This morning the panel will resume the questioning of Lieutenant Colonel north. Indicate that on , the select committees of the house and senate received the Opening Statement of colonel north. This statement pursuant to the have been examined and determined that there are no in everton disclosures of classified material, further, that we are satisfied that the statement does not exceed the bounds set forth by the court in the grant of immunity, and although the statement obviously exceeds ten minutes, we will not insist upon a summary of it. And if the colonel wishes to present his Opening Statement at this time, he may do so in total. Lt. Col. North thank you, mr. Chairman. Chairman inouye please proceed. Lt. Col. North as you all know by now, my name is oliver north, Lieutenant Colonel, United States marine corps. My best friend is my wife betsy, to whom i have been married for 19 years, and with whom i have had four wonderful children, aged 18, 16, 11and 6. I came to the National Security council six years ago to work in the administration of a great president. As a staff member, i came to understand his goals and his desires. I admired his policies, his strength, and his ability to bring our country together. I observed the president to be a leader who cared deeply about people, and who believed that the interests of our country were advanced by recognizing that ours is a nation at risk and dangerous world, and acting accordingly. He tried, and in my opinion succeeded, in advancing the cause of world peace by strengthening our country, by acting to restore and sustain democracy throughout the world, and by having the courage to take Decisive Action when needed. I also believe that we must guard against a rather perverse side of american life, and that is the tendency to launch vicious attacks and criticism against our elected officials. President reagan has made enormous contributions, and he deserves our respect and admiration. The National Security council is, in essence, the president s staff. It helps to formulate and coordinate National Security policy. Some, perhaps on this committee, believe that the nsc was devoid of experienced leadership. I believe that is wrong. While at the nsc, i worked most closely with three people mr. Robert c mcfarlane, admiral john poindexter, and cia director, william casey. Bud mcfarlane is a man who devoted nearly thirtyyear of his life to Public Service in a number of responsible positions. At the nsc, he worked long hours, made great contributions, and i admire him for those efforts. Admiral poindexter is a distinguished naval officer who served in a number of important positions of responsibility. He, too, was a tireless worker with a similar record of Public Service, and i, too, admire him greatly. William casey was a renowned lawyer, a war veteran of heroic proportions, and a former chairman of the sec. I understood that he was also a close personal friend and adviser to president reagan. There is a nearly a century of combined Public Service by these three men. As a member of the nsc staff, i knew that i held a position of responsibility. But i knew full well what my position was. I did not engage in fantasy that i was the president or Vice President or cabinet member, or even director of the National Security council. I was simply a staff member with a demonstrated ability to get the job done. Over time, i was made responsible for managing a number of complex and sensitive covert operations that we have discussed here to date. I reported directly to mr. Mcfarlane and to admiral poindexter. I coordinated directly with others, including director casey. My authority to act always flowed, i believe, from my superiors. My military training inculcated in me a strong belief in the chain of command. And so far as i can recall, i always acted on major matter with specific approval, after informing my superiors of the facts, as i knew them, the risks, and the potential benefits. I readily admit that i was actionoriented, that i took pride in the fact that i was counted upon as a man who got the job done. And i dont mean this by way of criticism, but there were occasions when my superiors, confronted with accomplishing goals or difficult tasks, would simply say, fix it, ollie, or, take care of it. Since graduating from the Naval Academy in 1968, i have strived to be the best marine officer that one can be. In combat, my goal was always to understand the objective, follow orders, accomplish the mission, and to keep alive the men who served under me. One of the good things that has come from the last seven months of worldwide notoriety has been the renewed contact that ive had with some of the finest people in the world those with whom i served in vietnam. Among the 50,000 or so messages of support that have arrived since i left the nsc are many from those who recount the horrors we lived through, and who now relate stories of their families and careers. After vietnam, i worked with my fellow officers to train good marines to be ready in case we were called upon elsewhere in the world, but at the same time to hope that we never were. I honestly believed that any soldier who has ever been to a war truly hopes he will never see one again. My marine corps career was untracked in 1981, when i was detailed to the National Security council. I was uneasy at the beginning, but i came to believe that it was important work, and as years passed and responsibilities grew, i got further from that which i loved, the marine corps and marines. During 1984, 85, and 86, there were periods of time when we worked two days in every one. My guess is that the average workday lasted at least 14 hours. To respond to various crises, the need for such was frequent, and we would often go without a nights sleep, hoping to recoup the next night or thereafter. If i had to estimate the number of meetings and discussions and phone calls over that five years, it would surely be in the tens of thousands. My only real regret is that i virtually abandoned my family for work during these years, and that work consisted of my first few years on the staff, as the project officer for a highly classified and compartmented National Security project, which is not a part of this inquiry. I worked hard on the political military strategy for restoring and sustaining democracy in central america, and in particular, el salvador. We sought to achieve the democratic outcome in nicaragua that this Administration Still supports, which involved keeping the contras together in both body and soul. We made efforts to open a new relationship with iran, and recover our hostages. We worked on the development of a concerted policy regarding terrorists and terrorism and a capability for dealing in a concerted manner with that threat. We worked on various crises, such as twa 847, the capture of achille lauro, the rescue of American Students in grenada and the restoration of democracy on that small island, and the us raid in libya in response to their terrorist attacks. And, as some may be willing to admit, there were efforts made to work with the congress on legislative programs. There were many problems. I believed that we worked as hard awe could to solve them, and sometimes we succeeded, and sometimes we failed, but at least we tried, and i want to tell you that i, for one, will never regret having tried. I believe that this is a strange process that you are putting me and others through. Apparently, the president has chosen not to assert his prerogatives, and you have been permitted to make the rules. You called before you the officials of the executive branch. You put them under oath for what must be collectively thousands of hours of testimony. You dissect that testimony to find inconsistencies and declare some to be truthful and others to be liars. You make the rulings as to what is proper and what is not proper. You put the testimony which you think is helpful to your goals up before the people and leave others out. Its sort of like a baseball game in which you are both the player and the umpire. Its a game in which you call the balls and strikes and where you determine who is out and who is safe. And in the end you determine the score and declare yourselves the winner. From where i sit, it is not the fairest process. One thing is, i think, for certain that you will not investigate yourselves in this matter. There is not much chance that you will conclude at the end of these hearings that the boland amendments and the frequent policy changes therefore were unwise or that your restrictions should not have been imposed on the executive branch. You are not likely to conclude that the administration acted properly by trying to sustain the Freedom Fighters in nicaragua when they were abandoned, and you are not likely to conclude by commending the president of the United States who tried valiantly to recover our citizens and achieve an opening that is strategically vital iran. I would not be frank with you if i did not admit that the last several months have been difficult for me and my family. It hasbeen difficult to be on the front pages of every newspaper in the land day after day, to be the lead story on National Television day after day, to be photographed thousands of times by bands of photographers who chase us around since november just because my name arose at the hearings. It is difficult to be caught in the middle of a constitutional struggle between the executive and legislative branches over who will formulate and direct the Foreign Policy of this nation. It is difficult to be vilified by people in and out of this body, some who have proclaimed that i am guilty of criminal conduct even before they heard me. Others have said that i would not tell the truth when i came here to testify, and one member asked a person testifying before this body whether he would believe me under oath. I asked when i got here if you dont believe me, why call me at all. It has been difficult to see questions raised about my character and morality, my honesty, because only partial evidence was provided. And, as i indicated yesterday, i think it was insensitive of this committee to place before the cameras my home address at a time when my family and i are under 24hour armed guard by over a dozen government agents of the Naval Investigative Service because of fear that terrorists will seek revenge for my official acts and carry out their announced intentions to kill me. It is also difficult to comprehend that my work at the nsc all of which was approved and carried out in the best interests of our country has led to two massive parallel investigations staffed by over 200 people. It is mindboggling to me that one of those investigations is criminal and that some here have attempted to criminalize policy differences between coequal branches of government and the executives conduct of foreign affairs. I believe it is inevitable that the congress will in the end blame the executive branch, but i suggest to you that it is the congress which must accept at least some of the blame in the nicaraguan Freedom Fighters matter. Plain and simple, the congress is to blame because of the fickle, vacillating, unpredictable, onagain offagain policy toward the Nicaraguan Democratic resistance thesecalled contras. I do not believe that the support of the nicaraguan Freedom Fighters can be treated as the passage of a budget. I suppose that if the budget doesnt get passed on time again this year, it will be inevitably another extension of another month or two. But, the contras, the nicaraguan Freedom Fighters are people living, breathing, young men and women who have had to suffer a desperate struggle for liberty with sporadic and confusing support from the United States of america. Armies need food and consistent help. They need a flow of money, of arms, clothing and medical supplies. The congress of the United States allowed the executive to encourage them, to do battle, and then abandoned them. The congress of the United States left soldiers in the field unsupported and vulnerable to their communist enemies. When the executive branch did Everything Possible within the law to prevent them from being wiped out by moscows surrogates in havana and managua, you then had this investigation to blame the problem on the executive branch. It does not make sense to me. In my opinion, these hearings have caused serious damage to our national interests. Our adversaries laugh at us, and our friends recoil in horror. I suppose it would be one thing if the intelligence committees wanted to hear all of this in private and thereafter pass laws which in the view of Congress Make for better policies or better functioning government. But, to hold them publicly for the whole world to see strikes me as very harmful. Not only does it embarrass our friends and allies with whom we have worked, many of whom have helped us in various programs, but it must also make them very wary of helping us again. I believe that these hearings, perhaps unintentionally so, have revealed matters of great secrecy in the operation of our government. And sources and methods of intelligence activities have clearly been revealed to the detriment of our security. As a result of rumor and speculation and innuendo, i have been accused of almost every crime imaginable. Wild rumors have abounded. Some media reports have suggested that i was guilty of espionage for the way i handled us intelligence. Some have said that i was guilty of treason, and suggested in front of my 11 year old daughter, that i should be given the death penalty. Some said i stole 10 million dollars. Some said i was second only in power to the president of the United States, and others that i condoned drugtrafficking to generate funds for the contras, or that i personally ordered assassinations, or that i was conducting my own Foreign Policy. It has even been suggested that i was the personal confidant of the president of the United States. These and many other stories are patently untrue. I dont mind telling you that im angry that what some have attempted to do to me and my family. I believe that these Committee Hearing will show that you have struck some blows. But, i am going to walk from here with my head high and my shoulders straight because i am proud of what we accomplished. I am proud of the efforts that we made, and i am proud of the fight that we fought. I am proud of serving the administration of a great president. I am not ashamed of anything in my professional or personal conduct. As we go through this process i ask that you continue to please keep an open mind. Please be open minded, and able to admit that, perhaps, your preliminary conclusions about me were wrong. And please, also, do not mistake my attitude for lack of respect. I am in awe of this Great Institution just as i am in awe of the presidency. Both are equal branches of government with separate areas of responsibility under the constitution that i have taken an oath to support and defend, and i have done so, as many of you have. And although i do not agree with what you are doing, or the way that it is being done, i do understand your interest in obtaining the facts and i have taken an oath to tell the truth and helping you to do so. In closing, mr. Chairman, and i thank you for this opportunity, i would just simply like to thank the tens of thousands of americans who have communicated their support, encouragement and prayers for me and my family in this difficult time. Thank you, sir. Chairman inouye thank you very much, colonel north. I wish the record to show that the panel did not amend, delete or strike out any word, or words or phrases from this Opening Statement. Furthermore, we did not put on testimony words which we thought were helpful to our goals and leave the rest out. I am certain you will agree with me, colonel, that every word you wanted to present to the people of the United States was presented. Isnt that correct, sir . Lt. Col. North yes, mr. Chairman it was, and i was not referring to my testimony but that which preceded me, sir about me. Chairman inouye and secondly, you have suggested that these hearings have disclosed matters of great secrecy in the operation of our government and sources and methods of intelligence activities have clearly been revealed to the detriment of our National Security. May i, once again, advise you that according to the director of the National Security agency, general odom, not a single bit of classified material has been leaked by activities of this joint panel. Did you read the steno books in the last six months . Lt. Col. North i did review them in counsel. In those steno books any references to conversations you had with admiral poindexter about the diversion . Lt. Col. North i do not recall. Bookswere 20 some odd that i delivered up here, counsel. Your counsel referred to the fact that you provided some 20 books to us. The fact of the matter is those did not include the six or six divers and or diversion memos you had written in the course of 1986. Lt. Col. North memos were contained in documents that were created in my office on a typewriter. There were no typewritten pages in the books i gave you. And those memos were destroyed by you, or at least you try to destroy them all . Now when you were meeting with admiral poindexter on the 21st, you believed in good faith that you had gotten rid of a memorandum that you referred to. Is that so . Lt. Col. North that is correct. And just to amplify on that, it is very unlikely very likely that the two that were not approved could have well been destroyed at that time. What im saying is the very most that may have been left in the waning days of my tenure may well have been just of three. That is why when the question was asked yesterday or the day before about how many memos i destroyed in those closing days i couldnt tell you because i honestly dont remember. There were five memos, and what you are saying now is two may have in destroyed at the occurrede transactions and the other three would have been destroyed later. The one memo that you do have was a transaction that did go did not go through. If we had done something or prepared a memo on some thing that was not done, i would destroy that memo at time the decision was made not to proceed. Obviously there was still a memo remaining in the files that pertain to a transaction which did not occur. It referred to an april plan that was never executed or implemented. There were three other transactions that did go through, of which there are no memorandum that you are aware of. And those are the ones that have been destroyed. Cs. Admirale time you gave poindexter this assurance you believe in good faith that no record existed of the diversion that you had written, is that correct . Talked to the admiral i assured him that all , references to the sale of arms nicaraguaned to the resistance have been destroyed. At that point you are in a position we did not have a single document that indicated wereyour actions authorized by your superiors. And i also believed all of the notes, which are now in stacks all over washington have also been destroyed. After you were dismissed, did admiral poindexter call you and say to you that he confirmed he he would confirm that he gave lt. Col. North i honestly dont recall a conversation with admiral poindexter after i was dismissed. He may have called. Did you recall any conversation with him in which he said, colonel north, dont worry, even if you destroy all the documents i will stand up and say i approved it . Lt. Col. North i recall no such conversation. Once the documents were destroyed you were out there without any kind of assurance that anyone would stand and you . Stand behind you. Lt. Col. North that was the plan. It was planned that i would be out there. And everything had gone according to plan up until 12 of until 12 05 in the afternoon. When the plan changed is when you had the criminal investigation announced. Lt. Col. North i dont know in who elses mind the plan changed. I know when i heard the words criminal investigation or criminal behavior in a press conference or shortly thereafter was certainly profound, that my mind that changed considerably. Mindset changed considerably. I think if you will indulge me for second, over the five and a half years i served on the sc on on the and the nsc staff, i hope as i test im hear today i saw every possible means to do what needed to be done within the law. We had gone in extremis to run to find a way to live within the constraints and prescriptions of boland. In 1985w a means working with various lawyers and various counsel to find a way to implement a policy without my acquiescence and work very hard to find legal ways to carry out the policy of the president. There probably wasnt another president on the planet earth shocked as i was. I can tell you that shock was compounded when i heard there was to be an independent counsel, and further compounded when i was the only name in the appointment order for that independent counsel. Person on the planet earth named in that appointment order counsel. If the investigation by the independent counsel had not been instituted, if you had not heard the words criminal, would you still be sticking by the cover story . I will not press it, it is hypothetical. Am glad you recognize it, we dont have to get the chair involved. You have testified casey had approved this. The diversion. I consulted very carefully with director casey. Dont know if approved is the right word. A director casey was very enthusiastic about the whole program. And advocated it. When you met with the attorney general on the afternoon of the 23rd of november, he asked you about the diversion. Correct . Did, he asked me specifically about that memorandum. Is it true that he asked to who knew about the fact that proceeds from the sale of iranian arms were being used to support the contras . Lt. Col. North im not entirely clear. In that afternoon i was up very late in the evening before. I suppose he may well have. I do not have detailed specifics notes from that meeting. Do you recall that you told him that admiral poindexter knew, that Richard Secord new comment that mr. Mcfarland knew . Lt. Col. North that sounds right. The recall that you did not tell the attorney general of the United States that director casey knew . Lt. Col. North i dont recall that i didnt. Was a part of the plan at that stage that you would not name rector casey . Lt. Col. North it had always been part of the plan that director casey would know nothing about the support of the plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance. Who else was a part of the plan who would not know anything about that support to the Nicaraguan Resistance . Lt. Col. North other cabinet officers who had to testify and appear things like that. It was a very closed circle of people who knew. Which other cabinet officers . Lt. Col. North people who didnt know. I told you who i thought new knew, and you have seen who ive set memoranda to. You know the record of medication i have had with officials. I do not know who else knows. I told you that. You testified a moment ago unless you we will soon see. It was always part of the plan not director casey would know. Is that in essence what you said . If you mean by the plan, the fall guy plan, yes. So the fall guy plan was that even though casey knew, you would not finger him to use a colloquial expression. Lt. Col. North your expression, counsel, not mine. Askhen the next question i ed was whether other people who that you were also not supposed to name . Lt. Col. North not that i know of. I know of no other people who actually knew. I have testified as to who i knew im confusing myself. Ive testified as to who i believe new about the command. Ive testified to who i can confer knowledge by the memoranda i created, the conversations we had. I had specifically talked to the admiral. I could well have said to the 23rd, bygeneral on the the way, the president knows. But i had asked the general on friday if the president knew, and the admiral told me no. The attorney general asked me about the president , i told him no. So the fact that which you told the attorney general is that you did not know whether or know. Did now lt. Col. North i think the discussion with mr. Mcfarland was before. The one where he ask you what lets go general back. Did you not talk to mr. Mcfarland after your conversation with the attorney general . Lt. Col. North i believe i did. I think i talked to both mr. Mcfarland and admiral poindexter. And when you talk to mr. Mcfarland after you met with the attorney general, did he ask you what happened at that meeting . I suppose heh did, or i volunteered it one or the other. Do you recall telling mr. Mcfarland about the fact that they had found the memoranda . Lt. Col. North yes, i did. Do you remember telling him that you were asked about who knew . Lt. Col. North i dont remember that part. It was a profoundly difficult time because that memorandum was not supposed to exist. Did i understand you to say a moment ago that if admiral poindexter had not told you on friday that he had not told the president , you may well have told the attorney general that the president did now know . That is a very confusing question, mr. Chairman. Could you restate it, sir . Lt. Col. North had admiral poindexter not told you on that friday that the president was unaware of the diversion, you might well have told the attorney general on that sunday that the president knew. Is that what you said . Lt. Col. North let me cast this the right way. In the conversations that i had with the admiral on friday, all departureelated to my , the safety of the hostages, the second channel, the cleanup of the files and that is unacceptable way of putting it. I asked the admiral that day, did the president or does the w about the fact that we used these moneys to support the resistance. He told me, no. The lasthat is conversation i ever had with the admiral about that aspect of it. Having assumed all along that those things which require president ial approval indeed had them. Can i conveyed to be attorney general on sunday those sentiments. Is, whenection of it he asked me if the president approved these, i told him, i guess he didnt, or he didnt, or Something Like that. That is what the admiral told me on friday. So what i think you were trying to say is that you had assumed for nine months that the president of the United States knew and approved of this . Lt. Col. North i assume from the day i took my post of the National Security council that those things which required the approval of the president , and i had the authority to proceed on various initiatives, that it did receive the approval of the president. Lt. Col. North so it wasnt until poindexter answer your question that you knew . Did youask him ask him, admiral poindexter, did you not discuss this with the president . Lt. Col. North no. Im not in the habit of questioning my superiors. Smartly and charged up the hill, that is what Lieutenant Colonels are supposed to do. I have no problem with that. I believe that nothing that we did was wrong or illegal. I thought it was a good idea to begin with terry still think it was a good idea. Had he wondered, wife it was a good idea, that the president of the United States dismissed it because of it . Lt. Col. North let me make one thing clear. This Lieutenant Colonel is not going to challenge a decision of the commander and chief for whom i still work. I am proud to work for the commander in chief. At that commander in chief tells a Lieutenant Colonel to go in the corner and sit on his head, i will do so. If the commander and chief the size to dismiss me from the staff, i will salute and say thank you for the opportunity to have served and go. I will not criticize his decision no matter how he relieves me, sir. Has anyone given you a giving you as the nation given you an. The president of the United States saw fit to call me later that day or he told me words to the effect, i just didnt know. Ive no reason to disbelieve but the commander in chief told me sir. I did you say to him that received approval from admiral poindexter and director casey . Lt. Col. North i did not say those words to the commander in chief. For beingd my thanks able to serve them for the last 5. 5 years. And my regrets that my service had brought forth a political firestorm and difficulties when all i saw to do was to help, but what i may have done was to hurt him. And when you were speaking to the attorney general on the 23rd, you understood that the attorney general was not just the chief legal officer of the United States, but he was a confidant and friend of the president , correct . He was an advisor of the president . Lt. Col. North would you please repeat the question . You understood that the attorney general was an advisor of the president . Lt. Col. North yes, i did. Why didntnt you you tell the attorney general that director casey knew . Lt. Col. North i dont know that i did and i dont know that i didnt. I dont recall that conversation in any detail. It was consistent with a long pattern that director casey did not know about any support outside of that provided by the cia for the Nicaraguan Resistance. This was part of that. Ascolonel north, as late november 23, where you still prepared to conceal from the attorney general facts relating to director casey . Lt. Col. North i was prepared at that point to continue not to the not to reveal the version as you put it occurred. That i had gotten them. Who were you protecting . Protectingrth i was the lives and the safety of the people who were engaged in the operation. Explained to us how telling the attorney general of the United States that director diversion would jeopardize lives other than wraps put him in jeopardy of coming under the investigation that you have been through . Lt. Col. North i dont know other than the fact that this investigation could result in lives being put in jeopardy. I dont think that a specific thought went through my mind on that issue. It was just instinctive that you dont mention the name of the director when youre talking to the attorney general about knowledge of support for the contras. Lt. Col. North it was instinctive or my earliest days of contact from contact with the director, that our relationship not be something that was publicly bandied about. Until these hearings, i dont know that the people in washington know that the director and i communed as often as we did. How often did you commune . Lt. Col. North several times a week. Where . Lt. Col. North mostly on the telephone. Sometimes we would meet in one of our offices. Sometimes at the Intelligence Community building across the street. I can recall meetings at his home. I recall writing in the car with him an airplane trips with him. We have enough to be able to coordinate sufficiently and i seek his guidance on a number of things. Who you couldrson confide in . Lt. Col. North i did. You valued his advice . T. Col. North interestingly are you on a first name basis . Lt. Col. North i called him mr. Casey to his face. I occasionally called him bill. Died, there were three people in the government of the United States who expressed their condolences. Poindexter, the Vice President of the United States, and bill casey. Man ofsey was for me a immense proportions and a man whose advice i valued greatly, and a man whose concerns for this country and the future of on the righte track. , but i dontg think history will bear that out. I took his advice to heart. Him in au look upon way as a boss . Lt. Col. North i have heard that said, i dont think so much but i know who my superiors are and i know the chain of command. He wasnt a boss so much as he on ersonal friend and an advisor and a person with whom i could consult and gave good solid advice and someone i could turn to for support. When you briefed him on what you were doing to keep the contras alive, did he express his approval to you . Lt. Col. North he never once way i can recall in any disagreed with any of the things that i was doing. In fact, he gave me a number of ideas of how they might be done better. It recall him ever dont recall that he ever said, dont do something you are doing. He often with suggest ways to do it better. Do you think he discussed the president s views with you from time to time . Not on areash bearing on this investigation. President s commitment to the contras . Lt. Col. North in general terms. Director casey was the one who formulated and laid out for the first time publicly what has come to be called the reagan doctrine. I think he had a very clear understanding of what the president s views work. He was able to formulate some of those as a Public Policy position. Directoru talk to casey about the financial needs of the contras . Knewol. North he probably more about it than i did because he was getting the raw intelligence. Yes we did. You told director casey about the fact that the ayatollah would be paid for those needs . Lt. Col. North yes i did. That matter had a double they in the sense that iranian government had been to theng arms sandinistas. Lt. Col. North you have been reading my tapirs, havent you . Thats right. They tried, and they also provided oil. Indeed, one of the points that the president approved in whereof reference mcfarland talked to the government representatives about is that they should not give the support to the sandinistas, right . Lt. Col. North that is correct. A staff member of the nsc succeeded in reversing it all, getting the money for the contras. Correct . Lt. Col. North we did. That was something that director casey must have been fired admired very much. Lt. Col. North he did. And it was something that you were proud of . Lt. Col. North i didnt say i was proud of it. I said it was a neat idea. Ever tellector casey that this is something you must never mention to any of your colleagues at the nsc . Sorry wouldth im you please did you discuss with director casey that the use of the proceeds was a matter that could be a political bombshell . I think werth probably did at a number of points. Certainly, we discussed that very clearly toward the end of my tenure. I think it actually came down to detailed discussions of that. Once he was aware that there were outside there was outside intelligence on it. Im focusing specifically on a friend of his that had approached him and told him that he, the friends, new about the use of the funds. And that was in the fall of 1986 . Lt. Col. North correct. And you testified to the fact of those result statements to the director, the director asked you to clean up your files . Lt. Col. North that is correct. It was not that one singular event. Things were unraveling rather quickly. We had the aircraft shutdown. We had the investigation of southern transport, innocent as far as i can determine. By thes followed revelations and pamphlets in iran. November of 1986 , after the iranian venture had been publicized in lebanon and in papers all over the world, did you discuss this with director casey . Lt. Col. North sure. Tell us about that whatever you can recall. We had several discussions about it. Recollection is that director casey agreed with my assessment at the time. Came time for someone to quite frankly he did not think that i was senior enough to do that. Im trying to recall, that suggested it would probably go up the line or Something Like that. Suggest who else could take the hit . He suggested it might be admiral poindexter. Because next up in the line it would be admiral poindexter on this matter . Lt. Col. North that is correct. There was a nominal deputy who wouldve been aware of some of this. Did you discuss blaming it on him after his death . Lt. Col. North it would be hard to blame something that was going on in november on somebody who died in the summer. The original approval . Lt. Col. North no. So director casey discuss justyou the fact that it might not be credible for you to take the hit and that it might have to be admiral poindexter . Lt. Col. North words to that effect. Did he discuss anyone else that would have to take the hit . Lt. Col. North he was concerned that the president not be damaged by it, and i shared that belief. These conversations took place before november 21, correct . Lt. Col. North i would guess so, yes. I spent the first part in november in very heavy travel, and so did the director. My recollection is we had one conversation early in the month, perhaps during one of my layovers in washington. The next conversations were not until very much later in the month. At the time you had that conversation in early november, you had not yet been told by admiral poindexter that he had not told the president , correct . Lt. Col. North i was that not told that by admiral poindexter until the 21st. Laboring were still under the assumption that the president of the United States knew, correct . Lt. Col. North yes. And did director casey tell you that the president doesnt not know . Lt. Col. North no. You and director casey were talking about take the hit,g to why did you understand that it was necessary for someone to take the hit . We couldnorth i think see that we would have a Major International and domestic Political Drama on this thing. It would be helpful if someone were as we originally planned, when it comes time for this thing to go down the tubes, here is the guy who gets fingered for it. None of us, certainly not me or know when i ever talked to, ever imagined we had done anything criminally wrong. You have testified that the director was known to be a lawyer . Lt. Col. North he was indeed. A reputation of being a very smart lawyer. Indeed. North he was it was not just his assessment of himself. But you saw how his mind operated. It was very quick. Lt. Col. North it sure was. That these conversations you were having with the director, it was clear to you that he was concerned about damage to the president . I think it would be beyond comprehension that anyone who served the president any president , wasnt concerned about that. Republican,from a democratic, or partisan perspective, that is seeing the president as the commander in chief, chief executive, and head of state. Upon allt is incumbent servants in the executive branch to have that kind of a concern, not so much for the man necessarily, but for the institution of the president. I certainly had that. I know director casey had that. November, didof you tell director casey that you were going to see the attorney general that sunday . Already north i had seen him by the 25th of november. Did you tell them before you saw the attorney general . Col. North if i may are you looking at it lt. Col. North i do not believe i talked to the director that day about that issue. What about the prior day . Lt. Col. North i didnt know i was going to see him until the 21st. Lets get the dates direct. You saw the attorney general on the 23rd. Lt. Col. North sunday the 23rd, right. Yound you knew that he were going to see him on the 22nd . Lt. Col. North that is correct. Did you speak to the director after the attorney general asked to see him . Lt. Col. North i do not have a recollection of doing that, no. When you talked to the october after the incident, and in november, did he ever ask you what the memorandum looked like that you had sent up a line and that you were either order to take care of or had taking care of . Lt. Col. North i dont believe so, i think at least on one memorandumwrote the with the director. So he knew what it looked like . That one . Lt. Col. North certainly. Can you recall which transaction was reflected in the memorandum that you went over with with the director . Lt. Col. North i have a sense it was probably the february one. It was probably the february transaction. Involved 1000 talks hawks, correct . Lt. Col. North correct. What occasions would you go over the memoranda with the director . Lt. Col. North my recollection is and it is fake because it was a long time ago it seems i was pursuing getting a cia officer a particular cia officer engaged in the initiative. Officer is only one cia with respect use to this, mr. Cave, is that the one . Lt. Col. North yes. My sense is that what director casey and i started talking about was getting mr. Cave because of his experience in that country and his obvious language ability so he had a who knewsides myself exactly what was being said and h whom i had absolutely absolute report. He chose to make some sort of arrangement to bring mr. Cave back to the service. It is my recollection that we it was right after the february transaction, at some when in that timeframe was trying to get him involved and i showed the director one of those memoranda. Colonel, was the memorandum as showed him the memorandum it existed before you sent it up the line, or after it came back . Lt. Col. North it was probably before. Wayid the director in any question you about not sending a memorandum that called for president ial approval . Lt. Col. North i dont recall him ever doing that. That givenir to say command,ng sense of , belief in rector casey director casey, that if he said you do not put the president s name on a memorandum, you wouldve done it . Lt. Col. North very true. But you put a reference in the memoranda that they should seek the approval of the president . Lt. Col. North that is correct. If we could just go to that. I will come to it in more detail later. But if you want to say now, say it. Again, i would like to make the point that i did not, nor do i know that others did, highlight that aspect of it in those memoranda. If you will note that the one wasrandum that still exists drafted at some point in april, it is five pages long with a fourpage attachment. There are only eight lines that refer in this many pages to that specific part of the transaction. Is the very important use and i know that is the focus of this investigation, but that the use of the funds notved as residuals was viewed as preeminent activity ongoing. The preeminent activity was to establish a relationship with iran and all of the other things that would derive therefrom. Saw, as director casey put it, the ultimate irony in that as a part of this process we could continue to needyt that desperately Nicaraguan Resistance. You said that you didnt highlighted. It is also true that you did not conceal it in the memoranda. Notcol. North i did conceal from my superiors anything that i did. The record is very clear on the paper. The record is very clear in the memorandum that have survived that you did not conceal it. Lt. Col. North i did not. In a very hurried inspection, Brad Reynolds spotted it very quickly. Lt. Col. North i dont know how long it took them to find it. They spent many hours in my office that day. They revealed it to you the next day. Lt. Col. North they certainly did. The reason that director casey asked you after the incident to get rid of the because of the one paragraph that refer to diversion . Lt. Col. North i dont know if that was solely on his mind. The director was concerned and this was , theistake that i made operational mistake was to cross the two operations. Operationally, if you have other alternatives, you do not do that. Second, i think what director casey saw was that there would be a major unraveling of the activities. And the aircraft you down was part of it. Were beingt leaflets handed out by another faction in. He government of iran he was complaining about the fact that investors had not gotten paid out of the proceeds of the sale, correct . Lt. Col. North know the problem with that revelation is that he thathim as i remember it somebody else had told to members of congress. That money from the sale of wrappings weapons to iran had been diverted. Those names are in the notebooks that i gave you, sir. A of notebooks. I have not seen those in the notebooks. I want to ask your counsel at a recess to point them out to us. You know what the names are . Lt. Col. North i dont recall them, no. And i sure would not want to be inaccurate on that. The director was talking about their version in terms of furmark. Lt. Col. North the concerns that the director addressed to shootdownu have the of the hostage airplane, that operation is in trouble. Furmark has now come and told me that other people are very aware of the fact that the armed sales to iran have generated funds that have gone to support others, and it is getting out. Did he say that this had been called to members of congress and they might start an investigation . Lt. Col. North i dont recall that part of it. But apparently someone had claimed to furmark that members of congress or were being made aware, or had been. So you were told to get rid of memoranda that would prevent that. Lt. Col. North i was told to clean up the files. Means to get rid of memoranda that reflected that. Lt. Col. North and that means that you went through your files to make sure that you found the memoranda that referred to the residuals . Lt. Col. North yes. And when you went through the files, you recall how many you found . Lt. Col. North the specific memoranda seeking approval . Yes. No, i dont. H what i probably found where dozens and dozens of memoranda relating to the residuals and the application to the contra, among other things. What i am saying is there are probably several copies of even the april one, which i thought i had gotten all of them. When you say that there were dozens lt. Col. North of the five that i sought approval for. So they were copies of the five . Lt. Col. North exactly. Did you look over them to see whose names were written on them . Lt. Col. North we went through this once. You said you didnt recall, and i am asking if you looked. Lt. Col. North i dont remember looking. I would like him to keep his answers to the questions. To the answerback then we can move on. Is that the answer that you did not look . Namesu look to see whose were written on those memos . Do not recall i looking to see whose names were written on the memos. Deaver called looking to see if they had checkmarks or initials . Lt. Col. North i do not. Is it fair to say that the stenography books that you took home contain very Sensitive Information . Likely, north it is with interpretation, that the stenography books are sensitive, yes. Ispart of the interpretation the names and those books . Lt. Col. North yes. You uttered a prayer to we treatttee that ,hese books with sensitivity and respect their security. You did that yesterday, correct . Lt. Col. North i did. These home that you took hopes to is a home that you had a great deal of concern about security, correct . Lt. Col. North yes. And can you explain to me, someone who has never been in a position such as yours, as to why you would be concerned about this the security of in an nsclocked subject to all stores a security regulations and access restrictions, or not concerned about keeping them at home . I may have had a few of them at home, i dont recall how many there were. I removed the rest of them on the 25th, along with several hundred pages of other documents. I did that for one purpose, to protect itself. After the press conference, my perspective changed. It became one of protecting myself. That was the reason to remove those notebooks from the nsc and take those documents. I took the documents from the white house with me. When did you do your , theding before the 25th last preceding day in which he did shredding that was out of the ordinary . It is entirely likely that i was shredding documents as late as the morning of the 25th. Did the attorney general, when you met with him on the 23rd, ask you to preserve every single document . Lt. Col. North no. From youru returned meeting with the attorney on the 23rd, did you go to your office and do shredding of documents that they day . Lt. Col. North i honestly dont remember, but i know i shredded documents after that fact. After your meeting with the attorney general where he confronted you with the divergent memo. Lt. Col. North if i remember accurately, my recollection is i went to the white house to try to call admiral poindexter on the telephone. Had gone to the redskins game. You plug new york lawyers, i plug the redskins. As i recall, he was not yet home. It was probably then that i called mr. Mcfarland. I would guess that i went back to my office at that point and for some time continued to clean up the files. I will also point out to the committee that i destroyed documents that had absolutely nothing to do with either iran or the Nicaraguan Resistance that no longer with the applicable in the event that i was soon to be transferred. The recall that on monday morning, the 24th, the shredder was full and overflowing . Lt. Col. North i dont remember that it was monday, but i do remember that happen at some point. Do remember shredding documents during the lunch hour on the 22nd when the representatives in the Attorney Generals Office had left for their lunch . Lt. Col. North i remember shredding documents when they were in their reading documents. Shredding in their present presence . Lt. Col. North they were sitting in my office and the shredder was in the hallway. So i was out there shredding and they were reading. They were sitting in my office reading. Documentd finish the and say, we dont need that anymore. I would walk out and shredded. They could. The shredder was right outside the door. You would go up there and take documents that they had finished reading . You now have a diagram of this Basement Office on the third floor. Desk that i had was in the corner of my office. Then there was a table about this size. On that table was all of the iran documents. I was working at my desk and other things cleaning out files on lots of things. When i finished with a handful of documents i would turn the corner and drop them in. Did anyone say to you, what are you doing . Lt. Col. North no. I did not think anything of it either. What you have to understand is that i did not think i had done anything wrong. I do not think that they necessarily thought i had done anything wrong. Shredderr that has a if office, ought to be he is not reading or writing documents are on the telephone, ought to be shredding them. Mr. Reynolds found the divers and he didnt im not interrupting your answer. Just wait for the question. He found that document. He attached significance to that document. What you are saying is that even after that, and this occurred before lunch, that you were there taking batches of st thents passed pa attorneys from the department of justice and shredding them. And they were not saying, stop, we would like to look, what are you doing, we are concerned none of that, right . Lt. Col. North im not trying to leave the wrong impression. Iat i am saying is that thought, and perhaps they thought, and im trying to be in at once. Eoples minds they were looking for the backs inwhat had transpired september, october, and november of 1985. What i was told they were looking for i thought was in the files that i gave them. Engaged in a number of other projects of National Security importance. The fact that i was shredding documents, i dont think would be unusual to them. Im not trying to say that these guys were letting me shred documents. I had a shredder for that purpose. Secretnish reading a top piece of intelligence, you dont leave it sitting around your office, you destroy it after you read them. That is what i was doing. Were you taking single documents over to this rather read taking files over to the shredder . Lt. Col. North i was sitting at my desk and they were working on their projects and i was working on mine. I dont think you have to accuse them of incompetence because they didnt stop a guy from doing a job. That is why the government of the United States gave me a shredder. That day wasob on to get rid of files, wasnt it . That is not what i came in for. Toas working desperately keep the hostages alive. We had had this stuff all over the newspapers. Calling mes were every half hour. I was working with those people. They heard me taking the phone calls. I was looking after several other action packages. Lt. Col. North was your work on the phone with the israelis leading you to shred documents . Went to going through your files to get rid of embarrassing documents . Lt. Col. North embarrassing, no. Documents that would compromise the National Security of the United States, documents that would put lives at risk, documents that would demonstrate covert actions, yes. I am not embarrassed to be here. Are yousaying thought thatou allowing the attorney general of the United States or his representatives to see documents that jeopardize would jeopardize lives . Lt. Col. North no. Im saying that revelations regarding those documents would destroy lives. That i the documents destroyed that day, prior to that day, and after that day had no relationship with iranian activities. They had to do with Nicaraguan Resistance activities. They had to do with counterterrorist operations. Has this committee has a scope within which they operate, they were looking for specific iranian associated activities. Matters a file of pertaining to support for the internal opposition in nicaragua or people i had contacted in europe and with whom i had worked to get weapons for the Nicaraguan Resistance sitting there at my desk, i would pull is out and look at them and say if youre not here tomorrow, this doesnt need to be found by anybody. I will take them over to the shredder and destroy them. That is what im saying. It was beyond the pale of their inquiry. Those were files that were assembled over time . Lt. Col. North over five years, sir. Those were files that had remained secure for 5. 5 years, correct . Lt. Col. North correct. And he knew that whoever was selected to fill that office would be the National Security advisor, correct . Lt. Col. North i did not know that the person who moved into the office which share the same responsibilities or have anything to do with the matters with which i had worked. The documents that existed as permanent files were all that were necessary to carry on. The activities i was engaged, and it was only a part of my in support of the Nicaraguan Resistance and would be terminated. There was no need to retain those documents. Deny that one of the reasons that you were shredding thements was to avoid political embarrassment of having these documents be seen by the attorney generals staff . Lt. Col. North i do not deny that. I think this is a good time for a break. The hearing will stay in recess for 10 minutes. Announcer youre watching American History tv. All weekend, every weekend on cspan3. To join the conversation, like us on facebook. American history tv visited the new museum of the American Revolution in philadelphia. For a Live Program Featuring mize museum exhibits and artifacts. Up next, a program recorded on july 6. Philadelphias newest museum is in the heart of the city. Two blocks from independence hall. It tells the story of our countries road to independence. It opened in april. Tonight we taku