We did know things were moving in that direction. Goingof east germans were to hungary and then hungary was etting them go through to austria. Wall had been circumvented, not breached, perhaps. Things were going in that direction. Had gone to october. Nd said the policy for east berlin, not t in moscow. They were going to maintain easternpire in force to europe with respect to the gdr. Me to those events led hink that it was possible that it was coming but we did not get a sense that it would happen it did. Was one seriesre in the event. When we came to office, there yufrp. Ferment in eastern we looked at that ferment and make it ant to other ones. An the it. Want to encourage underneath that that would cause the soviets to they did before. We tried to encourage the kind f freedom attitude without stirring up the soviet union. The wall was s vacationers going over to germany were all parts of this overall thing they had in mind. You do something of cab rating the results that we saw but not lead to another soviet crack down. About your strategy towards gorbechev in particular, soviets in general, the diplomacy that led to the we got . That when the wall was falling, we what was happening. And a press advisor said you know, you need to go on television. We sort of hesitated for a while. Then they brought the press orps in around the president s desk in the oval office. And you were all seated . In there. Was crowded the president said we knew the wall was opening. And the first press question was you dont look elated. We thought you would want to jump or dance on the wall. Im not a dancing kind of person. Off so rying to back us we didnt put gorbechev in a hole he couldnt get out of. Lot of resident got a flak. The press was saying, whats the matter with this guy . 40year conflict here. Victorious and he doesnt show any emotion whatsoever. Administration is uniform in their approach to the because the problems are complicated. We have some who want to be more gorbechev and more chances ic about their with the informers. The president and brent and i with them because we thought they were genuine reformers. We were ned out, correct. And but by working with them and ot sticking it in their eye when the wall came down at other to go we were able forward with german unification with the consent of the soviet or with acquiescence of and the the ion acquiescence of the United Kingdom and france. One of those countries were ecstatic about the idea of german unification. If we didnt move when we did, we couldnt have achieved that way we did. Right after the wall came down, gorbechevs attitude dramatically. He had been on our side because parastroika cing and glaznos. He wasnt trying to redemocratize but he was trying some sense of discipline and work ethic. So he was encouraging what was going on in Eastern Europe until wall came down. Diplomacy of the process. Ou touched on the reservations that mitch had, thatcher had, gorbechev had. You handle those . Leader of ays been a the alliance. We were able to bring both france and the United Kingdom over. Touchest nut was the soviet union. With the concept of a two plus four negotiation. With the rmanys aspects of communication and the would negotiate the external aspects. It worked. Pretty darn well. The final analysis, he soviet union act withesed because they didnt have a lot of alternatives and im that in of the fact germany will testify to this, the republic of germany gave the soviets 55 billion deutsche arks which didnt hurt helping acquiescence occasi une if unification. To get lot of steps there,dy mroep si led by the resident and taking advantage of a narrow opportunity and getting it done. People wait a minute, talking about this for 40 years. Having a chance to implement it, you mean youre not going to do works . O it one part of this where jim and i disagreed and he turned out to be right. The 2 plus 4. Two thats e the two germanys. The plus four were the occupying powers. But for me, three of the four unification . Erman i think Margaret Thatcher said i like germany so much, i think ought to be two of them. Some risk but we needed to go worked. D it the National Security advisor ells the story about having gone to a meeting between cole and thatcher. Came out, he said charles, hes just so german. Talk for a moment about german in is so the best sense of the word. He one who represented the west, chancellor cole. If chancellor cole and hasnt been on the same wavelength, german happened. N never those two individuals else cture than anybody made it happen. We had the reluctance of france, uk, and the soviet union. Chancellor cole came to camp of 1990. February right . Thats right. Jesus. Ad a coming to he said i want your help in unification. He said fine, youre all for it. To know from you youre not interested in a eutral germany in the heart of europe and youre not interested in a germany leaningestward. Youre going to support us in making sure that the unified germany is a member of the north atlantic treaty organization. He said i will. Both leaders lived up to it and done. One of the things that we about in y worried was gorbechev g reunification. Get out of there. Because it would have been tempting. They never really did promise. Have t think cole would because he had a scheme for reunification. Explained it to the president , the president said go for it. You made the point that both made the point that although you couldnt see the you could see the process. The fact that it was made clear world, did you have any nightmare moments in the runup that you could see something going terribly wrong, omething that could not only undermind the reunification process but endanger World Security . I remember one incident in which the soviet foreign the way, was by forward for bly peace and cooperation with the west than gorbechev, even. Remember one session, it may have been in germany. It may have been in some other country. Some other ed parroting his talking points. Of heat at ng a lot home. A big tugofwar going on within the soviet union. Military and the intelligence apparatus thought and the foreign minister were selling the country out and so forth. Foreign rly the minister was under a lot of pressure. I remember this meeting on unification. And what he said there at the table was so different than what we had heard before. Thought, uhoh, this whole thing has been knocked into a get it done. Ng that was one incident that i well. Remember very we had a strategy. We were generally confident it work. We didnt know how long. When we came in to office, there east germany. In up until then, the u. S. Policy eastern e satellites, tried to d been we help them cozy up to those making the most trouble for the soviet union. Morning, iend this escue wasromania, josh our favorite. Because they were always probing the soviet union. Thats not the measure. Were trying to liberalize. Right to the top. Poland went to the top because they were trying to maintain their system. Had a general sense of where we wanted to go and how. Of parls ande lots we were trying to work. It was such a sensitive topic at the beginning that there was debate to use the word unification. Youll remember that. We tried to call it a different e no, we wanted to stay away from that. Want because we didnt gorbechev to throw him out. Cue coupe later on. Late. Too you spent a lot of time with him before and after that period. Recall you were out shooting sheep with him in mongolia. No, he wasnt shooting sheep. I didnt say i wasnt shooting sheep. Is, i t of the matter wasnt shooting sheep, because the National Security advisor we leaked it to me the Washington Post that i wanted to hunt sheep and they wouldnt let me do it. You were doing we were negotiating the security. Secretary of state for clerical affairs. He said were worried about what us lligence is reporting to about iraqi troops on the border of kuwait. You might check with your interlocutor there to see what knows about it. Bout that time, he was the client for the soviet union. I said before we break for lunch, we have a report that be thinking of invading kuwait. Never said oh, he would as to do that. You might want to check with the us because the cia tells that the reports are genuine, a lot of troops out there. He said ill come back after lunch. No chance, he said, saddam would not be so foolish as to do that. Off to mongolia for the meeting. He invades. And the foreign minister is so embarrassed about the invasion to meet me in moscow and condemn the actions oh it was soviet client state. View, thats when the cold war ended, is when that happened. He did that, by the way, without gorbechevs okay. And without if okay of the in his Foreign Ministry which is what i meant by leaning further forward. That was the essence of the question i was going to ask, you believe that the way president handled the soviet union at the time of you fication, the way handled reunification itself, whether that had an impact with the ability less than a year later to form an effective oalition to push saddam out of kuwait. I think it did. I really do believe that. But then you have to remember we were the sole remaining super power. Everybody wants to get closer to the United States. The early Foreign Policy issues in his Administration Made a ifference in what we were able to do to pull together the coalition to kick iraq out of kuwait. Let me, please okay, let me use that to fast forward. Your friend and counterpart dr. Tolchek was asked this morning as we look at the current state u. S. German relations, what would he recommend . Had a great oneword answer talk. I would like to broaden that just a bit. In the ok at the crisis middle east, the efforts of the together aion to put to cop n as you did front it regional and internationally. What do you think we need to do internationally to succeed against this new enemy . Him . Oking at me or im going to try to dodge this, sir, so im looking at you. Im not going to dodge it at all. I tell you what, in my view we need to do. Applaud the idea the administrations effort to put together a broad based coalition. Thats great. We did in the first gulf war. Our coalition had muscle and the members contributed and substantially. Many contributed troops. We even happened egyptian troops, saudi troops, you name it. Not to mention 500,000 american troops. In my view, youre not going to win the war from the air. I dont see how you hold territory from the air. How are you going to get boots on the ground. You have to have them. Yes, were sending more special forces in, thats really good to guide the air strikes. Are the boots on the ground coming from that are going to take territory . Have serious doubts about whether that really can come as moderated as far syrian options, i think most of in the salons of london and paris. I dont know if there is any such thing anymore. But where are the troops coming from . Thing thats clearly missing is talking talking to our friends. Up. Pick it it rang on his desk. Allies. H the other we tried to get it with the soviet union and we didnt. Called his sh counterparts around the world just to talk to them. What are their problems . So on ande do to help so forth . Our friends were willing them p us when we needed because they saw us and knew on. We were after and so i dont think we have that kind of communication anymore. You dont draw them out. Egypt has the troops on the ground. Does. Y theyre not disposed to come to our help. I agreed with what brent just said. Know in that first gulf war, one of the strongest allies nd biggest contributors was president ozal of turkey. 60year ally en a of the United States and they a nato member. First things they do was cut off the oil pipeline from iraq through turkey. Tremendously rkey economically, but he did it. Solution for what its worth really make an effort to see if we can convince okay . Rks, the turks dont like isis. To abidey i know wants presence. Ing isis turks dont like isis. Why dont we say well supply in the air and you supply the troops and well give you your butter zone, which he wants in syria . Might solveto me is this problem. I dont know any other regions will do it. Menont support the idea of and women on the ground in iraq and syria. I agree. One problem is the kurds, different kinds of kurds. Nd the kinds of kurds that are more or less at war with the northern the ones in syria. Sish syrian kurds, turkish kurds and iraqi kurds. And iranian kurds. Complicated this, especially where the turks are concerned. That depth, breadth, and etail of understanding on a airly arcane issue is why you are one of the best teams in history. I mean that sincerely. At the time. Layer let me ask the question, what would you be saying to our particularlyes and the germans at this time as we at the unfolding crisis in the middle east, but a russia that 1 of course very different than the russia you dealt with and the of ukraine. What should we be saying . Kind of dialogue should we be having, what types of policy our d we be proposing with european friends starting with the germans . I think were having those conversations. Weve weve multilateral e sanctions. That is due to the drop the e price of oil because russian economy so dependent on that commodity. Were having those conversations leadership. Man i dont ppened there think we have to talk about how its inconsistent with any order. Of a stable world if you dont like whats going on next door, you cant just roll the tanks, you can. But if you do, there ought to be consequences. I think, again, one of the were talking to europeans, but i dont think talking enough we had snowden, ith especially with germany. It turned out that the got of chancellor merkel talking was from our industry. Know, those you types of things we can do more to really understand each other and why were doing this what you cant just call and say hey, we want to invade here, help us. Not sure were spending enough time doing it. With that. We are talking about sanctions. Little thats worked a bit. I wish we could finish this dialogue. Finite. Weve been privileged not only listen to the men who were witnesses of the most critical but who helpedry the United States shape that history for the better. Thank you very much. Thank you. [ applause ] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] you are watching American History tv all weekend, every weekend on cspan3. To join the conversation, like us on facebook. The siege of petersburg the siege of petersburg was a series of battles around petersburg, virginia lasting more than nine months from june 1864 into the spring of 1865. Petersburg was crucial to the supply lines of confederate general Robert E Lees army. Union forces under ulysses s. Grant repeatedly attacked and attempted to outflank the entrenched rebels, finally gaining an advantage that led to a confederate retreat, and days later, lees surrender. Richard somers takes us into the minds of each commanding general. He argues that the siege was unique in military history and discusses how the conflict brought about the end of the war. This talk is about an hour. Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the director of the u. S. Army Educational Center and the entire staff of the u. S. Army heritage and Educational Center, and the u. S. Army war college, welcome to the third lecture of our series. The u. S. Army war college sponsors the series to provide an historical dimension to the exercise of generalship,