufficiently established to survive. >> i will bring things to close by asking each of you -- it was gonna be my question but i see we actually have one. julian our time of the. we wanted you to close on this point. biggest takeaway for you. i will ask it this way to each of you. i will start with john? why would you want people to continue reading the farewell address now, 225 years later? what is the biggest takeaway for you? >> washington warned us about the forces that can destroy democratic republic's. the document contains all the hard-won wisdom of his life. it is a prophetic document. in particular, his warnings against hyperpartisanship, foreign wars, excessive, foreign interference in our domestic politics are ripped from the headlines of today. if i had to pick one of those that i would argue that washington was most concerned about, and we should be most concerned about, it is hyper partisanship. putting party over country. those are the forces we are playing with today. it is risking the success of our republic. >> lindsey, your biggest take away? why should people continue to turn this document now? >> i agree with everything john said. i would add just one element about the foreign policy piece that dovetails really nicely that we didn't quite touched down. washington warned against allowing emotions for other nations. foreign nations to color our ideas against our fellow americans. to color our ability to stand as a united nation. i think that hits it really the same point. stop allowing, whether it be partisan identity or foreign policy identity, to make us forget what we have in common. to make us forget our common ties. instead see the -- stop looking for the division and instead look for things that we have the bond of together. >> joe, last word? >> both of my colleagues have done a great job. john, lindsay, i cannot -- i will echo their view. as a teacher, 44 years, many students these days don't think anything happened before they were born. the farewell address is a document that, because it will be so alien to some of them, i want them to understand it. it's like leaving the president, going to a foreign country, learning to think and speak in a different language. the language that washington speaks for both of the region john mentioned, desperately absent from the center of american politics. especially the congressional and presidential level. the public interest is something that nobody understands. and to even suggest that your highest priority is that you are not qualified to serve. washington would never say, they would never run for public office. they would regard it as prostitution. >> it's a way of comparing where we were to where we are and looking back and learning something about where we will be in the future. >> thank you so much. we've had a great conversation. i have learned a lot, it's an important document and thank you for helping so many people out there better understand it. why it remains relevant today. on behalf of mount vernon to all of the out there, thanks for joining us tonight. we hope to see you again soon. thank you and goodnight. >> listening to programs on spiess -- c-span 3's c-span radio just got. easier tell yours more, speaker play c-span radio and listen to washington journal daily at 7 am eastern. important congressional hearings and other public affairs events throughout the day. and weekdays at 5 pm and 9 pm eastern. catch washington today for a fast-paced report on the stories of the day. listen to c-span anytime. just tell you smart speaker, play c-span radio. c-span, powered by cable. >> weekends on cpan two are an intellectual feast. every saturday, american history tv documents america's story. and on sundays, book tv brings you the latest on nonfiction books and authors. let me for c-span two comes from these television companies and more. including charter communications. >> broadband is a force for empowerment. that is why charter ha invested billions, build the infrastructure, upgrading technology, empowering opportunity, and communities they in small. tried or is connecting us. >> charter communications along with these television companies support c-span 2 as a public service. >> let me tell you about our speaker tonight winifred gallagher's include, "how the post office created american", "just the way you are", a new york times notable book, working out loud, "the power of place", "rapt" and "new: understanding our need for novelty and change". she's written for the atlantic monthly, rolling stone, and the new york times. her newest book, "new women in the old west", from settlers to suffragists, an untold american story, is available for purchase from politics and prose. if you lose the link in the chat box, it's also available on our website. you'll be able to purchase the book with a 10% discount. just make sure to use the code when checking out. please join me in welcoming to the smithsonian, winifred gallagher. >> -- >> hi winifred. >> hi kathy. thanks so much, it's wonderful to be with you. >> before i begin, i'd like to say a few words, before we begin, about mina westbye. you can see her on screen with her cousin. after homestead in north dakota. she was a norwegian immigrant who spoke no english at all when she arrived in the u.s. but she filed her homestead claim, lived on it for five years, and then sold it for a nice profit, which she used to start out in a new career as a photographer, with her own studio. like the other women we will talk about tonight, she made the most of the unusual opportunities that the american west afforded to her. i'd like to explain also that we will pick up with slides later in my talk, partly because women in general, particularly the ones that i'm going to talk about, were not much photographed until the women's rights movement really picked up later in the 19th century. i began thinking about new women in the old west during my 12 years of living halftime in rural wyoming. i was impressed by the strong, versatile women, starting with the 80-year-old mayor, who pretty much ran local affairs from government to business. and that's not even counting the actual cowgirls. was there something in the water? i did some research and found that my friends were carrying on a long tradition of independence, competent and civic-mindedness. it began in the old west era of the 1840s into the early 20th century, when more than half of america was settled. but historians fail to notice, however, that women busy building homes and communities from scratch not only joined, but at crucial moments, lead the massive human rights revolution that enfranchised half the nation. indeed, by the time the 19th amendment was finally ratified in 1920, most western women had already voted for years, sometimes for decades, before their sisters in a single state back east. the colonization of the west and the suffrage movement were overlapping epochs and three generations of women were critical to both. yet their double barreled achievement has simply been neglected. according to the foundational myth, strong silent men won the west. in fact, women were equally essential to the process. moreover, they were not just stereotypical martyrish pioneer wives or hookers with hearts of gold, who supported men in various ways, but single homesteaders and doctors, entrepreneurs and suffragists. in their experimental, improvised settler society,