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oversight and accountability. this is just over an hour and 15 minutes. >> good morning, everyone, welcome to the subcommittee on oversight, management, and accountability. i understand our ranking member is okay with us proceeding. he is on his way. i know there is a lot of contradicting messages this morning. we're supposed to be on the floor, the committee, or both, or neither. subcommittee and oversight management of accountability, we now come to order. and without objection, the chair is authorized to declare the subcommittee in recess at any point. good morning. i want to thank everyone for being here today. and for joining us to discuss this most important topic of federal buildings security. protection of facilities, employees, and visitors, it's an important part of the homeland securities day-to-day work. as all of you know, tensions have risen recently with response to the fbi's raided mar-a-lago, the passage of the historic inflation reduction act. we've all seen threats directed towards federal employees and federal office buildings. just last month, an armed man attempted to with violence can entrance to an fbi office in cincinnati. and less well-known are the increasingly threatening language that has been directed to irs employees and those working to preserve government documents at the national archives and records administration. while not typical, though it's high for security facilities, these are the government -- the men and women who work than visit them every day are now facing new security risks. with threats to federal facilities on the rise, we look to the first front lines of defense, the department of homeland security's federal protective service, also known as fps. fps ensures that more than 9500, 9500 federal operated buildings across the country are safe and secure, from government agency headquarters here in washington, d.c. to world court houses and field offices across the country, across the 50 states. if you've ever visited a federally owned building, you have noticed thousands of f espy officers and contract -- providing onsite security. but f espy, or i should say, fps's role extends beyond the guards posted, at entrances and exits. fps also helps government agencies prepare for and prevent any security risks. they result from a changing threat environment or aging infrastructures. fps performs facilities security assessments for all federally owned buildings and lease buildings. it makes recommendations for improvements to ensure that buildings meet required security standards. these facility assessments and recommendations are very important to ensure the security protocols keep up with the types of threats that we're seeing on a day-to-day basis. the suggested recommendations can range from replacing security cameras and alarms to updating security guidances and policies. however, despite the good coordination between fps and other government agencies, all too often, these recommendations go an implemented, leaving huge gaps in our security systems. according to the government accountability officer, g.a.o., customer agencies have described fps's security facility assessments as comprehensive, and useful. but they have rejected about 70% of fps's recommendations. so, again, good recommendations, awesome, but 70% of the time not heeded to. g.a.o. founded a variety of factors in the majority of five passes recommendations, not being implemented, including incomplete information and of course lack of proper funding. we can and we should do better in mitigating the risks to facilities, federal employees, and citizens that visit those buildings. and today, it will have the opportunity to hear more about inter agency cooperation that goes into developing building security standards, as well as the challenges of meeting the standards. and with that, i thank you again for joining us today, our witnesses and other guests. i will reserve time for our ranking member, mr. pete mayor from michigan for an opening statement when he gets here. and with that, members are reminded that the committee will operate according to the guidelines laid out by the chairman and ranking member in their february 3rd colloquy regarding remote procedures, and without objection, members not on the subcommittee shall be permitted to sit and question to witnesses. mr. meijer, we call on you front opening statements, or. >> thank you, mister chairman, for holding this important hearing today. i'm a security of federal buildings across the country. i appreciate this subcommittee diving into this topic. and also i'm grateful for witnesses who are here today to shed light on this important issue. it is said the committee held -- on the federal protective services role in june of 2019. i think it's important we follow up on what was learning that today. fps as an agency has evolved over time, it has experienced multiple transitions within the department of homeland security, formally established by the general services administration in 1971, fps is the primary federal agency responsible for the protection of all buildings, grounds, and property, owned, occupied, or secured by the federal government. this is obviously an enormous responsibility for an agency that often goes unnoticed and taken for granted. fps employees 1300 staff, approximately 934 of whom are law enforcement specialists, criminal investigation, investigators, or canine handlers, all of whom train at the federal law enforcement training center or flex e. in addition, fps idly relies on more than 15,000 contract guard stuff for protective service officers, or pieces, to conduct security screenings of more than 9000 federal buildings across the country. pesos are the backbone of the fps operation. without the help of these contract guards, a fierce would not be what carried its mission. the protection of our federal buildings and properties is of utmost significance. unfortunately, violence against the government, and in turn, against federal government buildings, property, and personal is not out of the norm and has become more prevalent in recent years. it's incredibly disheartening, we must worry about such things, but we must, and therefore a conversation today takes on added importance and relevance. with such an important mission, we need to ensure the fbi says the tools and authorities to operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. of now, fps has been on geo, government accountability offices, a high risk list since 2003, nearly 20 years, found the fps is not assessing risk that federal facilities in a consistent standard, such as the -- protection plans risk management framework, as fps had originally planned. this is especially worrisome because a failure by fps could have catastrophic results. the focus of today's hearing is on the security assessment process, afghans provide security assessments and recommendations to every federal facility protects in accordance with the inter agency security committee standards. this ioc standard, which is housed within ceases infrastructure security division collaboratively establishes, polices, monitors, compliance, and enhances the security protection of federal facilities. as we hear from our witnesses today, a large majority of the recommendations that come out of those assessments have not yet been implemented, which begs the obvious question of why not? as we are here, i would like to hear the perspectives from the witnesses on the following questions. number one, it is fps positioned correctly within the dhs to be the most effective? number two, how does fps work with cisa and how collaborative is that relationship? three, why do such a large majority of fbi a security assessment recommendations go on implemented and in turn is there a better way we can facilitate this process? for, does fps have the right structure with most of their workforce being contracts the port? and five, is the structure appropriate and effective for the role of f has today? mister chairman, i'm grateful for holding this hearing. it is a sometimes overlooked agency within dhs, as they play never important role protecting our government. we have to take our oversight responsibility here seriously, i look forward to hearing for our witnesses to determine what actions we can take moving forward. thank you, i yield back. >> thank you mister meijer. now, i would like to welcome our panel of witnesses. first we have mr. cline, the principal deputy director for the federal protective service. mr. cline has worked with fps for 20 years where he coordinates federal state and local officials to ensure the protection of the buildings, grounds, and property that are owned, occupy, or secured by the federal government. mr. cline previously served 20 years with u.s. army military police corps regiment. our second witness is mr. scott bregor, a soviet director for security programs for the infrastructure security division at the cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency or cisa. he helps lead the says efforts to secure the nation's critical infrastructure in coordination with government and private sectors. mr. bregor has over 30 years of military and senior executive experience in the u.s. government. and our third witness, miss catina latham. acting director of the physical infrastructure team at the government accountability office or g.a.o.. she has worked for g.a.o. for nearly 20 years, where she oversees g.a.o.'s work on federal really property management, including facility security and personal assets. without objection, the witnesses full statements will be inserted into the record. i now ask each witness to summarize his or her statement in five minutes. beginning with deputy director klein. welcome, sir. >> good morning, chairman correa, ranking member meijer, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. i'm honored to be here today to represent the federal protective services. employees to thankor f this. to testify to the central role we play in protecting employees and facilities. thank you for allowing us opportunity to raise awareness for the criticality of operation. fps employs nearly 1000 officers who protect the people and property of the federal government. our services provide protection and deter threats and thousands of federal facilities across the united states and territories. it protects millions of federal employees and businesses. our highest priority is the safety and security of the more than 1.4 million employees that work in the federal facilities that we protect. we cannot achieve this mission without the dedication and focus of the men and women of the federal protective services. i firmly believe they are the most dedicated and professional employees in the federal government. it is an honor to represent them here today. due to recent acts of violence and communities across the country, our nation remains at a heightened threat. according to the latest dhs issued, national terrorism advisory bulletin, potential targets include government facilities and personnel. there's been an increase in threats towards departments and agencies, most notably the fbi, internal revenue service, on the national archives and records administration. we have increased our protection efforts at those facilities, occupied by these agencies and remain prepared to detect, prevent, and respond to criminal activities of these locations. on a given day, at a single fps protected facility, dozens of our security countermeasures are in place. working together to protect the integrity of buildings and its occupants. we closely monitor for suspicious activity, counter-operations ensure facilities are secure. long for some officers and security officers are highly trained and prepared to deter attacks. as recently demonstrated at the chicago instance with fbi field offices. those took action that those locations are -- the first line of defense. we have selfless commitment as recognizing efforts this week as part of the national security officer appreciation week. from federal court -- high-profile trials take place, the daycare centers in federal facilities where we protect the most innocent, fps has time and time again proved we're dynamic, dedicated law enforcement agency. additionally, fps directly protects 233 -- located at 176 buildings in the fps prediction portfolio. we have a responsibility for protection efforts of these facilities and have strong relationships with the united states capitol police and the house and senate staff to ensure safety of all members. established over 50 years ago, fps is made progress as an organization. as an integral part of the homeland securities mission to safeguard the american people. yeah, law enforcement officers have saved lives by a lifesaving medical treatment, conscious -- conducting yearlong investigations, and even being entered into the line of duty, federal employees and business, among those who responded to the cohen january 6th 2021 to help secure the capital. simply put, fps has been extremely successful and answering the call to defend and protect the very institutions would allow our government to function in our country to flourish, i sincerely -- for inviting me to testify on f passes important role, i'd be pleased to answer any questions you have, thank you. >> scott bregor to summarize his statement for five minutes. >> -- as the associate director for security programs within cybersecurity infrastructures and security agencies, infrastructure security division, i appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the inner agency's security committee's role in the protection of federal buildings and its efforts to improve preparedness and coordination within agency partners. on october 19th, 1995, six months after the oklahoma city bombing at the federal building, president clinton issued an executive order one to 977, creating the inter agency security committee or easy. -- physical security requirements of federal facilities. membership of this that consisted of executives from 66 agencies. this collective security subject matter expertise allows us to develop chopped here risk management resources and coordinator agencies lotions to problems that can be solved by individual departments and agencies. the irc is a collective form that carries out its work by, with, and through its members with the primary governance framework of subcommittees and working groups. these working groups, which are provisional, test base bodies established by the ioc, clear objectives. in march 2003, the role of chair transferred from the general services administration to dhs. dhs delegated this responsibility to says that in light of its role to help protect and secure the nation's critical infrastructure. so is a stewardship ugly -- enters its work supports and leverages state, local, territorial, and tribal organizations as well as the private sector. all essential partners as we work tune sure the continued protection of federal facilities and assets across the nation and around the world. executive order one to 977 gave the ioc three key responsibilities. these include establish policies for security in and protection of federal facilities, development evaluate security standards and strategy to ensure compliance, and take actions to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security and protection of federal -- >> fulfills these responsibilities for multiple lines of effort, including the risk management process standard. the risk management process standards provides an integrates physical source countermeasures and guidance on countermeasure customization for all nonmilitary federal facilities. i asked the members created this process standard to provide a common method for all stakeholders to guide risk assessments in a standardized way and help facility owners identify levels of production in order to mitigate that risk. further, the ece value it's the tools and training programs as meeting the rest management process standards. this helps build individual organization capabilities to successfully implement icy guidance and conduct in these assessments, uses an assessment tool that's been validated by the ioc, modified infrastructure survey tool. additionally, fps is a fiscal security training program located at the federal law enforcement training center has similarly been validated by the icy. this training program trains fps personal on how to conduct risk assessment using their validated modifying infrastructure survey tool. to the main drivers of threats to -- targeted violence and terrorism. as noted in the most recent dhs national terrorism advisory system bulletin, these threats are becoming more varied and complex, it is and will remain a top priority of dhs. dhs is committed to using every resource available to prevent, detect, and mitigate threats of violence directed at federal facilities. thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. and for this committee's continued support of cisa and the department. i look forward to continuing to work closely with you and other members of congress to keep our federal facilities and those who work at them safe and secure. >> thank you for your testimony. i now recognize miss latham to summarize her statements in five minutes or less. welcome. >> thank you, good morning. chairman correa, ranking member meijer, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the federal protective services security risk assessments. as you've mentioned we have designated federal property management as a high risk area since 2003. in part because of the physical security challenges at federal facilities. my statement today will focus on our prior and ongoing work on fps. first, i will cover the stakeholders views on fps, facility assessments, and the status of fps security recommendations. next, i'll discuss the preliminary observations of fps law enforcement deployment. first, we recorded engineering 2021 that stakeholders were generally status side with fps security assessment process. however many of them expressed concern with the cost estimates fps provided in these reports. or as they lack important information that could help agencies make decisions. stakeholders reported their concerns about the cost estimates, may discourage them from implementing security measures intended to reduce the security threats. in that report, we recommended that the director of fps ensure that facility security assessments, document both the assumption and sources used to develop the cost estimates for each recommended security measure. as of august 2022, fps had taken steps to address their recommendations, in part by updating his directive and manual for conducting these assessments. we are now on the process of analyzing fps actions are fully responsive to our recommendations. next, fps data indicates that security recommendations are generally not implemented as the chairman mentioned, our knowledge the shows the between fiscal year 2017 and 2021, fps made more than 25,000 security recommendations at nearly 5000 federal facilities. now, these recommendations ranged from addressing physical vulnerabilities to ensuring policy or guidance documents. furthermore, fps data shows they did not receive a decision as to whether agencies approved or rejected more than half of the security recommendations. this data also shows an agency's approval of a recommendation does not necessarily mean it will be implemented. about the 6000 of the approved recommendations, only about 22% have been implemented as of september 2022. fdr's officials have also noted that some recommendations stay open for years as i can take time to secure the funding and implement some of the more costly recommended security measures. in our ongoing work, we will explore and identify factors that influence agency's decisions to approve or reject security recommendations. we'll also look at why fps is not receiving information on those decisions. we expect a report on this work in early 2023. in addition to conducting facilities security assessments, f pales provides law enforcement support other federal agencies, preliminary observations from their ongoing work shows that the number of days fps has displayed law enforcement officers has increased since fiscal year 2020. these officers are deployed to augment security fps protected securities to support other agencies homeland security operations. fps deployments, for example, have helped in securing federal facilities during protests and housing units for migrants in the southwest boarding region. as a final point, staffing is also an important consideration as f bs continues to have shortages. in june 2010, when fps was in the cybersecurity and infrastructure security agency, we reported the fps had difficulty obtaining the needed staff. fps had not field 20% of its authorize possessions, including about 200 law enforcement positions. we're currently conducting work on these changes. onsince fdr's move to the management directorate and how they are collaborating to address fps staffing shortages. we expect to release an issue on this work by the end of 2022. chairman correa, ranking member meijer, and members of the subcommittee. this concludes my statement, i'm happy to answer your questions. >> thank you very much, i want to thank all the witnesses for your testimony and i'll remind the subcommittee that each one of us has five minutes to question the panel, and all recognize myself for five minutes for questions. your testimony is very important. 70% of office piece, fps's recommendations not implemented, miss -- latham, you cited a number of factors, budgets. you cited the challenges in the southern border. is this 70% non implementation something new? or has this been something that's been going on for a number of years, miss latham? >> think you for the question, the work we're doing now, we're sending a look further in-depth into how long this is been a standing issue not being implemented. some of the reasons, as you mentioned, that we had heard in our prior work was due to not having the cost estimate as i noted. and the agencies noted they needed these cost estimates to just further understand the scale of what is needed to address them. they also said that they needed the information, for example, if they were in a building that was older. >> has this been going on for three, four, five years, a decade? i don't know the time period >> mr. cline? could you help me out here? mr. climb, can you help me out here? >> absolutely. it's been going on for a good while, sir. it is also -- >> and i asked this because, first of all, let me say, thank you for the good work you do. keeping us safe. our buildings, our citizens. our federal employees. you're jobs finding a needle in a haystack. yet, failure is unacceptable. oklahoma city bomb, 9-1-1. when you have failures, they're back. it's not you, it's. us what i'm trying to do is figure out a roadmap here to help you do your job better. 70%, help me out here. give me a little bit of a roadmap. what would you prioritize some of the things you need to do. 70% of your recommendations is not going implemented is not something uncomfortable listening to today. mr. cline, please. >> thank you, sir. as representative from -- mentioned. we have corrected the cost estimates for the countermeasures, so that's an approach that we've corrected. it is very difficult to get these countermeasures implemented. like we've mentioned, is typically resources from the agencies to be able to implement those countermeasures. if it's a monte -- and all the agencies in the facility, one has to agree to that countermeasure recommendation. number, too they have to fund their share of that cost for countermeasures recommendations. my counterpart and i see, they recently established a program to observe the compliance by agency other countermeasure recommendations. it might be worth having mr. rear talk to you a bit about that, sir. and how we're doing that. >> please. >> yes, sir. so, i another risk measure process that initially came out in 2013, one of the key aspects of that is ukiah best standard, now compliance to that standard. we are working with our inter agency partners, because i am here representing a collective of all 66 agencies and make up the icy. at the end of that tail, there is that specific department agency, that facility, that risk, what we rolled out in 2019, a compliance system. so we are now receiving reports from departments and agencies, with respect their compliance, with forest management process standard, active shooter, and also -- into federal facilities. i'm happy to say that this year, and going along with the best practices, we actually finished a pilot a verification program. so it's one thing yet to collect compliance, nothing to verify that compliance. going forward will be able to verify with department agencies submit to the compliance system. >> you had further questions, but i'd like to recognize the ranking measure of the subcommittee, for michigan. mister mayor, for his set questions. >> thank you mister chairman. obviously, it's a difficult position that you find yourselves and because you're making recommendations. you are trying to get those recommendations, or when making those recommendations, trying to present so in a way that is going to be most conducive to them ultimately been adopted. all the while having fps personnel standing in that breach in the interim. this is driven home by the death of p is so hunter wood and the 2020, during the george floyd protests. and accelerationist group took advantage of that chaos and shot and killed p.s. -- and wounded's partner. i don't necessarily want to dwell on that one tragic incident, but how does fps balance the desire to have those recommendations be implemented with the fact that it's fps personnel who are protecting, the special in the psa, side or protecting potentially made vulnerable, of those recommendations are not ultimately implemented by the facility owner. mr. cline, let's pass the steel. >> thank, you sir. it wasn't a difficult situation when the counter measures are not implemented. we balance our staff ain't requirements, we work with our local city, stay, partners, to maintain awareness of threats to facilities. as well as demonstrations that may occur in those facilities. we balanced our deployment efforts. as well as staffing efforts to those facilities, based on what we hear. i'm with you on -- one and went to his memorial service in oakland. the bad situation we had 17 officers there at the time, at that incident. it was total chaos. very violent demonstration that occurred at the time. like you, sad bad actors took advantage of that situation. for, us it's a balance on how we employ ourselves. we know that my facility, we are the highest risks are. we know where we need to put people. for example, the fbi facilities around the country, and president agencies, are very secure. in cincinnati, during the attack, there is no way anyone is going to get inside that building. or protect a security officer sounded the alarm, and the fbi agents inside the building responded. the individual flood. working to get the other agencies to reach that level of awareness and preparedness is our issue. like it was mentioned before, primarily it comes down to funding. this is a multi tenant agency we're working with our department agencies and washington d.c.. it could be $20,000. there's a portion of a, camera camera budget. getting that $20,000 back to ames, iowa, is difficult situation that the facilities secure committee's got themselves them. >> i want to follow up on what you said, mr. cline, but i don't want you to have to answer it. miss lynn them, mr. cline mentioned the fbi is in intended organization that is both aware of the threat that they face, and the critical role, as well as very equipped to understand and balances right versus the cost of the countermeasures. are there any, and this is why didn't mr. cline to have to answer, and other any agencies, ten agencies, that you think are particularly less inclined to adopt countermeasures on the opposite end of the spectrum, if fbi is maybe in the better practices? >> well, i would say that in terms of your question, i'm lawson client, but the agencies are viewed, as we notice, there are more recommendations that were not addressed. there are smaller agencies. this would be understandable to some of the -- may be due to some of their challenges to address them, but we did look further into that. i would say the smaller agencies compared to the larger ones had more on address recommendations. >> and mr., klein just want to get back to that real quick. a broader question, fps had been transferred, as we mentioned, to three different parts of dhs in the last two decades. do you think that right now the management director would be a permanent home for a fierce? or as another hall within dhs potentially more appropriate? >> thank you. our transition to management has been wonderful. we are really taking advantage of the expertise of the lines of business. cfo, crs out, you name it. we need to mature our business program with an f bs, and been under management. this is helping us do that. ultimately, the decision on the fps has, as we grow and mature, we would be ready to prepare ourselves to become a component within dhs, a stand-alone component. right, now our alignment with management, specifically under leadership and guidance of -- for management, dr. alice, has been a good place for us right now. >> thank, you mr. cline. with that, my time is expired. >> thank, you sir. chair will now recognize other members of the committee for questions that they may wish to ask the witnesses. in accordance with the guidelines laid out by the chairman and the ranking members of the february 3rd. we'll recognize members in order of seniority. alternating between majority and minority members. numbers are reminded to unmute themselves when recognized for questions. now i'd like to recognize mr. payne, from jersey, for five minutes of questions. mr. payne, welcome. >> thank you mister chairman. thank you for this timely hearing. deputy, mr. cline, according to the government of -- the federal protected services, and staffing shortage, approximately 21% of this position are -- including about 200 lawton forsman positions. how are you issuing that is still able to respond to threats, to the federal property, perform security assessments, and other core missions, while working with a reduced number of law enforcement personnel? >> thank you for your question congressman pain, you are correct, we are experiencing about a 21% sure fall on our staffing needs. it is a variety of reasons for this. like most of the businesses and agencies within the united states, who are all dealing with labor market challenges the same as everyone else. whirl so competing for the same people, so city council and law enforcement agencies are all looking for that same person to join their agencies and become a law enforcement officer. we continue to work with dhs, officers the chief freeman capital officer, are according, team they will be ads military base tomorrow to continue our recruiting efforts. we just started a class at the federal law enforcement training program last monday, 24 new students. we have other classes scheduled for this year. so it is a continued challenge for us, but our goal in fy 23 is to fill all of our vacancies, including a law enforcement and support position vacancies. >> no care. given what we have seen in the aftermath of january 6th investigations that uncovered both military and law enforcement personnel being involved in the insurrection, what is that doing to weed out the potential nature of ideological folks amongst the ranks? >> i thank you for your question, congressman. so when we recruit and hire, a new, officer they go through the security clearance process to the dhs office. obviously the chief security officer. it's a rigorous process, very detailed, thorough analysis of the background and suitability of that applicant. and once they come on board, the chief security officer of the ageist has also stood up a program, i don't know the exact name of, et cetera, but it's continuous monitoring. so if that individual, let's take me for instance, if tonight i was arrested for some reason, that continuous monitoring program would, the officer of the chief security officer, he would know about it tomorrow, then he would action on whatever that circumstance of the rust was. it is our goal to make sure that the people we hire are not involved in any dp type activity. we do hire a large number of veterans, who have 80% of our law enforcement officers are better and. i'm a veteran just like they are. but the process of the officer to use have occurred to do that, that background association on the respective employee and their continuous monitoring of the employees activities, it's really helping us to ensure we weed out those bad actors. >> okay. i think that was a focus on new hires. what about officers that are already in the organization? >> yes, sir. that's the process that the officer chief security officer uses on the continually monitoring program. also with our relationships to city council state and federal law enforcement, as you are, where the law enforcement agencies actively monitor different types of media, looking for individuals that may be associated with domestic violence and extremism. if we receive notification, or are aware of a dhs, or aefi has officer, then that will be turned over to our office of internal affairs to investigate that employees activity. >> thank you. mister chairman, we have to stay vigilant in this area because, as we now, we have done a incredible job stopping the foreign fighter, but it is the internal issues that we have with domestic terrorism that plagues our nation today. with that i yield. >> thank, you mr.. pain i recognize the gentleman from north carolina, mr. bishop, for five minutes. welcome, sir. >> thank you mister chairman. mr. cline, i want to focus on something that almost slipped from national consciousness, but it always struck me as something very strange. in portland oregon, over, i think june in july of 2020, their war 52 consecutive nights in which intifada anarchists and other radicals, i, guess carried out violence. a lot of it was focus on the federal courthouse in portland. one thing, just extend my memory about, that i know that there were some reports of the time that officers, federal officers were blinded or injured by lasers. how widespread was that? if those officers recovered fully, have there been permanent injuries resulting? >> thank you, congressman bishop. portland was the very chaotic, unprecedented edge of that. we hadn't seen this before. a number of officers, within an fps 363 officers were injured. i think roughly a total of 800 injuries are not only the fps officers, but also the cpd and i.c.e. officers that invited our assistance. primarily with green lasers, molotov cocktails, ball bearing shot with slingshots, commercial grade pyrotechnics that were thrown at them. the fps, the dhs officers supported that events are, in my eyes, their heroes. they are level of restraint, their goal was to ensure that the courthouse, in the federal facilities in portland were protected. they achieve that goal. they stayed inside that courthouse until someone was attempted to cause damage, like setting the building on fire, before they come out to take action. when they did come, out they were hit with a barrage of violence, basically. all those officers have recovered from those injuries. we did have one officer, an fbi surface, or who did die of a heart attack. not during the events, but as he was going to work. unfortunately, another officer within dhs did commit suicide. we don't know if it was related to his activities. he had served in portland. >> what an excellent summary of that, mr. cline. it's, you started with the term unprecedented. that was how it struck i think many americans. they've never seen anything like this in the terms of the continued activity over long period of time. one thing that was remarkable is the portland city council voted, as i understand, to prevent police from cooperating with federal law enforcement. the mayor, the ted wheeler, he said at one point the presence of dhs officers as, quote, actually leading to more violence and more vandalism, close quote. he had mayors from a number of cities. they attorney general, the acting dhs secretary saying that the deployment of officers to protect facilities was an abuse of power. i know that, if i'm understanding g.a.o.'s report on dhs's strategy in portland, they said suggested that there was an assumption that you received support from local law enforcement but that wasn't the case. the g.a.o. recommended introducing a new strategy to account for that. i hardly believe that i'm reading words like that in the congressional hearing, or certainly, that they would be true. what can you offer us about that issue? how does, how do you intend to respond to the fact that mayors have supported, and city council have supported that kind of lawlessness, and refused to help? >> thank you congressman, bishop. throughout the country, we rely heavily on city county state law enforcement to assist us in the protection of our facilities. typically in a large city, if there is some type of violence or criminal act in a federal building, the local law enforcement may be the first to respond. the majority of federal facilities that we protect our -- meaning the local law enforcement agencies have vividly to respond as well. within portland, we, the fact that the portland police bureau, who we are very tight with, we work well with, the fact that they were prohibited from assisting, that is the exact reason why we had to deploy my officers. this was to protect the federal facilities. typically, day-to-day, they will provide our systems, but during that timeframe, they were restricted. we were not able to support us, which resulted us to put more people out there. >> it seems to some of us that this kind of attack is something that can spring up, and lots of places in the united states. that there's someone out there organizing. it does that not need to be looked into by congress? to determine whether people have the ability to bring this type of attack into federal facilities that any damages? >> congressman bishop, i think between the summer of 2020, which a lot of law enforcement, not just fps, but a lot of law enforcement officers, and agencies, we're dealing with large-scale demonstrations, in some cases violence. you all experienced that on january six. we experience set out in portland. so i think we have done while working with our partner agencies, the federal government, and city council state to share information. we all learn classes. we all learn that we need to work better together to share information, make sure we are aware of it and what could pop up. that has really increased over the last year. >> thanks for your outstanding service and testimony, mister chairman. my time is expired. >> thank you very much. now i call on gentlelady from nevada, miss titus, for five minutes of questions. welcome. >> thank you very much, mister chairman. and the previous member of this committee was talking about portland been unprecedented events. let's talk about another unprecedented event, and that was the storming of the capital on january the six. now no one could've anticipated it would've been as terrible as it was. there were certainly warning signs, including the radical commentary on the internet for several days leading up to the events of that day, where people tried to storm, they didn't try, they did, storm the capitol and try to overturn our legal elections. it was hyper-partisan, and it wasn't the fastest, it was pro violence, and it was racist. that shouldn't give us some hints, because this was festering online for several days. we are not seeing that kind of incendiary language, to that extent, right now, but i think there are some lessons that we can learn about how to spot potential events like this. i would ask mr. cline, how is your agency working with others to keep apprized of misinformation online, and to stay aware of credible threats to federal buildings that might come as a result of that, or in conjunction with that? does the interagency security committee factor in online threats environment, when you're connecting risk assessments of federal buildings? if you don't, why not? >> thank you congresswoman titus. as we mentioned before, we have dramatically increased our communication with the city can't see state and federal law enforcement policy stairs. we maintain regular communications with our law enforcement partners, dhs, intelligence analysis, the centers throughout the country. the federal executive orders, which is the 28 federal executive board, throughout the country that have a level of oversight over the federal agencies and operations. we continue to maintain awareness of threats. as you mentioned, sharing that information is critical to make sure that we are prepared to actively respond and react to a given situation that might be coming up. you mentioned january 6th on that day, our job, the -- is to protect federal buildings that were in the area of the ellipse, and then the march that took place, the took the capitol. that is where we are focusing. we did provide some of support, and we did provide support to the capitalist in his that call went out. the sharing of information, the preparation for events like this that could occur as dramatically increase since january six, and it's in a really good place now. >> and while we certainly appreciate your help on that day, and trying to keep all of the buildings members, staff, press, everyone's, safe. thank you for that. can we talk specifically about the protected of investigations program, and how your members work there, train there, cooperate with them? >> absolutely, ma'am. so far this year we've opened up 201 protective threat investigations. we've made 19 arrests at this point. we anticipate will make more arrests as those investigations continue. most of these threat of instigations are, we are informed by an agency of an employee who received a threatening communications, whether it's an email, phone call, text message, whatever it may be. that information is provided to us and our special agencies, or criminal investigators, they will conduct the investigation, work with city council and state partners, federal partners, do the background on the bad actor, that are first making the threat. they will make a determination, coordinating with the assistant u.s. attorney and that area that the threat is coming from. this will make the determination on making the arrest. that's typically how that process works, ma'am. >> well thank you so much. this, we really appreciate the job that you do, and how it might be hard to get people to work to recruit, and also to maintain that forest. make sure you let us know what resources you need, if we need to provide additional funding in, or assistance in any way. in order for you to do your job effectively, then you mister chairman, and i'm going to -- >> thank you miss titus, now we recognize the gentlelady from tennessee, in this harsh berger from washington -- >> thank you mister chairman, and ranking member. honestly, i want to thank law enforcement for the job that they do. we don't get enough thank-yous these days. for his question is for -- we've heard about a fierce process for the security, but the committee, the federal facilities have been under this purview, my question is, what is i see that are all these agencies with security -- which applies with the standard? >> thanks for the question. this is back to 2019 where we released a compliance system. so the 66 departments and bases that make up the inter agency security committee, part of their report is everything that was going to run compliance was created by them, or compliance subcommittee. they are part of the process. now they must report on what they are doing with both the organizational level, and at the facility level with respect to meeting the standards of the inter agency security bank. and happy to say that at least this year we were able to run through a verification path flipped, so going forward, will be able to work with the departments and agencies to actually verify what they are submitting to the compliance system, so we can better monitor and track their species. >> yeah, it's all about -- and measuring those outcomes. i have a question for -- the facilities security has been on this risk since 2003. what are the issues that are keeping these facilities secure on this left? one of the key actions that fps can take to address g.a.o.'s concerns? >> thank you very question. yes, they have been on our high-risk list since 2003. there are two remaining items that need to be addressed. fps currently has two systems in place that they are working on, and have been developing over time. these systems are focusing on what they are learning activities are officers, as well as if the officers have completed training as well as times attendance. we are looking for fps to, one, fully implement both the systems, and in addition, and sure the systems are sort of interoperable and coordinating together so they can tell who needs the requirements, in one reportedly, who should stand opposed to be ready. >> absolutely. fps is a paid service organization, do you believe that that is the best way for them to operate ma'am? >> sorry the first prettier question, can you repeat it? >> fps is a -- do you believe that that is the best way for them to operate? >> thank you. while we have certainly look at components of the fee structure for fps such as to see if there are any advantages or disadvantages to the structure that stands. we haven't necessarily a whole review, but we've certainly made positive comments regarding that. >> >> okay. those are my questions mister chairman. without all yield back. >> thank you, ms. harshbarger. now i recognize gentleman from new york, mr. -- for five minutes of questions. welcome, sir. >> thank you, mister chair. i want to make sure i understand the process of the inter agency committee that sets the physical security standards, the federal protective service makes assessments and recommendations based on those standards. then the federal buildings facility security committee must decide whether to comply with those recommendations. is that how the process works? >> that's correct, congressman. >> if i scored 30% on an exam, i would receive enough, i feeling great. am i right to see a compliance rate of 30% is a failure? >> mr. cline? >> sir, the 30% is typically a failure. there are a variety of factors involved in making those decisions. >> sir, if it's a failure, rather than beat around the margins, should we not rethink the model of voluntary compliance? should security -- be binding? >> the new compliance implementation that the inter agency security committee is doing, that, i don't want to call it a steak, that is making the agencies that oversee and offices and aims iowa, is making the agencies more wear of what those countermeasure recommendations are, and making them comply with executive order, basically. this is the executive order that comes out 1995. it's inquiring the certain countermeasures to get the facility to the necessary level of protection. >> there's no obligation to implement that, right? so it's a model of voluntary compliance. my question, are there any circumstances under which security assessments should be binding? what about the level five federal buildings? what security risk is highest. should be finding out those circumstances? >> i think that we definitely need to have more influence, and i think required -- >> not influence, binding. >> requiring it to be implemented instead of requesting to be implemented -- >> because if we do the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result, that's a definition of anxiety, as albertans and said. you said earlier, if i understood correctly, that in order for countermeasures to be implemented, you need all the tenets to agree. it's not simply enough to have a majority, you need unity. there could be scores of tenets in a single building, that strikes me as a process that breeds inertia and failure. how could we possibly defend? that >> that is the facility security committee that we talk about earlier agreeing, because they all have to fund their portion of the counter measure. like i mentioned if it's a 10,000 dollar. >> one can imagine a model in which the majority of the committee a gray, and then everyone is required to pay -- that isn't much more rational system. expecting unanimity in every case, that's unrealistic. >> the weight of the vote on that committee is based on square footage of the tenets, so there is no way to weigh those who have more of a presence. they have a stronger vote. >> would you be in favor of substituting a majority of acquirement for a humidity report? >> yes and no, we can look at it. >> okay. it just seems to me that would facilitate compliance. >> what about staffing 1000 law enforcement security officers who were responsible, or portfolio of 9500 -- it would seem to me that the scale of your responsibilities are disproportionate to the scarcity of your resources. do you have the stacking need to sufficiently secure 9500 buildings? is 1000 enough? >> sir, our current goal is to through our current agencies, get those done. as we have, if the threats environment continues to escalate as it has -- >> let's assume there's no escalation. and you have 9500 building to have to protect, let's assume you fill all your vacancies. it seems that 1000 is a small number given this as your portfolio. >> our authorized strength for law enforcement is 1131. they are placed throughout the country based on a number of facilities, population of the federal employees there, threats, the highest risk facilities would have more people, we have more officers now in d.c. then we have any ms. iowa, primarily because they're needed here. -- >> the capitol police has thousands of officers for one complex. you have 1000 officers for 9500 buildings, it seems to be a disconnect. my time has expired. >> >> thank you mister tourists. i wanted to go through a second round of questions, and i wanted to follow up on mr. torres says concept here. you've got tenets, there is supposed to pay you their fair share. and misleading them you said one of the big issues is money to implement. this is 30%, compliances 70%. do we have to mandate that other federal agencies pay their fair share of what you recommend? would you prioritize as needs to be done to secure these buildings? >> thank you mister chairman, there is no mandate, there is no law that requires a. >> do we need one? >> and if the fbi and other federal government agencies have x number of dollars, and you just said you need to invest the following to protect the bill and into personnel and citizens to actually come to visit your buildings, this is been going on for a number of, years noncompliance. this is unacceptable. what do we need to do to mandate that the financing be there, be reallocated, so to speak, to make sure that at least that set of priorities to secure these buildings as actually addressed. >> so it's a critical issue for us. with scott, and i'm just, my counterpart from the ioc being here. working directly with those departments and agencies -- >> mr. breyer. >> yes, sir. we are seen voluntary compliance in 2019 we are seeing an improvement each year. there are couple issues that do arise and we are working on the internal guidance and the departments and agencies then have to implement the ioc standards within their organization, and to follow on to that, guidance in policy from headquarters. >> i hear you. i'm still concerned. you haven't alleviated my concerns because all of you are out there doing a good job protecting our citizens. yet, now essentially the threats are turning on you, on us. i'm trying to assassinate, in my mind, factually here from your statements, whether you're prepared to play defense as well. i'm not getting a good vibe out here statements today. >> thoughts? >> i think where we are with respect to -- that around the multi-tenets facilities, we have world out workshops and training, we now have retail advisers that are across the united states, they're in companies so i think that the facilities that have tenants, i think there is work that needs to be done so that they better understand -- >> i'm hearing your words, but i'd like to get more of an assurance that we're going to do better compliance, and priorities and things that need to be done. in these buildings, to ensure that they're not vulnerable to be senseless attacks. you now? actually that this takes place. none of us here, none of us here condone attacks on our federal officers, federal personnel, as well as our u.s. citizens. let me shift real quick, mr. klain, we have mr. bishop talking about war again, he talked about coordination that was an ugly situation. unprecedented, your words. something that none of us condone, i don't like seeing, i disagree, do everything i can to stop our federal officers were being attacked. can you talk about coordination. you extended your authority to cpp to help in that situation and yet the local portland law enforcement officials didn't want to see that happen because of their controversy, and local elements that essentially my words maybe inflaming the situation. how can we move for it to ensure those better coordination there? >> here at the feds, there at the local, you have to figure out the situation, before it gets out of control. lessons learned. >> we've learned all number of lessons that of portland. we rely heavily on city, county, state law enforcement to support our mission. and mr. torres mentioned, were a small agency. for us to, we don't want to create a federal police force across the nation we rely heavily on our contract and protect security officers to protect our facilities. right now that is about 6200 psl pose that are staffed with this minute. extreme mushy, major tom, adorable controls, monitoring cameras perimeter security, and we rely heavily on. we made a lot of changes up to portland. our policing doctrine, we sign that in june of 20 lana, new directive on how we approach law in order. the use of policy directive, it is in the director for -- that was coordinated with civil rights and civil liberties, that's the policy, and we've managed to change the process and how we approach civil disorder. as far as utilizing cpp and ice, that was necessary because the local law enforcement, the modern preece bureau, who we work hand-in-hand with day-to-day, during that instance, they were prohibited from assessing us. the no one county sheriff's department, in oregon state police, they came in attempts to assess. they were prohibited. we don't see that anywhere, alison we think that -- we no longer have a situation. >> thank you very much. around the time zone and a half mr. male live -- >> thank you mister chairman. i want to follow up a little bit on what mr. torres was asking about, and just to clarify the fsb's, because obviously any assessment of responsibility for the security and countermeasures ionization their shared, within the tenets, but for the efficacy it does have to be unanimous support of all members of the two adaptive recommendation, is that correct? >> the fcc, the ten members, are given away. we suspect based on square footage, so if you had a facility with three members, and one of those members were square footage with 66%, and their vote would be the driving force. the other two, members of the majority, could not, you know, go against the decision to move forward. >> so just to build on this line of questioning, it is the majority of the efficacy? >> based on square footage >> based on square footage. thank you. i think there was some misunderstanding about unanimity versus majority opinion. and getting back to the reasons why there are not implementing in the g.a.o. report, there is very explicit goal, reasons agencies planning to move, and so if you're only going to be in a facility in the police is running on two years, does it make sense to make upgrades. well below their wood was limitation cost. so you can have a range. are there, but i guess we're kind of building on the prior question. in some of those situations, it might be a facility that is a smaller facility, and individual stand-alone lease facility. we have the conception of the main federal building where you may have social security agency, and this just 19 if you, or a couple hundred, or a couple thousand square feet of land facility. when we're talking about a blend, but my question is, are there, to what extent on and, i recognize that this is more but she has a question, but to what extent are their recommendations to a smaller agency, a smaller footprint says these are not affordable are cost-effective upwards for us given our logistical circumstances, are there ways where, and they choose that location because it was relatively less expensive than maybe a hire or more secure facility was leasing out of four square above basis? you think you can understand where i'm getting at here. obviously fps is an important adviser -- when having these counter recommendations, cost-benefit analysis, each individual recommendation is going to be depended on that agency. they're also making a cost-benefit analysis in the sort of separate tranche on the individual we see inside. does fps offer recommendations prior to gsa or provision, or suggest, saying a lease location for agencies? >> thank you. yes, absolutely. the state agency decides they wanted through a new location and dallas. do you say will make contact with, us and will go with gsa, and the agency, and will duke release assessments. this is to go out and look at tsa has the offerings from some receives in the city. you have this many people, this much square footage, this kind of space, and then we'll go out and look at it. we'll kinetic down to the top three, and then gsa will work with the agency to establish the lease. then we'll work with the agency to establish the necessary levels of protections in that facility. we want to get in their first before they move in. let's get this established now before people are here. let's get the projects in place on a number of instances with the agency says i can't afford to do 20 cameras around my building. if you can't do, that can we do at these cameras at every entrance? so we can see who's coming in the, building records and type of the various activity going on there and then see if we can come up with something. we can't afford to do anything, let's try to do something that makes sense. that helps to secure the facility. >> typically, are part of that lease been signed, they understand that maybe this facility is in compliance alrighty with what fps my recommends. $40 a square foot, and personal you've $5 a square foot if it's were going at a cost basis, i don't want that agency to take the lower cost one that may have to add another $10 per square foot and security improvements. so you're that part police being finalized. >> yes, absolutely. this protects them in the first for the building. a number of facilities are offered to believe in the government about ready. that happens there, that's one last countermeasure that we have to implement because it's already in place. >> thank you. >> any other members wish to answer questions? and see no further questions. we thank the witnesses today for testimony, members of your questions. members of the committee, they may have additional questions for the witnesses. we ask that you respond to those written questions expeditiously. dear members, of the committee, we'll show that the record will remain open for ten days. without objection, this committee stands adjourned. thank you. 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