Director Johns Brennan and National Intelligence director james clapper. The Nixon Foundation hosted the event. It is an hour and a half. Good afternoon, everyone. On behalf of all my colleagues, i want to welcome you to todays event, the president s daily brief, delivering intelligence to president s nixon and ford. My name is joe lambert. Im the director of Information Management at eia. At cia. Events like this take a lot of work and i want to acknowledge the efforts of the cia officers who reviewed and declassified these 28,000 pages over the last year. They are assisted by a number of agencies, but the work of one in particular deserves special thanks, the National Security agency. Todays event marks the cias 25th major declassification and release event since 2007. The first was last september at the johnson president ial library. We are very fortunate once again to have two people with us who probably know more about the daily brief than anybody i can think of. That is the director of the cia, john brennan, and director of National Intelligence, jim clapper. Director clapper has instituted intelligence transparency council. It fits nicely with the goals of that counsel. Events like today would not happen without the support of director brennan. For those in attendance today, you should have a document like this on your chair with an agenda. The introductions will be brief. The agenda has all of the bios in it. For those of you watching at home, you can see all the documents on the cia website. I want to thank the Nixon Foundation, the Nixon Library, for making this wonderful venue available. Next, i would like to introduce the director of the Richard Nixon president ial library and museum to offer some remarks. Mike . [applause] good afternoon, everybody. On behalf of the archivist of the United States and the richard Nixon Foundation, good afternoon and welcome to the Richard Nixon president ial library and museum in yorba linda, california. I would like to welcome who has joined us today. On behalf of the National Archives and the Nixon Foundation, allow me to welcome directors clapper and brennan. I would also like to welcome bill, president and ceo of the Nixon Foundation, board member larry it be, elected representatives from yorba linda, and from around the region, and esteemed panelists, guests, and members of our community. Members of Community Soon to be informed on the value and place in history of the president s daily brief. And the importance of this Daily Briefing process to the security of our nation. I would like to recognize stacy davis, representing the gerald ford president ial library and institutional partner in todays release. Im the federal director of the Nixon Library and im privileged to represent one of 13 president ial libraries administered by the National Archives and Records Administration. President ial libraries and museums from overthrew bush 43 promote an understanding of the american experience. We preserve and provide access to historical materials, support research, and create interactive programs and exhibits that educate and inspire. Todays program is a perfect example of the president ial Library System fulfilling its mission. Similarly, in an overwhelming parallel, the mission of the National Archives and Records Administration is to drive openness, Cultivate Public participation, and strengthen our nation s democracy through Public Access to government records. How are we doing on that one . Todays conference addresses that mission directly and represents clearly the relationship between the Intelligence Community and the National Archives. When the time is right, the shared mission is openness and transparency of americas records. Today, the time is right. Finally, because weve gathered at the Nixon Library, i would like to offer a brief note. As you will note from the conference materials, author John Halverson tells the story of a sometimes difficult relationship between Richard Nixon and the Intelligence Community. Nixons exposure to the u. S. Intelligence community heightened during his eight years as Dwight EisenhowersVice President in the 1950s. Nixons familiarity with the Breeding Program served candidate, nominee, and president elect nixon very well nearly a decade later in 1968, and formed the basis for his National Security advisor, henry kissinger, and contributed to the tools Richard Nixon aggregated in becoming arguably the most wellprepared nation to assume the nations highest office. Stay tuned. We are going to learn more about the relationship between the Intelligence Community and president s ford and nixon throughout the day. Welcome to the Nixon Library and todays program. Im going to turn it back over to joe lambert. Thank you. [applause] thank you, mike. Lets get to the program. I would like to invite director brendan to the stage, please. [applause] mr. Brennan good afternoon, everyone. It is wonderful to be here this afternoon. It is an honor to be part of what i know will be a fascinating and enlightening event for all of us. Thank you, joe, for all your hard work on this project. This is the culmination of many months of effort by you and your team. Thank you, mike, for your terrific work, and for opening the doors to us today. Also in the grand tradition of our political processors, it is a pleasure to escape washington, d. C. In the month of august. Maybe more this year than previous years. I would normally say that it feels great to be out of washington, but i see that we are all in the east room. It is a bit surreal. Remarkable library. Im looking forward to the opening of the library on october 14. As i have often said, being cia director is the absolute greatest job in the world. One of the most rewarding elements of my tenure has been the chance to get across the country to give our fellow citizens a fuller understanding of the tremendous work performed by the women and men of cia, from throughout the Intelligence Community. Today is one such opportunity to shed light on our mission and our history for the benefit of the American People. This is not often as easy i would hope it would be. By definition, the world of intelligence requires a sufficient degree of secrecy to protect our officers, sources, methods, and nation. The American People demand more of their Intelligence Services and deserve better than secrecy for secrecys sake. The unique authorities granted to us through congress are a sacred trust, one that we must learn in part by being as forthcoming as we can. Todays occasion is one way in which we seek to earn that trust. When we can be open about what we do, when doing so does not hinder our Current Operations or hurt National Security, we are happy to contribute to the historical record. The president s daily brief represents the best picture of the world that cia and the Intelligence Community can furnish to the president. It is the premier intelligence product, culmination of painstaking effort each day so that our nations leaders have what they need to chart a safe and successful course for our country. It is also one of the most sensitive the u. S. Intelligence community produces. Pdb provides an unvarnished and often difficult truth. So the release of these historical pdbs reveal a crucial and until now missing dimension of the historical narrative. Most importantly, they give us a better understanding of the challenges facing president s next and and ford. Last year, i had the opportunity of speaking in texas, at the first substantial release of pdbs from the kennedy and johnson administrations. That collection contains some 2500 documents and 19,000 pages. Todays release is no less extensive. Im sure it will delight students looking for a dissertation topic. It tips the scales at about 2500 documents and 28,000 pages. These pdbs provide us with a survey of the world as it was presented to our nations leaders at the time. By reading through this release, you can envision yourself in the oval office, confronting these challenges. You can trace the evolution of cold war tensions with the soviet union that paved the way for agreements on nuclear and biological proliferation. You can follow the course of the vietnam war to the point as the pdb put it on april 30, 1975, when the flag of the viet cong government was wasted over the president ial palace, marking the end of 30 years of war in vietnam. Theres also coverage of the coup against the president of chile, the postcolonial conflicts in angola, the 1973 arabisraeli war, and the emergence of modern international terrorism. All that barely scratches the surface of what this collection entails. By perhaps scrolling through these pdbs we are reminded that the challenges facing our policymakers have always been more difficult than hindsight lets on. As these documents eliminate history, they also illuminate history, they also offer a window to the oval office. It was during the nixon and ford administrations that the pdb continued to grow in sophistication. The pdb synthesized intelligence and clandestine reporting, overhead imagery, intercepted communications, and open sources. Publishing the pdb was truly a 24 7 process. Perhaps foreshadowing the greater role the Intelligence Community would play in the process, the pdb under president nixon would often feature intelligence estimates. Those products that represented not only the views of cia but also the entire Intelligence Community. Intelligence support to the white house was a collective effort. Despite the historical value, the documentary record only goes so far. All too often, there are key memories and anecdotes that did not make it to the written page. That is one of the reasons we are so fortunate to be joined by director of National Intelligence jim clapper. Im certain there is no one more of a fight more qualified than jim to speak about the pdb. Jim has had a long and distinguished career, that extends even further back than the period covered in todays release. In the 1960s, jim was a briefer for general westmoreland in vietnam. Some reports indicate that jim was general pattons a discount in world war ii as well as a classmate of john j purging, but those reports remain uncorroborated. Under jims outstanding leadership as director of National Intelligence, the pdb has become a product of the Intelligence Community, marshaling its knowledge and expertise. I have seen firsthand that jim walks the talk when it comes to fostering the appropriate level of openness about our intelligence activities. An officer who rose to the rank of lieutenant general, director of the National Imagery and mapping agency, undersecretary for defense and intelligence, and now director of National Intelligence, jim clapper has agreed to join us today for a discussion about the pdbs. Jim, i would ask you to join me on the stage so we can talk a bit of shop. [applause] mr. Clapper hello . Ok. Mr. Brennan jim, thanks so much for joining us. You are better postured than anybody else to talk about how the pdb has changed since the early years. We will talk about the pdbs during the nixon and ford administrations, but i thought that it might be worthwhile to reflect on how the product has changed. Back then, there was a hard copy delivered to the president , and the process has changed. I want to get your perspective, since you are now the one that goes into the oval office to meet with the president and talk about the pdb, if you believe the pdb is still as influential, if not more influential, in terms of the president s thinking. Mr. Clapper thanks, john. Thanks for the honor of being on stage with you for the second time since i was invited to participate as well in the rollout at the johnson library. So it is a real honor to be with my close friend and great professional colleague, john brennan. Who i believe is going to go down as one of a hand all, and dont use all your fingers, of the most outstanding directors of cia in its history. Personal note on these two events, they actually book ended my tors in southeast asia, with the vietnam in 195566, and 197071, flying Reconnaissance Missions over cambodia. In both occasions, i didnt know there was a pdb. Reading through the contemporary pdbs, i understood what a very small cog i was in a large war effort. During the course of the tour is going to be spectacular, i think. I had a bar graph, a line graph, on the number of troops deployed on southeast asia. That was a reminder. In 1971, 300,000 people in southeast asia, and i was one of those. That is to put in perspective where i sit in the larger scheme of things. As to how pdb has changed, i think the major change, as john mentioned, is that instead of it being exclusively a cia product, it now represents the input, the views and assessments, of the entire u. S. Intelligence community. Cia is still the engine for the pdb, but in all cases, it is always, regardless of who drafted, cia or any component of the intelligence committee, it is always coordinated throughout the Intelligence Community. And importantly, where appropriate and where someone wants to, dissents are reflected. You wont find dissents in the pdbs that were rolled out in the university of texas, because it was done by one agency. I think that is a strength, frankly, to register dissent, president obama has won more than one occasion said that he welcomes that, would be surprised that there werent dissent within the Intelligence Community, so we reflect that. The other changes are more occasioned by the technology. I may be a little biased, but i think our pdbs today are richer because of the many more sources of information we draw on and the timeliness of the availability of those sources of information, which werent available then, because of the technology in the pdbs that will be rolled out today. We have gone to an ipad. President obama, who is very i. T. Smart, we went through this a couple years ago. That was a very hard transition for some people, not for him, but for others who didnt want to give up their precious hard copy. Now, ipads have become the standard. They are dumb ipads, i should say. We have paid money to dumb them down because they cant be wireless, of course. It does allow for much more agility in the presentation of material, to include graphics, videos, and references to previous articles, which can be done with the pointing of a finger. I think, from the standpoint of the sources of the pdb, the technology involved in producing it, the fact that it is more broad gays in broad gaze in representing the views of the entire Intelligence Community, and does reflect dissent, i think are the major changes. Mr. Brennan vietnam was mentioned in more than two thirds of the pdb documents that are being released today. Todays event is about history. General westmoreland was a historical figure. You had the opportunity to bring him intelligence about the war. Maybe we can take advantage of this opportunity to hear your views about what it was like to brief general westmoreland, how he received the information, and your techniques. Mr. Clapper i had been in the air force about 2. 5 years when i went to vietnam. I was in the first 100 air force Intelligence Officers sent on a permanent change of station basis. Up until that point, late 1965, all u. S. Forces deployed there were on a temporary basis. I had been there about three or four months and was sort of plucked out of the sea of anonymous lieutenants, and i was told, next saturday, you are going to headquarters to help be part of a Briefing Team for general westmoreland, who was the commander of u. S. Military Systems Command in vietnam. I had never even seen a fourstar general in my life, let alone talked to one. This was a very daunting experience and i was very nervous the first time i did it. My specific reading topic briefing topic was to synthesize intelligence reflections of airstrikes over north vietnam. I put together a map board, sort of what we call icon boxes, and i took my briefing boards down every saturday to brief him. To be quite honest, im not sure what he made of it. He always seemed very interested, asked questions about the significance or reflections of a particular intercept, which i struggled to answer. I did wonder sometimes about he had a great affinity for statistics and numbers, and i did wonder sometimes whether we maybe bored into the weeds and awful lot at the expense of what i came to regard as the bigger picture, which to be candid, reflected my own growing disillusionment with the war during my year there in 1965 in 1966. It was an interesting experience. Learn some things about how to try to present things to senior people, which i trust helped me later on. It was a humbling experience to zero. Experience too. I appreciate that command can be a very lonely thing, particularly when you are responsible for the lives of soldiers, and were watching a lot of them be killed and wounded. That had a wearing effect on general westmoreland. Mr. Brennan speaking about the weeds and the big picture, the pdbs being released today chronicle that war. There were daily developments. A lot of the pieces were focusing on the tactical developments on the ground. How do you see the balance between that tactical and strategic picture being manifest in the pdb, and how do you do that today in terms of making sure that as we look at the situation in syria, iraq, other places, that we have a broader perspective in terms of the overall trends . Mr. Clapper john, you put your finger on one of the challenges that the current generation of people who put together the pdb have. How do you balance the high level of generality that you have to keep in perspective, and at the same time, present enough detail that the reader, in this case policymaker number one, currently is getting enough of the flavor and the nuance and the subtleties and the atmospherics that prevail in whatever given situation you are trying to describe. That is something we constantly wrestle with today. To try to strike that balance. It was very interesting to go back, and i did read through a lot of the pdbs that are being rolled out, during the period of my second tour, 1970 to 1971. Just to see what was presented to the president at the time versus what i saw in the engine room. I actually thought the pdb articles were a pretty good chronicle of what i recall from my vantage on the ground, when i was in vietnam at the same time. And as well, because of the global perspective, the global responsibilities of the u. S. President , vietnam dominated as a topic, those pdbs. There were many other issues the president had to deal with as well, which the pdb had to treat. The cold war, access to berlin, the ever present middle east. Theres haunting similarity between situations in the middle east then versus now. Many of the same concerns and conditions. I think that and we always have that challenge of how to balance the detail and the broad picture. We spent a lot of time agonizing over what topics to pick. And labor over every word in the interest of doing the best we can to be as objective and responsible, but at the same time, mindful of the president s time. This president devotes a lot of time to intelligence, but he has a whole lot of other issues, as you all can appreciate, on his platter, and we have to be mindful of that, that we not inundate him with too much intelligence, which is possible. It is in the end for us today as it was historically, a balancing act. Mr. Brennan the pdb is not the only access the Intelligence Community has to the president. We spend time in the situation room and Security Council meetings when you can look at things strategically. Mr. Clapper exactly right. John and i spent a lot of time bonding in the situation room. I think that is a reflection of the fact that, in the National Security apparatus, intelligence drives everything. John and i dont get a pass when we go to these meetings. We always have to present the intelligence picture. They all start with that. That kind of drives the agenda for the meetings. The specific form that the president is involved in, National Security council meetings, very much driven by intelligence. So there will be intelligence material that the president will read, and i think our observation has been, in our time, the president is always eminently prepared. He has always done his homework before these meetings. As well, the president , the ipad, the pdb, he reads that, so we dont actually brief the pdb per se. We do have meetings, though, where we will brief other items, either that supplement or augment or update what is in the pdb, or on other issues that we think he should be familiar with, and cia, very much a part of that process as well. Frequently it will bring you news that is not always that pleasing in terms of policy course and options and choice. I was struck by looking at some of the pdbs in the early days of the nixon administration. This was in february 14, 1969 in the pdb said there were only a handful of politicians in South Vietnam with whom a small fraction of the people identified the government is likely to acquire a broader Political Base by bringing new faces in the are the cure is that in the cabinet. President nixon whose legacy was the vietnam war and he needs to deal with the issue supporting the self the emmys government here is intelligence bringing that news. Bringing information to be president that really challenges options and courses. Mr. Clapper yes. [laughter] mr. Clapper first of all, the quote that you read from the pdb way back then was accurate. That was one of the great personal disillusionments i had when i got to vietnam and found that what United States were propping up a series of dictators that were interested in preserving their own positions and lesser interest in leading their country in a very, very difficult time. Both john and i have had the experience of being the bearer of bad news to the president. I think the worst chastisement i ever got was a comment about, sometimes the Intelligence Community has a very elegant sense of timing. I remember that. I have to say as well, president obama has insisted, has insisted that we always tell it straight, we be as objective as we possibly can, and to not color things, politicize things, not shake things, letting them know what the truth is. We always try to do that. That is certainly always been the objective. I can certainly recall some unpleasant visits to the oval, which i will not go into, but it is a part of the deal. It is almost a writ in intelligence to always tell the truth to a par. It is something i have the occasion to do with general westmore were in airstrikes did not go so well, or airstrikes missed the target. And he did not like that, but i learned early on that is one of the, i think, fundamental obligations of professional Intelligence Officers. Mr. Brennan jim is famous for saying, there are only two conditions of washington. Do you want to point that out. Mr. Clapper you learned there are only two conditions in life, policy success, intelligence failure. No other conditions in life. [laughter] mr. Brennan as you point other some of the analysis looks like impression as to what actually happens. A lot of times policymakers are surprised. Sometimes it can be without foundation, but a lot of times with good reason. This pdb release covered the 1973 israeli war, which broke out in october 6 of 1973. On october 5 of 1973, the pdb says the military exercises in egypt seem to be on a larger scale and conducted more realistically but they do not appear to be preparation against israel. [laughter] mr. Clapper just kidding, you know . [laughter] mr. Clapper i think the serious point here is there is intelligence about distinguishing between mysteries and secrets. Secrets are normal fax that, if you have the access, you can glean them. Mysteries are unknown. I think a lot of times, and this may sound defensive but i will say it anyway, i think too often the Intelligence Community is held to the same standard for mysteries and secrets and being clairvoyant. In this case, and there are many others, but we did not make the right call for every one of those, there are ten calls that we made that were correct that never get publicized and where the Intelligence Community saved lives because of our ability, our foresight, are anticipatory abilities, and it is to the great and if it and safety of these people. I say that over a span of 53 years, whatever years it has been, and i have been in the intelligence business. Mr. Brennan we just watched the olympics in rio de janeiro. These pdbs covered a time when we had the tragic attacks in munich that led to the deaths of israeli athletes, which had only briefed treatment in the pdbs. Today, terrorism is much more of a prominent feature of the landscape. How do you see the pdb being the vehicle for making sure the president is kept uptodate on what might be coming down the pike is worst terrorist are concerned . Mr. Clapper we focused a great deal of effort across the Intelligence Community and certainly in the cia on terrorism and our efforts to counter it. This is usually complicated dimensions in our Intelligence Community, manifested in the intelligence in 2004 which created the position of dni. It also, importantly, represented the marriage, if you will, of both foreign and domestic intelligences, something which having grown up in the Intelligence Community i have learned the firewall, it always prevails for foreign and domestic intelligences. Now we have to marry those two up the best weekend. We have been at the foreign intelligence a lot wonder, it is more mature, but i think we have made great progress in linking our foreign intelligence capabilities with responsibilities to support local, tribal, state, private sector. It actually imposes a perhaps greater burden on the pdb given the time constraints the president has in the responsibility that is incumbent upon us to be as succinct as we possibly can but to keep the insights that we have on individual plots and how they affect this country. Regrettably, you know, pdb articles on terrorism began to appear during this period. I found it frankly chillingly haunting to read those articles which talked about the same forces we were contending with, also regrettably we will be in the business with suppressing terrorists for some time to come. That points out, highlights, emphasizes the importance of that portrayed as accurately and completely as possible in the president s Daily Briefing. Mr. Brennan the coup that to the austrian death was a prominent event during this time. At that time, we had stark separation inside the cia between analyst in operation officers. The analysts were writing pdb at the time were unaware of all of the covert action. As you know, right now, we have an effort to better integrate the capabilities, so that our collectors and analysts and technologies are able to Work Together more effectively and efficiently. Do you worry at all about analytic objectivity and integrity as a result of this process . Mr. Clapper no, i do not, at all. In fact, one of the features of the provision is a requirement that my office have an analytic Integrity Office whose omission Whose Mission is to assess and monitor analytic integrity throughout the Intelligence Community. We do that through a number of mechanisms including surveys and analysts which are anonymous. Every year, thousands of analysts respond to these questionnaires about objectivity and whether or not they feel pressured. An important question is whether they had an outlet or did they achieve a satisfactory outcome when they saw help from management . With specific respect to what john has mentioned with the transformation of modernization which basically calls for the amalgamation of analysts and collectors in the same organization, which i strongly support, only because it has a huge impact on strengthening the agency, but it has a tremendous spillover and influence on the best of the Intelligence Community. My mantra during my six years has been integration. That is what the 9 11 Commission Said was needed and that has found its way into the law through the irotpa. The fact that analysts and collectors worked together does not mean that analytic integrity is in any way compromised. I would comment that what john has done at the headquarters of the cia is simply congruent with the way things operate in the field. Today, just about any embassy you go to, you will have of course a cia contingent but representatives from many of the components of the Intelligence Community are there and they operate as an integrated team, capitalizing on the talents and capabilities in contributions of everybody who is represented there. Always under the leadership of a chief that wears a second hat for me as the dni presented of who reinforces the chief of stations role as the Intelligence Leader and promote integration, and that is what is happening at the cia. Other components of the Intelligence Community are doing the same. The dia, nsa are in the throes of organization and restructuring the greater theme of integration. To be sure, to be clear, we do have to safeguard and required by law to oversee analytic integrity. As well, each agency has an independent arm somewhere in its organization, those producing intelligence products also who also watch for safeguarding analytic integrity. Mr. Brennan i want to open up questions from the audience. The pdb was a unique product during president ford and nixon. The entire u. S. Intelligence agency is the Gold Standard worldwide. A lot of foreign Intelligence Services seek to emulate what the u. S. Intelligence community is doing it, how we do our work, how we collect, how we analyzed but also how we provide the head of state and government. We have had a number of conversations with our government counterparts. Do you know of any other similar type of products or services to their head of state that comes anywhere close to the pdb . Mr. Clapper no. There is no other country on the planet that it goes to the lengths as we do. This is a very serious endeavor. It is seven by 24. It takes the effort of a lot of people. Now even more than is reflected here because it involves the entire Intelligence Community. My view is it is a great strength of our system. Others have looked at it and i think made some effort to have some system for informing their head of state, but i know no one there goes to the lengths we do. Mr. Brennan lets open it up. We are going to get right into questions. I am going to do one quick commercial. This is cia week at the Nixon Library. Not only do we have these two great gentleman on stage, but tomorrow evening we have david preece who will talk his book the president s book of secrets which chronicles the Daily Briefings from kennedy all the way up to obama. Please go online and go ahead and sign up and we hope to see you back here tomorrow night. The first question, i would like to ask. Can you tell us about the president ial Daily Briefings regarding resident nixons trip to china and the influence it had . Mr. Clapper well, actually i cannot say much about it because as i say, i was a young pup at the nsa at the time. I think the pdb in the runup to the, it is my understanding there were a lot of discussions about interests outside the pdb because it was certainly a tremendously historic event as we were reminded during our tour today. It reset the relationship with china, and the legacy continues today. I think pdb treatment in the runup served as a tutorial, if you will, but i also believe that the president was receiving inputs from other sources, National Security advisor, secretary of state, beyond what was in the pdb. Differently was a seminal event that continues to resonate to this day. Mr. Brennan president obama is leaving for china next wednesday attending the g 20 summit out that. President nixons to go to china was significant and it is a good example of how to keep secrets before something takes place. This is part of the lexicon, something that will reference unexpected and needing to have someone who has taken such a strong line on an issue to try to resolve the problems and overcome the obstacles. Unless we had the opening then, i think the course of events would have been much different. President nixon deserves a lot of credit to recognize china as a global presence, global power, and we needed to have the dialogue that can sometimes be tense but incredibly important for National Intelligence. The next question, back of the room to your right, gentlemen. All of southern california, clay baxter. Thank you, sir. Thank you gentlemen for your service to our country. One of the questions i have is, what contribution to the president ial Daily Briefing comes from the military . Mr. Clapper well, today, the, the as i indicated, one of the major changes that is occasioned by the terrorism prevention act was the involvement of the entire Intelligence Community. The arm for the military is the Defense Agency and Intelligence Agency which will serve as a drafter, particularly on articles, as you would expect, direct military reference. Dia in turn can draw on the entirety of the military and Intelligence Community which includes the intelligence arms and arms serving the command. Military plays a prominent part of the process, and that is one of the benefits of opening it up, the preparation of the pdb to the entirety of the intelligence committee. Mr. Brennan most of that falls within the department of defense in terms of all of the agencies, National Security agency, others in the Intelligent Services of the various services. There is regular input from all of them. They share reporting. Obviously the United States military is actively engaged in places like afghanistan, iraq, so begin regular reports. Back to the right, gentlemen. You mentioned general westmoreland, sometimes seeming to get lost in the weeds, and the influence of president nixon. We also know president kennedy had hired secretary of defense from before company to streamline the military, etc. My question, do you think the combination of the two balanced out nixons view . Mr. Clapper well, that is probably a takehome question. [laughter] mr. Clapper i really cannot say whether, how much that influenced the president at the time. It did seem to me, and moore of a contemporary observation, that we did get awfully deep into facts and stats, body count, how many viet cong, north vietnamese were killed, how many were flown, how many bombs were dropped . That is what general westmore thought was important at the time. I cannot say to what extent the preoccupation with details, numbers, statistics had a vary on the president. I guess it did, but i cannot answer that specifically. Mr. Brennan many times jim and i found ourselves in the white house room and were pummeled with questions about the situation. We would look backandforth at each other, who has the answer and who takes this is a takehome answer. Mr. Clapper just like we are doing now. [laughter] mr. Brennan the Intelligence Community is a repository for those facts. Policymakers trying to figure out and making sense of very confusing, complex situations want to have as much input as possible and they do look at the Intelligence Community to provide them that insight. Mr. Clapper i do think, something john said that i will key in on, while intelligence is, we think, it is quite important and we try to tee it up for policymakers, they have the option of accepting or rejecting it or biting into some of it or not of it or drawing other sources. That is their option. And so, gauging to what extent a given piece of intelligence will influence policymakers most of them are drawing on many sources for influence into their decision calculating. Did patton focus on details . Mr. Clapper he did. Yes, john. Thank you very much for this event. This is a question for cia director mr. Brennan. They were reports that they had infiltrated senate emails, specifically Dianne Feinsteins emails. There was also a cia report that stated such application did occur. Can you please clarify this for us . Mr. Brennan i am trying to understand that in the pdb released today, quite frankly. I have talked about this. We carried out our responsibilities and we had an obligation to make sure they were secure and we found out there was some vulnerability, we carried out our responsibilities to investigate that, and it was fully informing the senate about it, and some believe it or not, there are some things that come out from the press that are not exactly a reflection of reality, and so i stand behind with the cia did during that time, and i have no problems in terms of explaining our work at the time with what we get it to the congress in them a full report, so i can sleep comfortably, very comfortably at night. Mr. Clapper i stand behind that. The Center Section just to your left, gentlemen. My question is, how do you communicate with each other in members of the administration . Do you use emails . That is the first question. The second part of that, when you send an email or received an email do you know whether it is classified or not . The last part of it, if you think it is important enough for National Security and it is leaked intentionally or by accident, do think that will harm security and therefore illegal . [laughter] mr. Brennan jim and i can to jim and i communicate regularly in a number of ways, phone calls, we spent a lot of time in the vietnam days talking as buddies. We do communicate in different fashions. U. S. Intelligence officials are different means in terms of emails, unclassified emails that we send to one another and then there are classified networks that the Intelligence Community really relies upon to do its work, to maintain the data and retain seekers. When information comes out for the public, a lot of times it is done with various purposes and agendas. All of the hackings that have taken place whether they be government emails, personal emails. I have had my personal emails hacked and personal emails put out publicly. This is one of the real challenges of our country, to be able to deal with the tremendous capabilities, unfortunately of those that want to do us harm. Whenever jim and i communicate, we try to make sure we put on the high side and on the low side, unclassified information. We all have an obligation to do that. Mr. Clapper one of the, my wife is not wild about it, but we do have small areas in her home with the ability to comedic is securely either at home or on the road. It is actually very important. I am very, very proud of the trust and confidence and the bond between the cia and my office. Next question, very back of the room, Center Section. Hi. You spoke earlier about the defense Intelligence Agency, and what i want to know, what kind of percentage come are using their information, 10 , 30 , 50 of the Daily Briefings . Mr. Clapper to be quite honest, we do not keep statistics like that. It is actually pretty hard to do that. I would not want to wager a guess on what percentage that we draw on any one of the ic components because we use it all