Many of you in the audience have benefited from her superb tours. She is working on a geography of general gordon meade which i hope will be published by the university of North Carolina press. Ian isherwood to the left of jen, he is the assistant director of the Civil War Institute at Gettysburg College for a few more months. He has accepted a position as a assistant professor in war and memory studies which i assume will be part of the civil War Studies Program right here at Gettysburg College. Its a good thing for our students, not a great thing for c. W. I. He has been a very important part of what we do here. He is fantastic, though, with our students. He is especially, especially gifted when it comes to developing our Students Research interests. In fact, he took one of our students to oxford to deliver a paper and i believe, ian can correct me on this, that he cowrote a paper, a war and memories study, the journal, did i get that wrong . Prof. Isherwood war and society. It will be coming out in a year. Very rare as you can probably imagine where a college professor, especially in history, that they are able to do their own research but not on their own, not in isolation, but their colleague is an undergraduate. So ian has done fantastic work there. He will continue to do that as he moves on. I should also had that ian is an active scholar as well. He has his own book coming out entitled remembering the great war, writing and publishing the experiences of world war i. It will be released in november of 2016 and i suspect that we can get ian to come back. He said he would stop by on occasion. Will you stop by, ian, to sign some books for everyone . Can you work it into your schedule . Prof. Isherwood anything for you, pete. The devotion and loyalty of my staff, it almost brings a tear to my eye. Its really pretty amazing. Christian keller. Christian keller is professor of history in the department of National Security and strategy at the United States war college in carlisle where he teaches courses on the theory of war and strategy, National Security policy and strategy and the war in history. Among his many publications of the civil war, he is author of chancellorsville and the germans, nativism, ethnicities and civil war memory. That is coedited and he is a coauthor of the book, dutch pennsylvania germans at gettysburg. He is working on a project right now between lee and jackson. You are thinking what more could be said about lee and stonewall jackson. Christian has a lot to say about that. He is going to emphasize the religious and spiritual relationship between those two men and that book i hope will be published by the university of North Carolina press as well. I should quickly add that christian was also, back in the day, he was a recipient of one of our high school scholarships. What year was that . Prof. Isherwood it was both 1987 and 1988. You got two . We dont allow that anymore, man. One and thats it. Prof. Isherwood they must have liked me. He is a graduate of washington lee college. He did his graduate p. H. D. At penn state. He started with dr. Gallacher. I said yesterday, West Virginia university, what i was thinking, West Virginia university and university of virginia are so close. Dr. Gallacher moved on to u. V. A. Wait, i taught at w. V. U. I love West Virginia university, its a fine institution. Dr. Gallacher went on to u. V. A. And then you worked with carol and mark neely for your dissertation. So i will turn it over to the panel. Christian will begin by reading a paper and well have some comments and questions for the audience. Take it away. Prof. Isherwood thank you, pete, for that generous introduction. Thank you all for being here after lunch. I know what this can be because when i have to teach an elective at 1 00, my officers are generally not exactly the happiest to be there at 1 00 in the afternoon. They like the morning classes because they can go and the golf course beckons after lunch. This is a tough slot. We will endeavor to ensure that you stay awake. Thats my plan. There are some tough material in this. Im going to try to make it interesting and make wild jess wild gesticulations and things likes that, well do our best. Ok. Enabling the inspiring leader to refight battles in his mind. Contingencyiguity, begins vicariously two cents the resulting decisions in the real world. Sharpen the past would judgment and thinking skills before judgment, not prescribe decisionmaking while it occurred. It allowed future generals to allow history through the thoughts and actions of the great captain. And in so doing, increased creative thinking. Studying the lessons of military history should aim and improving the mind of the future commander or more accurately, to guide him in his selfeducation, not accompany him to the battlefield. History, whether it be from the American Civil War or some other conflict was a means to an end. That end was the intellectual preparation of military leaders and their future performance on the battlefield, both of them. Education and practical application, if you will, the two went hand in hand and in the 50 years following appomattox, the leaders of the u. S. Military came to embrace that duel end state. One major way they did that was to study the campaigns of the civil war, indeed, the postwar American Military looked primarily to the lessons of leadership conveyed by that recent cataclysm, both to educate its officers and to deal realistically with the military challenges confronting them in the years prior to world war i. The occupation of the defeated south, the indian wars, the spanish american war, world wars and ii. All of them owed some degree of their character to the civil war. Pushing towards the middle of the 20th century, the insights of 18611865 were relegated more and more to the Educational Mission of the military academy and war college than to operational doctrine and practitioners in the field. But even so, the legacies of the war for the union were still studied and persevered in a very real and practical manner through battlefield staff rides where officers gleaned nuggets of value about the nature of war by studying the decisionmaking of meade, mcclellan, jackson, grant, and sherman on the actual ground where those decisions were made. In the last 40 years, the American Civil War has been taught as part of the official clutch la of nearly all of the nations military institutions at every level of professional military education, what we call p. M. E. , of course, the military has an acronym for everything, i will do it, too. Perhaps not the corps of cadets and officers education, but certainly as a component and staff rides remain critical to all five armed services. I would add that they remain critical to the education of Civil War Institute attendees as well. This panel will engage in a conversation about a conversation in legacies in the u. S. Military. We will focus from 1865 through the advent of world war i but also intend to discuss the lingering value of understanding the art of war for generations of American Military leaders who came later. I will highlight some of the themes discussed by the few scholars who have actually studied this aspect of the civil war, offer some commentary about how the war influenced the actual fighting of the indian wars of the 1860s through the 1880s and to end with observations about the educational use of Civil War History from the army from the 1880s onward. At that point, ill turn it over to my colleagues who will each offer their views and will engage in a discussion about this interesting and in my opinion very important topic. We invite your participation after that and look forward to your insights. This topic has frankly been understudied, so for the graduate students out there and anybody looking for an overarching subject to right about regarding the civil war, you have got some openings. Carol rear dons book, soldiers and scholars, which was published in 1990 still stands as the primary publication building on the earlier works of jay luvaas, timothy nenninger and others. None focus exclusively on the Lessons Learned from the American Civil War and luvaas concentrated on the war for the european armies which he argued were rather sparse. The terms Lessons Learned has been viewed by the military as reflecting low operation takeaways that have shortterm value in the field rather than war winning strategic level concepts that offer longer term value for the joint force. Other authors, andrew burdle, williamson murray, brian lynn and Gregory Downs have written or edited studies that touch upon the subject as it pertained to topics of their books, but other than a few supplementary articles, thats about the gamut of scholarship on this topic. This general lack of scholarship should be surprising to us considering the vast public and professional interest in the civil war, but i think much of it has to do with something i remind my students at the war college about in practically every lesson, that would be time and timing. You can see my proficiency with powerpoint is as high as others. Ill leave it at that. As i tell them time when things happen within the broader scope of national and International Events and timing, the specific chronological sequence of events within a finite period of time, each strategy regardless of the war in question and the particular context, the time of the American Civil War, i would argue, occurring as it did near the middle of the 19th century and near the beginning of the industrial, financial and managerial revolutions meaning that its enduring strategic legacy and tactical Lessons Learned would have real shelf life of utility to the armed forces. It was most potent in the 50 years after the war but before the entry of the United States into world war i which we know changed just about everything regarding the character of modern war. After the First World War, technological advances such as the advent of military aircraft, political and social changes such as the influence of progressivism and simply the very proximity of another big war, all of this, the timing of world war i, if you will, relegated the civil war increasingly to the realm of education in the United States, both military and civilian. Couple that with the timing of the peace dividend following the First World War that swept the thought of all things military from the minds of Many Americans along with much funding for the army and the navy which was then followed by the Great Depression and the onset of world war ii and you can see how the civil war faded in prominence in the minds of americas military leadership. Other events intervened. That does not mean, however, that the leaders forgot about the war. Instead, the war for the union was sub assumed in priority to more recent wars and contemporary pressing issues. In this manner, how the United States military viewed the value of studying the civil war is no different than how it has consistently viewed its past wars. The further back in time they are, the less valuable in a practical sense they become. This leads me to some observations about things relevant to our topic that previous scholars have highlighted. The first is the tension between the institutional educational use of the civil war as a means of officer education which found its golden years in the 1890s through approximately 1910 and the practical utilitarian use of Lessons Learned from the and experiences of civil war combat, military occupation and pacification. The growing number of military educators in uniform in the second half of 19th century, most ensconced in posts at leavenworth and the Army War College came to embrace the former legacy while the rough and ready tacticallyminded officers on the western frontier viewed the latter as essential in fulfilling their duties. These practical lessons were most applicable in the wars against native americans on the great plains and in the southwest in the 1870s and in the 1880s. Most of them derived not from the experiences of combat with an conventional i dont know federal rat forces, but with southern irregular fighters and hostile civilians in occupied sections of the south. That, i think, is an interesting point for us to consider. The most immediate applicable takeaways from the civil war were in the realm of irregular warfare and not in the conventional sphere. Yet with the exception of the reinstating some of these counterirregular tactics and the endearing policy legacy of francis liebers code during the insurrection of the early 1900s, the practical legacy of the civil war all about disappeared by 1914. The educational legacy, however, enshrined in what Carol Reardon called map maneuvers, war games and the advent of the popular staff rides endured long past the surrender of crazy horse, cochise and geronimo. It persisted and gained strength all the way to 1915, when the pancho villa difficulty in mexico followed quickly by world war i. After the interruption of the two world wars and the Great Depression during which the study of the civil war was still conducted in military education, albeit at a reduced level, it resurged, especially the staff ride, in the 1970s and 1980s and still with us today. The second theme involves tensions within the two primary methods through which the military utilized the lessons of the civil war in the second half of the 19th century. Im going to show you the slide here of what map maneuvers look like. They put a map out on the table and sometimes they had stone or wooden marketing and they moved them around on the map trying to replicate actual maneuvers of larger units of men in historical battles. The second theme involves tensions within the two primary methods through which the military utilized the lessons of the civil war in the second half of the 19th century. For instance, the hard war measures of the likes of generals george crook and nelson miles during the indian wars learned during their days fighting john s. Mosby in virginia or bushwhackers in western virginia were effective in many ways in defeating the sioux and cheyenne in the 1870s and the apaches in the 1880s especially coupled with more lenient pacification measures afterward. Surprise morning attacks, burning out Food Supplies and hunter Strike Forces that pursued the indian warriors day and night were all tactics they learned in the civil war and applied to their native opponents in the west. Yet, the American Public of the postwar period was not the northern public of the civil war era. In cries of hypocrisy and outrage emanated from the big city newspapers who said the policies of harshness and conciliation born of the die createdof the dichotomy during the war by liebers famous code and still roughly followed in the west at that time allowed for far too much discretion on the part of the commander in the field and resulted too often in massacres of native americans. The shock to the White American system delivered by little bighorn notwithstanding, many eastern elites including more than a few Army Officers stationed in washington and in eastern posts howled against the hard war measures of the army employed against the indians while the bulk of the Army Leadership including william t. Sherman and philip sheridan, both of whom had their fill of confederate irregulars in the civil war attempted to walk the fine line between frontier necessity as their subordinates in the west called it and Public Opinion and policy in the east. It was a tension that never really resolved and included a number of unfortunate experiments including the Indian School at Carlisle Barracks which was a large sense an attempt by the army for the misguided calls for americanization of native american children. Other use of Civil War History in the classrooms of fort leavenworth, kansas, and the Army War College, then in washington, tensions also existed. As early as 1881 when general sherman established a school of application for cavalry and infantry at fort leavenworth, military conservatives, many of them born and bred in the late antebellum and civil war periods that enshrined military heroics leading from the front and tough service in the field rose to the challenge of what they called a map making bacillus and an epidemic of wisdom that was turning their officer corps into a leagues of bookworms. Ironically, they found ready allies among the early progressives of the civilian world who in the mold of Teddy Roosevelt believed in selfmade men. Innate characteristics that either existed in soldiers or didnt. Those characteristics could be groomed only by experience and hard service with but a modicum of formal schooling. Yet these old School Officers increasingly found themselves in a losing battle with the rising stars of the army and indeed of the navy as well in their officer corps who came to believe in the theory of what we call safe leadership meaning that it was the responsibility of good military leaders to, one, utilize history in order to learn about the nature of war , critical decisionmaking and the role of chance before they even get onto a battlefield. And two, literally lead from behind in war, especially at higher ranks because their carefully cultivated brains would be no use to the soldiers if splattered on the battlefield. Emery upton, one of the great prodigy officers of the union army and about who we will be hearing more shortly from jen was an early pioneer of safe leadership as was colonel Arthur L Wagner at leavenworth, captain eben swift at the war college route. Retary of war, you would it was under their careful collective eyes that the students in the army officer schools meticulously mapped out, war gamed and visited on staff rides the great battle fields of civil war in order to apply the principals of war and creatively and critically in a crisis situation and deal with the fog and friction of war that are omnipresent regardless of time and present. Antietum and gettysburg were favorites for the war college in the 1900s and so were the approaches on washington in the summer of 1964 and shermans Atlanta Campaign in march of the same year. By the time america entered of the First World War, the safe Leadership School of military education and its use of civil war campaigns had triumphed over the crusty curmudgeons of the old army. They wouldnt call themselves that. These conflicting themes of practitioner oriented Lessons Learned versus institutional safe leadership education regarding not only the use of Civil War History, but, indeed, the military history of all eras still resonates within the modern American Armed forces. The conflicting themes of successfully applying the lessons of the last war to the current one, hopefully while not refighting the last war, i would add, and simultaneously balancing the political impact of Public Opinion also live on in modern america and indeed in the scholarship of more modern wars. And last but certainly not least, both the u. S. Military and academia, i might add, since the turn of the last century consistently displayed a greater interest in studying wars more contemporary, closer in time to their own era and more resonant than those fought by previous generations. Hence, the civil war became paramount in the education of the countrys officers in the late 1800s and early 1900s, but did fade in some significance as the 20th century marched into its later decades. Perhaps none of these themes are really that surprising, but they do provide insights into how americans, especially in uniform, think about past wars. In many ways, then, we see how the precedent of the u. S. Armys takeaways from the civil war set perhaps none of these themes are a foundation for the next 150 years, both intellectually and both pragmatically, with all of the tensions and contradictions inherent thereto. Thank you. [applause] prof. Keller now at this time im going to turn it over to jen who will tell us a little bit more about emery upton and reforms that he accomplished in the postwar era. So, jen, take it away. Prof. Keller the questions that our panelists tackling today are Lessons Learned and my comments will mostly be about the u. S. Army and specifically questions of tactics and the way that the u. S. Army dealt with what they learned on a Civil War Battlefield moving forward after 1865. So i want to start with a couple themes before we drum down to questions of tactics, so just give us a few points of departure for our overview. And make a couple of points about the status of the United States army. And thinking of the way of how the army grappled with lessons and 1865. Tween 1861 after 1865, what is the status of the United States army, what are their past, what are they doing. The photograph should be familiar to some of you. That, of course, is george custer, right, and the way that the u. S. Army is utilized in fighting indians in the western frontier is something that well explore during the course of our questioning. The u. S. Army fights over 1,000 engagements with indians on the western frontier, none of which we would call conventional by any stretch of the imagination. After the engagement with the indians, we turned to spain with the spanish american war and then finally getting up to the philippine insurrection and then world war i come 1917. At the same time that the u. S. Army is fighting counterinsurgency west and then also dealing with spain, the u. S. Military is going through a period of professionalization and this is the time that Army Officers in particular start to write in professional journals. This is the establishment of the army and navy journal and they start to think critically about these issues of tactics and strategy and doctrine. This is also the period that the Army Continues professional military education where people like william t. Sherman will call for Educational Opportunities for their officers beyond west point, so you have the establishment of the Artillery School at fort monroe in 1868 and you have the establishment of the cal valerie and Infantry School in 1881 and the u. S. Army war college. One of the questions that dominates the army after the civil war is the question of tactics. The civil war scholarship, whether it represented the last napoleonic war or the first modern war or is it both . A lot of times this question comes down to technology and how Technology Influences tactics. War,f you study the civil uc frontal assault. This is a depiction of pickets from the psychodrama. Where you have long, linear assaults with thousands of soldiers Standing Shoulder to soldier. And what you get are incredibly the excellence of makes civil war officers questioned the future of that. So what to go lessons does the United States military take from the civil war . Note that all three branches of the army question this. Color he is going through it changes the way the utility very will be used. This is something that the infantry also questions. How can we move away from these archaic, obsolete linear and a loose order formation . You are probably familiar that the u. S. Military is always prepared to fight the last war. With the postcivil war manual that the army is putting out, they are strongly committed to the bayonet. But what good is a planet in the postcivil war world . They devote numerous pages to the bad at. Strong advocates for the infantry retaining the bayonet. A lot of these officers are doing this on their own. Pursuit individual doctrine now and lessons that they take out of iraq and afghanistan, it is very much a thesion of Something Like seal manual. Putting together a unified doctrine of how we fight counter insurgencies. You dont see that in the postcivil war era. So that brings us to a familiar name and face of all of them. He is at the floor of bringing changes. Emery upton is a made Major General by 26, incredibly young and gifted. During the campaign, you can see that his already starting to think about the questions of tactics. , emery upton is going to take regiments and attack the confederates in a column assault. And tactics work for different result but it would be replicated later. If you read through uptons journal, you will find up to and aboutng critically leadership. His assault in spotsylvania doesnt work and you see him in the later weeks commenting on the futility of frontal assaults in the overland campaign. I extracted a couple of sentences from his memoir to take a look at. To put us in the mindset of how emery was thinking during the civil war which would help bridge the gap as to what he is encouraging the army to addressed to address. This is 1864. I will give you a minute to read through this. His tone is critical of a couple of things. He has discussed it with the general ship. He says men are being expected to do the impossible. I must confess that so long as i see in competency, there is no great in the army to which i do not aspire. He continues writing in this vein through the duration of the overland campaign. I will give you a few more quotes to further make this point. This is june 5, the sentiment is the same. Their little general ship through the war. Finds obvious disappointment and loss of life. Hes 26 years old when the civil and he has opportunity to put together the tactical manual. Friends with william p sherman. Sherman is championing the tactical reform. It is not all original. A lot of this is from a manual that came out earlier. But the big change that he sees is twofold. System calledth a fours. Going in linear upton is encouraging a boots order formation. E puts his men into fours the way the platoon works today. Flexibility as is with maneuverability on the battlefield. He goes from double ranks to single. Theoesnt believe we need double ranks any longer. Grant loves this. He says it is purely an american work. Is the system the United States adopts for tactics. Order formation in fours. There are a lot of critics of s is in one critic said you call out your number 14 on a battlefield. Upton continues to think about these questions of tactics through the rest of his life and he makes different revisions to infantry tactics. He puts forth a manual for and also went together for artillery. And you few are familiar with uptons career to its end, at the end of his career, he acts as an official, an observer for the u. S. Army. He is sent to russia and china to make observations about their military to see if there is any applicability to the u. S. Army. He very much transitions the to being more prussian. Leads the renaissance while the American Army is losing prestige. Wayn is frustrated with the that his tactics are being implement it. He will commit suicide. Last published posthumorously is which some folks will take forth and publish them in 1904. But upton is a key figure with the Lessons Learned as it applies to tactics on the battlefield. Thank you. [applause] thank you very much. En,we are going to turn to who will take us across the pond to look at the european legacy of the American Civil War. Thank you. First, a bit of a personal anecdote. Four years ago, i was getting my phd in history. , a very was graduating proud moment and i had done a dissertation on the british of the interwar time. Memoirs written by servicemen who fought in the british army during world war i. And if you had come up to me at that Graduation Ceremony and reach out your hand and said something nice as it is only polite to do, if you have reach out your hand and said something nice and then said yes, im really looking forward to having you speak at a civil war conference on reconstruction i would have said you had me confused. Phd inmeone who did a civil war. Said, i hope this sticks to something that i know something about and then talking a little bit about how we can expand and think about the American Civil War legacy moving forward onto the western front and perhaps beyond. July 1917, the eighth cotillion began training for a major attack. This is a battalion within the british army. The attack would be part of the it was atle volunteer unit. Not unlike a lot of volunteer units during the civil war. In 1917nteered for it andwent into battle suffered a lot of casualties between 1915 and 19 17. The battalion lost hundreds of commander talian he was a civilian officer who had risen in the ranks from lieutenant two major and who had been decorated for bravery. You can see here, not only the picture but also the tweets. So if you use twitter, make sure to follow him and you can get updates from the western front as they happened to the day. So that july, he received operational orders to detail and upcoming attack. And what operational orders look her were dozens of pages of spice orders that he used to instruct his own officers and his men for an upcoming attack. 30, italian went up to the trenches for the assault. At 3 30 a. M. On the 31st, the divisional artillery opened up thousands of shells being fired from heavy guns upon german trenches. The battalion and then attacked and they did so behind a creeping barrage, a curtain of as they rushed the german trenches opposite. They were successful in taking the first line. And made aegrouped second time barrage for its to make the of german trenches. He then wrote the following. Out ofbeen in and am now the the battalion did well. I am covered in mud. There are several things to know here besides his desire for a hot bath. The comparative anger is one. Beyond his desire for a hot bass, which is something of the vast differences between the 52 years between the great battle. For thet things to note sophistication of the assault. European and military thinkers paste fighting the next major war. Staff officers had learned hard lessons on the reality of combat on the front. Lessons they might not have learned if they studied the civil war. Andational planning combined arms they had all advanced rapidly to the changing world war i battlefield. Their attack was the product of that planning. The first attack in 1915, he suffered uncut barbed wire. Two years later, they followed a strict artillery timetable using a barrage of shells for cover or a rapid charge against and many against enemy trenches they were trained to move quickly and mop up enemy resistance. Carried light machine guns and mortar and grenades. Firepowertrained in meaning artillery and machine guns so that they could not just kill the enemy but also that firepower could be concentrated to dominates the battlefield. That limited the results seem now. There was no great rake through four him and his men. The war did not end on july 31, 1970. But he was proud of the men for meeting the objectives and following orders. So how does this story and the analytical points about specifics related back to the legacy of the civil war . A good question. , themerican civil war first war of the steam age, was a hinge on the door of industrialization. He wore demonstrated, in an embryonic stage, the direction in which warfare was headed. Possibly, the changing role of cavalry but they argued that these observations did little to change the nature of european warfare. European officers saw that they wanted to see and their conclusions affirmed the existing doctrine rather than creating new ways of fighting. The past punctuated. When we look at the civil war refracted through the lens of the great war, it is easy to see the similarities between the two. The war was some kind of worry about the trenches. The great this enchantment of those who fought. But this is not how the great thinkers approached the war. They had a war of robust and her relics. They studied the civils battles and campaigns. But they had other wars to study. Wars which were bloody but knew her to their own interests. The military planners before the great wars would be one of offensives and maneuvers. Theres staff offers had developed their own theory, the call to the offensive. Metal which was a product of imperialist. Heories of National Fiber the maneuver on the western front was replaced by the pragmatism. Offensive and maneuver were replaced by the assault tactics in 1970. It is in that heartfelt lesson that lies a legacy and a similarity between petersburg. It is the heritage of attrition and the elusive nature of battlefield victory. The nature of industrialized war became one of material, where exhaustion was equally important. The great comparison is not necessarily in the physicality. F the battlefield break the deadlock and win the war. In terms of the tactics and technologies used. In both wars, those lessons proved to have an enduring educational legacy. Thank you. [applause] thank you, that was very enlightening. I have copious notes from both presentations and what we will do is engage in a little conversation about themes that all three of us broke three of us brought up. Then i will open it up to the audience. The first thing that strikes me here is the role of technology as a gethat technology into the second half of the 19th century really begins to play a major role in all levels of four. Regarding how we are going to utilize the lessons of past wars. Themeat is a profound that we see here in United States and the european armies. Do either of you have ideas on that . On the role of centrality . Sure. [laughter] do you want to go first . Do want me ok. Technologies usually hugely important to the development of warfare. The first of the modern wars is a very interesting question that we hear a lot, a lot of debate. And i suspect it would be a good examination question for students. I will hold that in the back pocket. Of thehink in terms First World War and the frustration of commanders, they understood that technology was incredibly important to the direction in which the war was going. And that it would be very important to the way the war would be fought. One thing to keep in mind is that the last quarter of the 19th century some type is puttingancement it mildly. It is completely revolutionary in terms of the technology that people are experiencing in a day to day level. The last 20 years is comparable to that as well. There is a comparison there in terms of communication. And of machinery and industry. Huge developments happened in the late 19th century and with that comes development in terms of firepower and a great challenge for military thinkers based upon firepower. If you compare tactics used in the American Civil War and those war, you willn see some striking differences from breech loading weapons and later on, from artillery that can saturate the and in ald quickly concentrated way. A Huge Development and i dont think we can overstate the development. Up with a follow context comment. These are things that we grapple with today. The way the u. S. Military is grappling with the use of drones. Severe,gy has applicable ramifications as well as legal and moral ones. For the postcivil war army, the question about tactics is one of artillery. They are excited to have all of this rifle aid. Sonot utilized at all the debate or question then is that if you have technology and tactics synced and to find the opportunity where you put the best of them forward and to figure that out as quickly as possible. That seems to be a theme you will see throughout u. S. History and World Military history. How do you manage to sink technology and tactics and even operational thought . When see this all the time i teach my officers at the war college. The constant rattling of new technology. How do you find a way to implement it successfully . Especially at the strategic level. At the tactical level it has a direct effect on success. So this is something that occurred in the latter half of the 19th century. A theme that is still greatly dealt with by militaries of the world. How do you then think about the last war . You use the history of the last war when the technology is so rapidly increasing . That is a various salient question that i think we should also all consider a bit more. Another thing i wanted to bring out to see what you thought about was the idea of fighting the last war. And both of you have great comments on that. Is we have heard this before. It is often misapplied. Contexttated in the that it shouldnt be stated in. There is a proclivity of armies to focus on what they did in the t war right rather than where do we see the refighting of the civil war and the wars of the late 19th century up through world war i . Did itou see that lead to victory . [laughter] mike ullman to that is, think of the status of the army. The westerners had no use for it once the indian wars had been wrapped up and northerners are disengaged so where do the Lessons Learned and conversations happening, at a lower level of command. 26 years old when the war is ending. He is the one who is repelling a lot of the change forward. But they meet so much resistance along the way. He writes constantly about how frustrated he is that he cant get his tactics to be adopted by the u. S. Military. He actually self publishes his tactics manual and it generates him a lot of money when the army adopts it. He makes 3000 in royalties each year. I mean, my book doesnt make that. Mine certainly doesnt. The point these conversations are hard to have with the status of the military as it is post 1865. This. L be very brief on jenn did an excellent job answering the question. From outside of American History, what do you constitute the next war or the nexlast war . For prussia, it is the francoprussian war. Going into the First World War, and has an influence in the way in which germany is going to fight the first stage of the First World War. If youre looking at the british fighting in the sudan prepares soldiers for then going on to fight on the western front. How does fighting in south africa, that conflict is very different to what the conflict that is going to be waged in europe. These discussions are being had within staff colleges. And it should be said that british Staff Officers are writing papers on the American Civil War, on the campaigns at fredericksburg, writing on gettysburg and pittsburgh. And vicksburg. But theres a big question as to was nature of the naturlast war when youre looking into a future war you cant predict that can be vastly different than what youre expecting. That, andhink with there are so many more things we drive ascuss, we could train to this topic but i would like to open it up to the audience with any questions that you may happen to have for us. We can talk about what you would like to talk about. My question has to do with the fact that they principle armies, both the north and the south, where citizens and n military people. O there was also a large conscription process with the army. Did these military thinkers after the war, how do they think about these type of soldiers and did they influence their thinking towards future wars . The question was how did the legacy of citizen soldiers primarily fighting in the civil war affect post war military thought in preparation . I think that is an excellent question ill start out by saying that there was great concern in the east, which i mentioned in my paper, not only about the treatment of native americans and the tactics that were utilized against them, which were shocking when these were published in the eastern papers, but there was concerned about large. Ving the or maybe this is one of the problems of reconstruction that the army is demobilized so fast. And that is an american ethic. You demobilize your armies after wars. It is only since world war ii we have had a professional, large standing army. That was not the tradition. There are still many who question this and there was a belief that if you have the need for another big call up of volunteers they are going to do it. When the armyar, was small, professionalization in the United States, i will not speak for the europeans, the professionalization was seen as a special and necessary job of all officers. That they were truly to become specialist professionals. That included, therefore, the correct use of history. And the next wars will be fought by professionals as it was foreseen in the 1880s. Youll cuall up volunteers of necessary but in the is wasishamerican war there a and a lot of that stems back to this belief that only professional soldiers should be fighting the next wars. We go to the volunteers. We do an overall call up if necessary only. Quick followup to that. Upton wants 25,000 in the army. And that is why he likes the system of fours. If youre unfamiliar with the russell book the american way of war, that is a great read. The American Military is different from the european military. But there is a lot of tension post 1865 between the civilian and professional military. You see that moving to the 20th century. Ken mcallister from san antonio. I thought we left out triage. Triage in the American Military started with Jonathan Letterman and progressed. And putoull be triaged on an army plane. If you have burns, you go to Brooke Army Medical center. If you have other words, you go to walter reed. Efficient system. If you look at it, we are training Staff Officers to do it. I thought when you had this topic, i thought you were going to talk about triage. You are referring to the letter, to the reforms done during the war, especially federal medicine which were profound an absolutely critical. And they were on the way to being implemented by the time of the battle of antietam and there were well advanced by the time of gettysburg. That is clearly a legacy, absolutely correct. Sir . Yes. Dr. John washington, d. C. I would second what was just sa id. This is more of a comment. Audience thinkhe that emory upton committed suicide because of delayed ptsd. Yes, he suffered severe headaches. He had undergone painful medical treatment. That is the reason he shot himself in the head. Because of this sinus tumor. It had nothing to do with ptsd or anything like that. Thank you for your comment. Yeah, i may have, i caught jenns infantry reforms. And whatnot. I missed how the calvary and the artillery were reformed by uptons ideas. So, your question is about how the calvary was reformed after the civil war . Calvary and artillery. Cavalry and artillery. Well, i can talk to that, but it might take 25 minutes. Do either of you have short synopsis . One of the things that upton championed was integration. He found that sometimes the three arms of the military works too autonomously and often calls for assimilated tactics, joint operations on the battlefield so these three arms work together. A more combined arms approach. And we now have still today. We have time for one final comment. You have talk about this grappling with technology and strategy. Eventuallytechnology becoming so overwhelming that the study of civil war tactics at the war college or west point or annapolis will be moot . Its going to all be on twitter. What is your sense of how that is moving . Ill start out by saying that if im still teaching at the Army War College, we do not have to worry about the march of technology obviating the teaching of Civil War History. But i think your point is well taken in the sense that technology, i mentioned this in my paper, the newness of recent technologyeir new sometimes obliges the armed forces at least in this country to focus more on them. And that is a trend. Its undeniable. But i dont think it means we will not study old wars. At the Army War College we do study the peloponnesian war. And the reason for that, and i think this would apply to some of the more significant campaigns of the civil war, is that there are lessons that can be gained that are applicable about the nature of war. That dont change overtime. Things such as the human dimension in war. Things such as the role of technology writ large and how that affects the conduct of warfare. The role gof good leadership, command teams and civi lmilitary relations. These are just some examples. We still teach these primary themes on the staff classes today. I do not sense that the onward march of technology, drones and computers, is not going to knock that out in our lifetimes. Ill continue the question about the onward march of technology. Had mentioned there was a spirit of militant mailinn liness that infused world war i. Could you comment on the fact w soldierspears ho conceive of themselves as men and of soldiers and the behavior on the battlefield, willed behavior that can overcome technology. Pretty apparently cannot. What is going on there . Would you agree that the spirit of militant manliness has persisted and continues to ofsist even in the face wherarfare that seems to minimize the individual soldier . That is a great question. I probably should not abuse that phrase. Would approach of question like that is by looking at the changing definition of heroism. Areons of masculinity oftentimes filtered through the way in which culturally, the ways in which cultures and societies see the idea of what a hero is. What they privilege as virtue. There have been lots of scholars that have written about different wars. And in the civil war, you do have a culture of heroism that develops. Those definitions change a little bit and they change in the memory of the war as well afterwards as veterans reassess their conduct during the war. The same thing happens in the great war but in many ways the change that you see, the shift that you see in heroism which has been argued by a number of other scholars is once it is actually being driven by technology. Where the physical presence of trenches, in a confined space, where you do not have a sense of martial agency, youre not actively attacking or defending, where you are being shelled or being subject to shelling an sub changing the way in which some people perceive of the idea of the hero. Or the idea of being a survivor of enduring, but coming to the other side of survivor becomes a form of heroic virtue. Is there a similarity there . May be the idea of survivor then being somebody who is able to show their scars and say they were there on that day. Its something that is kind of universal. That soldiers are able to, are able to then feel great pride in surviving a great trial. That is the way i would approach the question. I would add the concept of safe leadership, which i as early as the 1880s and persists the holy into the Second World War period and prevails today. They would not call it that. This is a new thing, and it actually received a great deal of flak from the oldschool Army Officers who believed much as the question implies that heroism is something that you get on the battlefield to experience and you hone over time to that experience, but it became known in the army Schools Coalition that safe leadership is smart leadership. So, there is this tension between the heroic school of thought and the Experiential School of thought of learning by doing, which is still an existing tension today. And the safe Leadership School whereby you keep George C Marshall well ensconced safe behind the lines in washington where his brains can be best utilized rather than have him leading like george patton. I think this concludes our panel. Thank you so very much. [applause] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] you are watching American History tv all weekend, every weekend on cspan 3. To join the conversation, like us on facebook. Each week, American History tvs reel america brings you archival films to help provide context to todays Public Affairs issues. The president august 1966 includes scenes from lucy baines johnsons wedding, a trip through new england and president johnsons Birthday Celebration at his texas ranch. The Naval Photographic Center created monthly film reports on president johnson between 1964 and 1969. [video clip] this country is smaller than the state of vermont. It is sandwiched between two unfriendly powers. 18 years ago, it was inhospitable, largely barren and referred to w