Screeria nigeria. Over Irans Nuclear program from the u. S. Institute of peace. Leaders in europe have recently promised to triple funding for operations in the mediterranean sea. Conflict in libya is driving much of the migration into europe. The Brookings Institution examined the crisis and its effect on its neighbors. This is an hour and 25 minutes. My name is beth and im codirector of the brookings project on internal displacement. For the past 22 years weve been doing research on internal displacement and i think this is the first time weve organized an event focusing specifically on libyan. Migration in europe and although well be focusing on that as well. We have a good panel for you today. Were going to begin with Megan Bradley at my far left. Megan does Development Settings and Political Science in montreal. Shes done a lot of work on transitional displacement and reconciliation but from our perspective, shes almost coming home. She worked for us for a couple of years on internal displacement. We still miss you a lot megan and its really nice to see you here with us. Thank you. Megan is going to speak about the Research Based in doha. And then well talk about the embassy of tunisia, kais darragi who has worked in a variety of settings throughout the middle east, most recently, london tokyo, before coming to the u. S. In 2012 on displacement in libya, something to be considered. Well then turn to shelly pitterman, the United NationsHigh Commission of refugees and has worked for many years in different settings from headquarters to the middle east and now in washington where he focuses on the issues in the caribbean. But you and acr have been quite visible in the last week or two with what is happening in the mediterranean and i hope shelly can put this into a broader perspective. Displacement within a country has consequences far beyond the borders of those countries and i think well be seeing that as we hear the panel lives discuss today. I hope you are busily and megan, welcome. Tell us about your research. Well, thank you so much. Always nice to come home. Especially when the weather here is much better than when it is in montreal. Im particularly happy to have the chance to share with you today some of the results of a recent study on the displacement crisis within libya and across the libyan. Ibrahim shar kia is with the doha center and the other is a tunisian reservelger and journalist. Huba and ibrahim as it informed the study id like to start out by acknowledging their key couldnt contributions to the project. The report is not just focused on the flow of migrants across the mediterranean. Its focused on the displacement affecting libyans themselves although they are clearly interrelated dynamics and i look forward to speaking about that in the q a session. So just to start with the numbers and an overview of some of the displacement dynamics that we look in the report the population, as im sure many of you know, is 6. 2 million. A small country. After the fall of the gadhafi regime, some 550,000 libyans were uprooted within the borders of libya itself and in addition, an estimated 660,000 libyan sought shelter in tunisia and egypt. This is a sizeable population of a relatively small country. The majority of idps uprooted in the violence that accompanied the revolution were, for the most part, able to draw on their own resources to return to their homes promptly after the violence concluded. There was, however, a Smaller Group of about 50,000 people who ended up in a situation of socalled protracted displacement. These are individuals who even today have still not been able to return to their homes. The greatest proportion of this population is a group of about 40,000 people from the town of twerga. Perhaps some of you have followed the details of this case. But this is a situation in which the residence of this town who belonged to a ticket nick group were accused of loyalty to gadhafi. In retaliation, militias attacked the town and virtually destroyed it and arbitrarily displaced the entire population. The u. N. Has called this a war crime of itself and a war crime against humanity. So the majority of these idps who are relatively cohesive and vocal group are living in idp camps, prince plea in trip poly and benghazi. With the violence weve seen in 2014, theres been, in addition to this core group a whole new waves of people who have been forced from their homes. So the best estimates that we have is that there are some 400,000 libyans now uprooted within the country. Its important to stress though, that because the majority of International Actors pulled out of libya in the summer of 2014, there have been really no regular updated assessments of the size and characteristics of this population so 400,000 is very much a rough estimate. What we do know for sure is that many of those who are currently uprooted in that libya have been subject to multiple displacements so theyve been forced from the communities in which they sought shelter and still unable to return to their homes. And its also clear that the almost complete lack of International Assistance for idps in libya at the moment has pushed many of these people to situations of deep i am pof verbment and extreme vulnerability to the violence. In terms of those who sought shelter outside of libya, we also saw relatively prompt returnments after the conclusion of the revolution in 2011. However, we do see and i think mr. Darragi will speak to this we see a significant portion of the population remain in exile primarily in tunisia. Now, many of these individuals are assumed to have some degree of affiliation with a loyalty to the gadhafi regime. This has made them unable to return to the country because of concerns of retaliatory violence. In thinking about this population, its important to stress the vast majority of these people have never been involved in any kind of Violence Associated with the gadhafi regime. Instead, this is more a case of guilt by association, people being labeled as loyalists by virtue of family associations or having that label applied to them in the context of local power struggles. Its a very complicated case but its important to recognize that this is not a group that is uniformly in any way responsible for violence or human rights violations. So in addition to this group, which has stayed in exile for a longer period of time, there has been, again, a major surge of movement into tunisia and egypt since the summer of 2014. We dont have good numbers on this population. In the summer, the foreign minister of tunisia suggested there were 1. 5 million in tunisia. A Smaller Group has established residency but its very difficult to assess the scope of the population because libyans dont require a visa to enter tunisia. It has generously kept its border open throughout the crisis and so you have a situation of people using their own resources to travel into tunisia and they have not, for the most part registered as refugees although a sizeable group of the population would qualify for refugee status. So in effect tunisia has become a host state although they dont receive much International Support. This is something i hope we will discuss further. If we think about the crisis to the displacement taking place across the middle east in north africa at the moment, its striking how little attention the situation has received, particularly when were thinking about the displacement of libyans themselves and not just the issue of migrants and Asylum Seekers trying to escape to libyan shores. I think that this lack of attention to the libyan situation is significantly due to the fact that libya is a relatively wellresourced court and theres an assumption that libyans have their own resources to draw on in order to address their needs for housing and food et cetera. This has meant that, up until now, theres been relatively low costs of the displacement crisis for european states and for the u. S. But what i want to stress is this reliance on the displaced persons own resources is not tenable. What we saw in our research and interviews with affected populations is that yes some people are receiving, for example, regular pension payments from the government despite the ongoing payoffs which is quite remarkable but many dont. They are eating into their own resources approaching situations of increasing i am pof verment and many of the idps and exiles have protection that money alone cannot resolve. This means that the kind of neglect that the situation has received is not i think, something that can continue into the future. What we saw in our research is that many libyans in tunisia are effectively trying to live under the radar. The government has been generous in terms of keeping its borders open and enabling this informal protection that libyans have accessed to date. The government has pledged not to return libyans while the violence is ongoing and has enabled libyan children, for example, to go to school some are able to Access Medical care as well. But what we see in countries around the world is that this kind of hospitality does come at a cost when were talking about displacement situations that are expected to be protracted and thats certainly the case here. So, for example, we see rents significantly increasing in many tunisian cities, which is leading to tensions between tunisians and the libyan exiles. Many of the libyan exiles who we interviewed for this study reported that they live basically in perpetual fear of a policy change that would see them be forcibly returned to libya where they fear for their lives. This sulthggests theres a need to how the International Community can better support tunisia for the capacities as a host state and to provide secure and reliable protection to those within their borders. So, just to conclude, in terms of responding to and ultimately this situation, resolving the crisis in a sustainable manner without looking at the broader conflict resolution and peace building in libya. Increased security is obviously the essential precondition to stopping displacement and to resolving the predictament of those forced from their homes and across borders. What we found in our research is from the perspective, return is their preferred solution to displacement and this is presumably also the preference of the many states, National Organizations that are involved. What we see in other cases, though, is that as displacement becomes more protracted peoples preferences and plans can change. As the situation continues, it will be important to continue to have open dialogue with the displaced about their preferences. And to make sure that their opinions are closely taken into account. While returns are possible i want to close by highlighting three quick points that will need to be kept in mind moving forward and looking towards an event resolution of the situation. First, its absolutely imperative, it goes without saying, that returns must be voluntary and take place in conditions of safety and dignity, as is required under international law. The flip side of this is that while returns cant be forced, they also cant be banned. So its important to think about how to overcome, for example, the obstacles that have prevented the people from returning to their homes. We need to think about the relationship between transitional justice, reconciliation and ongoing displacement situation in libya. Transitional justice processes in libya have been effectively suspended with violence but i think there are many lessons to be learned from past failures of the processes eninitiated in 2011. The isolation law instituted in libya was problematic because of its punitive nature. This is an opportunity to take stock of some of the shortcomings and have a clear sense of the way to move forward in the future. And last its essential to think about how immediate support can be delivered to idps and exiles in ways that lay the ground work for durable solutions. Though even return is not an immediate possibility, there are ways that they can be assisted to help people come out from the shadows and not experience entrenched marginal lie zags, which is the risk that exiles face at the moment. To this entails, for example, ensuring libyan children take up the opportunity presented to them to go to school. Many are still not actually enrolled in school. This is just one small step that i think is an important part of making sure that this population is not locked into a situation of protracted displacement in the longer term. So, thank you very much. Thank you megan. A complex picture, protracted displacements, new displacements within the country the surrounding kournts and further abroad. We will go to kais darragi now. Thank you very much. We like to think of libya as unfortunately, its a problem for the whole region but its an internal problem for tunisia because of the interconnection and very close relationship that is cultural and economic. After the revolution in tunisia and evolution and start of the evolution in libya, we have received over 1 million libyans. Most of them are in our cityings but we have had around 90,000 libyans in refugee camps. The success of the libyan revolution was good news to tunisia because many of the libyan refugees went back home and we all hoped that it would be stability and opportunity for everybody. Unfortunately, things did not turn out to be very easy for everybody, for the tunisian process, too, it was quite long and painful but for the libyans, they are going through a much more complex and painful process. Right now we have its not easy to give figures precise figures. We have an estimation of more than 1 million libyans living in tunisia. Most of them we could call them refugees. Most of them are relying on their own means, on their savings. And more or less, they are living in very good conditions. The tunisia law allows libyans free circulation to tunisia, freedom to establish business and to be in tunisia like any other citizen. So this is a quite positive picture. In terms of repercussions to tunisia, i would start with the good news, the positive. The libyans come with capital inflection influx and help the economy, about 1 billion euro injected into the economy. But unfortunately this positive picture does not could not hide the negative impact so we have the pressure that we have on the tunisia economy in other aspects. You know over 1 million that is more than 10 of the tunisian population and population increase 10 increase of the population with nonproductive citizens that would have Inflationary Pressure on the tunisian economy and tunisians are feeling that. Obviously there are other concentrations but the blame is not to be put on this demographic but there are other consolations. It has contributed to, as megan has just said, to a strain on schools, Transportation Systems and most importantly and this is being fair to tunisia, is that they put more pressure on subsidy systems, food subsidies, energy subsidies. That is something that is being fed. Other negative aspects are related to security. The proliferation of weapons and we have concerns about smuggling weapons and its taking place in libyan. It creates some kind of precautions about the influx of libyans in tunisia. We have our homegrown security concerns and terrorists, too, and there is a connection between all terrorists regions throughout the region. So this situation is more complex because at the beginning of the libyan revolution when there was a surge of libyan refugees, the Tunisian Army did not have many assignment. Whether it was security or in terms of organizing refugee camps. But now the Tunisian Army is quite small and it has so Many Missions and it is fighting against terrorism in tunisia. It has a task of protecting borders. It does not have the capacity to play the same role as in 2007. So these are some of the aspects we have. But apart from these money and the urbanite and middle class refugees in tunisia, we have a problem with third nationals. It started in 2011 and we have around 200,000 subsaharan africans who came for refugee and stayed in tunisia. Most of them have run back home or have been adopted in other host countries in europe. Some of them, but not many, are still in tunisia. The concern is that we hope the situation in libya will improve. The national dialect will come to a positive conclusion. But tunisia and the whole region has to prepare themselves for the worst. We hope that in august 2014, when the fighting intensified in egypt to after the killing of 21 egyptian cops, there was a surge of new refugees of a border crossing. That obviously alerted the tunisian authorities and signaled that we have to be prepared for any new surge. The tunisian economy is not in the same shape as 2011. The army is not at the same readiness as in 2011. And, to be honest in tunisia, theres a sense of humanitarian fatigue. There was a huge stance of solidarity with the libyan people in 2011 and other refugees, there was a sense of willingness to contribute to help and to protect the generosity but even within tunisia itself, there were so many complainers of people moving to regions offering support, donations, now people with the Economic Situation are not in the same kind of attitude. So these are some of the challenges that we are facing and, as megan has said that we are facing alone without any International Support but i think the minimum is to try to work on emergency plans to provide not only support but support in terms of management and procedures to deal with an event that is possible with new refugees. So do i stop here and maybe we can deal with questions later on. Thank you very much. And lets turn now to shelly pitterman. Thank you very much beth. Its really a pleasure to be here. My conversation will start with three perspectives one with libya in specific and as we must, with any refugee situation, look at the neighborhood and then the region almost by definition. But in the case of libya given the security situation and our presence in libya is naturally quite constrained, which gets to some of the points megan mentioned about the level of assistance that can be offered to the displaced persons and, in fact, to some 40,000 refugees as well who are, according to our last count in libya. Mostly in the tripoli area. Weve had to withdraw our interNational Staff. Weve got about 30 to 40 National Staff in both benghazi principally in tripoli as well. Concentrated in various neighborhoods because, as you said, they are very department on family connections and they have basically been obliged to go it alone in the libyan mess. We work through some interNational Ngos, Like International medical corps the Danish Refugee Council as well as the libyan red crescent and some few National Ngos that are able to get things accomplished. So we continue to try to keep a presence to provide some minimum, you know, Material Support to work with the individuals and respond to individual protection needs but theres no illusion here that anything significant on our part is effectively changing their situation in a big way which i dare say is very often the case with displaced populations because of the nature of the conflicts that they regrettably find themselves in. Libya is a more extreme example of that. I guess in the current map of conflict and internal strife. So we watch carefully and optimistically the work of the special representative of the secretary general to find political solution. Apparently, this is a slow and complicated process. Its happening in multiple countries, dealing with multiple actors and thereagain i think patience is the key. And in that rather sad landscape, tunisia is a pearl reception of asylum of understanding and so naturally all who care are very grateful for the excellent support thats been provided by tunisia. When you think of the tunisian case, i, in my background think as well of lebanon and other countries that have been impacted by the surge of instability and insecurity in north africa as well as in the center of the middle east around the syrian refugee problem because there are relations there are relationships here. And theres been a lot of focus on how lebanon has been impacted by in particular lebanon, by the incredible number of Syrian Refugees and i guess we also have to think about tunisia in a significant way. And we can provide, as an International Community, direct support for relief to refugees but, you know, as youve said, they are a part of the community in many ways. They are being integrated through municipal services, health education, they are living in rented buildings and they are working on the savings that theyve had, the resources that they were able to bring. But as far as this is a protracted displacement, those resources will run dry. And when that happens well find ourselves in and its happened sooner in lebanon because of the dramatic quality, the war in syria. When that happens, those people will suffer more more clearly and it will have a more dramatic impact on tunisia. So we have to i think, already anticipate the problems that will come with exclusion with poverty and with the fact that they are not tunisian and, as you said tunisia already had quite an experience receiving tens of thousands of foreigners, including refugees on its territory and dealing with them in a most in a most hospitable way. So the High Commissioners been looking at this question and advocating for a more proactive approach to development. This is not a relief situation. Tunisia is a middle income country just as egypt on the other side. Therefore, not necessarily eligible for the types of grants that would normally come from Development Agencies and International Financial institutions like the world bank. It doesnt it simply doesnt qualify. But we were trying to make the case and i guess this is a very effective platform for doing so as well that its in the collective interests of the global north and of the people of tunisia and of libyans as well who are impacted by this, that we should think about creative ways to help affected countries to engage in structural and bilateral and multilateral support that we shouldnt have to wait until the crisis becomes well until the problem becomes a crisis but engage more proactively from the getgo. Tunisia is a case in point because of the economic hardships that you mentioned that are facing the country in terms of gdp and so on but there are other examples around the nigerian situation, camera roon mali lebanon and jordan are other important examples as well as turkey, to a lessor extent, where Development Institutions and Development Resources thats the key, can be leveraged to provide more support not only to help countries of asylum but to give more space and helpfully address this problem which i think is more critical of hospitality fatigue, humanitarian fatigue so there is a more concrete and shortterm benefit beyond the cooking pots and the blankets and the very puntctual support and weve been looking for creative ways to make that happen and there are some opportunities in the months to come through the g7 conversations and the next annual meeting of the world bank with whom weve been working closely on this and we hope that there will be advocates in this room and elsewhere to help find the key to a more creative and flexible approach to concession nal loans that recognize in the context like tunisia the openness that youve shown as a country and as a nation to refugees from libya and from elsewhere. The third piece that id tlik very quickly mention of course, is that the havoc in libya, the vacuum of authority, the insecurity and the instability creates a a pathway, however risky it may be for syrians and others to transit, to make their way to safer shores in the north, on the one hand, and then also for some of the 40,000 or so refugees themselves to exit. And so we have seen from libya over recent months and years an increase in the outflow of both people and also i call them both people, not to conjure of images of years ago and thats what they are. Weve seen on the tragedy in the mediterranean last week that they run a terrific risk in doing what they do. Its not a choice. Its not a poll. They are not economic migrants most of them. They are forced to flee because of the circumstances in their home countries. Its a tragedy within a tragedy, in effect, that theyve had to leave syria or artria or other countries from which they have fled to seek asylum in libya or to transit through such an environment and be at the behest of traffickers that are able to flourish in such an environment in order to try to make their way to europe and elsewhere in order to find safety. So i hope we can talk more about that but i just want to abuse it with my open time to try to draw the length between libya, the neighborhood in north africa i didnt speak about in egypt but the same principles exist in general but tunisias open border policy is clearly something that were very appreciative of and also to make the link that its the broader region and it has a global impact. Thank you very much. Thank you. And thanks to all of you. Before we open it up for discussion, i thought we might just have a little conversation amongst ourselves and maybe start with you megan. We know from experiences that the longer people are displaced the more protracted the situation the less likely they are to go home. Are there steps that might facilitate the return of libyans from tunisia and elsewhere . I think there are steps. One issue, for example, that certainly will need to be considered is an issue of restitution. This is going to be a very complex process. There always is when there have been largescale when people have lost their homes. In libya its going to be all the more complicated because the restitution claims are intertwined with the practices of the gadhafi regime over decades. The regime would use the allocation of Land Resources as a way of playing different groups off of one another and this, of course results in very complex, overlapping claims to the same properties. So in terms of thinking into the future when we can hope to see this situation sorted out, the restitution piece is going to be a big part of that. I think that theres work that can be done in terms of forward planning for strategies to address that situation. Thats just one example. I think that there are a range of ways in which there can be effective forward planning you know, it might seem idealistic at this moment because the security concerns are obviously paramount but i think it behooves us to do what we can in the situation that we are in at the moment. I want to turn to this issue of hospitality or compassion fa seeing. Fatigue. Everybody i know in the humanitarian sector is exhausted. You know, running from one crisis to another and trying to raise money and i mean, it just in this situation, tunisia gets very Little International attention and im struck by the fact that youve had this generous hospitable reaction to refugees from a neighboring country for several years now. And i mean, is there anything that the International Community could do to recognize the tremendous efforts that youve done to try to address that compassion fatigue . I mean this discussion of compassion fatigue is occurring all over the world. Really its complicated further by a sense of disillusionment, with people who thought that overnight the situation would change they would have economic opportunity, employment for everybody and very high standards of living overnight. Of course the economy was very slow and painful. Theres a sense of disillusionment at least. There is now a sense of political pride and what tunisia has achieved and, to be honest too, there is disillusionment about the International Community and sometimes our neighbors. They thought that they were generous above their means and that they made sacrifices but the hospitality was not returned. When there were possibilities in these countries, tunisians were not occurred as were not considered immediately to have some job opportunities. So there is it a sense of general fatigue that is both because of the effort that is being made and the long time that this effort is being made but also because theres a sense of disillusionment. In terms of what can be done, the International Community could help. The libyan authorities could also help because one of the issues that tunisian authorities have discussed before is that we have libyans that are here but they are benefiting from subsidies. We cannot limit subsidies to tunisians. They are welcome to our countries and we ask, in return, maybe some kind of financial aid, a subsidy, particularly in the energy sector. It did not work but now the situation is worse with infighting in libya itself. The International Community, i mean, we always hear about these complaints, italy with the number of refugees and economic migrants. But as you have just mentioned it does not compare with what lebanon is doing without complaining with tunisia is doing. They receive 5,000 or something and all the press and all the country is about that country. They are receiving millions. Over 10 of population are refugees. So in a sense, there should be more international responsibility, a sharing of costs, sharing of sacrifices. That has not taken place but i hope that things will prove that even in the interest of what you have with these countries, maybe the influx of migrants. Just to jump in on this question of compassion fatigue there was a really interesting piece of Public Opinion research that was done in march by a french and tunisian firm working in cooperation with the foundation and this Research Found interestingly that when tunisians were asked to identify their top two ways in which their government could help to respond to the libyan crisis 72 of respondents picked refugees from libya as one of the two ways to respond. On the one hand its a great testimony to how people do continue to maintain a very generous spirit despite this kind of compassion fatigue and yet the population was split almost down the line on the question of whether libyan families should be able to integrate into tunisian society. There was a lot more resistance to the notion of hospitality going further than just keeping the border open, which i think comes back to this question of hospitality fatigue and how hard it is to sustain these kinds of open policies in the long term. And if i may . Yes, please. And regrettably, if you look at the world map today, the situations only going to get worse. And so i think that, you know the conflicts are proliferating. There are more conflicts. Every month theres a new emergency. Weve just declared moving away from this particular region. Weve just declared a level one emergency in rwanda. Who would have thought after we engaged in a repatriation program. Only to suggest that the nature the nature of things these times reflects increased conflict, more violent conflict. You spoke of the beheading of the just more unpredictability more impunity and less management of existing conflicts. Theyve become more protracted. So we have protracted emergencies in ways that we didnt have before. And beth you know from your long experience in refugees that an emergency lasted six months not five years like in the middle east now. And so thats why we think that its really important to think in bigger terms because the humanitarian Financial System is broken. It cannot be it cannot sustain this kind of commitment and already we are satisfied with a you know with what we can do when were 50 funded and we have had to make some very serious choices. But when it gets to structural support and issues relating to services and host countries, we cant wait to engage the ent International Community in that reflection and its not just a question of being nice or couple passionate. There are Security Issues for states that are that are next to some of these failed states where if theres a risk, it needs to be addressed in a he have proactive way, in a very big way and that requires more than just a few projects. It requires a more systemic and sustained structural approach. This idea of support, i dont like to be selective and accept the first part and reject the second but if you asked me the same question, i would respond the same way. We think that the idea of integration is not good but its not because of rejection. I think its rational kind of behavior. Because if you say we would like to have them integrated, theres an inclination of failure. I think it is more rational in the sense that we wish them success and they are working here and we hope that they will have a positive solution in the near future. I personally would think this way if asked this question, rather than rejection of integration. But even before the revolution i mean, now we have lets say we have 1 million refugees but even before the revolution at all time we have always found 1 million libyans in tunisia, coming for two years for medical care. So they are part of society. Its always there. And better conditions for good purposes and for good reasons but in this case now its not a matter of choice. And one question more and then well open it up for discussion to you, shelly. Are european governments doing enough in responding to the exodus from libya. Many of us thought a wonderful Italian Initiative ended. Is Something Like that needed . The not to put you on the spot. Thats why im it was perceived by europe to be a pull factor and without too much controversy, its pretty clear now that in the year thats followed, the numbers have increased, the numbers of deaths have increased on the high sea and so marinorstrom was a Good Initiative from italy and should have gotten more support from europe generally. But thats that. It is what it is one could say, and now theres the tritan alternative approach which is focus more on border control, border management. Yesterday the European Council decided to triple the investment in the tritan operation which is i guess its a fair reaction to what has been happening in the month of april, especially with the last tragedy. Most of you should know by now that 900 people or more died in one single accident. 1200 people have died already on the high seas since 1276, since the beginning of this year. Its not a problem that is going to go away and now certainly with the seasonal with the season being as it is there will be more boat traffic and hopefully there will be more rescue but it can be said that germany and sweden in particular have been remarkably generous in their approach in particular for Syrian Refugees coming to sweden and to germany as Asylum Seekers directly or through programs of reset reset resettlement and visa and family reunification that would allow for more access legal, safe secure access to refugees and particularly to european states on a more generalized and equitable basis. That, unfortunately, did not come out of the European Council decision yesterday although there is more there is movement in that direction but no Firm Decision in that respect. Theres still, for very good reason, a focus on trafficking and on smuggling and theres important in and of itself because it represents risks, of course, to migrants and refugees. But it doesnt provide a safe alternative to those people who are forced to flee to find security and safety. Open it up for questions and maybe take several at a time. If you could introduce yourself and well start over here, please. Id like to bill loress. Id like to press further on that point and on the economic piece of this, i agree conflict is the main man problem here, not just regular economic deprivation. If you look at the fact that most tunisians work in the economic sector, libyans are pushed to work in the informal sector, it is informal flows of labor, large numbers of flows come from west africa and not just mali but senegal, if you look at the numbers. We have a lot of informal Economic Activity here. My question is when the u. N. Looks at livelihoods crises, how to deal with refugees, how do they deal with the informal economic sector piece and constructing economies that work. And for megan a quicker question. You alluded to the tunisia figures and the egyptians often say they have more libyans and you pointed out it is tied to the gadhafi, those tied to the regime. My question for you is what precedent is there, what models are there for external reconciliation . There are a lot of libyans that arent going to go back until they feel theres safety in going back, so how do we deal with International Dialogue with exiled population that fears to return. It is like the problem inside but what are the models. They wont come back until theres some take a couple more if you can stand up, helps to hear better. This gentleman here. Thank you. Michael boyce. Thank you for your presentations. A question regarding idp response. We see in other settings where idp populations are less accessible, like somalia syria that humanitarian organizations often use Remote Control mechanisms working from a neighboring country and using particularly local actors, civil society, local ngos to distribute the aid within the country. Of course it is never a perfect solution, especially when it comes to ensuring proper protection for idps, but i wonder if you could talk about the extent to which this is being used or considered for the libyan context. The gentleman in the very back there. Independent consultant on humanitarian issues. A comment and question. First, as someone who has often pointed to flaws, it is only fair to give them credit for the reporting you have done. In the annual reports over the last several years. Unhcr has consistently reported on the number of deaths at sea of people trying to flee of horn of africa and Northern Africa to europe and other parts of the middle east, and on an annual basis estimates are in the two or three thousand a year perish at sea. So this is not new. The only difference this last week is they were all on one ship. If the 900 people were on four different ships and died 200 a piece, it wouldnt have been in the media and we would not be hearing about it. This is not new. And they had this in the reporting several years, which leads me to my question, my primarily to shelly but the other members as well. This fleeing by boat, in libya does unhcr and implementing partners have any leverage to influence the most dangerous and abusive practices of traffickers. Similarly, have you had any success in raising Awareness Among would be Asylum Seekers and migrants before they depart libya about safer alternatives to reach their destination. Thank you. We have complex questions. Invite anybody to jump in and answer. Question on the relationship of informal migrants fits in with Asylum Seekers external reconciliation, question of unhcr and others doing remote management to work inside libya and does unhcr have any trafficking within give some of it a go. Perhaps in direct response to the question about the labor sector, it is not so much in countries of origin, so to speak, that we would engage. Certainly in countries of asylum, we are trying to get more involved and hear the buzz word, the keyword, the official word is resilience. So for example in the context of syrian refugee response for the first time and in a very collaborative way, hopefully it will be effective in terms of generating new resources. We have talked not only about responding to the refugee piece of our work in the countries of asylum but also resilience for the Host Community and putting into place certain activities through undp, through other Development Oriented organizations to respond to the impact of large numbers of refugees on the services in the host countries. And livelihoods and helping refugees and people in the Host Community to keep up income generation. What we are already seeing quickly though this gets back to the earlier point i made, these are inadequate responses because of just the availability of funds. Even if we begin to tap into the Development Pool of funding, there are inadequate responses to the kinds of issues mentioned with respect to tunisia and lebanon where you have real structural challenges in a big way that impact on National Security in the short or medium term and in these areas what were going for is important, its essential, but insufficient in terms of really keeping asylum space preserved and also keeping countries that do provide asylum secure. So thats i think the first piece. The second quickly i mention, we never denied that the movements by sea are mixed whether in the caribbean or red sea or east pacific. The mechanisms which are lacking in all four examples for identifying people in need of international protection. And dealing with that according to international and national law on the one hand and those who are migrants addressing their concerns however thats done by iom and by host countries and if it is according to law returning them safely to their point of departure or to their country of origin. Those mechanisms are just not in place anywhere frankly in a systemic coherent, predictable way, so thats why the High Commissioner took the Initiative Last december to have a dialogue, an International Dialogue on protection at sea, which was well timed to begin to have all states think about well, what are the mechanisms that need to be introduced in order to provide those protections on the one hand and protect state interests on the other. Not that theyre mutually exclusive by any means. Just quick reply on the remote management for idps, it is a very modest as i indicated, megan may have more to say about this. Like i said, we have our International Presence out of tunis. We have National Staff in tripoli, in benghazi we work with ngos, national and international, to do what we can. The program is underfunded, access is very limited, and so theres no pretense that what we are doing is anything on the order of the cross line operations or for that matter cross Border Operations as well in the syrian context where other idp emergency situations. And with respect to jeff, thank you very much for your observation. In fact, we have always together with iom spoken about that to the extent that we can count them we get this information from coast guards, so theyre not our numbers but we publish them because theyre part of the movements of people of concern or potentially of concern. I misquoted the number of deaths on the mediterranean. Since january of 1776, so thats a number that i should have more easily remembered. 1296 in april but the numbers arent as precise as we pretend. Several dozen in the caribbean this year that we get from the u. S. Coast guard, from bahamas, turks and caicos coast guard as well. My short answer to your question is i dont know but i dont think so. I dont imagine that we have relationships as such with traffickers in order to be able to give them some guidance or training on best practice. I dont think thats likely. Similarly, the whole nature of this being as secretive. It is very hard for us to give good advice to refugees or Asylum Seekers about the best way to manage this travel. Thats why and then ill stop, we focused on the need for states to introduce structures. Transparent, predictable structures that address the needs of Asylum Seekers and to give them legal alternatives