Fareed, together with zakaria. I recommend to you, if you really want to get an understanding of the middle east, read davids novels. They are outstanding to get a real understanding of the very subtle and byzantine trends going on in the middle east. David, as i say, will go ahead and introduce the other panelists. Thank thank you to tod, you, all of you, for coming back after your coffee break. We are glad to see you. This really is a kind of conspiracy of old friends. Tod and i go back to college. Evan and i also go back to college. We began as journalists together at the hartford crimson in addition to being outstanding journalists with time and newsweek is now prominent, his most recent book is an amazing effort to get inside that extraordinary difficult personality. Evan is going to discuss an historian of the cold war, thinking about the issues that underlie our discussions today. Their reading list would begin with the book that evan and Walter Isaacs wrote. It would certainly include evans recent book about president eisenhower. I will save more discussion about this issues for our interactions. Emma sky and i have known each other since 2003. We met in the most unlikely place, which was in iraq. Emma was the representative of the u. S. Led Coalition Provisional administration. Whatever it was called. I never forget emmas clarity as we arrived i was traveling with senior moroccan official and explaining just how complicated and messy kirkuk was in terms of its ethnic divisions. People have said that emma is the modern day gertrude bell, the great middle east expert. I think it is apt. Emma has written a brilliant book about iraq called the unraveling. The subtitle, i think, it is high hopes and missed opportunities. One of the things i really distinguishes emmas work is she is both fair to what the idea was, the ambition was, and absolutely merciless in talking about the failures. So i commend that book. Just a word of introduction about our subject. This has been a day in which we have had a beautiful commemoration of how america got into world war i. It was magnificent and rousing and, at many moments, patriotic. I still have the music from the woman who sang if he can fight like he can love, good night, germany. [laughter] that was a great moment. And the beautiful museum, which is our host for the event. As, really, nicely curated a museum that i have seen in a long time. Thanks to the people who did that. For me, and i think for all of us, thinking about world war i is also haunting. Haunting in the question of how it started. A chain of accidents, sncertainties, promises, host that led to the beginning of the war in 1914. And then the subject of our panel, which is the inability to build a stable new order. A stable peace after the end of world war i, after all of that suffering. You can walk into any church, in any village in england, going to any town square, and you just see the list of names. They go on forever. And you realize how the war just europe a wound across that is still visible. The inability after all of that suffering to create a stable order, as we all know two decades later, europe was at war again. We think today we should think about this quest for a stable order. Thinking about the world the versailles treaty created. Famously described by eight a a famous historian as peace to end all peace. That the end of conflict was almost inevitable. This was a week where we have seen the nightmare of the syrian war. It takes us back to images of world war i and world war ii. A country where half the population maybe more than that now is displaced. Chemical weapons featured in world war i are again being used. We look at what is happening in isul and think how on earth the war in iraq, the war against isis, going to create some kind of stability . We think about the meeting that is taking place today, in which the new rising power, the country that seeks to order the world president xi jinping is meeting with our very inexperienced and ambitious trump. So those issues, obviously, form the context in which we will talk with a Reference Point to the end of world war i about this issue. Of how you create a stable order, a stable structure in which nations and ethnic groups can live. I will ask emma to start off. Emma and i talked before our discussion a little bit about sykespicot agreement between britain and france to carve up the ottoman world, anticipating its collapse after the end of the war. Its become a truism to say that the sykespicot world is over. That the lines in the sand, as permanent as they were, are gone now. Maybe that would the a good starting point for you to start as we look at the cluster of issues. Emma well, it is hugely complex, and it is always difficult to know where to start. We look at the problems today and think, do they date back to a century, or are they new problems that have materialized . While the first solar was going on, britain while the First World War was going on, britain made a series of contradictory promises. Britain wanted the support of the arabs to fight against the ottomans. You had this correspondence going on between them, whereby britain said the arabs rise up and fight against the ottomans and keep the ottomans, the turks down in the middle east. The brits, in return will give , them an arab kingdom afterwards. That was the first pledge. Then the brits, without the declaration, committed to a jewish homeland in the holy land. Part of this was to get jewish support, and it was also a buffer for the suez canal. Then, there was the sykespicot agreement, whereby britain and france agreed to split the influence in the region. They really agreed on the coastal areas. These are the machinations that were going on. All of this was happening before the versailles treaty. When versailles happen, britain and france were obviously there, the empires were there, colonial powers were there. But delegations from the error arab worlds were not. The arab worlds were at a disadvantage because there was no agreement about what sort of future they wanted. Some delegations wanted their own nationstates. Like the ones from egypt for instance. That wanted egypt as a nationstate. But there were others who wanted a broader arab world. Demanding that there should be a broad arab world, arab country land, as promised by the brits. So they had different objectives. And the colonial powers had their own interests. The colonial powers basically said, look, these countries are not yet ready for independence. They need tutoring, and britain and france will have mandates to tutor them through the process. Even though the language of sykespicot, the term sykespicot, is used mostly for colonial deception. It is a cliche of sorts. If you look at the border today, between the countries, that is not that line. The borders were set later on. , again, peoplers like to say these borders where thrown up by colonial powers. Two straight lines. But these borders, for the most part, were based on ottoman administrative lines. They did not come out of nowhere. Those borders have proved remarkably resilient. There has never been a movement to unite syria and iraq. There has been a movement to get lebanon and syria put back together, because they were thought more of the same. On the whole, the borders have proved resilient right up until the emergence of isis. We saw a couple of years ago isis announcing it had erased the border between iraq and syria. David we will come back to these issues, especially to the stability of the borders and the future of the nationalities. But i want to ask evan to offer some starting comments. As i said, your book, the wise men, is the Foundation Stone for people who look at how the postworld war ii era was created. Maybe you could talk about that order and the postworld war i order. Maybe could talk about what was right in one and not so right in the other. Evan it is wonderful to be here. What a fantastic museum. After world war ii, most americans just wanted to go home. Averill harriman, who was a diplomat, said most americans want to go to the movies and drink coke. But a small group realize that was really not possible. That britain, the pox britannica, was falling, and the United States could not go home again. We, in a crisis in 1947, basically inherited the british mantle. In a small group we called them the wiseman. They were businessmen. They had an international perspective. They encouraged the United States to become involved in the war. Through some striking achievements, in retrospect. One was the marshall plan. The United States basically helped rebuild europe. An extraordinary, generous, actually self interested, act. To rebuild europe with american dollars to create a strong, democratic europe and to create a system of alliances. The western alliance, to try to contain the spread of soviet communism. This formula of economic strength, of economic free trade, open borders, trading with each other, global trade, and military alliances and military dependency to check our enemies. That system, which these men and their names were pretty obsc ure then and even more obscure today david not so obscure. Evan not exactly household names. Maybe acheson was because he was secretary of state. They helped president truman and secretary of state marshall to take this role. This role has been pretty hardy. This system of alliances, this world order of free trade and the spread of democracy has worked pretty well since 1945 to keep the larger peace. Yes, there have been big mistakes. The gnome vietnam, arguably a terrible, tragic mistake. Lots of falling outs. Paris dropped out of nato in the 1960s. But the larger order persisted for the past halfcentury and more. And that order is now at risk. We have a president of the United States who has pretty openly said too expensive, i do not like free trade, we are being duped by foreigners. Our allies arent spending enough for defense. In some of his tweets and statements, he sounds like an isolationist. The order that these men in those days, it was all men created is now in question. David emma, one of the things that the 1918 peacemaking wilsonian division about the world that should come after focused on was the idea of selfdetermination for the peoples who had suffered through the war. That was arguably the great unredeemed promise of that period. I am always reminded of that time when i visit my friends in kurdistan. The kurds feel that they have been principal victims during the 20th century in promises that were made and not kept. And so they would say if they heard you say these lines that were drawn, these orders are remarkably durable, the kurds would say they have suppressed our kurdish nationality. They have lead to oppression regime after regime, it is time for that to end. I am sure you have read the articles by various members of the barzani family. Take the issue of kurdish ambitions, both in 1918, but really more right now in 2017 as kind of a test case, what do you think about that . Should the kurds have their own selfdetermined homeland . Is that too dangerous for the region . What is your answer . Emma the region, the middle east, has always been multiethnic, multicultural, multilingual. It has never been anything other than that. The kurds, at versailles, believe that they were promised a homeland, and that was never implemented. So, they feel a grievance. But almost for 100 years, the kurds have been bedeviled by not having agreements on where their border should be or who their leader should be be. There are different kurdish movements. The kurds that you were talking about are the kurds of northern iraq. The kurds of northern iraq, the greatest National Kurdish national movement, you could say, is in opposition of turkish nationalism. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement has grown in strength, particularly after the imposition of a nofly zone in 1991. After saddam invaded kuwait, the kurds rose up, the u. S. And u. K. , to develop a nofly zone to protect that area. And in that area, the kurds , they developed the institutions of state. They have their own security forces, the peshmerga. They almost pursue their own Foreign Policy. They have their own flag. They have all the symbols, if you like, of independence. But they also have their own problems. When they got that safe haven given to them, within two or three years, they were having an internal civil war, kurdish civil war. They have power struggles in their region. Those power struggles have gotten more complex. You have the barzanis versus the p. U. K. , and now we have the pkk also playing out in that area. You have a lot of internal kurdish competition. Which spills over. David right, but they would say whatever the internal problems of Iraqi Kurdistan, they want their own country. That this conglomeration that is raq that confuses sunni, shia, and kurdish places together has outlived its viability, and we should just the world should accept it is over. That we are in the postsk ykespicot world now. What is good policy . What is the right thing for people to think in terms of emma people to think in terms of policy terms . Emma its difficult, because where would be border be between the kurds and the rest of iraq . Since isis, they have expanded their territory. They have annexed kirkuk and other territories that are disputed. So you have a border issue. Iran does not want to see the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan, because then its own kurds will want its land. Turkey has enough shovels with its kurds. The kurds inside turkey have been calling for equal rights in a democratic turkey, not for independence. And then you have the kurds in south syria. So, the danger is not the danger, the challenge is if Iraqi Kurdistan gets independence, how do you negotiate where that border will be . Manage the knock on effect . So we start to see the breakdown of those states. David we will take that as basically a caution be careful about a immature declaration premature declaration that iraq is or has come undone, that the structure is in the interest of the countries in the region and also, probably, the u. S. Evan, i want to come back to your point about the stability, farsightedness of the post1945 world order, and ask you, by extension, what was missing in 1918 and after . Was the problem that america came home after that war and did not stay engaged . Was the problem that wilson was not tough enough to enforce the kinds of changes that he wanted . What was missing . Evan looking through the eyes of people in the postworld war ii world, they were looking at what went wrong in 1918, what went wrong at versailles. I think what they saw informs everything about our Foreign Policy. And it is this they look back, and wilson is being too idealistic, too dreamy. About what you could have achieved. Too kumbaya, why dont we all do the right thing and make the world safe for democracy . Too idealistic. On the other hand, european powers are too cynical. To interest driven. T looking into their own economic or security interest and not idealistic enough. American foreignpolicy, i think since 1945 at least has been an attempt at balancing idealism and realism. And i think they were informed very much by an excess of idealism in 1918 and an excess of realism, just fizzling, not combine that with america throwing up its hands, coming home bad combination. Too much dreaminess, too much cynicism. We give up, lets go home. That does not work. Instead, what they do is lets try to balance these things. Lets try to be idealistic, somewhat. Try to spread democracy and individual freedom and western values and ideas that we care about. That is good for the world. Economically useful free trade. But also its not just the american boat, but all boats will rise if we have this world order for the future. That is idealistic, but it is also practical. They try to be realistic about what works and what does not. Eson, the great creator of this he did not believe in the u. N. At all. That you could have a global government. He did not believe in collective security in that sense. It is a human nature issue. He did not think the human beings running these countries were capable of maintaining that idealism. He thought they were more cynical and hardheaded than that. Still, he was willing to be somewhat realistic. Think of Henry Kissinger and the balance of power politics and competing interests balance against each other. So they tried to have this group i am talking about and american foreignpolicy generally tried to have a balance of realism and idealism. And it worked pretty well not perfectly but pretty well for a long time. I think the other element that i would add to this is humility. Because where it seems to have come a cropper was when we were arrogant. When this talents got out of whack was when we were arrogant. We thought we knew best because either from a realist point of view, we could, like kissinger, me playing the world, make it our way. Or some kind of dreamy aspect. We will just go in there, and be americans, to because we are great, and of course they want to be like us. American hubris, either in the realism camp or the idealism camp, that it not work. When we were more humble, things went better for us. That is a lesson going forward. David i think for people in our this vision of fusion of idealism and realism embodied in the marshall plan, the truman doctrine, the idea of a strong, benign america creating a liberal International Order that was the air that we breathe. It was just kind of hardwired for our generation. But clearly not for people throughout our country, who are now very skeptical about it. In light of the question i think lot of people have in our last election, i ask you bouth both to take a more skeptical look at this. Emma, you lived through the attempt to create a modern iraq coming on the heels of a regime that, literally, i always felt, was governed by torture. That saddam husseins iraq was governed by raw, physical intimidation. It is hard for people to remember just how horrible it was. You watched as that experiment unraveled. The title of your book is the unraveling. Maybe you can give us a few snapshots that maybe check or inform this marvelous vision of what our interventionist, post1945 idea of american idealism, how that came undone as you watch in 2003 and after. Emma we did not go to iraq out of idealism. We went out of anger and fear. We went based on faulty intelligence that saddam had wmds. We need to put that in mind. Because this was not a humanitarian intervention. That is not how it started. In 2003, there was no agreement on what should be done after saddam had been got rid off. Could have handed it over to the United Nations, but the United Nations was not in support of this war. Could it hand over to the iraqis . But which ones . So the decision was in the hands of japan and germany. But policy decisions taken very early on in the occupation were devastating. Basically, the decisions to dissolve the civil service, to dismiss all of the people in the security institutions, led to the collapse of the state. And i do not think any country in the world could have survived those policies being implemented. Furthermore, the nature of the peace settlement we put in place was not inclusive, and i think that is one of the big learnings from versailles. The lack of an inclusive peace agreement, the humiliation, what that leads to. There was a peace settlement we put in place in 2003, which was in the form of a governing council that we established, really privileged those who had been in exile. And privileged the islamists. And those who had been in exile and those who had been islamists had been on irans side in the iraniraq war. And those who remained in iraq the whole time really felt excluded. And with the collapse of the state, these new people put in charge, very quickly created chaos, led to gangs and the dissent into iraqs civil war. The borders were open. Come through. Then you look at the period between 2007 and 2009, which is an extraordinary period. In 2006, iraq looked absolutely on the precipice. Every day, there were dead bodies in the street. You could tell whether they were sunni or shia just by the way they were killed. Iraqis stopped eating fish in the river, because they said it had changed flavor from living off so many corpses. In that period, i think you really see american idealism at its best, because everybody thought the country was lost, and the decision to surge extra forces in, which was a decision president bush took against the advice of his advisers, basically, had a huge psychological effect. Because the sense of we are not lost it may be hard, but its not hopeless. We can come back. And this new energy, this new belief, you saw extraordinary leadership, the right resources being applied, and a strategy. In those two years, the violence went way, way, way down. For me, that was extraordinary. Because no other country could have pulled that off. The brits had analyzed the situation they were like iraq is lost, lets put our resources into afghanistan, because there is more hope there. In america, there is a sense of we cant leave it like this. We can turn it around. It is this extraordinary period. We lost 1000 soldiers during that year. A great sacrifice. But what they achieved was extraordinary. And i think for anybody who lived through that, it shows what america can do. It shows the potential. David i should note, for those in the audience who do not know this, emma was one of the people ,ho was an architect of this advised the core commander who became the commander of all u. S. Forces, general odierno, and speaks about this with authority. Emma, quickly, the question i am left with when you say this one of the kind of, you know, pieces of conventional wisdom today, shared by everybody from donald trump to pretty much the whole political spectrum, is that iraq was a catastrophic mistake. So, i want to ask you the what if. What if better decisions had been made right from the outset about drawing in not irans best friends, but people in the country . What if, rather than pull back, begin to get out in 2010, 2011, we had built on the surge and been persistent . Is there an alternative history in which this does not look like the biggest mistake weve made in modern times, but looks like the Successful Use of American Power . Emma i think we came very close to it by the end of the surge. I thought we really had actually got there. Because we believed, iraqis believed, the country was beyond the civil war, headed the right direction and had a great election in 2010. The turnout was really high. People who boycotted elections before turned out to vote. People who had been insurgents then stood as candidates. Thathere was a new bloc came together, campaigned for iraq for iraqis. That was a sense of not a sectarian country, but a country for all of its people. It was a very, very closely contended election. And to cut a very long story short, the party that won the most votes, the most seats in the election, was not given the opportunity to try to form a government. And this led to a breakdown in the politics, a real breakdown in the politics. America was seen to have lost its influence. Iran sensed a big opportunity. Iran stepped in. Brokered the government. The prime minister, who had actually lost the election, was kept in power, swung over to the iranian side, and then took revenge on his rivals. He went after the sunni politicians, accused them of terrorism. They had to flee the country. Leaders of thehe Sunni Awakening who, with our help, had fought against al qaeda. He arrested them, force them out of the country. He arrested sunnis en masse. Out of this, you saw these protests, which then were violently crushed. And the Islamic State of iraq rose up out of the ashes of al qaeda iraq, which had been defeated, and basically said, we will protect the sunnis from the uranian backed iranianbacked regime of nouri almaliki. That explains. The sunnis looked at isis and almaliki. And they decided isis was the least of the two evils and explains how isis managed to sweep through a third of iraq. If the government of iraq had been formed in a better way, if america had actually brokered the formation of the government, iraq would have set a model for other countries in the region, and you would not have isis rising up. So the situation in syria could have been a very different than it is today. What we are seeing in the middle east, it is not really an issue of borders. It is much more an issue of contested politics, failed politics, and broken governance. The crisis of political authority, the crisis of governance. David emma argues this systematically in her book. I really encourage people to read the book. The unraveling. Because she makes a case she just made orally. Again to be aou little contrarian. I was talking about your book the wise men, and this legacy of American Leadership in Foreign Policy with a mutual friend of ours, bob merry, who has written wonderful histories, a history of james k. Polk, but was deeply skeptical about the intervention, he thought, of American Power. Conservative, but very much limited government. And i said, bob, you ought to write a book about this world that we are living in, and you ought to call it the unwise men. [laughter] david meaning let me ask you to look at the subject your jitters, which was hubris and the hubristic side of our policy. More about the cia generation of covert practitioners. What about the unwisemen . Evan at times, they were unwise. Including the actual smaller group, the original wisemen, sometimes they were unwise. And why . If ever there was an evil seed in policy and in life, it is pride. So many times, we have been the human error of pride gets us into there is a reason why it is the greatest of sins in the bible. Pride goeth before the fall. It is a reason the greeks wrote about hubris. It is a reason why their romance, the most prideful of all, cautioned their leaders about pride. We make mistake after mistake after mistake when we are too prideful. Obviously, it is not that simple. Because leaders have to be proud. How do they get to become leaders . Ego and a certain arrogance and a certain sense of grandiosity to be a leader. So, it is tricky. We thought we were done in 2006. Done for. The country was finished. But really, i would argue that george w. Bushs pride led him to do that surge. All of the wise men, james a. Baker, the Foreign Policy guys, the iraq commission, all of that, they said, we are done. Lets get out. I think, to be colloquial about this, it pissed off president bush to have his fathers senior advisers tell him that he had lost. And so he said, you know what . To hell with you. Im going to double down here, and im going to surge, and he was going against the wise men view, the council on Foreign Relations view, and it worked for a couple of years until we screwed it up later. So, to argue against myself, that is the moment when pride, human pride, was useful. So, its obviously a complicated equation. But more often than not, i would say pride gets you into trouble. You need pride. You need to have selfconfidence. The one person i thought balanced this personally, or came as close as humanly possible, was dwight eisenhower. President eisenhower was and normatively supremely ormouslyormatively en egotistical. You dont get to conquer europe without being proud. But he learned to control it and disguise it. And his cultural norms were dont boast. He was political in a good sense. He let other people take the credit. In world war ii, when dealing with stalin, churchill, de gaulle, pretty prideful people. He had a way of laying low and letting himself be underestimated, and he did this again and again. As president of the United States, he posed as a genial, goofy, golf playing, outofit president. We know now from the historical record, thats not what he was at all. Behind the scenes, he was pulling all of the strings. But he let the secretary of state play the hawk. Eisenhower had this ability he did not have to be the smartest guy in the room. He was so confident, that he could be humble, and that made him a very effective leader. David again, to give a plug and push emma on sales, the name of the book here we are close to our end point. I would love to go on for another hour or so, but one more question to both of you. Ofis drawn from an event importance today, taking place resort,tain palm beach and that is the meeting of trump and xi jinping. Ist i would ask you to do what would a wise policy for the United States toward china, a very aggressive, increasingly belligerent china, in the South China Sea and elsewhere. What wise policy would be, in light of what we have been discussing, the failure of the post1918 order, the success of the post1945 order, and all the bumps in the road we have been we have discussed. Emma, what would be your if you could slip a memo at the 11th hour to Jared Kushner, who is really running everything [laughter] david what would it say . Emma it would say that despite everything, despite the hubris, arrogance, and mistakes, the u. S. Led world order has maintained stability in the world for 70 years. Thats a long time. A really, really long time. And yet, we seem to be at a crossroads now. It seems to be the end of the postcold war era. We have to think very carefully about what this means. Because its easy to criticize the mistakes made, but a World Without americas engagement is a more dangerous world. A much more dangerous world. Because who fills the vacuum . The vacuum gets filled by other powers, powers whose interest are not the same as our own. We have seen it with the withdrawal from the middle east. That has led to other powers playing a role there. Look what russia is doing. Look what iran is doing. Look at what these nonstate actors are doing. America does not need to go to war with china. We do not need to get into the thucydides trap. But to look at how to uphold an International Order based on laws, how to help balance, how to help show allies, who are scared by the rise of china, that america is still a player in the world and is still prepared to balance other powers. David evna, whats in your memo to Jared Kushner . Evan what emma just wrote. [laughter] evan let me put a little more edge on it. There are a lot of people who think what is really happening is the beginning of a chineseled order. Not just because of donald trump but because of a kind of national exhaustion, skepticism, put in your word for that. The period of american retreat is much more powerful and profound than simply this past election. Do you think that is true . Do you think it can be averted . Do you think the future speaks chinese, no matter what we do in the period . Evan i think it must be averted. I think it is highly dangerous. Power does abhor a vaccum. And the chinese will fill it. The idea of a nuclear, militarized china, north korea, all of these ancient rivals, facing each other with Nuclear Weapons and aggressive tendencies would be horrific for the world. I mean our great trading partners, after all europe, yes, but china and japan. Thats a lot of our economy, just to be practical about it. If they go to war with each other, thats not good for the world. And that is not good for us. But emma has said it already. Trump needs to say we are not going home. Forget what i said through the election. Ignore all that. I just said that to get elected. The chinese will appreciate that. They are realistic, pragmatic. They will have a good laugh. And he should say to xi with a wink, eh, i just said that to get elected. We are here to stay. The seventh fleet is going to be right there. I do not want to get into a trade war with you. But we are going to do a few things to get your attention. We need you on north korea. We really need you on north korea. And we might give up a little bit in order to get you to do something about north korea. The nixonian, if you will, very pragmatic, but definitely not retreating, not disengaging, not going home. We are here to stay. We are just working out the modalities of how to stay. David so, the reason journalists love anniversaries, 100th anniversary, 150th Anniversary Show us an anniversary, and we are happy. Forecause it gives us a tag whatever we want to talk about. It also gives us an opportunity contemporaryt problems and what happened in the past. I think both my panelists and i are really happy to be here with tod, who worked so hard to organize this event, and with all of you. And to celebrate the 100th anniversary of our involvement in world war i. So thank you all very much. Thank you. [applause] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2017] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] you are watching American History tv. All weekend, every weekend, on cspan 3. To join the conversation, like us on facebook at cspan history. After words, connecticut representative rosa delauro talks about her book. When Social Security reached its lowest point, we had Ronald Reagan and tip oneill and congress act to make Social Security solvent into the future. Hands this wringing of about Social Security and being insolvent can be solved immediately by lifting the cap. Watch after words tonight at 9 00 eastern on book tv. Next on American History television, pulitzer prizewinning author eric foner on the challenges of establishing civil rights for freedmen in the reconstruction period and beyond. The monday the 90 minute talk was hosted by the u. S. Capital Historical Society as part of its annual symposium. With that, i would like to introduce eric foner. I first encountered eric when i was a College Student thinking about becoming an historian and had visions of writing a good book. Then i read free soil, free labor, and freemen and thought, maybe i ought to stop now. Because i will not be able to write a book that good. If this is his first book, what is it going to be like after that . From fact, iran away antebellum hry