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Good afternoon. Very nice to see a really large level of the audience. Its for a really fantastic panel. Also wanted to welcome our cspan audience who will be watching this excellent panel which i want to address. First introduce the panelist. To my immediately right is eloy fad can. To his right is michael duran, also senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. To his right i want to welcome someone who has not been on our panel before. Leo, i think hes a colleague of mine at talent magazine and i think hell have an interesting perspective along with michael as well. Leal i should say its not admitted in the identifications but leals family is from jerusalem for many many years for forever. So i think that hell be able to mention to give an interesting historical perspective, and very interesting personal perspective as well on june 1967, which is thats what the panel is about today, six days of fire israel and the june 1967 war, 50 years on. Again, welcome. Ha little if youd begin. Thank you very much. And thank you for coming. We are here to talk about the longterm consequences of the sixday war and rightly so. We thought it well to speak of the it ourself and the situation on the eve of its outbreak. That is fallen to me. Among other reasons im old enough to remember it from direct experience. And it was an experience so dramatic and moving that it is very hard to forget. I had refreshed reminders of it last week during the visit to israel, most of all on juvenile d jerusalem day, the annual celebration of the city. In 1967, a few reminders of its history to that date. At that time israel was a 19yearold sperm, an experiment within jewish state hood. That experiment was formally launched by the u. N. In november of 1947. In other words, israels establishment was authorized in the mode of International Multi laterallism that we now tend to regard as something i think has forgotten being israel. It remained an experience for several reason. The arabs has neighbors were opposed to its existence and even though who had originally opposed israels establishment, including the u. S. Came to merits the doubt of those support. Why . It was a reason stated on the eve of sixday war by youth meyers the american ambassador. Quote whos value to the u. S. Is primarily emotional. Balanced with a pull range of the vital centra steek political, commercial and economic interest represented by arab states. This feud was powerful in 1948. It had anticipated to the arab states on israels border, egypt, syria, jordan and lebanon and others besides would attack and cease to murder iz real state and its cradle. The arabs did attack. Israel managed to avoid the war in 1948, by israels survival did not mean peace. For the next ten years the arab states continued to reject any status with the israel and attacked it wherefore possible. But theyre ultimate ending freelily announced was to destroy israel completely, to finish as they put it, the business of 48, to remove the same of 48. Until 67 that aim remained unfull filled and was not attempted. It was thought to unite a grand coalition of arab armys such has having put together in 1948. Only then could israels enemies launch a terror attack and achieve the ultimate goals. Until 67 these conditions were not achieved and could not be. The most important reason was that the army of egypt, the largest arab army could not be deapplied to israels boarders. It could not be because of the outcome of war in 1956, a war in which israel was alive with britain and france against egypt. The i know of that war provided for the partial de Peace Keeping force that acted or was suppose to act as a buffer. It also provided for the right of navigation through the straits ofty ron for israeli shipping. All of that changed in may of 1967 and abruptly. A crises arupted that lasted three long weeks and culminated in the sixday war. Egypt reintroduced its army into the sign nigh. It demanded and received the withdrawal of the u. N. Force. Its forces moved closer to theist really border. Egypt formed a line with syria. Subsequently yo subsequently jordan joined this alliance, placing its army under egyptian command. This was a painful blow to israel, jordan then ruled what is today called the west bank. The location of west bang means some places in central israel, israeli was only nine miles. The attack from this border could destroy israel and its coastal cities. The attack came. The circle of israel was complete as it has been in 98. Many countries rushed to join the especially iraq which sent its forces into jordan. Nasa took a fatal step by closing the to israel. Nasa knew and announced that this was amount of decoration of war and welcomed the onset of that war, confidence that he would win it. Its home was fortunately stated by the president of the iraq, quote, our goal is clear, to wipe israel off the face of the map, we shall, god willing meet in tell a vif. Such revision was repeated over and over by nasa and arab leaders and i could remember vividly, to people in the United States to hear. In israel, the government deliberated about what to do. Anyone who thinks that it took a decision to go eventually to war lightly, should just consult the record. It could have no doubts that it faced the prospect of a war of ex termination. One point in the three weeks the chief of staff said its now a question of to be or not to be. But apart from making military preparations it took no definitive decision. Some in the government hoped that had a peaceful resolution might be found. But in that event, israel might have to accept the new quo. Egypts army on its border and could not its arab enemies and could still and probably would still attack sometime later at a time of their choosing. In all events an acceptable peaceful resolution depended upon outside parties and thus israel under took a major diplomatic major which lasted those three weeks. The long way to three weeks grew increasingly painful. It was painful for many of those who sympathized with israel as well. People were oblige to wonder if they were about to witness a new holocaust. Confidence in the government faltered. Eventually to restore confidence, unity government was formed and hero of 56 was appointed minister. It had its own name, the waiting. In the end, the diplomatics efforts were a total and complete failure. Israel and 3 Million People totally and utterly alone. Several of the arab states had the soviet union as an ally. Frances Charles De Gaulle reputed an old alliance with israel as well as the 1957 guarantees. Britain was sympathetic but offered no help and effectively left its own guarantees in abeyance. America too was sympathetic. All of israels were was warmer than that expressed in the judgment i cited earlier than that of u. S. Ambassador. But he was informed by the same logic augmented by cold war concerns, the possibility of a direct confrontation with the soviet union. After much consultation the most president johnson was willing to offer was re repeated message was, and this is a direct quote, israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone. But israel regarded such a stance in the absense of real american support as unatenable. In the end on june 5th, israel did go at it alone. And prevailed all alone in a remarkable military campaign. It was a spectacular victory by every measure and many descriptions of t let me offer one written by the wellknown historian of world war i barbra tuckman who visited israel before and shortly after the war. Quote, a people considered for centuries nonfighters carried out in june against long odds the most nearly perfect military operation in modern history. Surrounded on three sides amount of armament fighting alone and equipped by major power and having lost the advantage of surprise, they accomplished the rarest of military feats. Obtain many of exact objectives. And with absence of blunder. Not quite with the absence of blunder, but thats a longer story. We will now move to the discussion of a longterm consequences of this victory, but i would like to close with one observation of its immediate consequences of israel at that time and following on. No doubt israel would have preferred to a less lonely path of security. But having to go it alone, it proved to itself two important things. And maybe to others that it was not a mere client state nor was it unviable. It had a chance if regrettably necessarily a fighting chance to be what it declares in its National Anthem to be a free people in its land. Beyond survival there is a special virtue in that. And in the last 50 years israel has made the most of that. Thank you. [ applause ] mike, if you would like to follow up. Thanks. I will say a few words about the egyptian role in all of this and then have a couple of reflections on the longterm meaning of the war. There is a kind of enduring mystery about the outbreak of the war because everyone agrees that this is nassars war and when i say everyone, to prove that, there is a historian, that has never had a sympathetic word to say about israel and in his history of the arab israeli conflict, even he kaernt cant assign responsibility to nassar. He didnt take the off ramp and he kept escalating. And the mystery in all of this is why did he do it. Because at the time, the best units of his army were bogged down in a war in yemen. So he was totally unprepared for this conflict. And couldnt have won it. And yet he escalated and escalated to the point where at a certain after he is remilitarized the signi, he said israel has no choice. But we put israel in a position that it has no choice but to attack. So you have to say he is totally irrational or playing a game that we dont understand very well. I will give you a couple of thoughts about what i think the game he was playing. This may be one of the questions that people may never be able to answer or maybe they will be able to answer defintively, but it is a mystery that continued to intrigue me. And i think perhaps because of a lit of selfinterests, i just wrote a book about 1956. And the key is 1956. I was going to mention that. I do have a tendency to see everything at 1956. In 56, nassar lost the war against israel but won politically. Britain, france, and israel teamed up against egypt. Defeated the Egyptian Army but the super powers got involved and the United States in particular forced the israelis out with minimal concessions. The concessions being the ones that nassar overturned in 67. Emergency force in signi. And that is the world in which that was nassars greatest moment. The unstoppable Political Force in the arab world was 1956. America handed him this incredible political victory. I think in 67 he thought he could replay 56. Escalate things at such a point that even if there was a conflict with israel, a conflict that he might not win on the ground, still come out the political winner. So his major miscalculation, he made two, one of them was the military miscalculation. The israelis destroyed his air force in record time and they did it alone. In 56, they had the french to help them in the air. And in 67, they didnt it. They did it alone. So though obliterated his forces so quickly, there wasnt time for the super powers to step in and hand him a victory, snatch defeat from the israelis from the jaws of military victory. The second miscalculation he made was about the americans. Since he had encountered the americans back from when he took power in in 1952, the americans had been completely allergic to association with zionism. They were afraid to be seen on being the side of the is israelis in the war and eager to distance themselves from israel. And that is what generated eisenhowers decision to role them out of the signai. Mr. Smith. I had a discussion with harold saunders, former Foreign Service officer. And he was among those, and saunders was among those who was very interested in maintaining good relation with nassar and believed that the u. S. Association with israel was pointing the relationship with nassar. And he told me that nassar gave a speech in 1966 in which he said in which it was full of fire and brimstone and defines of the americans. And if the americans dont like it, they can go drink the red sea. They can take a flying leap and saunders said that from that moment, for some reason, i dont know why, i never went to research the exact moment on the speech and why it had such an effect. But saunders told me from that moment on, the americans at the highest level were done with nassar. He said none of us could possibly put forward a proposal to window nasser because he had so undermined his own position in washington. And that was against the background of this war in yemen. The war in yemen was a super power proxy fight. The americans, the saudi and the yemeni royalist were on one side, the soviets, egyptians and insurgents were on the other side. And we saw that in those terms. When nasser provoked this war, the americans were not sympathetic at all. And right when the war ends, the u. S. Comes up with un he is solution 242. And that is a simple commonsensical idea. When it was you know, get israel out of the signi. In the Nixon Administration where nixon, and Henry Kissinger saw israeli power as an asset for the United States and the cold war where we can use it to put pressure on the allies of the soviet you knunion and if t want to be relieved of pressure, they have to come to us. Now, we werent quite there in 67, but once you get to the land for peace idea. Incredibly important turning point. Just a couple of other thoughts about the turning skpoipoint ann i will pass it over. One, as you hear me talking and saying soviet union, United States, it was another world. It was the height of the cold war and the middle east was a proxy arena in the cold war and that war is gone. There is Something Else that happened in 67, the biggest winner in 1967 was not the israelis. The biggest winner was the saudis and it is interesting if you think about where we are today. Because after 67, the famous cartoon which produced the famous three nos of cartoons, no recognition, no negotiations, and no peace with israel. The real work was that the egyptians made a with the saudis. They cut a deal with the saudis where they agreed to end their propaganda against saudis. And marks the turning point until the moment the egyptians were, egypt was the center of the arab world. And 67 marks the moment when the saudis come into the world. That is the moment where we think of the saudis being the leading power. The other big change that takes place, and then i will pass it to leo. One is this is effectively the end of nasserism and leader of the arab world and the leading power of the israelis. We do have the 76 because will goal of 73 was to get out of the conflict. To deal a big enough blow to israel that it would wake up the super powers and help the egyptians get out off the conflict. It wasnt to use the conflict for other purposes, it was to get out of the conflict. I dont want to you have the war of attrition, and both of them were serious conflicts. But from an egyptian point of view you can see something shifts dramatically in 67. And the last point is as the egyptians move out, start thinking about how to get out of this conflict, they Start Playing up the point that this conflict at its essence is a conflict between the israelis and the palestinians and it is a question of national determine nation for the palestinian people. And israel is an outpost for imperialism and so forth. And the arabs redefine it as palestinian nationalism versus israel. Which brings the plo to the foreand that brings us with the Peace Process which focuses on the palestinian issue. Thanks, mike. I never thought about the resolution 242 as being the premise. The United States would eventually look at israel as a cold war asset. And so that is really interesting. If you could thank you. Round of applause. [ applause ] thanks. So you know, as lee mentioned, my family has been for a while. They arrived in the fifties the seven fifties which means jerusalem syndrome has run anybody the family for generations. But what i am going to sound today is going to sound profoundly crazy. The first thing that i would like to say and it is perhaps a tad uncharitable in an event dedicated to the colossal historical meaning of 1967, is that 1967 actually mattered not a bit. And here is why i say that. I say that because i went to school in Telaviv University which was established over the ruins of villages that were destroyed and abandoned in 1948. And so if you are looking for some sort of Vantage Point at which to start telling a meaningful story about contemporary israel, about the middle east and israels place for t 67 seems a bit arbitrary, and for that matter, 48 as well. 1897, when the first major group of jews descended from the first ship to repopulate in a massive way. The much too Promised Land with its previous to inhabitants. I think that in a way, what 67 did is provide this major almost distraction. He had a beautiful phrase that i am going to bungle, but it had to do with multilateral. A deeply comforting prism for which to look at this conflict. We are now looking at it and seeing something that is solvable. Here is a problem. And we can make this work because this is a problem with negotiations between two sides that are profoundly willing to negotiate some kind of solution. I think both people have a very different perspective and in a sense have always had that perspective. I think the israelis may be looking at neighbors and say remember the jebbusites and the hittites, they were much mighty empires. And i think that is a much more to use a favorite term organic way of understanding the reality that most people had, and in a way, 67 had a major 50 year detour in which everybody is like, this resolution and negotiation, and process and how do we solve it and i think we are slowly climbing away from that. Interestingly enough, that is not the really crazy thing that i have to say. The really crazy thing that i would like to say is sort of contradictory of course to the first thing it will prove that you are crazy. Thats right. In one very important and nontrivial way, 67 mattered a tremendous dealing because it revealed and i use this term in all of its almost theological automa automany 146 years after, try asking italians how many of them identify as garrabaldists. And they will look at you and say what are you talking about. At the same time jews strongly define themselves as zionist and if you understand zionism as a Political Movement too reestablish you know, sometime between 60 odd years ago or 50 years ago, that mission has been secured. Once a modern state of israel has been established, why are we still talking about ourselves as zionists, and the answer that i would like to give and it has its origins in a very, very good book almost as good as mikes, which is the bible. Is the mission of zionism has never been solely political. I am almost tempted to say, not even mainly political. The mission of zionism has always been to fulfill. Here comes the crazy part, the messian messianic yearnings that are at the very core. This is a reason why this rag tag movement attracted people whose vision of what kind of event establish. You had religious jews, cultural jews, you had people who agreed not a like about what type of of policy would actually come to fruition. And the reason for this is because the contract, the reason for the return, the reason for the yearning always had to do not just with the establishment of a National Homeland for purposes of selfdefinition, defense, et cetera, but rather for the fulfillment of deep understanding meaning the nation did not just have to be a nation but had to be a perfect nation. This is why when moses sends ten spies dude, not so much milk and honey. They fail to understand what makes the promise land promise isnt some inherent quality. What makes it promise is our ability to inhabit it and make it an exemplary place for higher type of living here on earth. So up until 1967, it was very easy for majority of israelis to simply ignore this notion because indeed it sounds rather untenable and rather emotionally mendelian stable. Up until 1967 it was quite possible to focus and appeared to be real existential challenges of anything from strategic depth to kind of building, and i love what he said, continuing this experiment. 67 unleached all of that because in a weird way removed the last barrier. Something happened, and it happened literally about a week and a half after the war, a host of rabbis got together in jerusalem and sort of still shaken by this great and unexpected victory, i know this because some of my relatives were literally in the room they contemplated on whether now this miraculous occurrence was upon us, it was perhaps time to change the prayers that specifically speak of the disruption of jerusalem and our kind of mourning for it. Whether it was time to remove some of these lines in the prayers. And they decided almost unanimously which is hard for jews to do on anything especially on things like that, that the prayers ought not to be changed because the mission had not been accomplished. The actual unification of the city was not the end. It was the beginning and it was time to embark on a greater project which has been a project of zionism which was a creation of the more and more and more Perfect Union that expresses itself in platitudes. I think 67 freed a lot of people to continuing to do that. And the change in Israeli Society and israeli politics has been radical. Again, we are looking here at all of the wrong things. The energy goes to what about the settlements. Are they seizing land in accord dance with geneva conventions and these are interesting questions that people have spent a lot of time debating with. But the bigger and more interesting change is the gradual but undeniable and very convincing shift that a huge swath of Israeli Society has experienced in the last 50 years. I dont want to say two words religiousiosity because that is a highly explosive term but towards an understanding that the nation of our National Project isnt to build another berlin or d. C. Or paris on the mediterranean. It is something very, very different. And it has to do in some deeply intricate ways with faith, with jewish faith and in the way we understand it. This is why you could see all of a sudden weird hybrid huge Political Parties like the jewish home that have in them both quoteunquote religious politicians and very secular politicians because the actual level of observance has been the yardstick. It is the understanding of trying to do something different. Trying to build the jewish state and understand it as stuff. The project has been defined in one june many, many moons ago in sinai. And 67 unleashed that yearning. And the consequences of that are strangely far more reaching than anything that i think anyone in this room can begin to fathom. Thats great, thanks very much. [ applause ] so i want to stick with you for a second and come back to mike and hallel. We led up to 1967. We are in the middle of 1967 with you and now i want to look past it and ask you to continue with it. We have been speaking before about this. And if you want to continue a little more in this vein what does it look like post 1967. In some ways when you were speaking last night and also today, you are saying at 67, everyone understood, it was clear what the project was. And washington and the u. S. Press, people who are interested in israel, look at israel, you know the Different Things they say. Oh, israel becoming more religious, what does this look like . Look at these people. But you are saying it became clear in 1967. And what we are seeing now well i am going to leave it to you and explain. But i am going to ask you to describe what the region to look like. And lets talk about how american policy has changed since 1967 looking at israel and the region generally. So if we can stick with you for a second. You know, this is something that i learned a lot from mike for example how much if you think of america and how much of our political energies were connecticconsumed by the cold war and alliances between parties on the surface seem to have little in common. You have traditional conservatives and traditional liberals coming together over what both could agree was a perceived threat that had to be met. And all of a sudden both of these camps had to define the true essence of their ideology and were seeing the outcomes of that right now. Since november in grand operatic fashion. And this by the way, i think is also very pertinent to the American Jewish community could weave a narrative of experimentation. Here is this 19yearold nation is attempting some sort of david versus goliath thing. Still sufficiently steeped in its socialist background or history or roots for people of very, very wide range of political affiliations to feel this deep affinity towards it. And that built huge coalitions and kind of created these camps in support for what was understood to be the project in ways that were fairly unproblematic. When 67 occurred, that kind of ceased to be the case because the questions that israelis had to answer was a far starker one. Well, okay, we have removed the last barrier quoteunquote, the last kind of big existential program. We have reunified jerusalem and what now . And i think that big portions although i think they are diminishing and dwindling daily, well now, we are going to create a great nation state and we are going to do it bypassing laws that are widely understood, universally, cosmopolitanly, to be the sort of laws that nation states are progressive pass and there was an equally large part that said wait a minute, yes, we do have Firm Commitment to democratic principle, but at the same time we have an idea that this has always been and ought to remain a different kind of state. And all sorts of conflict that never existed bvr begin to bubble to the surface. Questions about what is the nature of businesses on the sabbath. Questions about the role of rabbi in public life. Essential issues of defining what the saturdwhat state ought. And that kind of process and we are seeing ripples of that happen still. And to get for a second to the Jewish Community abroad, i think that actually also sent shock waves into much world and particularly american jury. Again, if you do believe that this is just a solution, you know, a problem awaiting its solution, you could advocate one or another. It is because, i think the nation itself is becoming unrecognizable and insupportable and sufferable to people whose identity is so thoroughlily universalist secular as to not recognize a project that is thoroughly a jewish project. Proudly, religiously tinted nation state. That is a type of drama that in a way is not that different from dramas that we see everywhere from brexit to here. It is a question of what type of essential nation you want to have. It has brewed, israel is frequently the canary in the coal mine. Israels answer was decisive in one direction and now we are living out this drama. Thanks. That is fantastic. I want to go to mike because he has written a very interesting article on europe partly having to do with brexit. And i know you have been thinking about this for a while. But about europe and the United States and what these different ideas of nationalism and how they are playing out. I am curious to know if israel has been an example in this way, and if this was coming out of 1967, this was an instance while part of the world was moving this way towards globalization, towards lack of borders that israel after 67 was showing one thing and now this is what we are seeing both in europe and in the United States. I wouldnt have thought to connect those things is in this conversation, but i think i can do it at the risk im sorry. It is my fault. No. It is interesting. I think i can do it without being too reductive. And there are two schools of thought which goes back to 67 and one school of thought is that israel is a strategic liability to the United States and other says that it is an asset. And the one that says it is a liability also says it is a liability and it is a central issue. The palestinian israeli conflict is a central issue. And it is a liability because our association with israel is alienating the arabs and the muslims and the entire third world at large. And even further alienating from these days you hear in the halls of the state department, ali alienating from the europe nation. Therefore the job of the United States is the Peace Process. It is a strategically central aspect of american policy. Even if, and i think president obama if you read his comments carefully was pretty explicit about this. Our job is to Peace Process even if we dont believe at the end of this process there is going to be a peace. Because this is an outreach that we do, a way that we show respect for the community of nations. And behind that idea is the kind of universalist idea that liel is saying, more secular, use the word cosmopolitan i think, the cosmopolitanism of jewish youth. The globalist community. On the other side, the people who say that israel is not a liability and that it is an asset, that frame of reference, or that position resonates very deeply with american nationalist. And evangelicals or religious people. So the reunionification in 67, so from the beginning. Zionist projects there has been a strong gentile zionism that has propertied the project. Our colleague here, attention to something in 1991 called the blackstone memorial. William blackstone was a famous american businessman. He made a lot have money in real estate. He devoted his life to jesus. Wrote a book, jesus is coming and analyzing the ecclesiastes to show the return of jesus was near. And that book was a best seller for years. In 1891 he petitioned the president and said the Ottoman Empire is crumbling, it is the job of the United States to return the jews to the promise land. And that letter was signed by the editor of the new york times, things have changed. The editor of the washington post, jpmorgan, rockefeller, the american political intellectual elite all signed that. So that may have diminished someone, but it is still there. Many of you perhaps are not tuning into mike huckabee, but he is more attuned with that america. And politicians are very much aware. And that america says that it is in the National Interest of the United States to support israel. So a lot of what we do in washington, we think that these different positions that we are taking about israel are you know, strategic positions about, you know, these arguments over settlements are about bringing peace between israeli and palestinians and there is also a big cultural battle between two americans. And one is about globalist universalist effort, and another one says america by god. So what did that argument look like, the argument that mike is describing. What did it look like in washington for the last since 67, the argument in washington between american policy makers similar to saying israel a strategic ally and israel is a liability. And how did that play regarding relations also with arab states and muslim states. If i may, i think i will decline because i think mike has defined probably what the framework of discussion has been. And it seems to me in general over time the Strategic Asset over the strategic liability argument has gotten stronger and partially because many circumstances that have changed in the world. The ongoing collapse of the middle east and the violence and so forth has not made arrangements with the middle east look all that attractive, and therefore, the fact that we are not, we are losing out on a chance to be cozy with people who dont like israel has looked less substantial. I did want to comment on a couple of things that both have said which i think are quite important. Is that might insult mike, so i will call him reb mike. And these are somewhat separate points, but mike is correct in saying that the crucial factor here was egypt. And i think properly traces the source of nassers approach to what had happened in 56, for that matter what happened in 48, the soldier that was captured in the 48 war by the israeli army. I am not sure that and the arab forces in general could win. And that is connected with, i mean no doubt wasnt completely unaware of some of the difficulties but i think it was, his confidence or such confidence that he had in the victory came from the way in which what was wrong about israel in the first place, that is i referred before to the shame of 48, which was that jews had beaten arabs and muslims and that seemed at first impossible and it was explained away twice first in 48. The same thing happened in 56 and that argument was made by them and i think it also persuaded them that they had never faced israel in a fair fight because if they did, they could take them because jews are not fighters. As stuckman said. And so whatever reservations went on, everything conspired to give him further confidence. Everyone is backing off. And what is a significant event is the defeat. Because the defeat, first of all, it doesnt dispel the argument that israel survives only because it has foreign european, christian, whatever, support, but it becomes more and more implausible. And the rise of the saudis, but also and this goes along with it, you didnt state it, but i am sure it was implied, the rise of the alternative vision in what these politics should be which is islamists. A reconciliation with the islamists forces. And all of the subsequent developments. The last thing, i want to say the shift to the palestinian issue. I think it always bears emphasizing when the arabs attacked in 48 and when they were about to attack in 67, the goal was to destroy the jewish state. It was to destroy israel, not to establish a palestinian state. And had it been so, there would have been in 48 after the fighting stop. I think 100 to one of them establishing the palestine nan state then. And the odd thing about israels victory is that it paradoxically created the conditions for the establishment of the palestinians because the arabs would never have done it. And in fact that sort of happened. Gaza is a palestinian state and maybe there will be a palestinian state in the west bank. So it had that bizarre effect within the contours of what came to be the palestinian initiative. On the observations, first of all, in large part, i think you are correct. I would say that, and you are also correct that the people who built israel founded israel from say the late 19century on, were very, many great differences among them and great differences. Messionic utopian. And but after that, there was a considerable room for this agreement. They didnt all pull together so easily. My own parents were members of the far left party, and i am sure that they didnt, or their friends, they were fairly moderate in their views. But some of their friends certainly didnt see, didnt have fellow feeling with the other utopian extremes. But what they did have, and this is, i think we cant forget that you are right in where the project has reached a certain goal, the finding of the state. But the state takes on a real reality so that for example communists or left wing could fight shoulder to shoulder with religious guys in 67 and 73 and so forth. And they feel that bond. In fact, when i was in israel, i was with some friends and they were [ buzzer ] what do we do . I have no idea. I am going to wait. We do what we did in 67. Okay. Lets just wait. You know what, they are doing a lot of building in the building and they trip the fire alarm all the time. Having said that, there are probably real fires now. Are there people still outside who want to come back in. Sorry about that. I believe that is probably constructive on 12th street. Okay. The question or your observations is extremely important. But very complicated. We cant explore it adequately here. I think there are two things involved. One is, and this particularly pertains about your remark about the divide between American Jews and israel and in the court of creating a state, they also created a different type of person and israelis, and i think this was noted a long time ago, denominated with the term saabra. But i think it is also true in general that israeli jews are different than other jews. And it is a function of first of all, of the experience of living in that country, and also of having to answer the question or have an answer to the question you pose, what is the mission of israel. Is it merely to be, you know, a modern nation state along the lines of other modern nation states. Or is it to have something distinctively jewish about it. And by the way, since you cited the bible, that attention is there on the bible from the getgo. It isnt just to speak unto the light of the nations. But in israel, that has to be worked out through living experience. And in the United States, you get your choice. You can accommodate yourself through one side of the equation that mike described very well. Enlightened, modern, postmodern, universalist and so forth. Or living in those parts of williamsburg that havent been taken over by hipsters. So you can choose. In israel, that is not possible. And i think, you know, i dont know how much israelis misunderstand this, i am sure American Jews misunderstand this, and those arent simply alternative choices in israel and they have to be worked through and will be worked through. Over time, perhaps, you know, and the combination of the two, the end may look not so, repugnant or alien to americans who are American Jews but certainly be different. It may be, i mean, you talked about the creation of paris or london on the eastern mediterranean, the other option is Silicon Valley on the eastern mediterranean. And israelis of practically all religious persuasion gravitate towards that. And over time, that will see ha emerges from that. Did you want to, i saw you taking notes, did you want to respond to some of that . Well, it is funny, i was telling mike, as the fire raged on, that in a way, i didnt fully, even as i was sort of speaking, didnt anticipate that these connections would be made. But i am wondering now, you said in america you can make a choice and in israel, it is less clear. I am wondering, again, going off the canary and the coal mine theory here, i am actually wondering if the rest of the world has a choice or not. I am wondering if these big collections that we are seeing now arent basically the same conflict and in a way the rest. In a way i dont think that building on the silicone valley is anyway compatible in building out nationalist rallies. Being myself firmly in one side of this debate, right, i dont particular accept the assertion that, you know, enlightenment not as a Historical Movement but as a kind of divine charge lies or progress or all things good, true, and efficient lie necessarily in those who also advocate the kind of universalest, globalest approach. The hurdles were removed that permitted these energies to go out is to do the kind of work that makes possible a country that could both develop new and interesting religious ways and ways that take you from point a to point b. To me, that is a huge accomplishment and huge project. I just wondered to get badge to the original link point, if this tension that israelis that i agree with you partly by and large resolved, isnt coming home across the world. And let me i think that was mikes. Yeah. Im going to let mike answer this it seems to me the case the answers maybe. I think what israeli has shown specifically represented in the turmoil of the last few years but rather the turmoil more generally in the western world and elsewhere is that as a reflection of the fact that in a way the globalist perspective, the idea youre a citizen of the world is nonsense. And the reason for that is very simple. Its not that you couldnt imagine trying to be that. Its just that youve got a body, and it sort of has to be somewhere, and it has to have a home somewhere. And that people have begun to feel that much more powerfully. What the reasons for that are, im not entirely sure. But they do feel in europe maybe frenchman, maybe not europeans or germans rather than europeans, that theres something very specific about themselves in a very specific place where they belong. Now, if thats a trend, then it is the case that israel has may play some role in that development. At least here i would offer as a healthy way of resolving these things. Yes, we are going to have, you know, modern democratic principles and a certain kind of universal understanding, but were also going to be living in some lace, and that place is our home. In this regard, is it a little easier for israel to assert, not to come back to the war, to assert the idea of a National Identity of yes obviously were israelis because all of our neighbors keep telling us. We cant cross the border, we cant go there, we have to live here. Obviously we know the cost, but im just not sure a lot of people i think a lot of people feel dislocations, feel the actual dislocations. But its just not clear to me oh, wait, so its globalism. And thats not what these kinds in washington and Silicon Valley had in mind. Oh, wait, its globalism. Thats goofy. I think a lot of people feel the dislocations but the actual way some people argue at it, im not sure. Well, i think thats true. I think perhaps were just at the beginning of those people to have the arguments youre right. The argument hasnt been that clear, its still not clear. But it was formed Marine Le Pen, the struggle now, i think she said theres no left, theres no right. Theres globalists, their patriots. And i think whatever her inclinations are, shes onto something. People are beginning to feel the tension and divide. And a lot of people are drawn to it. Israel this week 60,000 children marching down the street, happy with their country and supportive of it and not vicious and so forth. And thats different than the image people have of pachrism i want to and mike, your American Interest essay, quoting Marine Le Pen putting it one way, but we were speaking about your essay last night. But somewhere people and anywhere people. Same thing. Can you just talk about that for a second, and then well open it up. In an effort to get at what l. L. Was just describing, it seems to me across the west now, and i stole this idea from David Goodheart in london who was trying to make sense of politics in light of the brexit debate. And he said the country is divided now between anywhere people and the somewhere people. If they lose their job in manchester, they can move to london. If they lose their job in london, they can move to paris or new york. And they work in the media, they work in Software Development and so on and so forth. The anywhere people live in a place. They live in a place, and they dont have a lot of mobility. Theyre less mobile, theyre less flexible. And if an industry leaves their town, theyre stuck in their town with no industry. The anywhere people make up about two thirds i mean the somewhere people make up about twothirds of the population but the somewhere people make up our politics, they run the show. Weve got people interpreting our politics in the media to the country, then we have the rest of the country, which is predominantly a somewhere place. And theyre not buying the presentation of our politics to themselves. Its interesting how you have connected this before for this language you have now you have connected before this you know in our conversations. You have connected, well, these are the kinds of people and theyre not just evangelicals, but the people who have strong feelings about their country. These are the people, americans who tend to support israel. Yeah, to move it back to the 67 war, theres a way in which americans project their own fight about the character of america and its place in the world onto israel. So if you take a position on israel, youre taking a position on the United States, right . Thats why fox news has thats why sarah pailen when she was the vice president. No, when she was the governor of alaska, she had an israeli flag in her office. Its not because she had jewish donors. They had their own name, by the way. The frozen chosen. In the middle of nowhere in texas and off the highway, up on a hill there was a shack with a huge flagpole. And on top of the flag there was an israeli flag. I guarantee that was not a jew who was living out there. And then you have the universities that are profoundally uncomfortable with israel. And the first Academic Organization to vote in favor of the bds in the United States wasnt the middle Eastern Studies association, which you would expect. It was the american studies. Thats very interesting. And these are people that study, you know, transgender Truck Drivers and latino transgender Truck Drivers. And this is how you get ahead in american studies. If i put a map on israel in front of them and ask them to identify the gaza strip in jerusalem, they couldnt even find it. Theyre not talking about its an exaggeration. Some of them could find it. But theyre not talking about israel at all. Theyre just talking about america. Going back to what you two said, in rizeral with the debate, it really is hard to be anywhere when anywhere you turn theres like a border an hour later telling you absolutely not. Youre somewhere. And thats what i meant. You cant cross that border even if you one element that makes it interesting and makes the whole thing unpredictable for the future seems to me is this. In your original question whether people have a positive view of israel or whergts they just feel they have to defendant it and remind that there are others, israel, thats just a situation i would say on the whole israelis have tried to make it a virtue of necessity and say we have a view on why were different. But you dont face that in many parts of the world because your country isnt under attack, you dont have to serve as a soldier and so forth. That era may come to an end, and this is another reason i think that people you mean that era for the rest of the world . Yeah, especially those parts of it that have gotten very used to thinking of themselves as safe and borders dont matter and so on and so forth, mainly europe. I think part of this relationship between the United States and israel has something to do with the fact that at least some Americans Still first of all, america still thinks it has to defend itself, and by the way, quite a few other people, and still has to fight. So that gives you a, you know, a very different outlook on the somewhere or anywhere issue. Were going to run a few minutes late because of the fire alarm. In the mean, lets take a few questions. I saw if someone with a microphone can come down the center aisle here, the woman right here, if you could identify yourself to the rest of the im shauna brian for the jewish policy center. Id like to go back to the war. Land for peace assumes that if israel wants peace, it has to give up land. 2242 not only doesnt say that, it inverts the process. The arabs are expected to give israel respect for sovereignty. Interesting the only two countries that did that are the only two countries with peace with egypt, and thats egypt and jordan. All these Peace Process stuff is backwards, it seems to me, asking israel to do a variety of things in order to induce the arabs, to give it peace when 242 says the opposite, you have to give, and then you make boundaries. So i wonder if you want to end the 67 war, which really hasnt ended, dont you have to go back to 242 . Mike, since you raised the issue first of all, its a very interesting idea that the 67 war hasnt ended. I see a little differently. I dont think the 48 war has ended. Is 1987 over . Its too early to tell. I mean theres an effort to define, if i understand you correctly, theres an effort to define the conflict in a very specific way. And there are a lot of people who for a whole host of reasons, some of which included they really see it that way, im talking in the arab world they actually see it that way. But then there are a lot of others who dont. You only need to listen to what the iranians say or what the syrians say or hezbollah says to see that the armstance line of 1948 are not really the issue. I dont know that this diplomatic formula or that diplomatic foorm luis the key to bringing about peace. I think its this larger problem of the nonacceptance of israel in the land. Theres a gentleman over here, so if you could hold on one second and if you could wait for the microphone. If you would stand and identify yourself please. Abraham, thank you so much for your presentations. 50 years ago i happened to serve as a lieutenant in the Israeli Air Force. Id like to share a few personal observations. Im so sorry. If you could keep it to a question you direct at some. Ill just make two quick observations. One observation. Okay. The country being under siege to becoming a regional super power after the power, the country kwu drupealalled the population by 2 Million People, the size kwu drupealled. The mood changed from anxiety to euphoria and the consequence of the occupation were not understood at the time. And the finally the contribution of the air force, the war started on monday, june 5, 8 00 in the morning where the entire Israeli Air Force was launched except for a few planes. They bombed the Egyptian Air Force on the sides of the canal, 340 egyptian planes were destroyed on the ground. And after that the air force worked around the clock facility after facility to bomb targets both in the west bank and heights a after both jordan and seralia joined the war. The tanks sir, thanks. Im sorry, thanks. I really need to move onto another question. Thank you very much. Theres a gentleman in the back. Doug. Hi, im doug fithe, im a fellow here at hudson. You raised which you . All of you discussed the change in attitude towards israel after 67 or you all referred to it in one way or another. Israel was treated in the United States very favorably at the time of the six days war, it was almost a kind of romantic celebration of israels victory in american magazines. I remember it as a kid, life sm magazine had these big spreads celebrating the israeli victary. That changed radically after the 67 war. Also as mike doran was highlighting the general idea the arab conflict was the israely states versus izaleral rather soon changed into the view that the conflict was between the israelis and palestinians. And im wondering if you could just reflect a bit, id be interested in your thoughts on how and why those transformations in the way the world, americans in particular but the world in epigeneral, view the arab israeli conflict from your point of the sympathy towards israel and who were the israelis fighting. Why did that happen, when did that happen . Id just be interested in your thoughts on the transformation. Ill let you answer that quickly, because i want to see if we can get to another question. It certainly hasnt happened completely, but i think as mike said before, a lot of the fight about israel in the end turns out to be a fight about ourselves, about us americans. And it has a lot to do with the development of the right and the leftover time in this country, especially the left. And thats clearest, you know, every four years now the demic party convention, when resolutions supportive of israel either cant get past it all or are very weak. So we have to look at that much more than really what happened in particular with israel. The one big thing was, of course, the oil shock in the 70s, but by now thats pretty much worn off. Mike, do you want to i see two big trends, the one i mentioned, not just egypt but the arab states in general want to disengage. They see the continued conflict with israel as too costly for them. The 67 showed that the egyptians can really really cost them the line. In shutting it down its a huge economic blow to egypt, and that goes just beyond the egyptians. They want to disengage, and they find a convenient way to disengage is put the pll forward and say its not their conflict but ours. Its not a total disengagement but a partial disengagement. Theres also a very savvy calculation behind this and that has to do with the shift in the west and attitudes in the west in particular the United States as a result of the vietnam war. If you think of carters speech at notre dame after hes elected, this is a famous speech where he says theres been an ino inordinate fear. The carter interpretation was this was a National Liberation in which the United States in its manachean vision of International Politics seeing a zerosum game between good and evil, between communism and liberalism, we went and militarized our Foreign Policy and expended all this bloods and treasure and for what . If we just would have realized it was a problem of national selfdetermination we could have worked with the soviets, come to an agreement, and everything would have been fine. So that template starts to become the template in which the american elite and the Carter Administration in particular on the left is looking at global politics. Weve been too muscular, too municken, and they put that forward and you find the Carter Administration comes in immediately on day one with two absolute firm convictions. One is that the palestinian selfdetermination was the core of the conflict, and number two, we have to bring the soviets in and the two of us are going to come together and solve this thing. So well have time for the gentleman right here. My question is sort of moving past the 67 war and looking forward today, things i think are a lot different. We have israel is sort of a regional power, militarily, economically democracy. And then you have the Trump Administration and iran. So if we could look forward now, whats the global strategic sort of view . Why dont we do a final speed round here with our final questions as everyone goes . Mike, would you like to kick off the speed round sphand i do mean the speed round, giving you 45 seconds. You just threw me off my game here. So if you think about what i just said, nixon to carter, you can map that onto bush to obama, right . Obama came in, we militarized our Foreign Policy, we engaged in a thankless war, and we need to pull back and be less militaristic, and that goes hand in glove with the Peace Process. Thats the key way we show the rest of the world that we want to find Diplomatic Solutions to problems without nasty muscular america. Trump comes in, trump is a hybrid between bush and obama. What trump said in the campaign was im going to give you more with less. Im going to give you more than president obama gave you, because he was unwilling to use military force and flex americas muscles pch not me. Youre going to see muscular america, but im going to do less than what george bush did. George bush got involved in all these thankless initiatives like spreading democracy all around the world. Not me. Im going to focus on narrow National Interest. So you find theres a tension in the Trump Administration. The narrow National Interest people who are thinking like obama about pulling back, right, they want Peace Process and they want to their wary of israel because the support for israel is a muscular policy. And other people think the opposite. 45 seconds, not a doran 45 seconds. I think mostly in a way youre asking about iran. And i would say [ inaudible ]. Look, it boils down to this. Iran will get a bomb unless someone stops them. And if they get a bomb, then we will have not only an iranian bomb, but well have further proliferation. No one has a clue as to what that would mean, how dangerous it would be. [ inaudible ]. You asked out people have to prepare now for what happens in ten years, and it may not take ten years. On the met physical sense i think that attitudes are changing, and theyre changing very dramatically. I also think that part of the problem is we have spent about 50 years looking for the end of the lamplight, hoping that we could only constrict, if we could only define the competence in the correct way and only construct some sort of framework, its just around the corner. I think were moving away from that. I think israel is moving away from that plitsically. I think america is, too. And i think in a really interesting way it would open really knew and hopeful coalitions of people around the world, not necessarily maybe here in the United States, but i think much of the sorts between israel and say india and china has to do with that actually very similar way of seeing the world and understanding longterm interests. And to me that is a dramatically hopeful change. I think a lot of what we have seen courtesy of the last president propelled us into an era in which the chances for a collaboration between israel and the saudis, certainly the egyptians is interesting to say the least. And so theres a lot of there are a lot of reasons to be very hopeful. Theyre just none of the reasons we would have imagined, say, five years ago. Interesting. Thank you. Thank you all for coming. Thank you Hudson Institute as well. Tomorrow secretary of state Rex Tillerson speaks about president trumps 2018 budget request interest the state department. Hes in front of the Senate Relations committee starting live at 10 00 a. M. Eastern an cspan 3. Also testimony from attorney Jeff Sessions on the enset Intelligence Committee is expected to answer questions on several issues including the Ongoing Investigation into russian hacking of the 2016 president ial election, and former fbi directors James Comey Testimony in front of the same Committee Last week. Watch the attorney generals remarks live tuesday at 2 30 eastern. You can also watch online or listen on the cspan radio app. Sunday night on afterwards, utah republican senator mike lee talks about forgotten historical figures who fought against Big Government in his book. Like i said when youre on the look out for them, they come to you gradually. Ask friends, other people i knew who they thought should get more credit than they get. And in the case of this, this is an indian chief from the tribe. And he understood the principle of federalism, because they lived it for sercharies. He had a profound impact on our system of government because hes the guy who enabled Benjamin Franklin to find it made it a more perfect way into the constitutionitution. Watch it at 9 00 p. M. Eastern on cspans book tv. In case you missed it, retired general brig dare callaway on the threat of Climate Change on national security. If you go back to older field manuals, theres one in the 1980 sz, that said whether its the runways that have to be open sole you can land on them, whether its the open seas or whether its the hill youre going to climb, when theyre in change, and they are in change right now, the military is concerned about that. So the military has long had an interest in dealing with things like this and forecasting what might happen. And then at a town hall meeting. I wonder why you dont just have a single payer you know what i said in the ginning of the meeting and that is that interruptions, you know, are not going to be tolerated. Okay, would you please sit down, sir . She has the floor, you do not. Would you please sit down or go out in the hallway . Thank you for leaving. Maine senator angus king at a hearing on the foreign Intelligence Surveillance act. Ill ask both of you the same question. Why are you not answering these questions . Is there an invocation by the president of the United States by executive privilege . Is there or not . Not that im aware of that. Than why are you not answering . Uzi feel it isnt appropriate, senator. What you feel isnt relevant. And then the. Edu act. Today what we leased was a cop on the beat. This is regarding the holy inadequate role in investigating the wells fargo fraudulent account scandal. We have received numerous records from wells fargo and others that indicate that the cfpb was asleep at the wheel. Cspan programs are available at cspan. Org, on our home page, and searching the video library. Earlier this month nsa held a conference to talk about the fisa act which gives the government authority

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