Transcripts For CSPAN3 Hearing On Afghan Security Forces 20160212

Welcome. Im delighted to convene this hearing. This is a very important topic and one i know the Ranking Member finds significant. Im happy to partner with her in exploring this subject. I also know the gentleman from North Carolina mr. Jones is attending the hearing with us today, therefore i ask unanimous consent that mr. Jones and any other Committee Members not assigned to this committee be able to participate in this hearing with understanding all members will be regulared for questions prior to those not it is tongue subcommittee. Without objection so order. This morning we continue the committees oversight dialogue with the department that began last week with the foundational testimony that general campbell laid out before the full committee. General campbell testified about the evolving security situation in afghanistan and the policy, strategy and posture required from our nation in toward develop, sustain and support the people and unity government of afghanistan well into the future. The goal of our hearing is to learn about and assess the departments efforts to train, advise and assist the Afghan Security forces as we and our Coalition Partners strife to balled capable and less theoretical security force. Afghanistan needs to maintain its sovereignty and protect its population and for the benefit of Afghanistan United States and the International Community it must also deny terrorists safehavens. In reading the recent congressional report submitted by our witnesses and listening to testimony by general campbell the understands the Afghan Security forces are still in initial stages of becoming a professionalized self sustaining and capable institution. But theres still various short falls and insufficient capabilities in important functions. Afghan force do not have enough airplanes or helicopters, especially those capable of providing Close Air Support. While there clearly has been improvement the ability to collect and disseminate and pull intelligence is lacking as is the ability to maintain an account for equipment. Even the bread and butter administrative issues such as pay, leave, medical services for Afghan Forces need attention. According to last weeks testimony these challenges are compounded by the fact that 70 of the problems facing Afghan Security forces result from poor Senior Leadership within the Afghan Ministry of defense and interior. The taliban are embolden. The Haqqani Network continues to support terrorism. We need to ensure Afghan Security forces and civilian leadership are properly positioned on the Critical Path of success. However, i am concerned that the president s current budget request for aiding Afghan Forces is 200 million less than last years amount. And the administration plans to withdraw u. S. Forces down to 5,500 beginning as soon as april. We must not reduce our commitment to people of afghanistan. We must look at early withdraw in iraq. General campbell noted last week devotion of the Afghan People in fighting for the country. This is a positive sign. While the material and support is something the American People can assist with having the heart and willingness to fight is something the Afghan People must offer. He also suggested last week the u. S. Should begin instituting a five year planning cycle instead of the one year approach. General campbell also readily acknowledged our sustained engagement in afghanistan will continue through 2024. Per this Strategic Partnership agreement signed by the governments of afghanistan and the United States we must also ensure there are appropriate mechanisms in governing structures in place to provide significant insight in order to overseries, account for and safeguard the Security Assistance the u. S. And our International Partners are contributing to the afghans. We need to limit as much as possible opportunities and activities or operations that would encourage or enable individuals to exploit or conduct any fraud, waste or abuse activities. Activities of this nature can undercut the trust of the American People, impedes moral of our troops and field skepticism were not seriously committed to effective use of our resources. Like forward to discussing the departments strategy for addressing the issues ive outlined and to hear from some who have conducted their own assessment of these activities. But before i introduce the witnesses i turn to the oversight investigation subcommittee Ranking Member for any opening remarks she wishes to make. Thank you, madam chair. Thank you for joining me in seeking this particular hearing. I want to thank all of our witnesses for appearing today. Our troops are in afghanistan performing an important mission. Which includes training, advising and ekwipg the Afghan National defense and Security Forces. So that they can sustainablely defend themselves against insurgent groups such as the taliban. Having said that im concerned that our strategy hasnt yielded the positive results that would inspire confidence that the Afghan Security forces can go it alone. Any time in the foreseeable future. Which leads to the obvious question. Will we ever leave . Can we ever leave . I am not convinced that our existing plan is one that we can take to the American People and assure them that our presence in afghanistan is worth the cost in money and in lives. By many accounts 2015 was the worst year for security and stability in afghanistan since 2001. 2015 was the first year that the of a against forces took the lead. Meaning some level of instability was expected. But it was alarming nonetheless and im not convinced that 2016 will be any better. Is there a Clear Strategy to support our troops and accomplish our goals or are we just moving chess pieces around the board because were forced to make a move . Underpinning these concerns i dont get a sense were frankly addressing the fundamental challenges we face in afghanistan. Corruption, weak Afghan Military leadership and a tenacious insurgency which seems to be getting stronger undermining our effort theres and i want to know how these issues get resolved that allows us to leave in a timely manner without creating a security vacuum. Again the question is do we ever leave . The American Public has a right to know. One thing is for sure, Congress Needs high quality information to understand the situation were confronting and effective oversight from Inspector General is essential to our ability to under these issues. Some might argue that this is one of the worlds greatest producers of sheep. I just want to make sure were not getting the wool pulled over our eyes. We need to make sure that the information were receiving is reliable, that were asking the right questions, and are able to travel the country to assess the conditions. Here are some bedrock issues that require far more clarity. We need to know how the Afghan Forces progress is being measured. What weve learned from the challenges of the last year and how gaps in the andsf capabilities will be addressed going forward. Are the Afghan Forces on a positive trajectory for meeting and sustaining their capability objectives . For now its apparent our assistance is still needed to build and sustain ministerial institutions to lead the Afghan Forces. They need a capable air force, other key enablers including sound operational planning,ing logistics and maintenance systems. Just this week it was reported the u. S. Military advisors are being cents to southern afghanistan to give Additional Support the Afghan National army in that region. In short the afghans are not ready to secure their own country without assistance from the u. S. And our Coalition Partners and if recent experience is any indication it could be years until they are. We need to be clear eyed and better informed by the Afghan Forces abilities now and in the future to secure the country teen reliably prevent extremists from using afghanistan as a safehaven for terrorists to threaten the United States. We need to make sure we have realistic goals and applausible strategy that fits our goals. Above all we need to make sure were telling ourselves the full story about our situation so that we can figure out where to go next. I look forward to all of your testimony and assessments about the developments of the afghan force which i hope will provide us a fuller picture of the forces progress, performance and capabilities. With that i yield back. Thank you, miss spear. Im pleased to recognize our witnesses and i want to thank them for taking the time to be with us. We have Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for afghanistan, pakistan and central asia from the office of the secretary of defense. Colonel Steven Michael Deputy Director for the pakistan, afghanistan and transregional threats coordination cell from the office of the chairman of joint chief of staff. The senior defers analyst for afghanistan with Defense Intelligence agency. The president appointed special general and mr. Michael child Deputy Inspector for overseas Contingency Operations for the department of defense. Thank you for being with us today and well begin with our Opening Statements. Thank you very much. Chairwoman, Ranking Member, members of the subcommittee, congressman jones thank you for your steadfast support for our efforts in afghanistan and for inviting me to discuss the department of defense efforts to develop the Afghan National defense and security for the ansdf. Im honored to have the opportunity to update you alongside my colleague from the joint staff, the Defense Intelligence agency, the office of the dod and Inspector General and special Inspector General for afghanistan reconstruction. All of the witnesses before you today take very seriously our responsibility to ensure u. S. Pirnl in afghanistan have resources, authorities and guidance they need to accomplish their mission. I would also like to acknowledge the 2236 u. S. Service members who lost their lives while serving in afghanistan. The 20,115 military personnel who have been wounded in that country. And the thousands of families who have also sacrificed for this important mission. Their efforts represent a strategically significant contribution to the security of our homeland. Now, within the department of defense my office provides overall policy guidance for and oversight of the mission in afghanistan. Including dod funded Security Assistance for the andsf. We have daily contact with key personnel in theater at the combined security transition assistance command, afghanistan, which has primary responsibility for the execution of the dod Security Assistance mission. We also work closely with other office within dod, the Intelligence Community and the department of state as we continually assess the status of our efforts in afghanistan. My Office Supports the efforts of the dod ig ensuring they have the information and importantly the context required to fulfill their mandates to review our efforts. Now our priority in afghanistan remains to prevent it from once again becoming a safehaven from which terrorists can plan attacks against the United States homeland, u. S. Interests abroad and our International Partners. In pursuit of this objective were conducting two complimentary missions in afghanistan. A Counterterrorism Mission against al qaeda such as the Islamic State and natoled train and advise and assist mission. In october 2015 following a comprehensive review of the mission, president obama announced that we would retain up to 9800 u. S. Military personnel in afghanistan throughout most of 2016, drawing down to 5,500 personnel by january 2017. Importantly this presence will not just be based in kabul but also in other locations including Bagram Airbase and kandahar. This decision provides u. S. Force sufficient capabilities to continue the development of afghan ministerial capacity along with key capabilities in aviation, logistics and maintenance. The United States can pursue counterterrorism targets and further develop those critical counterterrorism capabilities that we know are critical to our mutual security interests. The Financial Support of the United States and the International Community is critical to sustaining the ansdf. Over the last decade congressional appropriations for the Afghan Security forces fun have been key to the development of Afghan Security forces responsible for the security of afghanistan. As we develop the ansdf our support is focused on ensuring they can counter and degrade the taliban and establish a baseline of security that benefits the Afghan People and the International Community. For more than a year, the mission prove providing security for all of afghanistan has been the sole responsibility of the Afghan Government. While the security situation remains fragile, Afghan Forces will continue to require u. S. And Coalition Assistance for many years, we have witnessed important progress in their development over the years. As general campbell noted in his testimony last week, the ansdf proved clearing operations in the country and when insurgents attempted advances the ansdf was rally and recapture those areas. Significant challenges do remain and our train and advise and assist mission is focused on helping afghans overcome them. Its notable even in the midof fight warring the ansdf continue their capacity to manage complex tasks such as budgeting, Personnel Management and to address key capability gaps in aviation and intelligence. U. S. Taxpayers have been generous and patient and its our responsibility to review how best we can assist our afghan partners. Finding the right balance between the effectiveness and affordability is a key effort of this department. I would like to high like a few areas where i think progress success made. First, we continue to focus on the development of the aviation capabilities including addressing their critical Close Air Support means as well as long term lift requirements. This is very complex and represent as significant portion of our investment in the ansdf in going forward. In 2016 the afghan aerial fighter will triple. Second, we are spending a significant amount on Ground Forces equipment. Which has relatively high sustainment costs. Well significant numbers of humvees and other vehicles to ansdf to improve combat survivalability. Afghan ministry pay and personnel expenses are a major cost driver. About 20 puerto rico of the roughly 5 billion total costs for the ansdf. Dod funds the majority of this cost for the afghan cost to and we have been working with their security ministries to develop an integrated pay and personnel system that will ensure we can verify were paying the right people for the right jobs. Finally, corruption is a critical issue and president ghani is a great partner. Hes made procurement reforms to address corruption and after we helped him identify corruption in fuel contracting processes he fired those responsible and now new contracts are in place. He also pulled up responsibility for procurement to a National Level authority. Demonstrating the seriousness which he takes these issues. In each of these areas as well as many others dod, ig and sigar has helped us achieve our goals. In closing i want to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to discuss our efforts to develop the ansdf and ensure were doing so responsibly. The Afghan Government will continue to rely on arrange amounts much Financial Assistance to the ansdf until such time as fighting significantly diminishes. We are in the process of working with our allies and part noers extend International Funding commitments through 20 and we look forward to working with congress to ensure effective oversight of these efforts to achieve our National Objectives in afghanistan. Thank you. Thank you. Colonel michael . Chairman, Ranking Member, im grateful for this opportunity to talk to you and this subcommittee and provide you with information on the development of the ansdf. I ask you submit my full statement to the record and i would like to focus on some key essential points. As the chairman looks at afghanistan he looks at it through a couple of lens. First of all, afghanistan isall important to us because it affects the Vital National interest and key one is making sure nothing that happens there nothing in afghanistan threatens the homeland our threatens our interests. That is one of the primary lens the chairman views this mission. The second, he looks at the resiliency of the ndsf and its leadership. Is this force well led . Are they willing to do what it takes or are they willing to sacrifice . Do they wanted this more than we do . Do they understand they serve the people, that they serve the civilian government . Do they understand that you cannot harm the people, you know, whom youre trying to protect. Do they understand how to lead you know, how to lead a force . So resiliency to the ndsf, ability to fight back in adversity, the ability to lead at the appropriate level, the tiblt make the right decisions. He assesses whether we are committed to afghanistan, those are the questions he consistently asks of us. The second bid a chairman looks at is the viability of the government. Now, the military mission sets the conditions for everybody else. We set the political positions for the whole government to work. From the chairmans per speck tifshgs understanding whether the government is viable or not, same thing. Are they well led . Are they corrupt . Is this a government the people believe in . Those are all questions he consistently asks of himself to inform his best military advice. And his Current Assessment is the ndsf is resell yent. This is a force we should partner with. They deserve our support. Likewise, he seeings in president ghani. The chairmans assessment is a stable afghanistan meets and supports our interest and a stable afghanistan also lends, you know, to stability in the region. As we look at the ndsf development. So beginning in 2013 they were in the lead but in 2015, is the first year they were fully responsible for the security. Our strategy is focused on they own the tactical fight and were focusing on things that are really guaranteed, you know, longterm sustain ability and viability to force. Do they have the ability to man, train and equip and field a professional force . Do they have the ability to sustain that force, direct that force in the counterinsurgency fight. The tactical fight, they own this has been a pretty tough and contested year. Probably biggest difference is theyre operating in areas areas the coalition has been operating in. Theyre fighting all across the country. And across the board, theyre doing well. Theyre getting their noses bloodied but also theyre also doing a great job in securing afghanistan. As we look at it across the board, you can clearly see most of the Major Population Centers are controlled bit a by the ands. About 18 of those, or 4 , can say are under the influence of the taliban. This year has seen an increased month of casualties in the andsf. As we look at the numbers, its probably about 26 increase. Much of that is felt by the police. Also as we look at the numbers, most of the increases came in their directed multicorps operations. Much done in the south. Then in the east and also centrally in support of security capital in kabul. The impact of their operations is that theres also increased month of casualties that the taliban has taken. By conservative estimates, the conservative estimates that the taliban sustained some of their highest casualties since 2011 and casualties at a rate two times of that the ndsf. Our assessment is they own the tactical fight. Our job is really to support them in the tactical fight but we have to focus on the pieces to sustain long term, their ability to man, field and equip this force and direct this force. Isr and things that are essential to keeping this force viable in the long term. As we look at fighting season, this current fighting season, as ms. Abizaid says, we have a dual focus, train, advise and assist and separately counterterrorism. Training this force and to making sure it can secure afghanistan is critical to securing our interest, and secondly the Counterterrorism Mission gives us the ability to do things that the afghan force has not doesnt have the capability or the resources to do, or things that we see that directly impact our interests. And as we look at the kind of the long term and, you know, so the president made the decision, about a 5500 footprint going forward. That decision was informed by the best military advice of the chairman, the centcomm commander in the field. And that mission and the critical thing of that mission is one of the first times the decision was made to where it was really not necessarily tied, you know, to time frame. Its an enduring mission, tied to our Enduring Partnership with afghanistan and to cover and address our Strategic Interests in the region. Additionally, as you all know, were going through a leadership transition in afghanistan. General nicholson was confirmed by the senate and over the next period of months, he will transition into afghanistan. And as he said in his testimony, as he comes in, hell do an assessment and based on his assessment, hell recommend, you know, his best military advice. And both the outgoing chairman, general dempsey, said he has access and influence. And his ability to present his best military advice to the secretary of defense and the president and likewise general said the same thing. As we transition leadership, if general nicholson assesses any requirements or adjustments that need to made, he has latitude to bring that forward and for the chairman to present that as his best military advice. Thank you for your time. Thank you. Mr. Breedlove. Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to come before you today to discuss this important topic. My comments this morning will be brief and built upon my written statement and the previous Opening Statements from my colleagues. Afghanistan faces a diverse collective of threats from insurgent groups to extremist networks and from terrorist groups to narco criminal groups. This includes names were familiar with the taliban as well as the emergence of groups like the corazon province or indian subcontinent. They constitute a resilient and persistent threat to afghans stability and general stability in the region. Their activities range from opium trafficking, extortion and kidnapping that fuels the insurgency to highprofile attacks in pop late areas and improvised exclusive attacks along Road Networks that both typically result in high afghan casualties. Rural areas of afghanistan and the afghanistan pakistan Border Regions remain a sanctuary for these various groups and the remote and rugged terrain of these areas only adds to the security challenges they pose. In the first fighting season against an afghanled counterinsurgency, talibanled insurgents remain resilient. Fighting has been nearly consistent since last february, resulting in increased casualty among both Afghan Security forces and insurgents themselves. The taliban has proven capable of taken ground and contesting key terrain while continuing to conduct highprofile attacks in the capital city kabul. These high profile attacks, in particular, achieve one of the talibans Main Objective of garning media following Pakistani Military many out of area fighters to include some Al Qaeda Leaders were displaced in afghanistan. Al qaeda activities focus on survival, regeneration and planning future attacks. The organization has a sustained presence in afghanistan, primarily concentrated in the east and northeast of the country. Of the groups involved in the talibanled insurgency, the connie network remains the biggest threat, particularly with the demonstrated capacity and intent to launch these high profile attacks across country and, in particular, the kabul region. Acan any Network Leader elt operation as new leader has further strengthened the Networks Role in the insurgency. Over this past year, the talibanled insurgency remained determined, maintained or consolidated its influence in traditional rural strongholds, dominated the Information Space and cared out attacks with ib creased frequency compared to last year. They range from small scale checkpoint overruns to the temporary capture of kundu city. However, i want to emphasize that the insurgency is not immune to its environment. The announcement of mullah oel marchs death and led to the emergence of a taliban opposition faction in late 2015. Infighting between monday sour supporters is ongoing and taliban has faced competition from isil regional affiliates in the region, the isk. While the insurgency mounted larger coordinated attacks, they were generally outmatched when engaged with Afghan Security forces. They also could not capture or defend key targets they may have captured. And unable to hold some of these key areas of terrain for extended period of time, such as we saw in country deuce. They suffered higher levels of reported casualties as well as resource shortfalls. Let me close with a brief outlook to the coming fight this year. We expect the talibanled insurgency will try to build on its temporary vick tour in kundutz last year by attempting to vountd other population centers, exploit vulnerabilities in Afghan Security by massive attacks, primarily in remote or isolated rural areas. And attempt to impede ground Line Communications ahead of these attacks in those population centers. They will also seek to continue high profile attacks against government and civilian targets in key Populated Areas such as kabul. Thank you again for this opportunity and i look forward to your questions. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Breedlove. Mr. Sopko. Thank you very much and good morning. Chairman, Ranking Members and members of the subcommittee, im very pleased to be here today to discuss the development of the Afghan National Security Forces or andsf. Sigar has produced a substantial body of work on the andsf over the past years and has more work in progress. In addition to audit, investigations, and special project reports, sigar publishes a Quarterly Report that continues to be the single most comprehensive and detailed source of information on the andsf specifically and on afghan reconstruction in general. To conduct this work, sigar has the largest single investigative and auditing presence in afghanistan with more people on the ground than all other u. S. Oversight bodies combined and enjoys a unique direct oversight relationship with the Afghan Government and the personal support of president ghani and ceo abdullah, who i meet with on a regular basis. As we all know, afghanistan is one of the most difficult places in the world in which to work and to do business. The dangers there are very real. And our military, civilians and contractors, and we cant forget the contractors, have accomplished so much over the past 14plus years that its impossible not to be proud and humbled by their efforts and great sacrifice. Nevertheless, based on our work, we see five major challenges that could have a significant effect on whether the United States is able to achieve its strategic objectives in afghanistan. We believe that that the five questions provoked by these challenges should be at the center of yours and other policymakers discussions. The first chal epg is that the drawdown of troops has em per perilled u. S. s ability. U. S. Military advisers and their Coalition Partners now havegong little or no direct contact with andsf units below the army corps and Regional Police headquarters level. This provokes the obvious question is the current level of u. S. Military personnel in afghanistan adequate to ensure that the andsf do not fail in their mission . The second question, the reported force strength of the andsf is questionable. The u. S. Now has no option but to rely on the afghans to report on the number of troops and police in the field. Yet sigar audits show Record Keeping in the field by afghans is generally poor or nonexistent. We continue to see repeated reports of ghost soldiers, ghost police, as well as ghost teachers, ghost schools, ghost clinics throughout afghanistan. And these are even reported by the afghan leadership. This leads to the next question. Does the United States have an adequate understanding of the number of andsf troops and police . Thirdly, assessments of the andsfs capability and effectiveness have never been reliable and appear to be getting worse. Sigar audits show that over time, u. S. Capability ratings of Afghan Military units have become progressively less demanding and more vague. For example, only a few years ago the top rating was, quote unquote, fully capable. Which was later changed to, quote, effective with ambassadors. And has now declined to, quote, independent with advisers. The latter being something of a headscratching oxymoron. This leads to our third question does the u. S. Have a realistic understanding of the andsfs real capabilities . Fourthly, the afghan ministries of defense and interior obviously lack the capability to account for onbudget assistance. And this is important. Because since 2010, our government, as well as our allies, have gradually increased, based upon promises at international meetings, the level of direct onbudget funding to the Afghan Government. Yet there is less u. S. Visibility and control over those funds. Our work has uncovered several cases in which the mod and moi were incapable of properly managing onbudget assistance. The question, therefore, is if m. O. D. And m. O. I. Lack of capability to manage onbudget assistance, does cstica need to resume more control of more assistance to the andsf . Now, lastly, a year after the coalition draw down, the andsf is still far from being sustainable. And, remember, that is our goal. Sustain ability. The Afghan Government simply does not generate enough revenue to sustain the andsf or even the rest of their government. Now at or any time in the foreseeable future. At the same time, sigars work reveals the accountability for funding is lacking in many areas. This leads to us our last question for you. Is the u. S. Government conducting adequate oversight and management of the billions of dollars promised in the future to fund the andsf . Now, in recent testimony just this week, before the u. S. Senate, the director of the National Intelligence predicted that, quote, fighting in 2016 will be more intense than 015, continuing a decadelong trend of deteriorating security, unquote. He went on to say that the andsf will, quote, probably maintain control of Major Population Centers, however, it will cede control of various rushlt areas. He went on to say by saying without National Funding the andsf will probably not remain a cohesive or viable force, unquote. Now, i think his statement highlights the importance of honestly answering these five questions and taken realistic action accordingly. Thank you very much. And i look forward to answering your question. All right. Votes are being carried out right now. We have 11 minutes left. So, im feeling like we probably ought to suspend the hearing at this point and go vote. Its supposed to take about 40 minutes. And then come back and reconvene for your testimony and questions, mr. Childs. Apologize for the delay, but thank you for your understanding. Well look forward to hearing it soon. Thank you. The committee is taking a break. Members are voting on a bill increasing north koreas sanctions as a result of the country launching test missiles. Theyll also test on a bill advising the administrations bill requiring restaurant chains to list the calorie count of their items. Well show you the pentagon News Conference earlier this week where officials explained budget requests released this week for Defense Department branches. Good morning, steve. Or good evening for you. Good evening. Is there still any snow on the ground over there . You want to get started . If so, well let you do so, otherwise we can wait for another minute for your slide. There it is. Youre up. Might as well get the show on the road, right . Well, good morning, Pentagon Press corps. I want to start out today by thanking canada for their commitment on february 8th the canadian government announced its plan to expand its contributions. Canada will triple the size of its train, advise and assist mission. We welcome this. Canada will increase its complement of military personnel to approximately 830. Good afternoon, everybody. Thanks for joining us as we roll this discretionary funding for our base budget and 58. 8 billion in overseas Contingency Operations for a total of 582. 7 billion. That sustains the president s National Security and defense strategies. And they conform the figures conform to the budget levels found in the bipartisan budget agreement. Now, in building this program that informs the budget that were going to talk to you about today, secretary carter first asked the department to take the long view. The way he did it is say, well, how is the next 25 years going to differ from the last. How is it likely to be different . Of course, the future is inherently noble, but five of the strategic challenges would most likely drive the focus have our Planning Program and budget processes. The first two challenges are the most significant shift in the future security environment. That is a return to an era of great power competition. Today we are faced by a resurgent advance in russia and a rising chooiina. Both are nuclear powers. Both building capabilities at a rapid rate. Both are permanent members of the u. N. Security council and both take aspects of the internationaled principle of order that has enabled the peaceful pursuit of prosperity for decades. Russia on its western borders of nato and china in its near seas. As a consequence, even as we continue to cooperate on issues of mutual interest to both countries, we included the Department Must be prepared for a period of increased competition over the next 25 years. The third strategic challenge is a unpredictable and dangerous north korea. North korea is an Armed Nuclear power and now pursuing advanced ballistic capabilities that threaten our allies and those in the broader pacific asian region. It is committed to developing longrange missiles which could propose a direct threat to the continental United States if its successfully designed and fielded. That is a new thing. Moreover, another new thing is the new leader, kim jungung has demonstrated propensity to provocation and is very, very, in our view, destabilizing and risky. Threatening our ally, the ally of korea. For these reasons we must continue to retain forces on the peninsula that can fight tonight if called upon to counter north korean aggression. The fourth involves countering and deterring irans maligned influence throughout the middle east. They seek to become the dominant Regional Power and in support of its goal, its pursuing wide range of destabilizing activities throughout the region, threatening allies and partners, particularly israel. While we hope iran will moderate malioned activities over time, we must be prepared to counter them as well as any moves that country takes to violate the recent agreement to curtail its pursuit of Nuclear Weapons. The fifth challenge is our sustained Global Campaign against terrorist networks with near term emphasis with degrading isil and sustained effort to defeat al qaeda and counterthe spread of isil in south asia. Now, from our perspective, the campaign against Global Terrorist Networks will be in condition for much of the next 25 years and we must be prepared to monitor it constantly, respond to and treat it whenever necessary. I want to make clear that this list does not reflect a prioritization of strategic threats. Should miscalculation occur or deter rents fail, the department of defense has to be able to provide the president with options to respond to possible unexpected contingencies involving any of the four aforementioned state powers as well as those associated with the one enduring condition, our global fight against global against terrorism and so we, therefore, sought to develop a portfolio with the capabiliciti capabilities ready to address all of these challenges with some degree of risk. Thats important to note. The budget allows us to execute budget. Given the current level of funding, we simply cannot reduce every risk associated with every strategic challenge. We, therefore, developed a program that addresses all five and the secretary said, if we cannot reduce risks in all challenges, we have to prioritize. He told us to do three things. First, we should Prioritize Strengthening our conventional deter rent against the most advanced potential adversaries. When doing so, we didnt expect us to match advanced capabilities either numerically or system trickily. He instead told us to offset their strengths using new technologicalic operational and organizational constructs to achieve a lasting advantage and to strengthen deterrents. Like previous offset strategies, the advanced capabilities we are developing for our advanced competitors on directly applicable against lesser states. And also strengthens deterrent in that regard. Second, with respect to the services, the secretary asked us to focus far more on shape than size. He asked us to try to achieve the best balance of capacity, we call size or force structure, modernization or capability, and readiness within the existing budget level. Seek that balance. And in terms of readiness, he expected us to focus on reconstituting full spectrum readiness. He charged us to place heavy emphasis on. One, ensure we retain the advantage we enjoy in our Human Capital. Our people are the best and most competitive we have. Secondly, update our plans and operational concepts. The secretary and the chairman are pushing the department to look at each of the of these challenges in terms of transregional, multidomain, multifunctional. Dont look at it regionally. Look at it by exploiting our global posture. Third, he asked us to seek gamechanging technologies and make discreet technological bets that exploit our advantages as well as adversary weaknesses. Finally, he asked us to pursue widespread institutional reform. He wants us to become a lean and agile 21st Century Organization and, just as importantly, we want to free up Additional Resources to buy down any residual risks that remains in the program. I would like to pass it over to the vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, general paul selva, and then well be happy to take some of your questions. Thank you, mr. Secretary. Good afternoon. Let me express my deepest to the professionals who are the men and women to develop the Defense Budget submission. No easy task even in the best of times. This week we face the inhave iable tasks of expanding complex challenges to National Security entrance despite the enduring train. The result of this collaboration is what the chairman, the Service Chiefs and i believe is the one possible balance of capacity, capability and readiness investments based upon the resources available. Todays Strategic Security environment is more predictable than i have seen in my 35 years of service. Our dedicated soldiers, sailors and marines have been battling terrorism around the globe for nearly 15 years. The pervasive threat posed by violent extremist organizations has been and remains an immediate threat. Yet focus on this protracted fight in common with the burden of sequestration and budget uncertainty has come at a degrading cost. Delaying modernization and decreasing our overall capacity. As youre well aware, the rest of the world has not remained stag nanlt during this time. Concerns posed by agreeses ively state actors also demand our attention. We face growing challenges from russia and china, which are asserting their power. North koreas pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and ballistic technologies which continues to plague korean peninsula. This budget works to invest in capabilities needed to meet these growing challenges while to the best extent possible, preserving structure and advancing readiness. For the army it supports the ongoing transition back to highend combat and full spectrum capabilities. It invests in the navys lethalities and improvements in security capabilities, tactical and undersea capabilities. It maintains the marine corpss preeminent role as the nations most capable expeditionary response role. And for the air force this budget invests in highend capabilities across the range of domains that we expect our air force to respond in while attempting to improve ready areness through training for the highend fight. In closing, this proposal reflects the hard choices weve made and the context of todays security environment and economic constraints and does not leave much room for needed flexibility. I look forward to continuing to work to eventually get an approved budget which addresses the military readiness concerns of today and provides for the flexibility which allows us to continue to address our National Security interests into the future. Thank you again for being here today. We look forward to taking your questions. For either one of you or both, if possible, i just wanted to ask a couple questions on the accounts. First, can you talk about the thinking behind the new 200 million thats aimed at countering threats in north north africa, west africa, that region, and what you expect to buy with that money. And then for the afghanistan amount, about what troop levels will that support in afghanistan for the coming fiscal year. And then maybe just an overall, the increase in funding. What do you expect to buy from the 5 billion to new 7. 5 billion, what are you hoping that buys . Let me give a little overview and then ill turn it over to the general. The request for 58. 8 billion, let me just emphasize, that was built from the bottom up. We said, what do we need to do to do what we need to accomplish in afghanistan. The president , as you know, made a decision to keep 9800 troops through some time this year, probably through the fighting season and down to 5500 at the end of the year. This budget fully funds that. It fully funds all of the operations that are going on in both iraq and syria. And it asks for iraq, train and equ equip, as well as syria train and equip. So, this budget prois us everything we need, we believe, right now to execute our global operations. That left over about 5 billion to cover base needs. We didnt have a specific id have to defer to mike on the specific 5 billion, but generally 5 billion was able to address base needs. The only thing i would add to that is to raemphasize the fact that in the budget as submitted, we have anticipated all costs in south asia as well as across north and west africa portions of our transregional fight of terrorism and violent extremist organizations. Thats been fully covered. Each services as you get their briefs later today will likely be able to cover the detailed request inside that budget, but weve covered all the anticipated expenses in that endeavor. What about this 200 million for the africa region. What is the thinking behind that . What is the threat youre trying to address . Can you expand on that a little bit . Ill expand on that a little bit. If you think of the threats that exist across all of africa, al shabab in the east, boko haram in the west, the newly formed isil province in libya, the monies we put into the budget to address, those threats in africa are to be able to work with indigenous forces as well as Partner Forces to get at those three particular threats as well as others that might emerge. This goes back to what the secretary and chairman are saying. We have to approach this as a transregional problem. We have to approach the problem all the way from the western coast of africa all the way to afghanistan and potentially in southeast asia. So, none of these problems we look at as just a Central Command problem. We look at it, what do we need transregionally to address these threats. The thing we anticipate doing in Northern Africa would be in the broader support of our Global Campaign against terrorism. Question to you and then, general. This is the last Obama Administration budget. Youve been discussing within the building the looming biway the next administration faces in terms of Nuclear Modernization and air force issues after 2021. How serious is that that the next administration faces and what are some other options . General, since august during the debate, theres been a constant drum beat of claims that the American Military has been gutted. I dont know why i but how do you address someone who is watching today to hear that its been gutted . Youre talking about degrade overall capability, reduced modernization. Can you put this in context in terms of the condition of the u. S. Military today versus the hyperbolic word gutted . Let me talk about the bow wave and id like to turn it a little bit and talk about the fiscal risk we see going forward. The primary problem were faced with is we really like the budget deal. We applaud congress being able to provide us with two years of statement. Stanlt. In 2018 were planning on going up again significantly above the sequestration caps. If you take all of the money between 018 thats 100 billion were counteding on that we dont know for certain were going to get. The third is future of oco. How will it be done in the future . Thats another big uncertainty. We have money that is in oco that should be in base. It just happened over the last 14 years of war. We have to address that. As you said starting in between 21 and 35, its 8 billion a year to recapitalize our Strategic Nuclear deterrent. If that comes out of our conventional forces, that will be very, very problematic for us. So, rather than talk about the bow wave, there is future fiscal risks that the country, congress and future administrations and this future Administration Must come to grips with because once we have a better noting of that, well know for sure our Defense Strategy is on the right track. I wont be argumentative but i will take hum braj with the notion our military has been gutted. I stand here as a person that has worn a uniform for 35 years, we have the most powerful military on the face of the planet. We have challenges, of course we do. When are you face with the a global set of threats, have you to make choices on where you focus your energy. We focus the our energy on this violent extremist terrorist thread of threats for the better part of the last 15 years. That consumes the readiness of our force to do other tasks were given as part of our mission. You would say we are far from gutted. Have you in your joint force today the most powerful army on the planet. The most flexible and determined air force on the planet, the most capable navy on the planet and the marine corps no one can match. I would argue thats far from gutted. I dont engage in politics. This is the reality of the men and woem that serve in our army, navy, air force and marine corps. We have time for one more. Gordon. Two quick questions. Can you expand a little on the lcs. Ive seen a lot of that. If you could expand on your thinking. Also, update us on the growth to 90 caps of isr and if you see is that being delayed . Is it being accelerated . What in this bung specifically addresses that growth . Thank you, gordon. First question. Lcs is a perfect example of what the secretary meant by focusing more on shape rather than size the requirement for the u. S. Navy is a battle force of 308 ships. Theres a requirement for 88 and there was a requirement for 52 lcss for a total of 140 surface come babatants. Last year the navy was going to build up to 321 ships and then come down. We asked ourselves, what cant we buy because were going from 308 to 321 . We said, well, we cant buy a lot of capability. And so it was a very this is not an indictment against the lcs. If we didnt like the ship, we would stop buying it. But those 12 ships would take us from 321 to 309 ships. And allowed us to put more money into torpedos, more money into p8s, into advanced munitions, more money into Tactical Aviation so it was more about achieving that balance between size, readiness and modernization. We think the navy is much stronger because of this decision. And we will get to 300 ships in fy 19, 308 in fy 21. This was the type of challenges is trades the vice chairman was talking about where you look at it and say, would i rather have those 12 extra ships or all the capability that that allows us to buy and we made the decision to go for capability. On the isr caps were building a 90 low end permissive isr caps like reapers and predators. 60 will be healthy isr caps in the air force, which means theyll have ten pilots per line, per orbit, and that is a sustainable a sustainable force structure. The army is going to add 16 caps in what we call the Global Force Management Allocation Fund and they will actually have 16 orbits. Then were going to buy ten governmentowned contractoroperated orbit which is will be our bumper i mean our shock absorber. That gets us to 86. Four are supporting our forces to today. Thats how we get to 90. We wont get to 90 until the latter part but were on track. Theres no slowdown. That plan is fully funded. We hope that congress will support us in that goal. General, did you have anything to add . I got it all. Thank you again. Lcs i have to push you on this one. Why did you add one more lcs for two when in december the secretary said youre only going to get one in 17. Can you square that . Sure. The secretary is very flexible on these points and the navy came back in and said, hey, in terms of competition, it would help us if both of the yards had a ship in 17. Both could compete and then well do the down select. If it doesnt change to 40. It was just a slight change in the profile. It was allowing us to make sure the down select to the frig et, the frig et was a way to do it. Again, on all of these things, these were hard choices. Choices between size, modernization and readiness. And each of the services are going to explain to you this afternoon the choices they had to make and the choices that we approved to achieve what general selva said is the best balance. Thank you very much. Thank you for being here this afternoon. Thank you yall. About two minutes well get started with undersecretary mccord. A little more detail about what the deputy secretary was talking about. Give me just one minute here. This is under secretary of defense comptroller, mike mccord. On his left is the director of force structure, resources and assessment for the joint staff. When youre ready. Thank you, mark. Good afternoon. First of all, i want to say the deputy and the vice chairman have done a great job leading the internal effort with stretches over many months. It seems like forever sometimes. Since this is the last time ill likely be doing this, i want to recognize the hard work that goes on all across this building in the department by so many people in the surfaces, comb combatant commands to get this budget done. I especially want to take a second to recognize the enormous contribution to two people. One, my colleague, jamie, the director of cost analysis and program analysis, leads a great team over there. And ill get to the second one in a second, i guess. It wasnt until early november we got a budget deal that told us what top line we were going to get for all the work weve been doing starting back in late spring. We were very far along in our process by then in building this budget and we really had to scramble to last six weeks or so to cut 17 billion, ill explain is that number, in the last six weeks. It was probably in the last ten days of our process that we knew what congress had done to the 16 budget in the omnibus appropriations bill. A lot came in late. My staff worked through the holidays to wrap this up, get it done and get a quality product. I want to close my introductory remarks by thanking mary of my staff, who did the work of two people throughout this entire late in the year process from november on. When we missing and still missing the top career budget official in the department. Hes been out for illness for an extended period of time. In the meantime, mary has done enormous work to do her job as well as his. I want to thank you for that. If i could go to the first slide. The deputy kind of covered first of all, three things here. I think the deputy touched on that. He talked at some degree of spes fessty about the secretarys guide to us and you have to fight and win across a range of challenges. What problems are we trying to solve . What problems does the secretary want us to solve . For anyone listening who didnt read the secretarys remarks from a week ago, i would encourage people to go to defense. Gov website and start with his speech on the 2nd for what hes trying to do and a little more meat on the bones of the five challenges, which is what this budget is trying to address. And then finally, the deputy touched on this, a word on the future as we hand this off to the next administration who will do the 18 budget, 19 budget and so on. The sequester issue is still hanging around like a bad cold. It needs to be taken care of purr our plans have been consistent and well talk about that across several years. But our plans arent going to work if we cant get the sequester Problem Solved and get back up to the level of resources that we need to keep this progress going. We do think were making progress in this budget. Im going to skim past the next slide which shows you the history of the base budget and the oco budget layered on top of it since 9 11. Weve done a slide like this before. I want to drill down a little bit on the threeyear period weve just been through and are about to start. So, whats important about the budget addition about the budget situation, the budget deal. A couple things. From 16 to 17, the two bars on the right, we only got about 2. 5 billion more this year than last year. Thats under the terms of the budget deal, which was very flat from year to year and was exactly flat in the oco budget for those two years. Were only up about 2. 5 billion, what i would call Kitchen Table math, what did you have this year compared to last year . The pay raises we have in the budget basically consume about that amount of money. Taking that aside we had a flat amount of money once we got past the compensation part to work with. That speaks to the deputys point about this being more about the shape of the budget than the size because the size isnt growing. If you look back to the year before, one of the reasons the secretary will say and has said he was grateful for the budget deal is that it jumped us up a good 20, 25 billion where we were stuck in a rut. So i would certainly much rather be in the 520 neighborhood than in the 490 budget. Thats what this budget did for us. Its a better jumping off point for trying to get the next jump up we need in the future. When the secretary talks about being grateful for the deal, i think hes speaking primarily in terms of it was compromised. He called for a compromise. Make a decision. Get something done. When he says grateful, he doesnt mean he had to get everything he wanted and still think this was a good deal. We got stability which was important to the troops for our own planners, industry partners. In that sense the deal was a step up to where we think we need to be and nearterm certainty, which was probably the best we were going to expect under the circumstances. If i could get the next slide. I want to take you back to where we were a year ago at this time. We were coming off the second year of the murray ryan deal back to free for all land in terms of what was going to happen in the budget. So, we were seeking in last years budget a huge jump after three years of being stuck down in the mid490s we were seeking to go up about 35 billion. A very large increase. Thats what we were trying to accomplish last year. Now ill flip to this years picture of where we are now. The budget deal came in, raised the caps for 16 and 17 in the bipartisan budget agreement from last november. Jumped us up a good bit of the way. So, what we need this year this year our top line is theres no drama because it was set by the deal the president signed last november. Were looking ahead a little to the future now. We need to jump up again just as we did from the 13, 14, 15 level to the higher 16, 17 level, which is about we need to make another jump in 18. If you look at two more things i want to point out about this chart. This, i think, has been the most consistent administration ive ever seen in my 30something years in terms of the outyear profile, the 16 budget, 17 budget, those lines are in purple, blue and green on this chart. Very similar top lines. What you used to see all the time was in every fiveyear plan was slanted down lower and lower than the previous fiveyear plan. We stuck through our position pretty well in advocating in what we need, the size we need, the resources we think we need. This chart also speaks to the point the deputy was making about the 100 billion, the caps in law have four more years whether theyre still in force if nothing changes from fy 18 through 21. The difference in our position represented by those three lines and the red line below thats about 100 billion so 25 billion a year or so per year over the next four years is whats at stake for us between the resources we think we need and what weesh going to get if the law is not changed. If i could get the next slide. Im going to pivot for a second from the numbers picture, the top line picture, to the secretarys priorities. The deputy talked about this and i dont think we need to say too much more here. The thing that strikes me about what the secretary wants us to be doing is just the breadth, i think, of what we need to be addressing. Our military as vice chairman said is the best in the world and probably nobody else would contemplate being excellent in all the things the secretary wants us to be excellent at. You think about what hes asking us to do. Its to be is to be able to fight and win today and far into the future. You think about the five challenges the deputy enumerated. They span europe, middle east, asia. The worlds geography, time from now into the future as well as domains, the typical air, sea, land and space, and now cyberspace. The breadth of what were taerpting to be excellent at, i think, is really something only our military could do. Now, if i could go to the next slide. Im going to do something i wouldnt normally do in a budget brief which is to talk about whats not in a budget. I know this is of some interest to folks and were going to have two slides on this. Looking at the base budget, which is the predominant part of our budget and the predominant part of the budget agreement, the caps were reduced about 22 billion below what we had planned for this year. Now, a couple slides ago i was talking about what i call the Kitchen Table math. This is different math. This is what did we plan for in those lines i just showed you that have been consistent year after year after year of what did we say we needed in fy 17, compared to that plan the budget deal cut us 22. As we discussed a little when the deputy was up here, the budget agreement for the first time had a specific number for socalled oco or wartime spending. When we built all our requirements, as we did from the ground up, as we always do in the oco budget, we came out to about 5 billion less than that. We had 5 billion basically of relief, which was, as i think everybody who covers this knows, directly intended by the thank you for much for your patience and for waiting until we got done with votes. Lets hear your testimony. Thank you. Chairwoman, Ranking Member spear, distinguished members of the subcommittee thank you for the opportunity to discuss capable gaps in the Afghan National Security Forces. As the deposit fi Inspector General overseas continues the operations, i manage operation for freedom sentinel in afghanistan. As the chair of the interagency southwest asia joint planning group, i help coordinate oversight among the several inspectors general in afghanistan. I serve a similar role for Operation Inherent resolve, the iraq syria counter isil mission. I zroib that coordinating role in more detail in my written statement. Regard Afghan Security forces, my observations are based on our oversight work in recent published reports. We view the challenge of developing sustaining afghan fighting forces is twofold. Balancing the requirement to provide near term fighting capability against the afghans sustaining their fighting forces. In buildings institutions where those have not previously kpised. Shortcoming in afghan sustainment capacity are a recurrent theme in our work. I would like to highlight three examples. Supply and may not nents, property accountability and key commodities. As the supply and maintenance, for many years in during freedom, u. S. And nato partners emphasized rapidly growing the army and Police Forces robustly supported them and pushed the supplies to afghan units rather than requiring unit to pull supplies based on need and validated requirements. The result is the afghans have little experience with demand driven support systems. A recent assessment found that the Afghan National army was unable to properly forecast their material requirements. Regard property accountability, we reported in april of 2015 that the ministries of defense and interior did not have effective controls to manage the 95,000 vehicles procured by the u. S. And Coalition Partners. The long Term Solution to equipment readiness and may it please the court innocence should be the implementation of the afghan maintenance strategy. This strategy will place contractors at 23 locations to maintain equipment and train to afghan to conduct their own maintenance. The goal is to achieve full afghan responsibility for maintenance by 2021. Regarding key commodities, our overnight has found significant finding. We found a lack of adequate internal controls to manage fuel and ammunition. Last month we reported deficiencies in control involving fuel procured for the ministry. We found that coalitioned a viedsers has no assurance that all u. S. Funded fuel valued at 438 million was used for its intended purpose. Well conduct a similar audit of fuel procurement for the minute city of defense later this year. Future d. O. D. Work with include assessments of u. S. Efforts to build an independent Afghan Special forces and intelligence capability. Well soon evaluate the progress of u. S. Special Operations Forces in training and advising, assisting the Afghan Special forces. And this month we will send a team of intelligence specialists to assess progress in developing effective Afghan Intelligence operations. Looking forward, my office is engaged in a review of current programs and operations to identify future oversight work as lead Inspector General for operation freedom sentinel. As you may recall, congress created the lead ij for overseas Contingency Operations in the 2013 National Defense authorization act. The ijs of department of defense, department of state and United States agency for International Development execute the lead ig man gait which was enacted to provide improved coordinated whole of government oversight in overseas Contingency Operations. We appreciate the support of this committee, subcommittee as we discharge our oversight responsibilities and i look forward to your questions. Thank you. Thank you. Start the questions. I was wondering, what is the rationale for beginning the drawdown before the upcoming summer fighting season and before a new u. S. Administration has an opportunity to conduct its own assessment of the mission and needed troop levels . So, my understanding of the drawdown time line is noo that it will begin in the summer of 2016. The president has directed that general campbell try and keep at the 9,800 level through as much of 2016 as possible to we can do what we can in our mission to get the most out of our relationship with the afghans as they improve throughout fighting season 16. The rationale for the drawdown to the 5,500 is about how we set ourselves up for a future sustainable presence in the country at kilo occasions outside of kabul. The fact that we will maintain facilities in kandahar are key differences between the plan that was originally approved and the one that president obama revised that i think provide us the kind of flexibility we need to adjust the mission accordingly. Very good. Thank you. Colonel michael, Afghan Security forces have capability gaps, as we have heard you testify, and helicopter airplane capablabil s capabilities. Thee include the missions that the professional militaries need to be effective and lethal. What limiting factors are precluding the amdsf from effectively establishing these capabilities . Maam, i would say that there isnt anything specific that i wouldnt say theres anything specifically thats limiting them. It just takes time. First is time in getting the material and time in training process. We look specifically at the cast. Were feeling the 829. Theres four platforms that are already in country. Theres four more that will be there by april. And then theres a total of correction, eight more that will show up after that. Part of it is procuring the equipment on time and then the other part is training the capability. As you know, developing pilots is something that takes, you know, taking a lot of, you know, specificity and time. How will the development of these capabilities be affected by the upcoming drawdown to 5,500 troops . Maam, as the 5,500 also has the capacity to pain train train, advice and assist with the Afghan Air Force. And in addition were also specifically focused on train, advice and assist the Afghan Special Security Forces. Both of those components will maintain train and advice oversight. Mr. Breed love, how do you believe the Afghan Taliban would react if the u. S. Coalition forces were able to target the Afghan Taliban directly as part of the Counter Terrorism mission in only extremist type situations . I think the best way i would phrase it is we saw we have seen how this insurgents, and in particularly the taliban do we act when we were under the surge, when we had u. S. And Coalition Forces in the fight backed up by their own air support, as you know. And we saw adjustments in how they approached their tactics. With your specific questions, i dont think we would see much of a change as far as the fight on the ground. I think the fighters on the ground will adjust. They are an adaptable enemy. Theyll adjust to their environment as we saw this year. Same as we saw them adjust when u. S. Combat forces were much larger or much more aggressive in previous years. But it doesnt stop them from fighting. So at best we may see hesitation among some operations. We may see changes in how they maneuver. But i think at a tack call level that would be the most we would expect to see. At a senior level, i dont think it would have much of an impact. Most of the Senior Leaders are not in the country anyways. Would direct targeting bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table quicker and bring breathing room to the Afghan Government in. Maam, many my opinion, that would be it could be a factor, one of many tools that could be applied. But in and of itself i dont think thats enough. It would have to be one of many tools to help change their belief that they still have the time to win this fight. Okay. Thank you. And, in your professional opinions, has the department of defense made adequate progress in establishing sufficient oversight and accountability mechanisms within its command govern answer architecture to men mize opportunities or identify quickly if they occur, fraud, waste that have plagued the departments execution over the recent years . Very briefly, no. And part of that is because we dont have the resources for doing so. And i think i note in my longer statement, which i offer to be made part of the record, that weve even noted some of the Task Forces Set up to fight and combat corruption, have had to be abolished because there are no resources. So i would say no. Okay. Mr. Chau . Maam, i believe from our oversight they have established systems. The challenge is properly and fully implementing the systems. And i would offer through examples. They have begun the process of moving the afghans to electronic pay and information system. They have, the department, improved the process for identifying training, the proper both military and civilian advisers to conduct, train advice and assist. And theyve increased the enforcement of the commitment letters. But again, i would not say that they have adequately progressed in that. This is part of a process. And i think there are also complicated factors. Its real important to consider. Youve got illiteracy, endemic corruption, the political tribal decisions for selecting commanders. General campbell said that 70 of the problems that he saw was based on leadership. Both selecting and being able to relief commanders and Senior Leaders is too often based on these other factors rather than competency. And i think for understandable reasons, we dont have the stability of advisers because the tours are nine months to a year. Its very difficult to the kind of relationship over time. Instead the Contractor Force is really the institutional memory in afghanistan. And thats a challenge. And finally, as mr. Sopko properly pointed out, the insecurity of afghanistan to have both the department and oversight agencies check, kick the tires, be downrange properly at the proper level to check, we really are defend dependent on afghans in their reporting. Without implementing those types of systems where we can better detect that the money is being properly used, there is no adequate progress. But i do believe systems have been identified and properly put in place, will provide that kind of progress. Thank you. Thank you. Ranking member spear. Question . Madam chair, thank you. I want to apologize to all of the witnesses. Many of the members who were here earlier wanted to be able to stay but because this is a getaway day, you know, peoples schedules are such that they have to make planes. I think this hearing is so important that it should be held as a full committee hearing. We are sending so much money in afghanistan and from the testimony weve heard today, theres virtually no accountability. But lets get to a couple of the points that youve made. Colonel michael, you said in your statement significant long term capability gaps remain in the areas of andsf leadership. Rotary wing aviation, combined arms operation, intelligence collection and dissemination, closed air support and maintenance. Thats a pretty significant indictment. If its not improved in 2016, what are you going to do differently or what are you going to recommend that be done differently . Maam, the key thing to highlight is that its a process. We talk about theres capability gaps in leadership. But its something thats being developed, you know, develop over time at the tack call level and the core level. The main thing to reinforce, weve been building this force since 2009. Initially we started off, this was an american fight. We were in the lead, we were pulling, yaw know i know all of that. Yes, maam. The question though is weve been there for a very long time now. At some point if we dont put conditions on money coming in, the spigot being turned off and not being turned off, were not going to get the results were looking for. And if you dont develop a plan and specific expectations that are going to take place in 2016 or else, funds arent going to be available in 2017. We will be there indefinitely with no success and with the American People literally pulling out their hair saying, what are we doing here. Thats more rhetorical than anything else. I dont think your answer, frankly, is adequate. Let me ask all of the others of you, if 2016 is as bad as 2015, what would you recommend be done differently . Maam, first, thanks for the question. I would start by saying, you know, the capability gaps that you have identified that weve all identified in our statements are thex4 n capability gaps thae among the most sophisticated aspects of the force were still trying to build. Weve always planned for those to be the focus of the long term relationship with the Afghan Government and the andsf. And the president s decision to maintain a presence at 5500 will allow us to kus on the aviation, the special operations, the intel development. This is an investment that we think is important for the long term future of the partnership between the United States and the Afghan Government on key ct relevant capabilities. So do you anticipate there will be at least 5,000 troops in afghanistan indefinitely . I wouldnt say indefinitely. I think that the plan is to ensure that they progress and as they progress we can have more and more confidence in reducing our own troop level. Which is part of how we got to the drawdown that were currently planning on now. The 30,000 to 9800 did assume that the afghans could assume full responsibility for the security environment in 2015. And despite very real challenges that we mostly anticipated, they have performed as expected. Now the drawdown to 5500 anticipate gaps remain but were going to make up the gaps over time. I dont have a good estimate for how much time that will take but i do not think it is an indefinite investment. What do you think we should do differently in 2017 if 2017 is as bad as 2015 . Well, i think 2016 will be as bad as 2015. I support the judgment of the head of National Intelligence who predicted that. I would say if things look bad, and i think they do, i would have four suggestions to you. Number one, fully support and ensure that general nicholson actually has the resources and the time to conduct that 90day assessment. A true 90day assessment of whats going on and what his needs are. And bring him back and have him explain to this committee and other committees as to what those needs are. He is the person on the ground, hes got to get there out with his people and see whats going on. The second thing is i think this congress should require u. S. Aid and dod and the department of state to actually rate and rack and stack their programs as to whats succeeded, what hasnt and what do you want to get rid of in the fact that we have a physical crisis in the government. Why are we paying for programs that make no sense. They have never done that. I sent a letter to the head of the aid and secretary of defense after i was on the job one year, three years ago, asking them to rack and stack all of their programs and at minimum give me some of your Success Stories and why and they wrooerent able to it. All i got back is balloons and kites and happy talk. Were helping the Afghan Military. Great. What program helped the Afghan Military. If you have an unlimited budget, you can fund everything. But if you have a limited budget, limited time and limited security, which programs are the most important programs. I would think thats something Congress Needs to do. And going into 2016 thats what you really need to do. And they have to come up with real measurements of success. Right now the measurement of success seems to be do you spend the appropriations. Im not seeing real measurements of success in the work i do, not only with d. O. D. But with a. I. D. And state. And i think thats something Congress Needs to hold somebodys feet to the fire on. Mr. Childs . Maam, i cant argue with what he has said. I think in terms of the agencies. But i do believe its beyond my expertise as an Oversight Organization to address the actual policy and the prescriptions. When policy is decided and objectives are declared, i see it as our job as oversight to see how thats being implemented. But the idea of providing general nicholson the opportunity to come back and to, after his assessment, to make clear what he thinks he needs to properly do his job, i think that is a proper way forward and likewise, i think its very important that the agencies, as they discharge their responsibilities, they will assess what works and they may then change their policy. When they do, i think its my job representing the Oversight Community to see how thats being implemented. Thank you. So there were two issues that were brought up this morning. One ghost troops and few that i would think we should be able to get our handle on. 438 million being spent on u. S. Fuel to afghanistan and mr. Childs, you testified that there really is no accountability. Is this fuel being sold on the black market . Is that a potential effect of whats going on . Maam, to be precise, we found that there was no reasonable assurance that all of the fuel was being used for its proper purpose. We couldnt pin down more precisely. And as to the ghost soldiers, we have direct funding audit that inpart concerns the pay system. And that will address some portion of the concern that were paying for troops that are not actually there. So these troops that could be in provinces that we dont have the ability because its so unsafe to send personnel to audit, would suggest that we really have no way of knowing whether these troops exist or dont exist and whether they are functioning as members of the afghan armed services, correct . It is, it is certainly the fact that we cant properly assess. They clearly have troops in the role or on the roles because its a tough fighting year. In fact they do have the question is how many other are we paying for that are not on the rolls. And thats in part what the pay systems are designed to address. And as i was saying, i believe weve established, the department has established that type of mechanism to address. But it hasnt been fully implemented. Mr. Sopko is shaking his head, so i think, i think my colleague mentioned it. Weve got a program out there, weve got a contract we let but it hasnt been implemented. We tried and i mentioned it in my statement to ping the system. Which is supposed to have all of this great data and they couldnt give us any answer from it. Thats the big problem. Were relying still on the afghans who have an incentive to lie because they can collect the money to fill in the data cells. We dont have the people on the ground. Remember, were at the level of the core. We are not at the level of the briga brigade. We have no visibility. So at the core level it may look good. I mean, thats like measuring air effectiveness by going over to the pentagon and understanding whats going on in afghan stan. Youve got to have people out on the ground and that is the inherent problem with that. I dont care how many i. T. Systems you put into place, if your data going in, its garj in, garj out and thats what we seeing, particularly in a country in afghanistan where there is an incentive. My concern is we saw in iraq where there were paper division. And apparently if you listen to the reporting coming in by afghan officials, they were paper units. Which may explain what the problem is. My concern is how many of those units are actually just paper units. And were paying for the salaries of each and every afghan soldier, is that correct . . We and our allies, yes. Were paying the bulk of it. And the police force as well . Thats correct. All right. I have many more questions but ill yield back. Thank you. Sure. Mr. Scott. Thank you, madam chair. Maam, gentlemen, thank you for your service. Colonel michael, i know were discussing afghanistan today, but King Abdullah was here one month ago today and discussed that whole region of the world, if you will, including libya and the saudi and iran situation. Youre in charge of pakistan as well as afghanistan and the transregional threat. How do you assess the region as a whole right now, the threat level . Well, i think if you look regionally, the threat level is fairly high. Thats one of the reasons were there. Were there to make sure that we set conditions, so that what happens there doesnt imnate and touch here. From that perspective, the fact that were presence reinforces that the threat level is high. As we look at iskp and you heard mr. Breedloves assessment and general campbell said iskp was operation emergent and we have the, you know, he has the target authority to target them. Primarily looking at iskp from a global perspective, given the fact were fighting in iraq and syria, making sure we have the ability to engage and defeat them wherever they show up. Its i mean, and today were talking about an individual country. But sit a regional issue to me. When you look across that whole spectrum, libya, from what i understand is in worse shape than syria. Theres not much reporting there because the press cant get in there. King ap due la was blunt with his statement that the volatility can no be overexaggerated and the whole region is very close to potentially an allout war. And thats very concerning to me. And we need to make sure that we keep our friends as strong as they can possibly be in that whole region, i would think, to hopefully bring about stability. Mr. Sopko and mr. Childs, this may be more of a statement than a question. We talk a lot about individual things but it seems like we waste a lot of money on not just the process that seems to be broken but a procurement system that seems to be broken. Colonel michael mentioned the a29 program. Im somewhat familiar with that as theyre trained in any district. And if things had gone as planned, they would be in country right now, is that correct . . And so where we sit today is that they should be there three years from now. Sir, theres four a29s in country. The rest will wait until 2018 to be fully but the completion of the whole they should all be there right now. Yes. Contract delays did delay the arrival of the a29s. And it will take three years from now because of those contract delays to get the rest of the pilots trained and the unit actually in country so they can help carry out the fight. So that delay came as the result of a lawsuit from beechcraft defense if im not mistaken, is that correct . . I think thats my understanding. It was a lawsuit, i believe that was the company. In the written statement it names them in the footnotes. Is it possible to calculate how much that lawsuit cost us, cost the United States by delaying that program for three years . You know, id have to check on that. I assume there are some costs involved, but i really dont know. We could take a look at that if you would like us to, sir. My point is, the situation on the ground may be very different and may be very much more in our favor if with we had been able to get the equipment in that our soldiers and friends need to carry out the fight. This isnt just with this situation. Its with situations all across the d. O. D. Where the contractors are suing us and those lawsuits are preventing us from getting the men and women out there carrying out the fight the equipment that they need. Colonel michaels, if you had the, if you had the a29s that youre supposed to have today, could it change the fight . Sir, absolutely. The maneuvering that theyre doing is greatly enhanced by closer support. Is it possible that what happened on september 28 may have had a different outcome if we were able to provide the air support in. I cant necessarily guarantee the outcome but the bottom line is that the maneuver operations on the ground is much better and enhanced with proper closer support. So these lawsuits that are delaying our ability to carry out the mission are costing us more than the legal cost of the suit is my point. And its costing us in lives as well. One last question that i have, if i may madam chair before i turn it back over. When we pull down from approximately 10,000 troops to 5500 or 6,000, whatever it may be. When we pull our soldiers out, how many of those men and women are being replaced with contractors . Sir, its not a one for one exchange. I think right now the level of contractors are almost about the same. I think when we go down to 5500 it will be an increased number of contractors. But if you look at what theyre doing, theyre not necessarily a lot of it is support capability. Absolute lit. Maintenance own aircraft and helicopters. It seems to me we have this number and we say we want to pull this down because we have this perception that as long as we have fewer men and women in uniform in the country that were not spending as much and that were not engaged as much. But when we pull down a maintenance unit, for example, and we turn around and send contractors back in to do that exact same maintenance and we pay those contractors three and four times as much as we were paying u. S. Service personnel, were not, we are not being honest really about the cost of things. And i would ask, mr. S. O. P. K. O. , is it possible to calculate how much more, i would think it would be, were spending on contractors as we draw down than we were spending on u. S. Troops . We have not done that type of assessment. But im certain we could test that. We could take a specific contract or a specific program that was run by the military and then compare the costs. Thats something we could do. We have not done it. If i could make one final point, colonel. In talking with the soldiers, it creates a problem when you have a United States soldier who is making a couple of thousand dollars a month sitting right next to a contractor whos making 10,000 a month doing the exact same job. And the soldiers that i talk to, when you get to the point that you have enough trust that were honest with each other, that creates some strife in an operation. Because our soldiers are not treated as well as the contractors are, if were honest about it. And so thats more of a point than a question. But something im very concerned about, making sure that we take care of our soldiers. Very good point, gentlemen. Now, ms. Spear, have some more questions . I do. I think in that last round, you wanted to say something, because i thought my time should be shifted to someone else. I did not give you the opportunity to speak. So if you have a comment on that last round. Sure. I appreciate the opportunity to come back to it. First of all, i think that the go soldiers problem, the problem with accountability or Afghan Soldiers that were paying for is a real problem and one that we work closely with mr. Childs and mr. Sopko to understand. We also work closely to develop a comprehensive solution to address it. We are working toward an integrated pay and personnel system that will mitt tate opportunities for corruption in the system. I think its a really Important Initiative that were putting in place. Its one that were focused on and its taken a while to develop given the unique terrain that is afghanistan. But it is something that were absolutely focused on and think is an important aspect of the mission. In terms of the difference between fighting season 15 and fighting season 16 and how were trying to account for those, i do want to assure you that general campbell, in speaking with the secretary of defense, the interagency has communicated the work hes doing already to evaluate fighting season 15. And what changes that the Afghan Security forces need to make for fighting season 16 but that we need to make in our mission. Its a clear focus that were not sort of blindly following the template that we started with in fighting season 15. Were look to improve upon and ro progress in the development of the andsf so we set ourselves up for success in fighting season 16 and the Long Term Mission in afghanistan. Thank you. So as it relates to ghost troops, can we be confident that by the end of 2016 there will be a system in place with retina detection or something so that well have a competent understanding of how many troops the Afghan Military service has . We will certainly have greater confidence. We are instituting a biometric id card system and issuing those to all m. O. D. And Afghan National army elements. When will they all be distributed . I believe by the middle of the year. The integrated pay in personnel system will be fully implemented in the middle f the year as well and by early 17 well transition to the m. O. D. As well. Thank you. Mr. Breedlove in terms of our intelligence capability there, we were surprised with the death of mullah omar and did not know he had been dead for some time. Is that correct . . Yes, maam. So with that knowledge, what can you tell us about what we need to do to have better intelligence . Well, i think its ill lose tra tif on that particular account that we need to keep in mind that somebody like mullah omar was in self exile. He wasnt out there. He had always been that way. So trying to get at it from an intelligence perspective, if somebody wants to stay hidden and hes surrounded by people that want to stay hideden and he doesnt communicate and doesnt move, it makes it very difficult to find the need until the hay stack. I think that was illustrative of this particular situation and as well as the conspiracy to perpetuate the fact that he was alive. I guess my question though is, are you comfortable that we have enough resources being expended on intelligence in the region, particularly in afghanistan . I am. Its never perfect. Its never enough. Youre asking an intelligence professional if we have enough information. We can never have enough information. Were always going to want more information. Our gaps are always large. In this particular case theyve grown since weve reduced our footprint. But were adequate to get after what we need to do. And speaking for my agency, i think were sufficient in order to do our mission set, which is to support the war fighter in theater. Mr. Sopko, is it true that we just built a new headquarters facility for the ministry of defense in. Thats correct. What was the cost of that facility . I think the project cost was 155 million. It was 100 million over budget and completed five years late. Who is the contractor on that . I dont have that data handy. But i would have to get back to you. 100 million over budget in. Thats correct. And who was watching the store on that one . Well, i think it was the id have to doublecheck. Maybe ms. Abez say would know. It was air force contract or corps of engineers. Could you get back to us on that . Absolutely. Happy to do that. The maintenance cost, is that going to be able to be supported . Well, i wouldnt know since the Afghan National i mean the Afghan Government cant pay for the military. I dont know that they can pay for those costs which is about 2. 6 million, 3 million a year to maintain the building. Thats our best estimate. So if they dont have the money to maintain the building, the building will be a White Elephant in short order . Or well pay for it, like were paying for most of the other oem. What about the other facility. Were in the process of building a new facility. That should be compete completed soon at the cost of 100 million. Is that on budget . No. But i dont have those exact figures since its not finished. So the ministries, or the ministers want lavish facilities and so we say, okay, and we build them. Do we consider the construction of these buildings on any accountability . Not that i know of. And that is an issue i remember having a lengthy conversation with general similar night who said that prior to 2013 we did not have any conditionality on the money that they were spending or giving. So i think basically 2013 and then he was a big advocate of conditionality. But these building, the construction started before he got there. So moving forward would you recommend that there be conditionality on the construction of any palace . I agree fully with that. This is something ive had long conversations with the general, hes now been replaced. And it was the whole issue. He had smart conditionality. I mean you cant stop giving the Afghan National Security Forces guns or bullets because theyll lose the war. But identify the shiny objects that the local official wants and then focus on that as your condition. That was the generals approach to smart conditionality and its something that we should consider following. Okay. Mr. Chairman, i dont know if you intend to do another round. I dont want to continue to ask questions without giving you the opportunity to i have a couple of brief ones, but i dont have anything long. Ill be happy to go briefly and then turn it over to you and then well close out. Great. This may be along the lines, more along the lines of suggestions that you could make. But in most vehicles in america that you buy now, you can call the manufacturers if the vehicle is stolen and they can tell you exactly where it is and they can actually shut the vehicle down so that it can be recovered. Seems to me that we could use the same types of technology in some of our military equipment that if the equipment ends up in the hands of somebody we dont want to have it, that we could stop that equipment from being used against us with stuff that we have in every gm or ford vehicle in the country. Just a suggestion that bothers someone greatly to see our enemy riding around in vehicles that the United States purchased. Were going to be pulling from 9800 down to 5500 uniform personnel over the next ten and a half months naps the current plan, is that correct . . Yes, sir. So thats approximately 50 of the men and women that we have in uniform. I want to go back to the issue of the contractors. How many contractors do we intend to hire over the next 11 months to replace the work that our men and women in uniform are performing . And will those contractors be predominantly from the United States or will they be local. Sir, we dont have an exam number of, you know, contractors were looking to hire. And its not the replace, you know the 5500 is really designed to accomplish exactly what we need from our military. As we draw down, were not just increasing contractors to replace the fact that weve drawn down the military. The assessment is as we go forward we need to focus on a regional Counter Terrorism platform as you talked about. Regional is based out of kabul in the south and the east and that gives us the capability to Search Capacity if we need to and the capability to address any threats. It focuses advice and asis at the ministerial level and the Afghan Security institutions when a focuses advice and assist at the kritable capabilities that we think we need long term, in the Afghan Air Force and the Afghan Special Security Forces. So the number of military is the assessment, that is exactly what we need. Obviously we will also be able to lechblg contractors. But the intent was not to draw down military and replace them with contractors. The number of military is the assessment of what we think well need. But you understand the point. I mean soldiers that i talked with were like, you know, they say theyre drawing down, were losing uniform personnel but in the end were putting other people in there doing the exact same job. And contractors arent necessarily carrying rifles. Many of them are operating on the equipment maintenance and other things. But i think the soldiers who are flying the aircraft prefer to have the men and women that are taking care of the men in the United States. I would point out on the a29 program, its not just training the pilots. When they come to the United States, they bring the maintenance people as well. So were sending a whole crew back to take care of that system. I hope we get it to you sooner rather than later. I dont have have any further questions. Ill turn it back over to ms. Spooer if she has any. Thank you, mr. Scott. One of the issues that many of you have raised, that general campbell raised was the fact that the andsf have fallen short in terms of their aviation capabilities. Part of it was referenced by mr. Scott in terms of getting the actual platforms there. But it appears that part of the problem is that youre dealing with a population that for the most part is illiterate. So id like your thoughts on whether or not were bringing in equipment that is too sophisticated for the population that were trying to train in terms of the air force to be able to commandeer these aircraft. Thanks for the question, maam. Human capital shortages are significant when we talk about the aviation cape thablt the Afghan Air Force needs and its one of the drivers as we look at how we should build a force that the Afghan Government can actually afford. We do focus literacy training, we do focus Technical Training on those highend skills associated with aviation maintenance, that with associated with the piloting of the aircraft to the key population that we think is going to be necessary for the afghans to be able to operate the air force that they need. But in terms of the sophistication of the system, i think what were trying to do is establish a contracted Logistic Support system that both incorporates, you know, contracted maintenance that we, the United States military often uses for our own sophisticated systems but also increases the training of afghans to be able to increasingly do the maintenance on their own so it become as more organic capability. Were aware again of the Human Capital shortages and that is a key driving factor in how we balance and plan for the air force that is actually absorbable. Yes, mr. Sopko. Congresswoman, i think youre raising a really critical point. It goes beyond the literacy. It goes back to the sufficiency of the resources that the generals have. Due to a lack of data we do not know right now how many amdsf people will lit rail. Our best estimate is its less than 30 . Why . Even though we spent 200 Million Dollars in literacy training, they dont have the ability because they dont have the resources to measure the effectiveness of the Literacy Program and determine the extent to which overall literacy in andsf has improved. Remember, we transitioned the Literacy Program to the afghans. And once we did that we lost all visibility. So we dont know how many people have been trained. But more importantly, how many of those soldiers and police we trained are still in