The nixon and administration. Jeff had written a major book on nixon and the vietnam war, while i had written on kissinger and was trying to get documents on the alert declassified. More research and eventually had enough source material to write an article. Its published in cold war history in early 2003. We give the first full account of the alert and argued that the Readiness Test as it was officially known, was an exercise in the context of the stalled negotiations on the vietnam war. Warn wanted to end the quickly and was angry with the soviets and soviet leadership for not helping to arrange a settlement. By putting u. S. Nuclear forces and conventional forces on high readiness, nixon wanted to joel sovietsold jolk to end the war quickly. Those were some of the key elements of the argument we presented in the article. Later, with more sources become available, we decided there was enough material to justify a book on the october alert and the larger context of the next and white house decisionmaking process on vietnam. As we were writing, to take into account new information like the madman theory, about secret Naval Operations about Nuclear Weapons in vietnam planning, and about the alert itself. Go, weas nonus sources used published North Vietnamese documents, information from individuals in North Vietnam, and had only. We made an effort to get records from the Eastern European archives, but nothing extraordinary or revelatory turned up. Somethingy learned had been opened up, but it was too late to do any good for the project. We could use the external republish record of anatolys records of his conversations with next and on kissinger at the white house. In any event, it was a deeply collaborative process, worked closely together in the drafting and subsequent revisions and editing of every section of the manuscript. What we wrote is a book about the vietnam war policy and strategy of Richard Nixon during his first year in office, his use of madman diplomacy to try and settle the war, an effort in which a secret alert was an important, but not the only phase. In severalis story contexts. An important part of the setting is the u. S. Nuclear threat making in the course of diplomacy during the first decades of the cold war. , throughring this time the association with president eisenhower, the secretary of dulles and then Vice President and began to develop what he later called the madman theory. Learn about the role military threats of diplomacy and the possibility of threatening Nuclear Weapons use, which eisenhower had done directly and indirectly during crises and conflicts in east asia and the middle east during the 1950s. Was also during this time that kissinger develop their worldviews about diplomacy and military affairs, and had begun to face the problems raised a revolutionary internationalist people in the colonial and postcolonial world, including the longrunning conflicts in vietnam. Also relevant to context or the development of the future thinking about Nuclear Weapons, the bomb in popular culture, bureaucratic infighting, divisive politics, the Antiwar Movements, and national diplomacy, including soviet and viennese factions and policies. Isther part of the context the Nuclear Taboo, which served as a powerful and formal constraint against military use of Nuclear Weapons by the United States. Heres a short synopsis. When nixon came to power in january 1969, his top priority was ending u. S. Military involvement in the amount. At the outset, nixon believed would be possible to end the war in the u. S. s favor with military force and coercive diplomacy. Yet they an kissinger did not seek military victory. Like Lyndon Johnsons wiseman, they did not think it possible to defeat hanoi in any meaningful or costeffective sense. Coercing hanois forces to settle was virtually impossible, nixon and kissinger realized they could not guarantee the future of the saigon regime erie it they hope to get better terms for u. S. Exit, and reserve credibility i backing up diplomacy towards annoying in moscow with the madman theory of threatening excessive works for extraordinaryor force. He tried to make the soviets worry that the president was getting out of control. And they might take crazy and irrational actions. Accordingly, and an kissinger began in 1969 with threats and military signals, for example, the secret bombing of North Vietnam in cambodia. Continues, but they also launched a secret route is to convey the threat of Mining Operations against haiphong harbor. U. S. Aircraft carriers began to carry out mining operation. They thought chinese intelligence would notice these activities, and make hanoi worry about what nixon might do next. , when nixonith this asked the navy to drop the plan, the chief of Naval Operations duly supplied him with a mining plan codenamed duck hook. All this activity took place in the deepest of secrecy, seeping is seeking maximum secrecy. Only a few advisors knew the actual direction of policy. But because of the threats and signals failed to sway moscow or hanoi in the summer of 1959, nixon and kissinger concluded that mining would not be enough. They stepped up their warnings and initiated planning for a massive shock and all mining and Bombing Campaign slated for early november, the date of the threat they made to hanoi through a letter to ho chi minh. These plans for escalation were also codenamed to duck hook, although the joint chiefs of staffs had their own code word for a similar plan they were developing on their own. Together, the plans were known as the november option. The mining of North Vietnamese quartz and bombing in the hanoi area, the initial concept for duck hook included proposals for ground incursions into North Vietnam by u. S. Forces or south Vietnamese Forces alternatively, the bombing of dikes, and the use of tactical Nuclear Weapons against which is to targets. Removedly, kissinger the options like Nuclear Weapons, and then early october, nixon dropped the entire duck hook plan. He was influenced by hanois defiance, and was concerned about u. S. Public reactions, antiwar protests, and internal and administration dissent against escalation. Instead of the november option, nixon and kissinger ordered what amounted to a secret Global Nuclear alert in the hopes it would lend credibility to their prior threats. It was to be what president and called a special reminder of how far he might go. Note insiders as the Readiness Test, nixon and kissinger wanted to signal anger for moscows support of annoying and to use their leverage to induce the ally to make the vatican sessions. They did not want the signals to be so threatening to moscow that they described a crisis. ,o get moscows attention involving the rest of the world, carried out between october 13th and 30th, the activities included higher readiness levels between Strategic Air bombers, tactical error, air defenses, and a variety of naval maneuvers, including movements of Aircraft Carriers, Ballistic Missile submarines, and the shadowing of soviet merchant ships sailing towards haiphong harbor. Wheeler commented with Nuclear Armed bombers flying over northern alaska for several days. A wellkept secret for the American Public and most of the government, some elements of the Readiness Test were noticed in neighborhoods towards the pacific and western europe. The u. S. Government, secrecy created confusion because such activities as the abrupt sailing of ships at port were unusual, and reported by the media. For example, the sudden departure of the Aircraft Carrier yorktown from rotterdam harbor and 200 sailors, and that could not be missed. They got reported in the press. The soviets took note of the unusual u. S. Activities and responded only with lowlevel precautionary actions. They stepped up to medication and intelligence efforts and so forth and moved some command headquarters different places. Most of what they might have done, we dont know because the National Security agency and the Defense Intelligence agency were producing reports. They were heavily excised because they involve sensitive to medications and intelligence. Communications and intelligence. What moscow thought about the alert, especially if they understood the signals they believed they were sending. Marked a turning point for the Administration Strategy for exiting from vietnam. Kissinger became increasingly resigned to a long route approach of providing saigon with a decent chance of survival for decent interval once u. S. Forces had withdrawn after a negotiated settlement. We provide an epilogue that discusses the aftermath of the failed threats and analyzes the policies and strategies during the remaining years of the american war in vietnam. The strategy remains basic to nixon and kissingers conduct in major crises in the vietnam war endgame. Jeff will now speak about what significant. Thanks for anall amazing introduction, and thanks to christian, who i dont think is here. He couldnt make it. Since hes not here, i can say i taught him everything he knows. He was in one of my classes at my University Many years ago. Peter and others who worked here, we appreciate it. Him as billdo is said, to list some of the new information or interpretations to be found in the book, as well as we believe constitutes a significant addition to our understanding of the topics relevant to the historical story. Of knownso make note unknowns and unknown unknowns, that is, things that were known before were not fully understood, or things that were not known before, but that which we have become made known. I will be touching on a few of the points the bill made in slightly different ways. What iso emphasize somewhat new or entirely new, or important in our minds. Explained, its a copiously documented account of nixons secret Nuclear Alert in october 1969, which updates the earlier article. Much of the new documentation draws on sources that have never been cited before, and many of the pieces of evidence , most of these pieces of evidence if not all computer ohere with one another, and correspond to the events. We have produced new interpretations, but they are evidentially based. We are willing to change our mind is if others come up with new information, but we are pretty confident about this evidence. In addition to being a well sourced account of the nixon phase of the vietnam war and kissingers role in it, especially for the year 1969, we believe the book contributes new information about, and insights into several important themes and topics. Thatpe it will be evident our narrative and findings will overturn some of the conventional wisdom and historical myths about this phase of the american war in vietnam. Among the new information and of thes are the roles socalled Nuclear Taboo as bill mentioned in preventing nuclear use. Plus, the impact of politics and Public Opinion, and fostering as well as stopping wars. And such relevant socalled side topics as the 1969 ec 121 spy plane shootdown by the north koreans, the nuances of nixons and kissingers options for vietnam. Well, there was they kafkaesque working environment. We also provide new information and insights in chapter one about nuclear making in 1969, as bill mentioned, that i do want to mention that this chapter may be the first concise and copiously documented survey of known episodes of Nuclear Threat making and nearmrs. Near 1949 through 1973, since we will deal with that as well. Counte cases, our introduces new information about threatmaking, for example, the nuclear potential in the korean war. Mentioned ataboo moment ago deserves extended discussion, but suffice it to , ithere, in addition features the dropping of the nuclear bomb on not a sake and andshima nagasaki hiroshima. During the last 70 years, these have an used to prevent the use of Nuclear Weapons. Were nixon and kissinger tented to use Nuclear Weapons in vietnam, this taboo restrain them. There was the risk of use. In this book, furthermore, we nixon movedn that alert. Wards the nuclear in other words, it was more towards the continuum of threat making. One escalation led to another. In this sense, escalation threats were all of a piece of the continuum of threats, each was an effort by nixon and kissinger to intimidate moscow to achieve a satisfactory conclusion in vietnam and thereby preserve u. S. Credibility. Credibility of the United States and its rivalry with the soviet union, but also the credibility of nixon in conducting foreign affairs. These operations included the stepping up of reconnaissance flights in vietnam, the sending gulf to the talk and tonken gulf. And this includes the launching of a new mining root in the spring of 1959. 1969. These routes continue for months from the spring of 69 and into the summer. Thee mining roads lead to drafting of a navy plan in late july to actually mine vietnam. Wasur knowledge, this plan previously unknown to historians. Warped into a mining and bombing project, projected to be launched in november, should hanoi resist demands. Too, itill mentioned, came in two versions. The reason for that was the s whiten kissinger house, he set up a planning group, although it was not quite acohesive group, but it was group of people that developed the concept that nixon and kissinger wanted to apply in the perspective prospective operation. That miningonly plan. Itd not have an official name for what they were working on for november, although it is popularly known as such. Nixon kissinger and kissinger wanted what is known today as shock and all shock and awe, and they wanted targets that would cause so much problems that it would cause shock and awe and after this of time, this first phase, they would wait and see until vietnam responded. This would continue to escalate. In the end, the joint chiefs of staff, they disliked both concepts. The interservice group tried to concept, butgers had been, we suspect, instructed , to make it chiefs. Plan the military, as the military wants, usually wanted military usuallyruning knife solutions, but in the end, even the joint chiefs disliked that plan. Theill mentioned, too, first concept presented to kissinger, we dont quite know who drafted it, we think captain robinson did this, he was a ison with admiral more , i dont know if you can read this, this is the third page of a short concept plan. Below ande checkmarks the circled items. Even if you cant read it, these are the two places where in the fourth or fifth phase, it has slipped my mind, socalled tactical Nuclear Weapons would be used. That would be against logistics and targets. Three strikes against passes on the laotian North Vietnamese two strikes against the Northern Railroad linked to china. Appear ins did not subsequent plans that we have seen, although they may have remained, but they are not yet to be found, had not been found, in the documents we have examined. We also present a well documented explanation as to why nixon canceled the contemplated november option. None of this was carried out, as you know. Hisg the several causes of decision, we can confirm his decision about a forthcoming antiwar demonstration, a long contested issue in the story a torography of his the war. Other causes include the he plan withinld this the time estimated for its success within the next six months. Not havely would succeeded even assuming it could have succeeded. Their opposition to escalation was another important factor. Criticism of the plan by , like tony lake and roger morris were important, and also important, was hanois refusal to bow to washingtons threats. Also was included in this was moscows cooperation. Continuing with a list of what is new in the book, we are confident we have cited ample, solid evidence that the Nuclear Alert was connected to vietnam, not to china. Bill talked about this, and i wont say anymore unless you wanted to discuss this later. We also provide additional documentation for the decent strategy, and how it was an interval part of nixon ss strategy towards the soviet union in relation to the vietnam war, and i forgot if you mentioned the decent interval strategy in your introduction, but this is a hotlydebated issue and if it had not been nailed done before, i think we would have nail that down. Nixons decision against launching a november offensive against North Vietnam in the october Nuclear Alerts, failure to lever soviet to phonetic, marked the start of the transition in the administration s strategy. And here, i think we are pushing new pushing a interpretation here. With nixon and vietnam is that he entered office with a plan of vietnamization, but it wasnt that at the beginning. At the beginning, it was this threat, this strategy, to force the North Vietnamese to have specific concessions so that the u. S. Could exit with credibility and honor, and we havent talked about the details of what that settlement would be. It is a little bit obligated, but we could talk about this a bitbit later, perhaps complicated, but we could talk about this a little bit later, perhaps. Imitation so vietnamization, or the ization process, began. That would be the withdrawing of the troops and finally by 1972, if all goes well, they would come up with a negotiated agreement. Kissingers strategy was, yes, villa terry escalation causation military escalating. Nixonstyle version of Nuclear Threats, but nothing end of Nuclear Threat making altogether. Today, that is called all of the options are on the table. Inay, we believe the stories this book holds important lessons of the past and the future and discusses the uncertainties of Nuclear Threat making. One of these is that Nuclear Threat making does not work when the other party can make significant threats with or without Nuclear Weapons, or when the threatened party is covered by an nuclear umbrella, possessed by another nuclear power. Moreover, Nuclear Threat making is not credible when directed country, andll especially when the threatened parties are deeply committed to their cause and willing to sacrifice their own people. Nuclear threat making appears even less effective when it is grossly disproportionate to the issues at hand. ,inally, there are the risks which produce constraints, the risks of ones bluff failing and resulting in the loss of credibility and of themselves. And then, of course, there is the hurdle of the Nuclear Taboo, mentioned earlier. So that is a brief summary of some of the book and our contributions, we think. Me, i want to open this up to questions, but before we open this up to questions, i want to post this one question about the madman theory. Simultaneous use by nixon and kissinger and all of their conversations with each other about their concerns with yetcredibility and resolve, the theory, the strategy, is to present nixon as irrational, crazy, putting too many chips in the other pot, taking that he might go all the way with Nuclear Weapons, and the assumption on the other side is going to consider this rationally, the rational actor theory. And it seems to me that there is this extraordinary contradiction in this entire notion about the madman theory and that nixon the it explicitly to haldeman campaign trail, you have that great quote in the haldeman memoirs, to me, i could never wrap my head when reading both of these books that they would exist simultaneously. Can you comment on the cognitive dissonance of do you want to start . It is contradictory. In this book review, i was program, ithe cspan was watching, about another i dont know how you feel, bill, but reading all of these documents and writing this book, this book, and other books andt this period, Kissinger Nixon appear very naive, and not very realistic about what the soviets, how they would react to this. And so there is this dissonance, obviously. Think it goes to nixons personality, to some extent, and we didnt fully examine that, but it is the idea of the bully, the threat maker, believing that his or her threat is so great and so irrational and crazy and mad that the other side will give in. Of is aest i can think bad neighbor, and i have a couple of those or i have had. [laughter] you know, and you are kind of, you dont want to get into you let something slide before you get into a big argument. But, on the other hand, dealing with the soviet union, a big power, smart guys and gals on the other side, i dont know how many gals, what i know there were many guys, but yes, there there was quite a great deal of distance. Have their immersion in nuclear longegizing during that period leading up to this, we deal with this in the first chapter of what kissinger was theorizing about limited nuclear war. Yeah. I think theyd, were naive, in many ways. I think they were having the strangelovian mindset, and some people said that they were crackpot realists. I could say more, but there was overconfidence. Pull in your microphone. Yes, there was overconfidence, and nixon thought a third rate agricultural country could reach a breaking point and that they could get them to bend to their will with threats and coercion. But with mcnamara, they wanted to go with shock and awe, which is why they were going towards nuclear. Those two think Nuclear Documents disappeared from the rest of the documents . In your presentation, jeff, you showed us though, but they are circled in red and you parenthetically noted, probably by kissinger, and what i am curious about, why did you think that was kissinger . Why did they then disappear . Lacuna of ast a declassification process . Checkwas like a kissinger mark as compared to what weve seen. Talk into the microphone . It was like a kissinger check mark. It could have been a nixon, too. We just dont know whether that document made it to nixon. There is no indication it did. October 2, they went to florida, and part of kissingerss went to florida, too, and they were talking about this november option Kissinger Kissinger kissinger andent to florida, too, they were talking about this november option, and i dont know, but we may have cooped there by saying it was probably kissinger. But i was either going to say that it was kissinger or nixon. Mr. Burr probably kissinger. Lets take a quick question from the audience and lets turn back to you guys. Peter, turn on the microphone and hold on one second, milton. Microphone. I had a little question in a big question. Ws were supposed to be tnws were supposed to carriers, but have you ever found any evidence of tnws on land in vietnam . Your first chapter also deals with Nuclear Threats after in october, i think 1970, there is a very little known, i think it is actually a deaf con it change that had to do with jordan or something, and that nixon called, and then i dont remember if there were devcon changes during the business with brezhnev in 1973. Yes, there was. Ok, so there was 2, 2 more. So if this didnt work, then why did they do two more right after . Prof. Kimball with the quote that nixon was referring to, well, go ahead. Mr. Burr there is a history by the Defense Department of nuclear stockpiles, and there is of Aircraft Carriers circling, sort of circling that area prof. Kimball nixon issued a sort of public warning. Of burr but in terms Strategic Aircraft, there could be something going on, but we just have evidence yet that there was. [indiscernible] prof. Kimball because they continue to think that if you push as many chips into the pot as kissinger said and before that, it before that it was general Maxwell Taylor and before that it was alexander haig, they always talked about poker chips and so on, they talked about if you pushed too many chips into the pot, they would confuse the other side. And going back to the question, in a way, it does maybe keep you guessing. Lets take the crisis now regarding russias intervention in syria. , if the u. S. Does more in reaction, there is something that might escalate their. There. I know it is probably not going to happen, but once big powers powers start facing up with one another, it does cause one of them to rethink what their interests are. I think it was still stupid. [laughter] in your book at the end, you even describe kissinger afterwards sort of looking back at his time in government at thinking, well, we really cant do that anymore. Prof. Kimball we really cant do that anymore. In effect in 1973 with nixon incapacitated, moving to devcon. Vlad . Pleasure to be here and there is such a tremendous effort and i am looking forward to read this book. The madmans theory is so prominent and it will be prominent, probably more, as you will present your book, and it will be presented, and i want, maybe you can give us more substance about personal and psychological rationale behind it. You do mention, i checked very quickly in the book, you do mention khrushchevs example, and both nixon and kissinger were the people involved intensely with the soviets during the previous 16 years, if not more. ,ixon learned from khrushchev in a sense, and so did you find anything in this process of nixonian learning . And did the soviets always look at nixon as a reactionary, dangerous man . Did they present nixon as such . The first twoger announce the first first to announce limited nuclear war . Can we trace this to any documentation . Yes, about nixon, you could begin with his psychology, and we dont deal with this extensively in this particular book, but biographies, i did talk a little bit about this in nixons vietnam war. Number one, it suggest it might have something to do with his father. My daughter is a phd in psychology, and i dont dismiss psychology, so there may be something to that. Personality is important here. At thealso learned that knee of dwight d. Eisenhower. There is not much of a difference, which i know, both theories, the madman theory, and that was nixons term. We sort of suggest in chapter two that the word mad was in the 60s. The 50s and the certainly, most americans thought that nuclear war was madness. Popular culture, dr. Strangelove, movies like that. Its madness, talking about Nuclear Conflict and so forth. You even have khrushchev talking about those madmen in the United States and if they use in, then we will destroy them. So it is all a mad threat and you have people on both sides madness, andis all if you remember, mutually assured destruction, or m. A. D. But where precisely nixon got the term, who knows . Gaveerg, Daniel Ellsberg, a series of lectures at harvard about code version and strategy and he did one on what year . What year was the ellsberg lectures . Prof. Kimball late 60s. Kissinger heard them . Yes, and ofl course, hitler, hitler is another good example of that. I dont think it is a strange example to go back to hittite archives, clay tablet archives, if you go back to other minor kings, if you dont want to do what i want you to do, i will destroy your city. Mr. Burr at the height of the year,in october of that nixon considered the heightened alert with robert thompson, an expert in counterinsurgency. They thought if they could do this in the war, they could do this in vietnam. Clearly citing eisenhower as an example of how to end a war. Rootlieves in ending the vietnam and nuclear war with the basis of Nuclear Threats. But in your book prof. Kimball quick question, quick question, there are suggestions that this never got through. And if you look at what is going on in the field of battle, but the reality. Just one more thing, and we will go to another question, but you asked about kissinger being known for his rational nuclear strategizing, and the answer to that, and correct me, bill, if i am wrong, we go into this in some detail, but nixon was trying to get away from the fact that the eisenhower notion is that the russians attacked, and then there would be an allout response. Proposing whats some others were proposing, namely, a graduated, ive got to look at you, a graduated response. And then you stop it and then you see how the others respond, and that is what he is thinking about. And he like other Nuclear Strategists thought this was all very rational, but it is not a but it is nutty, but theres not much of a leap once he knows what nixon is talking about in the madman theory. I dont think theres much of a different between those two, even though he thought it was rational before. Introduce yourself . Steven shore. A new approach occurred to me t def ging the dea con was not written anywhere. Is there any instance in which a president can change it or have you seen any documents of this nature . Does it give the president enough wiggle room changing it without an appropriate reason . There are a lot of unknowns but i think you cant do without a secretary of defense whos cooperative and if a secretary of defense is thinking this is its right way to go going to be hard to order them to go on military alerts. There are stories that maybe they would do something crazy and there would be ways the president might get around this there are some unknowns to that for me, at least. Theres a quote from gentle earl wheeler, the secretary of the defense. In a note on november 6 its difficult to measure the success of this operation since the objectives of the test are unknown. [laughter] wow. Thats the chairman of joint chiefs. They were all scratching their heads. Why are we doing this . Maybe it had something to do with vietnam but they werent really sure. The instructions said do these things and raise forces at certain levels and do things that wouldnt be noticeable not to the vovets, but in terms of the rationale, it was all kept secret from them. Michael . Air force declassification office. Somebody who was in the business back in the 19 50s told me that if the soviets were going to invade western europe we would have advance knowledge because they had to do certain things and we would pick those up. I assume that everything that was done was part of established war plans. Were there things that logically should have been done that werent and the soviets might have seen that and said oh, well, these are amateurs trying to scare us so we can just ignore what theyre doing for now . The history said the one thing that wasnt done they didnt change missile alert levels. Missiles were alreadyed a a high state of readyness as a rule so they couldnt do too much about that short of shooting them up, i suppose. Thats a good question. There were some things that were head of the he alaska command. Lets go with the Reconnaissance Aircraft and so forth. And that was not done. There were selffights going on but not like the alaskan commander. How about submarines . Nuclear submarines . They were set out at higher rates in the pacific but some of the details are still declassified about that. Near that you mentioned concerning the soviets and dr. Strange love. It doesnt quite fit but do you remember that line, whats the point to have doomsday machine if you keep it secret . Wheeler naught that some of the impact of that alert was undermined by keeping it secret. Stead of going through defcon. The defcon system had been used it would have been too light a signal and actually made things worse and also have gone public more quickly. Thats the point to be 1973 defcon that, in fact, it backfired on kissinger and seemed so disproportionate to whatever brezhnev wanted to do, right . Kimball and i thanlt they didnt want to get the public more riled than it already was from the vietnam war. There are things from kissinger and the conversations, from the had man material about the impact of the antiwar demonstrations and the almost accidental or contingent way in which the two big demonstrations ended up sandwiching the exact moment that duck hook was aiming for, which was first of november. You end up with an october 15 and november 15, these massive mobilizations, i think the quote from the halderman diary is this thing is huge, Something Like that and you have nixon ineffectively in the conversations with kissinger baking down in october from the sort of maximum version of the plan. Can you speak i heard you judiciously put the demonstrations into the mix along with hanois defiance and internal criticism from rogers, morris, other worries about brord Public Opinion and support. Can you speak a little bit to the effect of the antiwar nonadministrations, nixons plan something story and t of the here hinchings. There are issues out there and have been debated within and without the profession and one of those is the argument by those in the Antiwar Movement, which we were part of and my i was and so forth and president of peace history seth and i knew others. And we knew Daniel Ellsberg and he feels very strongly about this they are people in the movement who do believe that the demonstrations caused nixon to cancel the november option. Even though we didnt know evening about that option and we have found there were multiple contributery causes. Its a complex event and there were complex causes. We did go back and forth with dan, actually, when he read the manuscript but i think the evidence is clear that the demonstrations were very important, but there were all these other things and its very hard those who write history or think about Current Affairs causation is a complex topic topic and its hard to pint pin down whats the most important. Aides who kissingers have already issued warnings about the prospective operation. Theres concern about what congress would do, holding the public nixon had taken polls and on and on there were these concerns. But to your point, these demonstrations had long been scheduled october 15, the moratorium so you may remember is in the middle of the scommn another more torrey november 15 to be followed by the more left wing new organization where the moratorium was more liberal a demonstration and theres a phone call in which nixon is talking to kissinger, can you move the date up of the attack on North Vietnam . If it comes after the they referred to it as october 15th, then the other side might think it was a reaction to that. See he was concerned about how the other side is thinking about demonstrations and Public Opinion and then after that comes the november demonstrations and it might get out of hand and be chaos. Rioting. Rioting, yes, rioting. They always referred to peaceful demonstration as riots before they took place. I dont ry important think we could say that it was the reason because its clear hes worried about laird and dgers and Public Opinion and he goes through the options and he suggestions at one point, one of the several problems with the escalation option is that it might fail. That is, they may not be bluffed and then youll have to carry through with it but if you carry through with it, they werent intimidated by the bluff and may not be intimidated by the actual operation because their credibility is now on the line and so youre failing all around. I think nixon had a lot of considerations about this and he chickened out. I want to use his terms because he used in a lot with regard to other people later saying that oh, we should have done this we couch won the war. Look what we did with linebacker one and two. We ended that war and we ended it favorably and it was only because of congress and not ving enough money to South Vietnam that vietnam fail and would thats nonsense. Hes the one who quit and even his claims about linebacker are questionable. So all that goes into the whole legacy of vietnam and the annual movement played an important role. Im sorry, im going on about this but what i think one of the big roles it played was that it created a countered narrative about what you could do in foreign policy. It provided an alternative to what the u. S. Had been doing. It was not only demonstrations but it gave larger public, which was influenced by the Antiwar Movement but had its own reasons for posing the war. It gave them an alternative narrative for this kind of war. And you find it in play right now concerning syria. Another question i had for you just from your quotes in the documents, you describe in effect a view that nixon and kissinger come into office with, which is that the road to peace in vietnam actually goes through moscow, that somehow and one of your lessons at the end that Nuclear Threats wont work when the other party, the hanoi party is determined and fighting essentially an existential struggle. When the chinese first reach out to nixon and kissinger about having a secret emsorry as late as april 1971, one of the first things kissinger says to nixon on the phone is oh, the chinese really have us out there. We could end the vietnam war this year. Theyre still seeing the road to peace through the sponsors, which is, in retrospect knowing what we know about the deverge si of views nevin hanoi seems particularly blindered. Can you comment on that . Am i reading the documents right . Hanoi was dependent upon beijing or moscow for military assistance and other kinds of assistance and the super powers pulled the strings in come respects. But as you noticed, there were a lot of internal differences and the soviets were freal if they put too much pressure on hanoi they might get pressured by the chinese for capitulation to the United States. The soviets, for whatever reason, werent ready to test the way that nicksen and kissinger wanted. They thought that hanoi would be vulnerable to pressure but the soviets didnt put that kind of pressure or didnt want to but there was hope in the case of china in 1971 that the soviets could make a difference in the outcome but in the end that wasnt so much the case. Although in 1972 there was some question on whether the chinese might put more pressure on hanoi to settle in the wake of nixons trip. Kimball that is one thing thats hard to nail down. With kotoc, when i asked him about this he was an aide to having a senior moment here. But anyway, he was in on the negotiations. Later foreign minister, right. But anyway, in answer to this question, he he said they gave us advice. Advice. You know, they didnt tell us. And the documentation ive seen from other historians who work in chinese documents, for example, or soviet documents is that they talked about it the chinese were saying look, why dont you just make a concession keeping the South Vietnamese president in power. Compromising his power a little bit. Let that go. Hes going to go in the long run because hanoi was holding out for that. So i think thats what it was about. Behind the scenes they were still supplying the North Vietnamese so there wasnt any real pressure. The state department told nicksen and kissinger in 1969 that well, if both china and the soviet union are afraid that if they pressure hanoi, the other side will have more influence on hanoi. Hanoi farctually gave more freedom of movement because it did deliberately play off those parties. Kimball yes. We still need to learn a lot about what they said to each other. Because like nixon the records of nicks on the kissinger, they met on a daytoday basis. They would talk about the issues almost every morning during the week. Kissinger took notes of those meetings. There werent any take place. There are no tapes. Kessjerp took handwritten notes, which arer not available. And apparently theres a kissinger diary too so theres a lot more to be learned about the dynamics of their relationship during that period. Final question. You mentioned that a lot of these intelligence summaries afterwards asking the question did the soviets notice are heavily redacted because of the communication intelligence again and the like. There are and i think you quote multiple exerts that where the larger conclusion that the soviets didnt really know that there wasnt really much reaction. Do you feel comfortable in that judgments even with the redactions . R when you combine the materials back too moscow and the memoirs and even these dedakotaed redacted reporters reports, it makes you comfortable with the conclusion that in fact, the soviets didnt really they probably noticed what was going on. One document indicates the soviets became aware of u. S. Operations at least by october 15. So they could sort of read the tea leaves and watch reactions. But the big something what did the soviets make of it . Thats more difficult to know. Kimball yeah, what we havent mentioned well have to do this next time, i think it appears that this alert had the purpose of suggesting to the soviets that were going to bomb North Vietnam and were going to be ready for any contingency. It wasnt a threat against the soviet union per se. It was just to signal at least the intent was how the soviets they probably saw it that way so even if the soviets took it very seriously. I think they couch simply thought that nixon was going to become being bombing North Vietnam. All right, thats unfortunate they would think because thats going to screw up the possibility for detente and its going to cause problems for us but its nots inly a threat against him. In eres a great footnote la bow and stein. There was a footnote. We were puzzled but these continue alerts. Georgia and in 1973. They sort of dismissed it at a certain point because they kept doing it. Undermines the capacity of even that threat making. Yeah. The other point you make about coercive by oklahoma si, especially using Nuclear Weapons is the internal critics. Both the whoo itened readiness leads to the possibility of things that are not within the control of the president. Although he thinks hes in control, right . But also these internal restravenlts and limits, the nonmoral components of the that boo. Could you speak to that briefly, jeff . Kimball well, i think bill might be able to speak more about the nuclear that boo, but understand that nene tannenbald, who wrote the book about the nuclear that boo, emphasized the moral aspect to the tattoo, right . Although, when you read the book, she does mention practicable bureaucratic, political, and other factors and we talk look this a lot, about how to handle this. My own view in reading and researching what i did with bill is that if there is a taboo and we believe there is, its more than moral. Its all these other things. There were practical considerations. If we use Nuclear Weapons, will they work . Is it suitable for a particular targets . Suppose they dont work . Then you under meanwhile the responsibility of a nuclear weapon. All sorts of things. We put them all together and it seemed to us that the history of threat making during this period demonstrated it was moral but other things as well. Urr there was a moral concern among wild numbers of people and that becomes sort of a 34ril8 force. But theyre not convinced theres a moral issue involved. They have to take into account international opinions, which are foreign by moral concerns so its a constraint shaped by the feelings of others. Totally d say, being bloodthirsty and coarse about this, he still had to take in nto account world opinion. Kimball it becomes political and moral and so on. This has been a fantastic discussion. Any other questions . Oh, we have two more. Just each yourself. If youre a madman, you dont have to worry about all those moral considerations and with the essential problem that they couldnt convince the russians that they might madmen without also convincing the American People and the congress they might be mad men and they werent already to willing to do that. They were probably people in congress to say someone else is mad. We talked about this when nixon met with debritainen. Would issue a little debrinnon. You have to read the transcripts of these conversations. Nixon, the real touch guy, actually, when he was talking, its my impression and yours too. When he was talking to de rennan, he did not come across as out of control, he came across to debrennan and debrennans ian worlds, emotional, excited so he didnt appear apparently because debrennan could be mature and seriously threatening. Its hard to read these to find out exactly whats happening but yeah, to come across as a mad man, im not sure what you have to do but nixon did not succeed personally. [laughter] that actions would be the debrennan quote is that nixon evidently felt hed gotten too worked up so the president said you should not take everything negatively. Then nixon leaves the meeting and then calls kis jerp and says wait a second. You have to go back and talk to debrennan again. This time you tell him im close to the president. Hes been through more than each one of us put together. Come on, henry, be tough. He knew he didnt do well. Really amazing. Please, yes, maam . Oh, im sorry. Do you think that all of the current political candidates for nuclear accept the taboo or would adhere to it . [laughter] are you killed something is that a rhetorical question . I dont know. We live in a new world. I dont know. Kimball i dont know what donald trump would say. Helped probably i take that ack. No, from the way some of the candidates are talking in one political party, i dont think they would first know what the Nuclear Taboo is. No, i have no idea but im concerned about it, lets put that it way, yes. Yes, sir . Thank you. Edward eagle. An area that really interests me is the, what id call the analytical process and it seems to me what youre describing is policymaking at the very top being pushed down. In that case, to what degree did kessinger genuinely invite contrary analysis . Well, thats a good question. Lean forward, yeah. For example, did kissinger have the c. I. A. Prepare studies the possible effects of the Mining Campaign against North Vietnam. The first study he got was like in may of 19. Theres a copy in 969. Theres a copy in nixons library with kissingers annotations on it. He was very skeptical with the mining and the effects on hanoi. Kissingers comments were very, very skeptical and dericive about the c. I. A. Analysis and he kept asking them to do more analysis with less of the opinion. What would be the actual impact, the Economic Impact . Thats what he wanted to know. Terms of the impact diplomatically, i think kissinger didnt really want to know what they want. Kimball kissinger seems to be the hage at this point although it was said that hague was nudging him and probably both things were true. Whats going on in kissingers mind . Is he trying to do what nixon wants. I think thats part of it. So hes playing the hawk, even though his reputation moon many is not that. To answer your question, he goes to his own aides, anthony lake and roger morris and others and they come back with caveats and qualifications. I dont know. We dont know. We have a lot of data but theres a limit to what we have, whats really going on, how seriously is kissinger taking this . Its just not clear, and then later you have nixon still talking about Nuclear Weapons. We discussed this in the ep lowing a little more, where god hes talking about darn it. He doesnt say that, he says something else, im going to use Nuclear Weapons. Right away he takes it back. Jesus ing to bomb the be out of it and so forth. There are recorded conferrings in which he does talk about the use of Nuclear Weapons. So how much theyre listening to others song its still a mystery. Even though the whole process of drafting dacook, even though we have a lot of information and i think a brilliant analysis of what was going on, we still dont know precisely what role each play was player was playing. Yes, they went to aides but how much they credited that, dont know. The last question . Well, then we will pronounce this adjourned and please join me in thanking our authors and pioneer books. [applause] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] history bookshelf features Popular American history writers and airs on American History tv every weekend at this time. Next, author Elizabeth Dowling taylor recounts the life of paul jennings, who was a servant to president james madison. After gaining his freedom, he was involved in the perl affair, the largest slave escape ever attempted, and was the author of the First White House memoir