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Transcripts For CSPAN3 Korea And China After World War II 20170408

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People who should have them because of their achievements. I will start with dr. Alan millett. There are three of them. One who served his country, a retired colonel in the marine corps reserve. Another is a prolific author, a war to be won, and semper fidelis, and a third volume in preparation as we speak. A one volume history of the war in korea coming out next year. He says at that point, that is all anyone can take on the war in korea. But a prolific and awardwinning author. And of course, the educator. 37 years at the ohio state university. And now at the university of new orleans. 1010, last time i checked, michigan state. [laughter] in that time, he has turned out an army of wonderful students. They have become serious scholars in their own rights and you can almost tell them that when you meet them by the breath dth of their education and their work ethic. Our second speaker, hans van de ven, teaches chinese history at cambridge university, and is a one of the leading authorities on history of 19thcentury china. We should stipulate, we do not bring you here unless you are one of the, or the authority on the topic. He is the author of numerous awardwinning books from a friend to comrade, the formation of the communist party. War and nationalism in china, 1925 to 1945. Breaking with the past, the maritime customs service, the global origins of modernity in china. His edited work the battle for china on the sino japanese war 1937 to 1945, is essential reading. I have a copy of it at home. I know i am not the only one. His newest book a china at war, will be forthcoming this summer. He is a publishing and scholarly machine. Lets begin by introducing dr. Millett. [applause] dr. Millett anything to take my space off the street. [laughter] thank you. I think the audience should know that dr. Citino is a brilliant toition to the history the World War Ii Museum and i must mention he is an ohio state graduate. [laughter] [applause] dr. Millett i find that encouraging. I want all of you to think back to a movie that has nothing to do with korea. Butch cassidy and the sundance kid. If you are in one of my classes i would probably have to explain what that movie is about and who paul newman and Robert Redford were. But you can be comforted by the fact that i do not think i have to do that for this audience. You will recall at the peak of the movie, sundance and butch are pursued by a gang of vigilantes or peace officers. They are in fact, pinkertons. But they do not know that. They continue to ask themselves as they rush through the american west, who are those guys . Who are those guys . Well, we are going to ask the question in the korean concept, answer the question in the korean concept, who is that man . Kim ilsung and a new korea. The chaos of the surrendered liberation of korea in 1945, the same question bedeviled americans and koreans that in october of 1945 view to three viewed three soviet generals accompanied by two koreans, pyongyang, and had a political rally explaining the goals of soviet occupation. They were there to introduce these two korean gentleman that were expected to govern pyongyang and govern all of northern korea and perhaps all of korea. One of them was well known to the crowd. In ancient i hesitate to use that word because i am getting pretty ancient myself, but an elderly man was known to everybody. The spiritual leader of the Christian Community, he had been a resistance leader for the japanese, but the other man confused the crowd. People began to murmur. [speaking foreign language] who is that guy . I hope nobody out there speaks korean. [laughter] that was close enough. Recognizedt they him. A rebellious student who grew up in a village outside pyongyang. He had been expelled at the age of 17 after eight years of schooling. He had disappeared in 1929. The russians called him kim ilsung. Who is this guy . No one knew. We need to go back to the division of korea in august of 1945. In the cairo meeting of 1943, the allies promised to restore korean sovereignty, independence, which had been lost in 1910 when korea had been annexed by japan as part of the spoils of war of the russiajapanese war. Liberation in 1945 meant Different Things to the allies. To the americans, it was an opportunity to come to korea to fulfill a promise to liberate korea, to restore its sovereignty, eventually. The picture that i thought i had shows negotiations between the americans and the russians of the 38th parallel, setting up the terms of the occupation. The russian attitude, however, was payback to restore at least some of the damage they believed they had felt in the settlement of 19041905. The russian behavior in what is now north korea, was pretty awful. Not in the sense that it killed they killed a lot of northern koreans, but they pillaged the entire northern sector, which they occupied above the 38th parallel. One would expect a certain amount of exaggeration from refugees who fled the northern occupation zone. But we have a very detailed observations made by an oss team in pyongyang on an american mission. There were reports of what russians were doing, they were exhaustive. They were taking human reparations from north korea, treating the North Koreans like they were japanese. They were not too kind to manchurians elsewhere. They needed some cooperation. And they found it. They included their chosen one, that is a bad pun. [laughter] dr. Millett who is that guy . In the meeting with the soviet generals whose names are forgettable, but for the record, i will tell you. This group who were responsible for the russian occupation, when looting was going on were looking for koreans they could find that were cooperative. One was supposed to pacify the christians. The question was, who would control the people outside the Christian Community . Pyongyang was a hotbed of christian activity. That is the picture we really wanted. Communist came and four groups, all claiming legitimacy in terms of succeeding the russians and governments of north korea. One group or soviet koreans. They had lived in the soviet union for two or three generations, spoke russian better than they did korean. They rejected bureaucrats and people who had come in with the occupation. These were many of the members of the red army. Also, the south korean labour party, which had been reformed, had been wiped out six times by the japanese. But it reformed again under unattractive, honest, an attractive, honest, revolutionary name and they had set up liaisons with the group in pyongyang, looking for a unification of korea under a Domestic Group of communists. Then there were very large numbers of koreans who had early members of the communist party in china. They had risen to important positions within the party and in the peopled liberation army. Peoples liberation army. There was a political, spiritual leader, and another that was a general in the Peoples Liberation army. One was very legendary, he led the advanced guard on the long so legendary, they forgot his march. Family name was kim. We have accounts of when he appeared, he is not in this picture. I will explain who they are. And last, there was a group that had been guerrillas in manchuria, fighting the japanese since the early 1930s. The new guy, who is that man . Was part of this faction and kim ilsung, a name borrowed from another resistance leader, there was an earlier kim ilsung not related to the eventual premiere of north korea. But he was in a kind of retirement, not entirely clear what happened to him. By the other kim taking his like it basically is saying my name is bob, or changing your name to robin hood. You have to have a great Freedom Fighter name. So is why he became kindle kim. This is a picture of the hardcore of the faction. The firstadmiring submachine gun. I will tell you who they are. On your left is one of the most effective leaders of north korea, who later became the minister of defense, a much bigger record than kim ilsung as a guerrilla leader in manchuria. Next to him is also a very abled military leader. And then kim ilsung, and a general kong. Kong by the as king americans, who renamed people in ways that seemed to denigrate their status, not really a good idea. This group, along with others, had real credentials as antijapanese fighters. In the early 1930s, and opposition to the japanese control of manchuria, the Chinese Communists particularly organized an antijapanese united army organized in the northwest, meaning manchuria, to carry on partisan operations. The Sixth Division of the second army, which was chinesedominated, included an officer named kim ilsung. Do not be misled by the title. The sixth army at its maximum size had about 200 partisans. But they did conduct one meaningful raid in northern korea in 1937. It was there that kim ilsung built the myth of his career as a great antijapanese resistance leader. In 1941, the japanese had a Guerrilla Campaign that destroyed most of the northeast antijapanese united army and kim ilsung, with six men come across the border into the soviet union. The original force had been a 15,000, which gives you some idea of japanese efficiency. Many of the survivors passed on to china proper and became part of the Chinese Communist forces in the yunnan province. Kim ilsung sold himself to the russians, a true marxist. Someone who was interested in collaboration with the soviets, somebody who is interested in establishing a communist state in korea. The soviets created an organization, those 88 special independent sniper brigades, that had about 600 members, 100 were koreans. It was a chinesekorean force. Kim ilsung became a Company Commander in the brigade. I believe he was favored because he spoke chinese. When he had been a student in the pyongyang area, he attended irregularly a school in chinese and a school in korean that was run by presbyterians. Kim ilsungs parents were, in fact, both christians. There are missionary families today in korea that can go to pyongyang because they had Never Associated themselves with the southern regime. And they play upon the kim familys christian influences in the early years. When kim ilsung returned to korea in september of 1945, he came a month after the soviet occupation. He was not a liberator. He came, basically, to pacify fellow koreans. , they came toes help the soviet police and army keep the koreans under control while the russians looted the country. By october, however, moscow had decided there was perhaps a purpose for stopping the looting of north korea and creating some kind of Political Base that would allow them to influence unification of korea on communist terms. It appears as if kim ilsung had made a couple of omissions in manchuria that he was party to this planning. But the people that were most effective, to a large degree, where people far more active and far more military. One of the really interesting accounts we have of this period was from a korean expat, now deceased. He was a russian interpreter. His family had not lived in korea for three generations. He grew up in kazakhstan. And he disliked kim ilsung from the very start and became chief of operations for the korean peoples army. His pictures of kim are not attractive. He had some of the problems of hygiene and Mental Health and other things that characterized him. Kim ilsungs favorite person was Joseph Stalin. He tried to model himself after stalin in his personal life and political life, as well. The largest challenge that kim ilsung had to face before 1950 was in fact an insurgency, started by the southern communists in south korea. Well, i am not a real believer in powerpoint, for obvious reasons. Let me draw a picture for you. The communists in south korea did everything they could to prevent the establishment of an independent south korea. First of all, by blocking the creation of south koreas r. O. C. Government, and attempting to subvert it. Kim ilsung at first, knowing he could not control this movement, did not quite ignore it because he uses south korea as a haven for southern communist rule to flee from the south. But he did not intervene for almost a year. In about the winter of 1949, particularly, units of the north korean army and Border Police began to assist the southern guerillas and staging raids in the south. What he discovered, the war fed his larger purposes. Which were, eliminating his opponents in north korea, and then building a force, a public commitment in the invasion of south korea, which came in june of 1950. The big lesson i think he learned too well, here he is conferring with his chinese ally, was that war serves the purposes of his regime. And one hardly can argue with that because by the time the armistice occurred in 1953 he had a very firm grip on north korea and then purged his potential opponents. So who is this guy . You see him in this picture next to a Chinese Expeditionary force commander. You notice kim ilsung seems to be well fed. [laughter] there is a marvelous passage in a transcript that shows a conversation between him and josef stalin in 1949. Stalin goes on and on about the fact the last time he saw him, which would have been the summer of 1946, kim ilsung was skinny. Stalin said, things must not be too bad in north korea, since you seem to have put on a great deal of weight since i saw you last. This picture shows certainly a contrast of chinese commanders in their peasant garb. And the north korean officers who look like part of the soviet army, and in fact, many of them had been. Nobody really knew who this guy was. It turned out we are still dealing with his family dynasty. And whether we know him or not, it is clear enough that he was a victor in the war that followed world war ii. Thank you very much. [applause] dr. Van de ven good afternoon, everybody. I first of all would like to thank nick for inviting me a second time here. It has been absolutely wonderful so far. I also want to thank them for organizing everything, it went very smoothly. I was listening yesterday to David Kennedy and he spoke very elegantly about the surprising rise to superstar status during world war ii. As a historian i will try to explain today, just as a Remarkable Development in world war ii was the emergence from a very defeated army in 1937, to one that held the fate of china in its hands in 1947. This is a story that would have no immediate consequence, but one we still live with today. To do so, i will focus on the campaign in manchuria, which lasted from may until october 1948. And this was the decisive engagement of the chinese civil war. Following the nationalist defeat, others were to follow. Including a campaign of 1948 until january of 1949. These were the last vestiges of chinese control. The laotian campaign was thatck to the nationalist their morale collapsed and never recovered. Today we begin by providing an overview of the campaign and i will seek to answer the question, how did communists manage to emerge with forces , train them, and build momentum to achieve a victory that changed the fate of china . And something i will argue in my cache and it might surprise a few people, the thinking of a great chinese theoretician of war had a significant role,. One point to make at the outset, made in the introduction, the distinction between chinas war against japan and the national communist civil war from 1945 to 1949, is in many ways, a postwar construction. Even the word world war ii is a postwar construction. As one of my cambridge colleagues pointed out, it was only in 1947 that the british decided they had just been fighting the Second World War. I think that is an important thing to keep in mind. When allied leaders declared world war ii over, when japan and germany fell in 1945, they articulated less a reality than that was hard to make stick on the ground in europe, as well as asia. There are these highly Organization Units in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the world. In both areas of the world, a huge amount of violence took place after 1945, in which many millions of people would die. China is an example of that. When world war ii began in china in 1937, the nationalist and communist formed a united front, ending the civil war that had preceded it. The two sides did cooperate, at times. The united front held for the duration of the war, nominally. By 1939, friction began to outweigh cooperation. Armed clashes involving tens of positions happened from 1940 to 1941. After it became clear that allies would become victorious, both sides positioned themselves as they could with the civil war was expected to follow after the fall of japan. After the japanese offensive in drove them out of much of china, 1944 allowing the communist forces to grow and influx into these areas in the wake of the japanese, and putting them in a poor position. The communists did not take power in china at this point. Not because of nationalist strength, but because the japanese decided it was now in their interest to support the nationalist. Believing that they were the best hope for preventing a communist takeover of the country, which would bring a revival of japanese trade. Japanese forces therefore helped nationalists recover control over coastal china. The irony, of course, since they had lost so much blood and treasure over the preceding eight years and trying to defeat exactly the same people. U. S. Forces also helped the nationalists. U. S. Marines were in a shanghai. And many of you will have memories of this. U. S. Marines occupied shanghai, and an important port city. The aim less to ensure a nationalist victory but to facilitate the repatriation of all Japanese Forces and then withdraw, so as to bring the boys home. Those were two important aspects of u. S. Occupation of japan. China was seen as a basket case and the u. S. Was determined to stay out of a nationalist communist war. In august, they withdrew asian officers from nationalist forces. The soviets also decided their interests were best served by reining in the Chinese Communists because they had been occupying the last days of the war and secured important concessions from the nationalists in a final soviet treaty, that also concluded before the fall of japan. It blocked in north china, the communist retreated into manchuria, which is a peninsula between japan and china proper. In the first two years of the 2. 5 years of the civil war, the nationalists appeared to have the upper hand. In spring of 1946, the nationalists went on the offensive in manchuria and drove the communists from its southern half, where one of chinas main Industrial Centers was located. One that was wanted by the japanese and where the land was agriculturally productive. One of the things the soviets did was to take back war reparations. The nationalists also made advances in north china and even succeeded in driving the communists from their Main Base Area from the communist capital. But in the summer of 1947, it begin to wane, and they were on the defensive. The important factors were the severe lack of ammunition, that curtailed their power. The economy was integrated as israel as a result of hyperinflation. The destruction of transport networks and food shortages, in part because International Trade things had been upset by the Second World War in east asia, which also affected japan. Next is the forces in manchuria withdrew into large cities. Namely, from the north to the south, we will give you a map in a minute. It was against this background that the laotian campaign took place. By 1948, nationalist forces in manchuria numbered 500,000 troops. The soviet commended 700,000 troops. The laotian campaign happened in may of 1948. That means everlasting spring. That is not a description of reality, but an expression of hope. There were temperatures well below freezing for half the year, at least. Even today, travelers are advised to warm their mobiles in the winter because it is so cold they will not work at that time of year. By this time, the communist commanderinchief in manchuria were discussing which city to attack first, for some time. Prevailed in his view. Because it was closer to north manchuria, which was under communist control, reducing logistical difficulties. And the general had doubts of the ability of his forces to take large cities. Understandably so because in 1947, he had lost 60,000 troops troops in a battle. It was a disastrous and to the first communist attempt to end a large city in china. The need for caution was born out by a disappointing beginning to the communist attempts to take the city with 100,000 nationalist troops. He failed, allowing the two divisions to drawback into the city. What happened, he decided to starve the city to death. In the photo you see, there are very few illustrations of this, but this is one photo that illustrates what is happening. One woman is utterly distraught by what has been happening. Food made it to the city, they denied the agricultural areas close to the city where vegetables were grown. The also confiscated food stamps from local farmers. There is an interesting report from the communists manchurian leadership to mao, not allowing the starving people to leave the city and pushing back those who have left, is extremely difficult to explain to both the people and probably more on their minds, the starving soldiers. The starving people, begging to be let through. Some had babies and children, and leave them and run away. Some had ropes and hanged themselves in front of our sentries. It is an utterly horrible siege in which communists used famine. Sorry, i need to retrieve that. Communists used famine as a weapon of war. This would not be concluded until the end of the laotian campaign, the war for manchuria. I will switch to that now. And theu see manchuria, city i was just talking about in the north, about 250 kilometers , and then the critical city. I will briefly talk about how this played out further on what was that it . September 7, 1948. Limbiao decided to go for it. This is one of the most impressive operations. They moved over 250,000 soldiers of south. They surrounded the city and besieged it. They put in blocks to the south and north. They collected no less than 900 cannons around the city. They had their tanks ready. They were ready to pounce. Jinzhou is important because it is in a corridor between china proper, to the south, and then there is manchuria. So if the communists took jinzhou, the consequent it be that the nationalist troops in manchuria could not withdraw into china proper. As well as nationalist reinforcement from china also cannot move in manchuria. Jinzhou is the critical piece of this nationalist position. These troops moved in, john kaishek madeiang a counter move which had it , worked, might well have changed the fate of china. He ordered his generals in north china to make a counterencirclement of the 250,000 communist troops who were now ready in position there. Americanr, his commander later, said, had these orders been followed, it would have succeeded. It would have worked. Who knows . That is, of course, afterthefact analysis. The problem was that his generals in north china were very reluctant to move. So theres this image of Chiang Kaishek flying back and forth between these places for 10 days or so, trying to convince his generals to move, and they didnt. And general lin biao i have a picture of him. It is a painting, derived from a picture. Biao thought this aishek move was so dangerous, he council to end this. And mao thought about this. But it would take the nationalists three weeks to circle us. If we move now, we will be able to win. He ordered lin biao to move, and he did. The result, first of all, was lin biao took the city of jinzhou in one day. The fear the communists had had of an exhausting battle defended by u. S. Armed nationalist, and they took it in one day. It is, of course because they , had the artillery. And the disaster got worse and worse. The they got jinzhou, general started to debate each other. Outbiao was able to lure these forces, surround them, defeat them. At that point, the city was also surrounded in collapsed quickly. And the defenders also gave out. So by october, the communists had inflicted this shock victory over the communists, and the whole situation unraveled after that. What i want to do in the remaining few minutes i have is explain a little of how come the communists were able to do this in a shock tempo, almost. One important point i should make is i put it in the context of the emergence of National Liberation war, which became so important after world war ii in east and Southeast Asia. One important point to make is that mao never thought that guerrilla war alone asymmetrical , warfare alone, could deliver victory. From clauhe learned sewitz was that defense is the stronger form of war, and that it could be used to weaken the enemy. Once the enemy had been sufficiently weakened, mao argued it was important to go on the offensive and inflict an overwhelming defeat in conventional warfare. That was always a maoist vision of war. It was building up the force in the countryside to make the transition from smallscale guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare. So to campaign, the communists had to train the commanders, acquire ammunition, and mobilize the people behind their cause. Already, during world war ii, in the early 1950s from 1938, actually, people were sent to the soviet union, including lin biao, to gain the training they needed to conduct these kinds of operations. The top communist command, including lin biao, had spent a lot of time of the French Military academy and artillery schools and so on. And the health of them transform and there were logistical people as well. That own them that transformed them and enable them to transform an illiterate soldiery into a powerful force. They also needed the weapons. To some extent, communists were the lucky beneficiaries of the geopolitical situation at the time. Believedusa and ussr they could not allow the other to afford the other control of the vast resources of northeast asia, japan, korea, manchuria, siberia. In many ways, i think the korean war and this were all come together as one story. There was a pillar of Japanese Military might. If kinds of with if connected with siberia or south of the great wall in china the threat , from this area would surpass anything of wartime japan. So it would not be allowed to happen. Now, the Marshall Mission tried to gain this territory for the americans. We can talk more about this. Marshalls aim was to repatriate try to createse, a unified government, but also secure nationalist control of manchuria. That is why the americans supported the nationalist going into manchuria. Ek also wantedsh to inflict defeat on the communists before negotiations. So the relationship broke down usehat marshall began to his control over weapons, as the u. S. Support for the nationalists, as a means of trying to make Chiang Kaishek more pliant. To american ways of seeing what needed to be done. Again, we can talk about that. But so they stopped supplying. The soviets did not want a confrontation with the americans over manchuria. Certainly not over manchuria or korea, because these were not really europe was strategically more important. But the soviets armed communists. I have the figures from chinese historians in china today, as well as from british intelligence, which i do not entirely trust. But the numbers of arms that were handed to the communists, huge amounts, hundreds of thousands of rifles. All of the artillery. All of the tanks. I am not going to go through details. Clearly, any idea that this is communist force being more clever than the nationalists, no. I think the reality is more that the communists were probably better armed, certainly after the americans stopped supplying the nationalists. But i think there was another important aspect to this. And this was the artillery used at jinzhou. And this is land reform. At had always been good mobilizing depopulation. But what he learned from clausewitz is that more all is absolutely key. To mobilize, in the shadow of what he was saying, to mobilize a people that is virtually starving, without food, that was an enormous achievement on the side of communism. They faced desperate situations. Just as desperate of the internationalist on the nationalists. They used to achieve the mobilization of morale both for the armies and the people, was land revolution. To drive off landlords to take the lands, and redistribute them to the people. Land is, of course, unimaginably important to a peasantry that is starving. Land is far more important than money. Especially at a time of hyperinflation. That is your food. That is something that helps you sustain your children. That promise, giving the peasants a stake in the revolution is one thing. Keep in mind that what the commonest target he was not just what the00 communists had to get 700,000 troops into the field but also mobilize hundreds of thousands of people to do the carrying, also keep the animals fed, especially oxen and mule. The land revolution was very, very important. And i will stop here. I could say more. But land revolution was not a right thing. I have read horrible, horrible accounts of it. It was violent. It also showed that the communists had the power to reality new communist underground. And part of that revolution was to attack their own communist officials who had been corrupt. They were showing, we really, really stand with the peasantry. And we have the power to make it stick. So i think that is one thing that mao also learned from clausewitz. I think he learned to something else, something more important something people have not quite , understood. In ade mao read clausewitz certain way. What he also sought in clausewitz was the essential importance of political unity and political strength and having the military under the control of the political top. And it was. That is what i think, in the 1940s, he conducted the famous rectification campaign. Sort of the stalinist birch purge, created the party of iron discipline, utterly able to enforce its will. It is also why mao became a politician and made sure he used the party to make sure when they china had been so divided, there was one central political control over all of these armed forces. So the most important thing he learned from clausewitz was the enormous significance of the political. And that, he had not actually seen or done before reading clausewitz. He had made victories, but never quite had that kind of control over the political reality. Me to sort ofeads my final point. Thatthis kind of warfare National Liberation war, mobilizing the population, moving from guerrilla warfare to this more conventional kind of warfare in which artillery is , important, is clearly in the case in vietnam, as well. Had annd of warfare influence over postworld war ii developments, broadly defined. As important as technological inventions like the nuclear bomb. It reshaped east asia. It reshaped Southeast Asia. And it has an influence today. I read some account of the founders of al qaeda strategy. They all know their mao. It is mao that you read. It is an influence that has continued for a very long time. I want to finish with the point that i think people have already referred to. While writing the book i am writing now, i was very interested in clausewitz. I thought i never would leave. I just had him on my desk and was kind of like boy, that is clever. That is good. We can all think of examples where clausewitz needs updating, as they say. Of course in naval warfare, economic warfare. Triangular warfare, as someone else has said. But i think one area and all of the talks we had today and yesterday illustrate that when clausewitz was writing, ending war was not that hard. But in the age of total warfare, it became absolutely critical to conducting war successfully. Wasich was saying, this done so well in japan, and much less well in many other areas of the world. So if clausewitz needs updating i am not sure he does it needs updating in the question age ofe end war in an total warfare . That is an important aspect we need to think about. It needs to be a part of military planning. That lesson needs to be learned. Thank you very much. We will end with that. [applause] mr. Citino we have time for questions. In the back of the room, in the center. Question for dr. Millett. As much as we hate, and properly hate, dictators, usually there is some element of popularity or they initially stood for something, like dr. Alexander ritchie pointed out earlier today how Joseph Stalin was quite popular in his country. When you look at kim ilsung, it does not seem, from what i have researched and what you he was not a korean nationalist. He was helping the soviets plunder his own people. He was not a true believing marxistleninist. He did not seem to stand for anything. So how did he ever gain the popularity or not popularity, but the control we see he and his son and his grandson have . Dr. Millett he got a lot of help, first from the soviets and then from the chinese. One of the burdens he carried, to some degree, was that he presented by southern koreans as a tool of external , foreign interests. Which, in many ways, he was. Although he broke loose in the mid1950s, basically by purging any north korean who had strong loyalties to china, to the soviet union, to any external authority. He was pretty ruthless in eliminating competition. One of the reasons that he allowed a lot of people to leave north korea before 1950 was it was a cheap way to get rid of dissidents. And he confiscated their property and their money and the like. So he shipped his dissidents south. Turned out to be not real bright, because expats from north korea turned out to be the real bulwark of the south korean regime. Today, about one third of the population of south korea has north korean antecedents. He was very clever. Played people and elements off against each other. Like other dictators of his ilk, he found ways to accuse his opponents of being spies for the cia, for being dupes of the south koreans. Largest rival was the vice premier and foreign minister. He had them tried for treason and was executed in 1954, 1955. There were very few breaks on him at any kind. He had not yet developed his juche mantra. It is amazing north korea had never been independent or selfsustaining. Juche, yelling juche, they were really autonomous. They said, we can play off everybody against each other to our benefits. The definition of autonomy. It is quite amazing to go through all the people who hold positions of importance in the dprk today and find out they are the sons and grandsons and other people connected to the kim family early in their rise to power. Stalin was his model. He said that continuously. Zation started, he opposed it. The russians told him, you have to go along with moderation and modify the economic system. He absolutely refused to do that. His family has been difficult in their relationship with the chinese as well. The chinese are scared to death of any kind of conflict, the whole population of north korea will go to manchuria. They cannot imagine anything worse. Prof. Van de ven business on . I think that is right. The chinese clearly are. In some sense, a divided korea is something that the chinese exactly want. That makes korea less of a problem. And i think many other powers think the same way. South korea, as well as china, are afraid of the consequences that will happen if the whole thing collapses. Nobody has found a way out of what is a horrible, horrible situation. Dr. Millett it is unbelievable. I was in manchuria little over a year ago, right on the river. Populationtimillion prosperous city. Manchuria is a very economically viable part of china. The chinese were trading foreign cigarettes to the North Koreans in the middle of the river, because they were then getting quality, from the North Koreans, but the North Koreans were desperate for cigarettes that were not made in north korea. One can imagine how wonderful they are. You can tell that the chinese can hardly stand to deal with them. Dr. Van de ven but there is more and more trade between that withand north korea and oil and things like that. It has to be done. This question is for hans. What influence did vinegar Joe Stillwell have on Chang Kaishek . Dr. Van de ven oh, dear. [laughter] that is a long story, and im not sure it is relevant for this period. I say, oh, dear, because i have written about stillwell in many negative terms. I could go on about that. It started in 1944. I think there were all kinds of problems between Chiang Kaishek and stillwell. We can understand the role of stillwell in many ways. What i emphasize and the way i write about this is as much about americas relationship with china during world war ii might take on this way that i develop the ideas in the book i just finished. A we have talked too much about stillwell, and it shouldnt overshadow everything else. The most important thing that america did for china in world war ii was to support chinas morale. And it did so in a number of ways, less through military support, which was not that significant, and often misguided in my view, but by such things as not just inviting churchill, but also madam john. To the United States. Traffic across new york. There was the Hollywood Bowl thing. They really gave people great hope. She addressed the american famous radio link. And america took the lead in abolishing unequal treaties. And invited the u. K. To join that as well. It is not true that the u. K. Was unwilling to do so, the although the timing was awkward given the quit india campaign. Said before 1937 that they were ready to do that. But increasing the prestige of china, incorporating it into the big four, those things were important. If you read, as i have, the diaries of people, china, youngsters and so forth, they are full of praise about roosevelt. When roosevelt died, classes were stopped, and Walt Whitmans poetry was read, oh captain, my captain. I do not know the whole thing, but may be some of you do. Oh captain, my captain. We are close to harbour, but you are dead. It is that kind of very emotional and very sincere. But that is the important american role. Next question on your right. Hans, reading in a book that you edited about world war ii conference in china, im interested in finding out more about that. Is it something similar to the conference here . The series of conferences . Starting in harvard . Dr. Van de ven thank you for dr. Van de ven thank you for bringing that up. I am involved with others, like a professor at harvard university, in bringing chinese as well as japanese historians together to ensure that there is dialogue. I am not quite sure they actually need us. There is quite a bit of dialogue. But we have now had six or seven seriousces of the most scholars about these issues in japan, in china. We have done some various places. We began in the comfort of hawaii, which created a comfortable situation with lots of historical issues that could be discussed more pleasantly. We have been in chun ching, taipei, which i think is a good move we will go to japan. , that is part of a general effort to keep that dialogue together. It is intellectually serious. That is a point to make. What i think the book refers to world wart we begin ii in asia with highly militarized empires. The dutch, my own country, the british, the japanese. With china as a semicolony, they still feel under the sway of these greater powers. Of course, we end with china in a very different position, and the world decolonizing rapidly. That is the kind of change and the role of chinese diplomats and their negotiations with the french, the british, the americans, and so on and the soviets. That is illustrated in that particular book. But thank you for allowing me to plug that particular book. Mr. Citino right here in the front. Iam sure it is implicit know it is implicit in much of what you said you but would you be a little more explicit about chinas reluctance to control north koreas Foreign Policy . Dr. Van de ven you are probably much more qualified to do that. Dr. Millett that is a nice pass off on a tough question. The koreans are totally unpredictable. That is part of the problem. Pyongyang. And beijing likes control and predictability. They have a very clear view of what their own interests are. In the sense of North Koreans, they have to be dealt with, because they are there. But on the other hand, they are an unpredictable element. The koreans have always, by and large, attempted to increase their power or protect themselves by playing great powers off against each other. Therefore, i think no one really much, which is understandable. I would say that applies to the r. O. K. As well. They do things, unfortunately, much alike. I think the chinese do not really feel that they want to take responsibility for what happens. The japanese feel the same way. So it is a pretty tough situation for us to come in and say, well, they are your neighbors, you take care of them. And they say, thank you, but i do not think we are going to. Dr. Van de ven two points. The divided korea illustrates that world war ii, in some ways, has not ended in east asia. There are serious historical legacies. We will get to that later in the session. Dr. Millett this is why both china and japan are not thrilled with the idea of unification. Like Charles De Gaulle said about germany, i like it so much, i would like to have two of them. [laughter] i think the chinese and the japanese attitudes are pretty much look that way at the koreans. Doubly de ven it is difficult, because so many koreans live in china. It illustrates the complexity of chinas borders. That is something i am not an ir specialists, but ir specialists do not realize how complex the borders are. With the divided korea and so many koreans living in china, how are you going to deal with this . Impossible. Mr. Citino one final question in the front. You have been partially answering the question i have. Ande is this long, long intense hostility and animosity between korea, north and south, and japan. But since the korean war in particular, there has been striking success, prosperity in south korea, not north korea. But in south korea and japan. I would think and both have been within the u. S. Security umbrella i would think that there would be far greater interest in both places, in japan and south korea, if in some sort of joint activity. That signifies [inaudible] more interested now in striking some kind of common cause and common activity in a security arrangement that is perceived to be at least as real as article five in the nato charter, in terms of some kind of mutual action that involves the United States, on behalf of both. Dr. Van de ven that is sort of a comment more than a question. Well, it is a question. Dr. Van de ven one thing to note here is that taiwan belongs in that particular circle, which is very important. That was sort of one question. I think it goes to the experience of occupation, which in taiwan was far easier than, for instance in korea. Whiches to the issue of elites profited most. South korea collaborated more closely with japan. That is part of the reason there is division. The deeper question, which is about asian solidarities. These solidarities run strong, in many ways, between japan, manchuria, korea, taiwan, china itself. But they often go through popular redemptive movements, gong, which are not trusted by politicians. These things play out rather differently than you might expect. The reality for all of them is that china is the big guy in their area. They have a careful balancing act to play. And i think one thing that struck me very much and i will go back to history, which is more comfortable, then the contemporary. But in the time of the American Occupation of japan, there was a wonderful moment. Japan was officially occupied by all allied forces, though macarthur dominated. At one point, macarthur wanted to do away with the japanese script and use some latinized form of it. Which could be done with japanese. It could be an alphabetic script rather than the chinese characters they partly use. The chinese were worried about this. Yoshida shigeru, the Prime Minister at the time, and they had a lovely lunch with nice cigars and said, you dont want to do that, because we are an area of the world combined that has chinese character and asian script in common. Yes, this is what they want, but they are not going to succeed. That suggests the commonality and the differences between these countries. You have the partial script in japan, the full script in taiwan as well as hong kong and singapore. The korean script is partly derived from chinese characters and partly not. As part resistance of that. And vietnam is the same way. It is an area full of a sense of commonalities but also strong contradictions that go deep into history. Dr. Millett if i could pick up on that theme, the chinese still regard the koreans as crypto japanese. That they have never really shaken off the japanese culture. Fact thate dna, in , has proved the koreans are closer to the japanese than the chinese. And the chinese are in a huff about that. They are, youat know, concerned that the chinese americansouth koreanformosanjapanese conspiracy, which has been at the heart of communist rhetoric since the late 1940s. They are very concerned about the fact that power is , in a sense, imbalanced toward this neoimperialist, capitalist conspiracy. To tell one and it notes, anecdote, i was in beijing about a year and half ago 10 years ago. I had a visit, and a guy was running a chinese foreignpolicy think tank. He said lets talk about relations. I could not do much damage at the time, so i said i will see what they have to say. He said, you know if the united , states would balance its policy in such a way that we felt that we were on equal status with japan, we would get along a lot better. And i said, what do you have in mind . He says, there is something you can do that would really improve relations. Just give us taiwan. [laughter] and i said, well, i did not think it was ours to do that. It seemed to me that that was asking a great deal and the taiwanese would probably have something to say about that. But there is that sense of victimization and deprivation , which gnp and growth rates are not going to make go away. So i think part of the problem is we assume that economic growth, for some reason, modifies all resentments. I think it enriches them in some ways. Now, we have better weapons. There is a lot of payback out there. And nobody forgets anything, as far as i can tell. The south korean army, for example, still sees itself, to some degree, as an extension of their japanese past. Not their association with the United States. They do something year, we will quit meeting the troops, because americans dont like that. So if they are watching, we will not do that, but the cameras go away, we will whack the troops to shape them up. Just like the japanese did. That is the right way to instill discipline. Its hard to get people to change what they think represents their true being, their way of life. That is what youre up against. Mr. Citino thank you very much, gentlemen. [applause] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2017] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] join us tomorrow at 10 00 a. M. Eastern for a ceremony marking the 100th anniversary of americas entry into world war i. The United States world war i Centennial Commission hosts the program from the National World war i museum and memorial in kansas city, missouri. The ceremony includes age matter retelling a dramatic retelling of the debate on whether to join the global conflict. Woodrow wilson side of declaration of war against germany on april 6, 1917. More than 4 million american men and women served in uniform. More than 100,000 died. That is tomorrow on american, here on cspan 3. On april 2, 1917, jeanette nette rankin of a firstwas sworn in as woman into congress. Heres a brief look at her life and career. That story of women in Congress Begins with Jeannette Rankin of montana. She is elected for years before women have the right to vote nationally. In a way, she is a bridge from womenffrage movement to attaining full political rights. Nationalctive in a womens suffrage organization. She helped a woman get the right to vote not only in montana but in a couple states west of the mississippi. She runs, in 1916. She is elected to one of montanas two atlarge districts pay part of her form is she is a pacifist. She is sworn into the house on april 2, 1917. The house has come into special session, extraordinary session, because the president that night, woodrow wilson, delivers a message to congress, asking for a declaration of war against germany. The u. S. Entry into world war i. Held, when that vote is is one of the group of about 50 members who votes against u. S. Intervention in world war i. She served a term in the house. She was on the womens suffrage committee. The public lands committee, which was an important assignment for a woman with so much of the lands being held by the federal government. Position. Important she serves only a term in the house. She tries to run for senate in montana are paid does not get the republican nomination, but runs as in the patent independent. Of the votes. 1 5 she goes back to private life. She is involved in womens rights issues. Is hiv forced she is also involved in International Peace organizations. To 1940. Ard she runs for congress again. Platform to on a keep the u. S. Out of the war in europe. And she is faced, on december 8, 1941, with a tremendous of votes. This is the day after pearl harbor. And addressed congress. 7, 1941rday, december 80 which will live in infamy. The senate goes back to their chamber and quickly and unanimously has is a war resolution. The house begins debating. House members know that Jeannette Rankin is a pacifist and will vote her conscience. So we have some oral histories of people who were in the chamber who recalled members going up to rankin and asking her to vote present, do not vote no. Conscience. S her she is the lone vote against u. S. Entry into the war. Political career. She goes back into private life. But she is a force in the antiwar movement, really for another couple of decades. But a remarkable career. In 2004, we commissioned a new portrait of jeanette Jeannette Rankin. She is so important in the expansion of rights. When we commissioned it, we wanted to show what it was like to come into congress as the first women, when women do not even have the right to vote nationally. , 1917 whens is 1916 she is elected, there is a lot of newspaper coverage of it. The cuts she is a woman and something on a novelty, there is a lot of coverage on what she is wearing. We know exactly what she was wearing. So the portrait shows her in that navy blue trash. We know she was wearing a big hat. We know exactly what the Washington Post said that morning, so the portrait has her in those clothes, holding the Washington Post. What is interesting is she is wearing that hat and placed just outside the chamber doors. If they were entered if we were to enter into that space with her, she is about to turn to her right and enter the chamber, at which point she would take off her hat. Because hats were not worn in the chamber, even though there was much discussion of as a woman, should she wear a hat, because that is formal attire. Or issue not a woman but a member of congress and therefore should not wear it . It turns out she is a member of congress more than she is her linarilly, so she takes it off. In thesense that she was house but much more a creature of her other interests as well pacifism, suffrage, all of the issues important to her. It was a somewhat lonely spot to be in, to be the only woman and also to be taking these stands of conscience that put her at odds with other people. Check out our cspan classroom website at cspan. Org classroom. Of teaching resources. The improved layout gives teachers easy access to resources, including short Current Events videos, which highlight important events in washington, d. C. Constitution clips to bring the constitution to life. Social studies lessons plans. As well as on this day in history resources. Cspan Classroom Teachers can search and filter by date, person, keywords, topic, and grade level. Our bell ringers video clips are favorites. The videos are paired with vocabulary questions. I love the bellringer is paid a lot of times, i do not use them as actual bell ringers but use them in conjunction with an activity we are doing that day as more of a wrap up. The new website is fabulous. My students use in regularly. It is so easy, in fact, that they are, right now, working on clipping videos and making questions that they can design and turn into their own bellringers. My favorite aspect is the deliberations phase. It is perfectly set up, ready to classroom deliberation, classroom discussion, on a variety of topics relevant today. If you are a middle or high school teacher, it joined thousands of your fellow teachers as a member of cspan classrooms. It is free and easy to register at cspan. Org classroom. You can request our free classroom sized american president s poster. Of theic biography president s. This weekend on american artifacts, we tour washington, d. C. s union station, built in 1907. At the time, it was one of the largest train stations in the world. Here is a preview. This room was very important. Remembering that this building was filled in 1905. In 1901, president mckinley had been assassinated. 20 years prior to that, president garfield had been assassinated just down the street in one of the railroad stations. So it was important to have a place where the president could be secluded and yet enjoy train travel, which was the primary way of getting in and out of washington, d. C. So the president ial suite was established on the side of the building. Carriage could pull up in seclusion. The president and his family or guests could then get into this weekend and rest here, have dinner, entertain guests. And privately be taken to the north side to get on their train. The ninedents of states, at various times, also used this room as ceremonial gatherings. Prince albert and Queen Elizabeth were greeted here in the 1930s by the results. The red cross, used this room to entertain soldiers and administer to their needs in world war i. U. S. O. D war ii, the took over this facility. Result, president truman decided, after world war ii, it would be a better use of this space. He did not use the president ial suite for himself but turned the facility over to the u. S. O. To as aed through the 1950s second home for the servicemen to use. Throughte was used president truman, who then turned it over to the u. S. O. Though other president s, through president kennedy, used the station to greet dignitaries and for events, theyd never no longer used the president ial suite for that purpose. Watch the entire tour of 6 00 p. M. Andat 10 00 p. M. Eastern sunday on american artifacts. Tv, is American History only on cspan 3. Sunday night on q a here was the pad where alderman writes down, in the 1968, we areber, going to put a monkeywrench in Lyndon Johnsons peace initiative. Toon denied it at the time lyndon johnson. And to david frost. And to his biographers. Always said he had never played a role in doing this. John farrell, author of Richard Nixon the life. The way the watergate burglars were assembled was clumsy. They were burnt out former intelligence or fbi agents supervised by young men on nixons staff, who just wanted catsone of the famous that brought the dead mouse to the president s door. Sunday night on q a. Next, historian william about therg talks effectiveness and legacies of 20thcentury president s. The conversation focuses on the book the american president from Teddy Roosevelt to bill clinton. The New York Historical society hosts this hourlong event. Tonights program, the , atican president part two the New Historical society. I would like to thank Bernard Schwartz for making this lecture possible, along with all of the other programs he supports. I would like to thank and recognize two of our trustees

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