Ideology it would be nice to think we can bring them back in an ideological struggle. Im somewhat skeptical of that. I think for those who are truly committed this is a fight. As colonel price correctly points out, i dont know how many nazis were left in germany in terms of the mindset at the end of world war ii, but it lacked the military capacity to inflict that on other nations, so it was defeated. In so far as these particular adversaries not accepting that defeat, whether they accept it or not, what we want to do is blunt their capacity to impose it on others. With regard to the various models of u. S. Intervention, i dont think under any circumstances, however exquisite our counterterrorism strategies are, u. S. Troops in a foreign country killing local people is not going to be a winning formula. It may be absolutely necessary at times to conduct limited operations, but we ought to avoid that as much as possible. First of all, its difficult to sustain in terms of american political support, but also we accumulate enemies fairly quickly in trying to do that. So what this means is its going to be indirect methods. Its going to be working with allies, and its going to be working with local partners. Now, thats an imperfect way of doing things, and these coalitions and these things are going to be messy, but that is preferable to sending in tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of American Forces unless were really prepared to keep them in for the next half century and the bear the price of doing that. And im not even sure it would work then. I dont think it would work then either. Ive taken up quite a bit of time. I want to let others get in. Mr. Jeffrey, you can offer your comments on that, but i want to led others ask questions, so ill yield my time. Mr. Jones . Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Jenkins, i was thinking about your conflicts. Im not an isolationist, but im a realist. Were 19. 4 trillion in debt. We continue to spend billions and billions of dollars in afghanistan. I dont know what were getting out of that quite frankly except from time to time a soldier will lose a leg or get killed and we keep doing it. And i wonder from you three experts well, is china concerned about jihadists . I dont think so. And here we are because of our Foreign Policy that i blame both parties for, bush taking out Saddam Hussein was a horrible mistake, then obama going in and taking out gaddafi was another horrible mistake. Here we are, as i think one of you said and im going to stop in just a second. You said that when we get trapped into a situation theyre my words, not yours that we keep doing the same thing. And all were doing is enhancing those who hate us. With drone strikes and other strikes that end up killing innocent people. Thats what they talk about for the next hundred years just like those in afghanistan who defeated the russians. So what kind of Foreign Policy do you think makes sense instead of going in this direction of spending billions and billions of dollars in a failed policy in afghanistan that we will continue to pass bills to keep funding it and then at some point in time when we hit 21 to 22 trillion in debt, which might happen in the next two years, then our whole country is in an economic collapse . How do you get, say, a congress to understand what is the right policy versus a policy of keeping to spend, spend, spend and you get nothing but chaos in afghanistan . John has said that corruption is worse today than in afghanistan than it was 16 years ago. To my comments, would you give me a statement and rebuttal or a statement that im somewhat not off track . Mr. Ambassador, i start with you. Youre not off track, congressman. Our National Budget and the deficit are Core National security concerns. Nonetheless, theres ways to do that over the long term without breaking the bank. Theres ways to do it over the long term without, as mr. Jenkins rightly said, antagonizing those people because were in muslim lands killing their people. For example, i did an inventory. We have from pakistan to egypt in that region longterm presence in 13 countries. In each country the presence is relatively minimal, but it is serving a good purpose over the long term securing things. Taken all together on shore, its less than the 28,000 troops we have in korea since 1950, and thats probably costing us more money than most of what were doing in the middle east, but we all understand on the long run it buys us and it buys the region security without getting us up until now into trouble. You try to limit your commitments to something that is sustainable in terms of the american public, the budget, and casualties and also not try to provoke people in these regions. And we have been successful both in the middle east and elsewhere in the world in doing that. Its not impossible. What is impossible and gets to the second question that came up is changing the region. Because of the concerns you raised, mr. Jones, people want to somehow rush in and just end this. We dont want to keep being there for decades, so we try to find a solution. We try to get to hearts and minds and thats where, a, we start sending up the bills. Right now the fight against isis, i think, over the last year was 7 billion. Somewhere around that. We burned through 7 billion in a few weeks in iraq for years, and i was there to watch it. So i think that theres a way we can do this, but i realize its hard to persuade people because this is a very, very good question. Thank you. Ms. Davis . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here and increasing our understanding. In light of the discussion right now, where would you suggest that resources really be focused and directed in a way that perhaps you dont see them being directed today, and could you include without any additional authorities that you think are required to continue this battle essentially . Mr. Jeffries, you were going in that direction if you want to focus on that. Bearing in mind understanding that, but where should they be that theyre maybe not being . Im skeptical about working to change the mindset in the region about terrorism, about extremis extremist philosophies and such. It doesnt hurt to try because it could be wrong and it doesnt take a lot of money. That is one place where were putting a lot of attention with limited success, but we might succeed tomorrow. Weve done this in other areas, eastern europe, for example, successfully. Perhaps it is certainly worth trying. Secondly intelligence. Thats crucial that we know what is going on out there and who is coming at us as soon as possible. That has helped us a lot in homeland defense. That is something thats really vital. Thirdly, supporting this very limited but effective military force who will not be large, who will not be tasked to change the mindset of whole populations, but who will be given specific military missions they can do. We can take out isis in mosul. We want to do it with partners, which is right, but a lot of that will require u. S. Leadership, u. S. Fire power, u. S. Combat experience, and some people on the ground at least as advisers. Thats the kind of thing we have to reinforce as well. But again if the region is all screwed up, theres nothing we can do to deal with this pupping up of new terrorist movements everywhere, so everything we can do diplomatically, politically, economically to keep this area calm that will help. Mr. Jenkins, can you respond . You know, in all of the questions that have come up thus far there is an understandable skepticism about what we have received in return for the resources that we have invested. And that reflects the fact that americans are pragmatists. If we invest something, we want to know what we get in return and how are we doing in this. But in this particular case, that skepticism on the part of congress i think is entirely appropriate because in the immediate wake of 9 11 the issue was spare no expense, do whatever we have to do to prevent another 9 11. Its not which button we will press. We will press every single button. One of them has to work. Fortunately, it worked. Combination of what we did and luck. But now looking for the long haul we have become more sensitive to both how much we do and how we go about doing that. Part of that is imposed by the terrible costs that we have incurred thus far, but i underscore the ambassadors remarks where if you look at the more recent activities where we have worked with the kurds or others in syria or we have done things with special forces or done things more with local partners, military and nonmilitary, the resources there have been a fraction of the terrible price that we have paid if you look back at the previous 15 years, especially the first ten years after 9 11. Thank you. Colonel, could you respond quickly . Yes, absolutely. I agree with most of what has been said. In my opinion, the three places to improve i agree. Intel is a great place where you get great return on investment. I think the publicprivate partnerships is a way forward there. The last one is not very cost efficient, but it has to do with improving governance programs. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wilson . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you each of you for being here. Ambassador, in particular, i want to thank you for pointing out in particular that the people in the middle east want to live in the 21st century. Having the opportunity to visit from beirut to aman to dubai, i explained to my constituents that many of these cities look like hilton head on steroids. They really want to really be part of the 21st century. Its personal to me. All four of my sons have served there. My oldest son was Field Artillery in iraq. My second son was a doctor serving in baghdad. My third son served bright star signal in egypt. And my fourth guy was an engineer in afghanistan serving with the local military. And so i just im just so hopeful we can back them up, but sadly the legacy of president obama is failure by not taking isis seriously by declaring a red line that was not serious, by not having a status forces agreement, to me, he has not learned the lesson of 9 11 that where there is a safe haven American Families are at risk. We see it today. I was in new york on monday. Thank goodness there were police officers, there were law enforcements, there were First Responders who were National Guard every five feet in a city that shouldnt be under siege, but they are. And i want to make every effort that we can to defeat terrorists from overseas. With that in mind, colonel price, you have referenced this and that is we need to counteract the social media of the islamic terrorists. How can we do this best and what is the role of the department of defense . Sir, obviously im not here speaking on behalf of the department of defense, but i can offer some of the academic perspectives in what we can do in terms of the social media realm. This goes back to the privatepublic partnerships we can foster. The jihadists are very adept at skirting around the different ways to both communicate, but to do it in a way that is not always illegal. So i think this will ultimately come down to a policy question of that im not really equipped to speak on. For each of you and it could relate to how we address this, and that is are there legislative authorities that are needed to address the specific aspects of countering the Cyber Threats to our country . I dont know if its a matter of legislative authority. I think those authorities are there, and i think we are making some progress. A couple of areas that have already been mentioned that i think were were not fully exploiting is colonel price is absolutely correct. Theres an extraordinary trove of documents produced by al qaeda, produced by isil, which i dont know why theyre classified. I dont see that its our responsibility to maintain our enemies, protect their secrets. These would be better served in the Public Domain because i think they would be really instructive. I would make those available. I think another thing that is an underutilized resource is we have some of these people coming back from this experience. They can be utilized more. I know our tendency is and its understandable, this is a nation of law, to say we will lock them up and put them away and forget about them. Thats fine, but that is an underutilized resource. It doesnt make any difference whether we think they are sincere or not, but certainly they, not we, represent the most effective voices against jihad, against radicalization. Among these many hundreds who we have in europe and here, we could utilize them a lot more in terms of their own propaganda against their own side. And we look forward to your input. Ambassador, i want to thank you also. You cited success stories. Ive just returned from a wedding in bogota, colombia. Due to the success of the american military, now that dynamic country of 40 Million People is free and dynamic. Thank you for your service. Thank you. We diplomats will take some credit for colombia too, congressman. Mr. Rourke . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Ambassador jeffrey, you talked about our failure to react in a timely fashion. But i also want to talk about some of those thing that we have done in the past that have precipitated some of the problems that we see today and perhaps looking forward some of the actions that we can take that could potentially prevent them that may not be military in nature. I really appreciate my colleague, mr. Jones, pointing out that 2003 the invasion of iraq set off a chain of consequences. Some of them factoring into what were talking about and then the decision to remove omar gaddafi in libya had some very negative consequences, which we are still dealing with today. There was an interesting article in addition to the one that mr. Jenkins contributed to in the atlantic published in the New York Times written by Scott Anderson how the arab world came apart. One of the things he notes is in these areas where were concerned about isis they all had something in common, which is that 100 years ago they were creations of the west. They werent inherently there was no real syria. There was no real libya. There was no real iraq. These artificial political constructions could really only be kept together by a strong man, and typically the west would put a strong man of the majority tribe or sect in power. And it has produced some of the problems that we see today, this lack of coherence, this lack of national identity, this problem that despite the fact that we spent 60 billion training and equipping the iraqi army, there was no real iraqi army and they melted in the face of a far more insignificant force in isis. So my question is to expand on the excellent question from the chairman, lets look 15 years back. Lets look 15 years forward. Could you look 100 years back and 100 years forward with me . Is there something we can do to facilitate a different political construction in these three countries . The shorthand term for this is partitioning. Something that acknowledges that sectarian interests that Trump National identity. It may be the least bad option. Convince me why it is not worth exploring and pursuing. I think the reality is, as i mentioned in my testimony, that the partitions that we currently see in syria and iraq are going to persist. I know diplomats have to be optimists and for a variety of reasons we have to remain committed at least in theory to the territorial integrity of syria and iraq. The reality on the ground is quite different. Without abandoning the notion that we are in the business of being the new people who will now draw new lines in the sand, i do think that it might alter our approach to recognize that reality and instead of thinking in terms of broad peace agreements that will encompass the entire nation or governments that will be created that will be able to command the loyalty of all citizens within those territories that we accept the reality and perhaps go for more modest local accommodations. Instead of one grand peace treaty, a series of small steps that are aimed only at limiting lowering the level of violence and allowing some commerce to take place and life to come back to something approaching normality as opposed to going for these threepoint diplomatic shots that we sometimes try for. If i could very quickly, congressman, i agree with everything mr. Jenkins said, but there are two problems with this that i think we need to consider. First of all, other than east asia, i know of no part of the world where you have countries with each its own ethnic religious group by and large and a little bit of europe. What you described in the middle east is absolutely correct, but s s Subsaharan Africa saw the same thing without turmoil. Latin america, that was one big set of spanish colonies that broke apart with separate ethnic and religious backgrounds but managed to survive as independent countries. It may be theres a special problem in the middle east that we dont see elsewhere. Supporting the international order, national sovereignty, National Unity should be our default position because its what we represent. We can make exceptions to that, as mr. Jenkins said and as i was involved in the balkans where we helped break up countries, but one requirement that worked in the balkans that hasnt worked in the middle east is if youre going to do any fiddling inside that country, everybody in that region has to be with. Because if only one is against you, syria and iran with iraq, pakistan with afghanistan, we know all too well in this room what happens. Thank you. Mr. Wittman . Thank you, mr. Chairman. I want to follow up on your written testimony where you talked about what the United States did after major operations in iraq ceased and our presence there and lack of presence there and what led to the current security situation we find ourselves in five years after that significantly reduced military presence in iraq. We see whats happening now. I expect in the months to come there will be another major offensive to perhaps retake mosul. The question then becomes, what should the u. S. Role be to ensure security in iraq after mosul is hopefully regained from isil . Yes, sir. So in my testimony, i did discuss that a little bit. Unfortunately, this problem is not unique to the United States as ambassador jeffrey pointed out earlier. Doing this type of work and finding leverage in other countries to govern the way you would like to govern is extremely difficult. One thing i will say though is that i believe if you take a look at most of the debates surrounding our campaign against the Islamic State today, i would argue that most of those debates are centered around the ways and means of attacking them, discussions about boots on the ground, troop levels, rules of engagement, air strikes, building capacity and so forth. I think the real debates need to focus around what happens after. I think the Islamic State last thing ill say is that they have created an interesting scenario because theyve created a lot of enemies in the region, and so i believe that were going to be successful in retaking territory. My concern is what happens after. And i would like to see more National Debate on that. Let me ask this. Having visited there, went to kurdistan, visited the kurds, visited with the government in baghdad and i use the Term Government loosely and seeing what theyre dealing with with sunnis and shias in that region, is the future one thats likely to hold a country that is not like what we saw iraq previously with having those three areas united as one country . Would it be a kurdistan, shia and sunni regions, governments that would be operating under centralized government of baghdad . Give me some idea of how governance would occur after you regain security. Yes, sir. Theres no really easy answer to that question. The only thing i will add again this is in my own personal opinion. The key question whether youre talking about posthostilities in iraq or syria, the key fundamental governance question is are these states able to provide an alternative and credible government that is going to be preferable to living the jihadist lifestyle. Very difficult task. Ill sede my team. Government in parentheses, youre absolutely right. But thats okay. Taiwan was a problem. Thailand is still a problem, but we somehow deal with them. The answer to iraq is it was functioning pretty well from the end of the surge 2009 to roughly 2013. Many factors led to the decline of the state including a lack of attention by us and increasing sectarian thought and actions particularly by the largely shia Arab Government against the sunni arabs. The kurds and shias worked things out in their own unique way. But i would say you could go back to that. Youll have all the problems here that you have out there, but you have a lot of problems in egypt and elsewhere in the region. It can work. Ive seen it work. The most important thing is the delta, we have to stay in there diplomatically and militarily. That means dealing with iran. Because job number one with iran is to get our 5,000 people out of there. We have to find a way to persuade everyone in iraq that thats a bad idea and to some degree persuade iran its a bad idea in the long run for iran too. Thats a much bigger problem. I touched on it in my testimony, but it is going to haunt us as long as were trying to stabilize the region. Ms. Gabbert . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Just briefly a follow up to ambassador jeffrey on that point. Do you think the very closely and intertwined relationship between the shia government in baghdad and iran can be so easily supplanted by our 5,000 groups on the ground in our engagement there . Absolutely not, congresswoman. We have to live with the fact that iran will have a great deal of influence in iraq. Not just with the largely shia government and the shia in the south, but frankly with many of the kurds in the north. Ive seen that as well. The question is, do we want to compete with iran or turn the place over to them . One of the problems with letting the place split into its three components is the other two components tend to anger the shia south in a sort of independent status. If iran really were in charge, it would have long since picked up the phone and said, why are you exploiting up to 400 Million Barrels of oil a iraq is exploiting now compared to a decade ago, thanks largely to us and International Oil companies, thats one of the Reasons Oil Prices are so low. Thats good for your american consumers, but it is not good for iran. Iran doesnt do that, because it knows the iraqis would say no. You break that country up, the shia south is going to have to gravitate into irans orbit in a way much more than today. Total oil reserves in iran and the shia south of iraq are greater than saudi arabias. Thats something worth combating. I think we can stay in there and i think we can push back, but it takes a lot of effort and, again, is going to take a lot of dealing directly with iran. Thats a Big Conversation that we can get into about the three state possibility for iraq and the consequence of as mr. Jenkins mentioned, the reality on the ground, which is that this partition has already taken place and the vacuum created by the oppression of the sunni tribes and others by the shia government has allowed groups like isis to in fact come in. Which leads me to my next question, much of the testimony today and much of the talk in the media and much of the conversation from the administration as well as from military leaders on the grounds is places like syria is their mission to defeat isis, period. When we ask questions about what about al qaeda, what about the Group Formerly known as al nasr. Why are we not targeting them or are we targeting them. The answers are insufficient. They speak to the fact we are not. As a result, groups like jfs have really integrated themselves deeply within the syrian society, right under our noses, to the point where if the administration is successful in removing assad, the likelihood is these groups, al qaeda, would take over, creating a greater threat not only to the region, but to the world. Can you speak to the issue of why things have been so completely focused on this group called isis rather than recognizing the fact thatt al qaeda still has leading terror groups all around the world and why more is not being done, therefore, to take the next step to address defeating the ideology. Im not sure that were ignoring al qaeda around the world. I mean, there are continuing efforts and efforts that have achieved the measure of success in reducing the capacity of al shabaab in somalia an al qaeda affiliate. There is an ongoing campaign, which the United States is supporting to go after al qaeda in the arabian peninsula, in yemen. And at least with the air campaign, some of that has been also directed against al qaedas affiliate in syria. But you do underscore an issue here, and that is that what used to be, you know, the performing actor known as al nusr, has in fact become a part of, embedded itself deeply in this broader coalition of rebel forces against them, and it is extremely difficult and will become more so for us to precisely target that component without weakening what is essentially still a u. S. Backed broader rebel effort against assad. All of this comes about because of the fundamental problem, and that is for the sunni population in syria, the only avatars they have, the only military defenders they have right now are the Islamic State and this coalition of rebel forces dominated by dominated by jihadists. There is not another force in the area that can protect that sunni population. So we have the dilemma that part of the people we are supporting, includes a component of the very people were against. Precisely. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Gibson. Thanks, mr. Chairman. Appreciate the panelists, weve heard from you earlier your testimony about how important the competition of ideas is. And also, in some of your testimony, you talked about declassification of information and it caused me to reflect on a very significant experience i had in the surge, ambassador jeffrey, you may remember this from iraq. In the early summer, general mccrystal had captured high value target, and in his debriefing, essentially exposed the fraudulent nature of al qaeda in iraq. At that point they were trying to say how this was homegrown and they were all kinds of iraqis involved in this, and this individual we had captured, he basically said no, it is all penetrated. It is all foreign. They have one token in the lead. I bring it up, because general mccrystal made a smart decision. He declassified all that information, first week of july. I think it was about the first week of july. And that helped us so much. I mean, as the Operations Officer for everything north of baghdad, this helped us in mosul, bakuba, tekret, the sunni awakening, moving from the west over to the province. Look, these guys are complete frauds. And you know, it really struck me that, you know, he was which is not surprising for general mccrystal, but really taking on some risk in declassifying this information and using it in a way that we were targeting with it. So, my question is, you know, looking across and elevating and thinking about this is a national endeavor, what recommendations do you have as far as laws or guidance on enhancing our agility to declassify to win this competition of ideas, and in your remarks any specific recommendations would you have for either the president and executive branch or for us, in the congress, for delegation trips, messaging, hearings, that will help on this score . Sir, the case that you just mentioned was one that we highlight in the combating Terrorism Center all the time. General mccrystal gave those documents to the ctc. The sinjar documents. They disclosed, like you mentioned, the foreign fighter threat, it was not a homegrown threat. In fact, when we were able to do that analysis on those documents, we were able to determine that when you take a look at the per capita donors from specific countries, i think everyone had assumed that saudi arabia was going to be the largest donor at that time. They were number one on the list. But another state that was number two was libya. And when you were able to parse out that data down to the actual towns where these individuals were coming from, as you mentioned, this is 2007, the two highest per capita were darna and benghazi. This is well before benghazi was a household name. What systems are available for us to do this . There is a joint Collaborative Program along with u. S. Special operations called the Harmony Program and thats the vehicle by which the general used in order to declassify those, that program is still in function today. And we look forward to getting more declassified documents. How about other thoughts in terms of how we can get more agile and more effective in this domain, this competition of ideas . Certainly there is a continuum between speed and effectiveness and protection of sources and i get all that. Are there any sort of lessons you can draw out of this that we can hone in on . Be more effective with the government . My experience, which includes trying to supervise parts of that underlying, when i was in the white house, it is very complicated, because there are always two reasons why you classify information. One is the actual damage that that information might do if it came out into the public sector. But as colonel price and you just indicated, congressman, in many cases, it is advantageous for us to have that information out there. The second reason, and thats where you get to the bureaucracy your role, the role of the executive is, sources and methods. That is, its an inok would you say piece of information. It would do good, not bad, if people abroad could read it if you could have access to it freely. But people are afraid, because by some algorithm of steps and actions and mathematical formulas, that could reveal how we gather information. Im less worried about that. I think than many people are. But this is something that you have to discuss with the intelligence committees and the intelligence community. Because they are very ferocious on this. Sometimes correctly, sometimes not. But if you want to be fast and agile, you need to look in into that specifically. I think we should. Mr. Nugent. Thank you, mr. Chairman. And you dont paint a pretty picture as to how this is going to be resolved in the future. Dynamics in the middle east are so diverse. We talked about, you know, in columbia, other states, we didnt have the two religious organizations that are the