Transcripts For CSPAN3 Future Of The Army 20141125

Questions that this one has answered. Berlin battle, operational and tactical level of war. This one is operational tactical and strategic level of war. Battle, built to deal with the known. This is to deal with the unknown. Unknowable and constantly changing. Probably trying to solve the battle with a fight out number to win. And this one wins in a complex world. Now, not only do each of those words have a very specific meaning, if you look at the battle, the implied task is to win, you had to fight. If you look at when in the complex world, the focus here is winning. The focus is on winning. In fact you may not have to fight to win. But, a qualifying mark, but as soon as i say that, people say, i love that idea. Winning without fighting. But the only way you could possibly win without fighting, is it must be absolutely clear to everybody involved that if you do fight, you will absolutely win. So it has to be clear to everybody that if there is a fight, there is no doubt who is going to win. Once you cross that threshold, then you may have a chance to win without fighting. Because a lot of people say, i like the idea of winning without fighting. I want to buy that kind of army. I want to win without fighting because it sound cheaper. It can be smarter. No, youve got it all wrong. If you want an army that can win without fighting, you have to buy an army that can absolutely win the and in fact it has to be absolutely clear to people. So to clear an army that can win without fighting may mean you need a more capable army that if you only want an army that can fight to win. Because you have to be able to have the deterrence capability and the way you lead that army has to leave no doubt in anybodys mind that you can win any fight anywhere any time in the unknown world that is unknowable and constantly changing. Once have you an army that can do that, you can deter people from fighting. Thats a very capable army. So actually cheaper army may be well i maybe just bite one that can fight and win. So a lot of people dont understand the relationship between winning without fighting, means you absolutely have to have the capability to win the fight if it comes that way. Thats how you build that deterrence capability and a lot of people dont understand deterrence capability and what it means for deterrence capability and full capability. Which means intense, capability weapons systems. Capability to sustain yourselves, put yourselves strategically, thats a very large and encompassing capability to deter conflict. So what does that actually mean for the army . So if you blow up that slide, what we spend just a couple of things that the army has do to win in a complex world. That is, you see them on the left, one is the army is inherently the foundation for the join force. So we said to win in a complex world is a strategic level aspiration. That means the army has to bring together the strategic Assets Available to us as nation. When you look at early battles you are focussing on the tactical operational level, you are focussing on acquiring enemy targets and engaging them. So it became a targeting exercise. It is math problem. So i focus on acquiring targets and engaging targets. It was about synchronizing firepower. How do you synchronize firepower . When in a complex world, what we are saying is synchronizing firepower in and of itself is inadequate. What we are saying the army has to do now, if you want to win at strategic level, we cant only synchronize and deliver firepower, we have to synchronize and deliver National Power. National power is much larger than firepower. Firepower is part of it. But National Power means can you deliver economic capability. Can you enable diplomatic capability. Can you enable all of the instruments of the United States National Power to be able to focus and win at the strategic level. So now you say, you know what, my staffs have to be different. I have to have different kind of people on the division staff. They cant not only know about artillery but they have to know about diplomatic activity. They have to know about economic activity. They have to know about cultural activity. They have to know about how Coalition Partners operate. If i send a brigade to western africa and deal with ebola, they might have to know how to deal with the World Health Organization. Work with united nations. When you look at this picture, not only is it colored but you can see it has the domain, maritime domain, cyber domain and land domain. Special operating forces. Unhcr. Marine corps, navy, air force. Mountainous terrain. Plains. It is all of the domains intersecting each other. When you look at the battle all about the land domain, then when you talk about air, it was about what does air do to land . Really with that, what we are saying is because and most of the time that i grew up and in the complex i was in, the air and sea were uncontested really. And actually we had to keep it that way. In the army we want to make sure the United States air force has air supremacy at least wherever i am. I like that. We want to make sure the United States navy has absolute naval supremacy wherever they are. Make sure the United States marine corps has absolute supremacy whatever they are responding to crisis. Those are all given. So this is a very joint document and we want all those guys and gals to kind of really do their part as well. Now what is happening now as we move to the future, those domains previously uncontested are becoming more and more contested. Which means we no longer have the other domains being uncontested space and what we are saying those that operate on land, we may have to deliver effect needs other domains. We may have do something from land to secure the for the United States navy. We may have to do something in the space domain for Ballistic Missile defense or for our air force brethren. It is not all about land. This is about what does land do to synchronize and deliver all elements of National Power in all domains. Other point ill bring up there is the ability for us to present multiple dilemmas to the enemy. Because thats what you have do in a strategic level endeavor. You are chess players. If you put somebody in check mate, it means they still may have moves available. But wherever you move, you have something for them. They cant move without you countering their move. You cant just have a single dilemma, you have to have multiple dilemmas. You generally present single dilemmas. And that if you look on the previous slide, i have my main body of tanks and so i have one dilemma for you. If you can somehow mitigate that, then you sort of have freedom of action. What we say at the strategic level, if you want to win at the strategic level, there could be nowhere that our enemy turns that they are not contested. Thats why we have to deliver all elements of National Power. Thats why if all you can do is target somebody, thats all can you do is target somebody, eventually they will stop presenting themselves as target. So you may build the influence over the tactical level but you cant influence and compel their activity without their compliance, the strategic level unless you can stop every move they have and present them with these multiple dilemmas. Can you see down there,ant grate partners. This is part of us being a member of the joint force. And in the end consolidate games. When you operate in a tactical and operational level, you get effects there. But when you want to win at the strategic level, you have time and space and consolidate them to give you sustainable political outcomes. Because that is what war is about. Thats how you win at the strategic level. And the nature that war is by politics of other means and in other words, really quite honestly, the reason the United States goes to war is to gain some type of sustainable political outcome in the favor of our national interest. Well we are saying most of that occurs on land. So what we have do is not only provide a tactical operational effect, we have to consolidate all of those gains and all of those gains of National Power, economic, political, Coalition Partner, into sustainable political gains for the United States or why do it in the first place. You may feel good about yourself, a momentary tactical effect. But if you cant translate into a political outcome that you are focused on in the longterm, what we are saying is you are coming up with short with what we say an army is. The future of the army is to win in complex world and win at the strategic level and all limit of National Power in an unknown, unknowable and constantly changing world. And so i think that at this point we transition to i guess a discussion and in q a . Okay. And so good evening, everyone. As ms. Shoup said, im from the Rand Corporation here in washington and the way we will proceed here is general perkins and i will engage in about a 15minute conversation. And that should leave about 20 minutes for q a from the audience. So with that, sir, thank you for your remarks. And for the keeping the power point to a minimum. Three slides is most of them were pictures. Thats right. Excellent, excellent correct use of power point slides there. In reading through the latest operating concept, i think you accurately sort of get at all of these unknowns were dealing with Going Forward here. Be it the environment, enemy, the coalitions well be working with. Given all of these unknowns, how difficult is it to articulate a clear Strategic Vision Going Forward . Particularly when you have to incorporate all these other entities that perhaps didnt have to be part of the deliberations in the past . Yes. You know, it is very complex, right . One of the things, and you know, why we actually thought a while about this, the words in a complex world, is that you, from the very beginning, you have to get into this discussion of winning. Which is very difficult. Because define that, draw a picture of it, what does it look like, et cetera. It involves multiple people. If you look back at previous conflicts, world war ii, world war i, they each had a different view. And if you look at lincoln, his vision of winning in the civil war changed multiple times during fighting the civil war. But he always had a longterm strategic look of an outcome that was sustainable for a long time. And so, what were saying is that that is critical because what it does, first of all, it forces the very tough discussions. There is no exact answer and it is probably going to change because your coalition will change. Maybe some of the outcomes that are within the realm of the possible change. People may switch sides. People have a change of heart. But if you always stay at that level, what it does is it provides a basis of understanding of what youre try doing in the longterm. And therefore, when you have discussions about a short term problem, a lot of times, if you dont have that longterm view, and is it sustainable. A lot of times, we are very clear and we talk about sustainable gains. Sustainable outcomes. That people have a view and they say, i dont think that is really sustainable, is it . It makes you grade your own homework. And you say, i probably have to do things differently. When i was Division Commander in iraq, we were the last division up north. And at that time, and there were a lot of issues and things like that and i would go around to Brigade Commanders and what are you doing and well sir we are doing this and there is this security mechanism and my unit is in the middle of it all. And whenever there is an argument, they come see me and i figure it out. Yeah, but thats not sustainable. Because youre not going to be here forever. So how are you working yourself out of picture. Youre the last commander here. So what i need you to do from now on when i come up here is you need brief me on how you are making yourself irrelevant. Thats generally not the way we look at things. The Army Officers are type a people. So we generally, in the army, have a solution of which we are the center, if im irrelevant, why am i there . Maybe youre there to build a sustainable process that as you stay out they can continue on. Thats why winning at strategic level is imperative to keep it at the forefront otherwise you will sub optimize what you are doing for a temporary tactical operational gain. Thank you for that. Okay. Thank you for that. Just to follow on the concept of win, as you are going through deliberation and draft of this document, was there ever any sort of push back on do we want to use this word . And sometimes i know the long involved process and a lot of people get a vote, but when i think of win, i think there is an insinuation that there is some level of closure. That i think certainly a recent experience in the world have been not been able to produce. So i would be curious know as you are going through the drafts, was there any sort of push back or people who felt that maybe we should be careful about how we use this word. To this day. So i probably have received more i would say a lively discussion. On whether or not we ought to put that word there. And there is a there are a number of reasons for it, quite honestly. And that we chose to put it there. I would like to say first of all, it was a product of you know, six to eight years of intensive research, focus groups, looking extensively at history and all that. The truth of the matter is, you know, we have a shorter time line than maybe hist and so we have to define the problem because i tell my staff, define the problem before we come and answer. So they came to me with a very sort of, what i call army ease overwritten description of the problem which is like two pages long. And it kind of tries to get, you know, at the very nuance world and you know, not capability and lets look for something generally favorable and all of the mentions that it went on and on and on to define the problem. I said, okay, look, heres the deal. I always tell my folks, never lose clarity in the search for accuracy. Im sure theres a very accurate description of the world we are going into. It is not very clear. So always especially when you are talking at a large level, a document like this, you need clarity. Clarity versus pages and pages of excessive accuracy that really dont provide clarity. So we went through a couple turns and we go from two pages to a page and half and okay, heres the deal. There are Large Organizations and forcing functions. Everyone tells me early in battle, thats the standard. It can be as good as that. Lets look at the problem statement. Youve got six syllables, really, thats all the guidance a four star general can tell me, just six syllables. So win in a complex world, i think thats six syllables. That is forced to bring clarity to what it is we are try doing. Can you go on and on and on and on about accurate nuances but what were saying is the first question we want you to discuss, im not telling you what the answer so win is, im just telling you, you need to focus on that and you need to come to an understanding collectively. We are talking about understanding visualize describe then direct, lead and assess. There is more to it than the four power point slide. What we are saying is if you dont have a common understanding of visualization of what some form of win means or what it doesnt mean, the problem is, you automatically will revert to tactics. And what happens is if you dont have some vision of what win is, and youre not looking at strategic level of things, you start substituting tactics for strategy. Tactics is not strategy. Ways are the tactics. But what happen says a lot of times, we confuse it and instead of having end which is the vision of win then ways to get there, then means that you work with to get there, we focus all our ways on getting more means versus our ways to achieve an end. And then we get a lot of means but it never gets us to an end because we have the math wrong. We have means you apply via ways to get to the end. You need a strategy, an system of random tactics. So it is a forcing function. Staying on the complex theory, the various entities involved now days, when compiling a document like this, how do you incorporate feedback from not just other services but also, in the boat on slide. And it has become players in some of these theaters that we find ourselves in. Do you incorporate their feedback and their input as you go through a process like this. This is very important. We want this to be sort of not just a tradeoff when we document but an Army Document and then really a National Document with regards to what the army does. So we did a number of things. The first thing that i did personally and my team did before we wrote our document is we read the Navy Air Force and marine corpss operating concept. So we could read what they are saying about themselves and how they view themselves and how they view the future. And in many ways, the foundational element and how can we enable what they do. Than we look inside the army and bring it all of the Division Commanders, all of the corps commanders, most of the one stars and out to groups of captains and we would have these sessions and we have gone through multiple versions and first of all, does this make sense . Can you understand it . Can you see it translating to capabilities . Because thats the next thing that this does. So the Division Commanders, these not people without opinions, you know. And so thats why they are Division Court commanders. They provide good insight us to. They have all of the four stars. That i went down to quantico. And i briefed the chief of staff of the air force on this and about a month ago, army staff, briefing chief of Naval Operations and navy staff on it and extensively out to think tanks and put it on the blogisphere and this is not only an invented document to make sure we are not oversimplifying the problem. A lot of people start explaining this and thats too complicated, you need simplify it. I said, no, the one problem we dont has dont have is people oversimplify and we dont have a lack of people oversimplifying complex problem. That happens all the time. What i need do is clarify the complexity. Not simplify it. I need clarify it. So people understand it so that we can deal with it. When you simplify complexity, what happens is you assume away the hard stuff and the hard stuff is what you gets you in trouble because in the process of simplifying it, you assumed it away so our job here is to clarify it so we can deal with it. We try to throw a very wide net. Thats one of the reasons im here. This is the first document were going to have a series of war games after this. And a series of other documents. We are trying to get feed back from as many folks from as wide a genre as we can get. The next steps for this, this is sort of the big picture, you know, top document. Right. Given all of the complexity, do you see this feeding down into many different sort of branches here and is there any i dont want to say concern, but is there any feeling that this might get, you know, as with all these unknowns, there is going to be any number of scenarios we can plan for or discuss or talk about a war game, and has that come up at all as far as at some point we have to try to do something. Exactly. Thats exactly what it is do. This lays out the principles. Broad intellectual foundation about what the future could look like and what the army does about it and now what we are focussing on is specific capabilities that we think are useful in the kind of environment that were describing. So what we have in these universal things that we think we can be pretty well assure is going to happen, one of them is, with our capabilities and technology, the enemy generally try dose a number of things. One, they try to emulate them. We have robotic systems. They have robot okay systems. We have submarines. They have submarines. One of the things that happens quite routinely because the United States generally is in the forefront when it comes to military capability is we can no longer assume that we are the only ones that are going to have it. That the enemy is going to emulate us. When i grew up we had equipment nobody else had. We had night vision goggles. The enemy didnt. I had 12 more hours to fight the enemy. I had 12 more hours out of the day i can fight. What we are saying in the future as we describe it, that gap in technology will get less an less and less because they will emulate what we have. I have night vision goggles, they have night vision goggles. Now the issue is how do i develop that better. How do i train my soldiers and there is a huge differentiation in technology. The future what you need do sin crease your rate of innovation. You cant count on differentiation. What we are saying is what are the capabilities the enemy will do . They will emulate us. Avoid our strengths. So if we are good at targeting people they will stop presenting themselves as targets. Okay. If we are very good at conducting large maneuver in the middle of the desert with tanks, they will avoid fighting us in the middle of the desert with tanks. Though will avoid our strengths. They will stop becoming targets and meld into the population. They will go under ground. They are avoiding our strength. Whatever strength we come up, they will tend to avoid it or emulate it. So we will now run war games and say, how do you deal with an enemy that is emulating your technology . They know that what we like do is come in with a lot of stuff and build up a big base of support and then launch on. So what are they going to try do . Deny us access. They will try to deny us access from port. Deny us access from airfield. Deny us access from air domain. Deny access from cyber domain. So we know now in the future however i try to gain access, they are going to try to deny access while avoiding strengths and emulating our capabilities. Now i have to run a war game and say, how do i get access while im actively trying to be denied access at the same time the enemy is a avoiding my strengths and emulating my capability. It is all based on the broad intellectual background. Trying to describe the future. Not this country at this grid square. It is broad capabilities. Now i need have capabilities to operate in this environment so we have 20 what we call for this year, 20 first order things we are looking at. We will do five a quarter. One of it is how do we gain access when people are trying to deny it to us. Another one is, how do i optimize soldier and team performance. How do i take the most expensive and most capable weapons system the United States army inventory, the soldier. This is our smart weapons system. How do i take this system and make it more can i increase the way it operates as part after team . Can i increase the interface between my soldier and their technology so that they can innovate quicker than the enemy soldier and their technology. So we are looking at defining very specific capabilities that we think are applicable. A lot of people say, you are just taking a bye. You say, the future is unknown so i cant think anything about it. It is very critical so if you think you are dealing with an unknown world there are a lot of things can you do to deal with unknown situations. Thank you, sir. With that, that pretty much will conclude my questions here. Weve got a microphone set up in the center of the room. If anybody in the audience would like to ask a question of general perkins. There must be something i left out. Im here to get my homework done and add other aspects to it. And when you come up to the mic, please introduce yourself. Keep your statements brief. And please ensure that they end in a question mark. Good evening, sir. I wanted to ask you, obviously, it is no secret that navy has a great operational focus on the eastern South China Sea and proverbial pivot to asia. Intellectual background. Trying to describe the future. In other words, its not this country at this grid square, its broad capabilities. Now i need have capabilities to operate in this environment so we have 20 what we call for this year, 20 first order things we are looking at. We will do five a quarter. One of it is how do we gain access when people are trying to deny it to us. Another one is, how do i optimize soldier and team performance. How do i take the most expensive and most capable weapons system the United States army inventory, the soldier. This is our smart weapons system. How do i take this system and make it more capability. Can i increase the way that it operates as a part of a team. Can i increase the interface between my soldier and their technology so that they can innovate quicker than the enemy soldier and their technology. So we are looking at defining very specific capabilities that we think are applicable. A lot of people say, you are just taking a bye. You say, the future is unknown so i cant do anything about it. No. It is very critical so if you think you are dealing with an unknown world there are a lot of things can you do to deal with unknown situations. Thank you, sir. With that, that pretty much will conclude my questions here. Weve got a microphone set up in the center of the room. If anybody in the audience would like to ask a question of general perkins. There must be something i left out. Im here actually to get my homework done, and add other aspects to it, you know. And when you come up to the mic, please introduce yourself. Keep your statements brief. And please ensure that they end in a question mark. Good evening, sir. I wanted to ask you, obviously, it is no secret that navy has a great operational focus on the western pacific, on the east and South China Sea and the proverbial pivot to asia. In your opinion, what role do you see the army having in asia and also how are you shaping the army thats vastly different from the mesopotamia and the full maritime environment . We have the pivot to the pacific. Now, the one thing, just to clarify a lot, a lot of people when they think about the pacific, they dont think about the army. They think about the marines, the navy. But even before the pacific pivot occurred, we had well over 60,000 soldiers operating in the pacific. So theres a lot of activity already going on. One of the things we think the army is uniquely suited for in the pacific and general brooks is now the u. S. Army pacific commander, which was previously a threestar position, which is now a fourstar position. So i tell my great west point classmate there that he kind of won the lottery. Not only is he the first fourstar army guy to have that, but he gets to work in hawaii. So he lives a good life. The army sets the theater. We have core competency that we said the army does uniquely for the joint force. One of them is we set the theater generally from a logistical point of view. So for instance, army provides most of the Network Activity for the joint force in the pacific already. We provide a lot of these logistical background, medical background, things like that. I know general brooks spends a lot of his time with his counterparts in the pacific, because the vast majority, over 90 of their chiefs of defense in the pacific are army. Thats the branch they are in of their nation. So that is the likely person to work with because they, you know, navys are very expensive to have. They continually remind us. Navys are very expensive to have. Air force are very expensive to have. So a lot of nations dont have robust navy and air forces. But most nations have army. Whether it is to protect from external threats. That is in many cases the first point of entry. For Theater Security corporation in building milltomill relationships. So in a macro sense, we dont see our role any different. We were very clear when we wrote the Army Operating concept, we said we wanted to maintain clarity on the consistency of the nature of war while taking into account the changing characteristics of war. There are some eternal natures of war that stay constant, while the characteristics, technology, location, et cetera, like that, can change. Consistencies are war is a human endeavor. That is what war is, a human endeavor. Trying to compel activity of humans, generally on land and sustainable political goal, and a contest of wills. War is a contest of wills. Who can who has the most will and can stay at it the longest until somebody sort of, you know, is their actions are compelled one way or the other. So we think that is no different in the pacific than anywhere else. The pacific is characterized by large distances. Not necessarily contiguous land masses. So if you look at the Central Plains of europe, that is a contiguous land mass. So if you take a look at our diagram there, you can say one of the things we have to do now is we have to design and build an army that can operate in noncontiguous environments. Noncontiguous environments yet can provide some level of a fact as you would expect as if it was operating in a contiguous environment. In many ways the things we are looking at for unified land operations are very much in need in the pacific, that we are very much a joint force. Because the large distances, air, maritime and land. And then, our ability to apply that foundational capability, ability to operate in noncontiguous development, it is almost custom made for our view of what we have to have here. So great question. Thank you, sir. Thank you, very much, general. Im mark wahl. Yeah, mark, good to see you again. We worked together in baghdad in 2008 and 2009. Good to see you again. Thats right. And its good to see you again. Two related questions. One is, how do your various experiences in iraq shape, or form the work youre doing now . How has it affected your thinking about this work . And the second question is, with five or six years later, whats your assessment of how things have turned out . What could we have done differently . And what does that mean for what were doing now, or trying to do . I generally refer all sort of criticisms and what ifs to myself personally or my service so i can stay on lane and plus i know them very well. So to your first question, what have i learned like all of us have after these many years of war. This is not designed to fight iraq better next time. It really is to be informed by it. One of it is quite honestly my experiences, the one word that we put in there, complexity of it. Unknown and constantly changing. I have been back to iraq many times. And every time i go back, i tell people, same country, different world. And what i saw is, with ewould have a lot of folks that would come back. It is a little bit of an achille heel. This is my fourth time here. What would happen is they would show up thinking they knew everything about it not understanding this is a complex world which means it is constantly changing. And they wouldnt do all their homework to reunderstand what had happened and in many ways we set ourselves back to say, well, you know, that worked two years ago. It doesnt work anymore. Because this is a complex world. Constantly changing. What did i say our enemy tries to do . They try to emulate and avoid our strengths. So that tactic that you used before does not work any more. In fact it gets people killed. Our enemy is avoiding that or they emulated it and they do it better than we do. So i would say a lot of what we have put in here is not just my experience, but almost a collective experience, not trying to focus on ieds, but saying that is an example of the enemy adapting, and avoiding our strengths, which is tankontank fight, and then trying to emulate a capability, which is a chemical shape charge weapon that we have and use it in a different manner. So i would say it was highly informed by that. And it really is that complexity and the constantly changing nature of it. What could we have done better . And what could i have done better . I would go back to the first word, when. And it also gets in the complexity, what we say in here is you have to understand vishl youllize, describe. So i went in as a young Brigade Commander. And i will tell you, we really did not understand the complexity of what were going through, whether it was iraq or just the microcosm that is baghdad. And if you dont understand the complexity of it, the problem is, you will optimize activity as a tactical and operational level. If you say, i really understood the complexity of it better than a relationship between sunni, shia, kurd, and im thinking for longterm sustainable goals and i want to win at the strategic level, i would go in as Brigade Commander thinking, not just how do i win this tactical fight, which quite honestly is what i was focused on, but how can i set the conditions so that five years from now, were in a sustainable process. So i went in in 2003 and okay, lets get of a it. And electricity wasnt working, water wasnt working. And quite honestly learned a lot working with my good friends with the state department. And actually taking a longer term view which i was constantly reminded as sometimes Brigade Commanders do. And so trying to figure out how to get power, get electricity. You know, we what we need do is go in and build the power plants and you got work the transmission lines and distribution lines and im sure i was like everyone else. No, i want power now. Just go out and buy a bunch of honda generators and get things up and running, and things like that. A fouryear plan, i dont want a fouryear plan. I reminded myself in 2008 as the guy in charge of electricity rebuilding, that if in 2003 i had signed up for a fouryear plan, it would all be running a year ago. And so this is sort of the peril of going into these quick wins. I tell folks, i hate that term, quick win. Because quick win equals shortsightedness. Thats why i put the word win in the operating concept. Every soldier, whether youre colonel perkins, private perkins, general perkins, you have to think strategically. Because your tactical actions have strategic outkorms. If youre not thinking strategically, you will devolve, into a short term tactical win and the way you do it may be counter productive to longterm outcome. In other words, giving everyone honda generators everyday and giving them the fuel is actually working against you in the longterm. I remember when i went back to 2008, i was supposed to be working getting the economy up and running. And working there and getting the Banking System up and running and we had started probably at the brigade level this microgrant program, trying to jumpstart the economy and pass out free grants. So mom and pop operations, things like that. So we attract, who is brigade sector, is not utilizing the micro grant program. Now im going back there and trying to start up the banks, and my boss is, how come the Banking System isnt working . Well, okay, but the way banks work, is they give you a loan and charge interest. Thats how it works. So if im running two programs simultaneously in the same town, saying, mr. Iraqi, you have two choices, you can either take this free money, microgrant program, or take this money that you have to pay interest in. Which one do you want . We were surprised why the Banking System wasnt being stood up because we were giving away free money. Those are the kind of things i would do differently. Im definitely very jealous you are able to utilize the idea of systems thinking in your concept paper, and it is something we desperately need and dont have right now unfortunately. My question goes more toward the collaboration between International Development and you know, postconflict. Thats a vague term. Yeah, exactly. Ive gotten away from differentiating what phase are we in, its just all meshed together after a while. Just one bad nightmare. So my question is, where do you see the most gains had between collaboration between agencies like usa and the army and those relations for the future and what we do. Like you said, sustainability. Thats something we need to get better at. I definitely am a big fan of getting left of the boom, as they say. It really begins as a great mentor most of us, general sullivan said, the less physical lead it. What we do is stack college, which is the job i had before i came here, we are working very hard to get interagency people in every staff group we have of army majors. Right now we have all the services, theres a sea service person, air service person, generally an international officer. Were trying to get an interagency person in there. Starting at that level, in the interagency folks, people are starting to have the dialogue and understand how all of National Power works. Because what were saying is, the army can no longer focus on synchronizing firepower. When i went to the command general Staff College, the only people in your staff group were Army Officers. Okay . So there were Army Officers, and you spent all your time synchronizing firepower. If you go to command Staff College now, some have two officers, interagency person in each of them. And we have a joint all of the joint services are represented. Were saying, its about our young majors learning how to synchronize National Power. You cant wait and do it at the conflict. Its just too you can try hard at it and get some success, but youve really missed all the preliminary part of it, because a lot of the success that you need during those periods youre talking about, you really have to set the Foundation Early on. You really have to set it early on. You know, the example that i use, again, using myself as hopefully a learning organization, so when i went into baghdad, as Brigade Commander, i said, you know what . We may be here a couple of months. Okay . We may be here a while. So maybe i ought to think twice before i bomb a bridge and take it down. Maybe i ought to think twice before i bomb a power plant and take out the lights. Because that gives me a momentary advantage that ive taken out the lights, so the enemy cant see me. But now it could take years to rebuild it. And i may own the rebuilding of it. So youve got to think through this before you cross the line of departure. Because what you do tactically, if its not informed by a Strategic Vision, you could do things that you will later regret. And i did a lot of things that i later regretted, because all of a sudden, you know, you get your just desserts. You know what general parker did . Your job is to fix it. General perkins, thank you so much for your talk. I thought it was really fantastic. Im currently a master student at American University studying u. S. Foreign policy. And this semester one of the things im looking at is role of nato in the u. S. National security. Yeah. And i thought it was great that you included coalitions. You mentioned nato. What do you see as the future of a plan like this working with some of our Coalition Partners, specifically with nato . Yeah, i think nato is crucial. It really is the best example of what a Strong Coalition can do. Is it perfect . No. Does it have sublevel of bureaucracy . Yes. But actually sometimes thats good, because there is a process to get to a decision. So in many ways, nato is the example of how you have to think about how you are a cog in a larger machine. And so i you know, a couple weeks ago we put it out in the association of the United States army, a posting they have every year, a lot of International Officers are there. And what it has done now is starting them thinking, you know what . Maybe we ought to have a concept not all armies do they dont have a tradeoc. Some say thats a good thing. But theyll have to decide that. But we need to have a concept. We need to think longterm about what it is we do, so we drive ourselves. So we are being asked, actually, to go over to europe, many of us, to sit down with them and run through this intellectual exercise that were going through. I think its extremely valuable. Not only for them, but for the u. S. Because the were never going to do anything alone. This is a joint and coalition world. The armys never going to do anything as an army, single service. Well have a joist world. Thats why you see everything with the word joint in it. Its probably more prevalent than the word army in our document here. The idea of a coalition is prominent, because there are very few things the United States is going to do by itself. What we dont do is focus on what you have to do is avoid some of the pitfalls, again, sometimes the army folks have. Which is, the way were going to get along is, you just act like the army. Well, thats not how they do things. Okay . They do things differently. So we cant say, you know what, heres my Army Operations center. Doctors without borders walks in the back. You know, nato Coalition Partner walks back and says, look, if you didnt buy any radios, im not going to talk to you. Or you didnt go to the army general Staff College, you dont know how to take part in our military decisionmaking process. If we say were going to be the foundation for the joint force and integrate all partners, we have to say, when were sitting at our Operations Center in west africa, and the World Health Organization walks in, it should be, weve been expecting somebody like you. We have a way to integrate you into what we do. Our staff is built that you can operate on our staff without having graduated from the army general Staff College. You dont have to know Army Doctrine to work with us. We have Communications Systems to work with you even if you dont have a topsecret clearance, et cetera, like that. If you say, you have to operate with everybody, you build staffs differently, train people differently, buy different kinds of radios, you run your security clearances differently, you do everything differently, than if you say, were just going to optimize this for the army. If youre not like the army, you cant play with us. So its really endless ramifications. General, were running short on time here. We only have two questions left. Hopefully theyre easy ones. My name is leo cruz, and im a defense fellow in osd. The question i have is looking at sequestration coming ahead. Around looking at the size of the army. With looking at what you suggested earlier in this talk about how looking at the Strategic Deterrence of a standing army, and whether or not we have the forces and the numbers to do a Strategic Deterrence, you know, is that a large army . Or is it a more capable army to do all the great things youve suggested in the operating well, one thing go ahead. Double barrel. Retired foreign service. Also served. Thank you so much for your interesting, thoughtful presentation. Napoleon is the most important strategic advice is when your enemy makes a mistake, dont disturb him. Right. So with that in mind, to what extent the army is capable of taking advantage of the intelligence and counterintelligence of enemy mistakes to perform to better perform and accomplish objectives . Two great questions. The first one, that comes up a lot. Sequestration, budget, stuff like that. This document was not designed to be a forcing construct. You will not see the word palm or budget or sequestration or anything like that. It is budget immaterial. In fact, and this question came up in a previous for um i was at, a lot of folks say this is ambitious. If you dont have enough money to do it, then why did you put out this document . I told folks, its just the opposite. When you have a lot of money, sometimes a vision and priorities are less important. Because you have so much money, you can almost waste it and throw enough of it out there and eventually get it. But when you have less money, you definitely better have a vision of what you want to do with it. You definitely better have priorities. In some ways, resource constraints are a force in function to kind of get your act together and say, do you know what youre for . Do you know what your priorities are . Do you have a way to go about it . What the budget does for us is it allows us to build capacity to do this. Can i do this in a smaller area or larger area . Three times at once or five times at once . How much time do i need . I can do it once and i need ten months off, and another time. What budget and size do is it dictates capacity, but how often and where you do it. What were saying is, regardless of the budget and the size, these are the capabilities our army has. If you say, well, youre going to have sequestration, so i dont have the money to build an army that operates jointly, or integrates folks in the joint force, were saying all the more important. So i try to divorce the two. They are related, because the Budget Resources you for capacity to do it, but you still have to have priorities and a focus which that does. With regards to, sir, what youre talking about, that really gets to the win part. You know, if you focus on winning, if you say i have to fight to win, what happens is, you may disturb them when they are their own worls the enemy. Because youre just focused on fighting them. If you say you need to focus on winning, you tend to step back a little bit and say, are they making a lot of mistakes . And if they are, maybe ill facilitate their mistakes in a way thats not directly in contrary to them. That may force them to get their stuff together. If i push hard on them. What ill do is, with all elements of power with coalition folks, indigenous folks, what i do is reinforce their mistakes until it gets to a part where its to my strategic advantage. Thats the difference between focusing on winning versus focusing on fighting. Well, sir, thank you for the insightful remarks. And for taking all the questions. Ms. Shoup, would you thank you very much, general. Its been a very informative and interesting evening. I think we all have learned a lot tonight. And thank you very much. And thank you. My pleasure. Thanks. [ applause ] our primetime programming across the cspan networks. Here on cspan3, starting at 8 00 eastern, a look at how one community in america is handling the recent influx of young undocumented residents. Theres efforts described of how to provide undocumented children with education and health services. On cspan2 clock at 8 00, Steve Simpson a constitutional attorney and director of legal studies in california, shares his thoughts from the hungry minds speakers series, englewood, colorado. Heres a preview. As long as we view governments role as essentially dividing us, which is the practical effect, dividing us into warring factions, or warring Interest Groups, corruption will be the rule. Or the use of force against one person, one person against another, and warring Interest Groups and legal plunder is the only option. So perhaps a better word for the term that people refer to, or the term that they use, cronyism, i would say instead of crony capitalism, which is a horrible term, it suggests the capitalism, which is a system of freedom, is leading to this sort of thing, the better term would be crony statism, statism being the system in which the individual is subordinated to the group or to the state. But actually, thats redundant in my view. Because the real essential evil here is that form of government. Its statism. If you really want to pinpoint what the problem is, where people talk about cronyism, it is the view that the state is supreme, and individuals are subordinate. If we want to fix this problem, the only solution ultimately is, i would sum it up as leave us the hell alone. Join us tonight on cspan for interviews of retiring members of congress. Well feature Iowa Democratic senator tom harkin, and North Carolina republican howard cobell. This is part of our weeklong series. This thanksgiving week, cspan is featuring interviews from retiring members of congress. Watch the interview tonight through thursday at 8 00 p. M. Eastern. Ive often said the republicans do have a legitimate argument here, by the way. And that theyre not being allowed to offer amendments. Well, theyre not being allowed to offer amendments because they filibuster bills, because theyre not allowed to offer amendments. Its one of those chicken and egg things. The best way to get rid of it is get rid of the filibuster, but guarantee to the minority in new rules in the senate that the minority will be allowed to offer germane amendments to any bill thats on the floor. Germane amendments. To that legislation. With reasonable time limits for debate. The late i wont even qualify the statement of probably u the most eloquent orator in the congress. Henry told me one time, he said, im not wild about this impeachment. But he said there are 23 americans serving active prison sentences for having committed perjury. He said, how do you justify that, and then turn a blind eye to the president. He said, i cant do it. And ill always remember henry saying that. And also on thursday, thanksgiving day, well take an American History tour of various native american tribes. Thats at 10 00 a. M. Eastern, following washington journal. Then at 1 30, attend a groundbreaking ceremony of the new Diplomacy Center in washington with former secretaries of state. And Supreme Court justices clarence thomas, samuel alito and Sonya Sotomayor this thanksgiving week on cspan. For the complete schedule, go to cspan. Org. Wendy sherman is the undersecretary of state for Political Affairs. She spoke last month at the center for strategic and International Studies about the p5plus 1 negotiations on irans new clare program, stressing the negotiations are not centered on human rights abuses or terrorism. She said the u. S. Will not turn a blind eye to those issues just because the two nations are in talks. This is about 35 minutes. Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you for coming. My name is john hamry. Its a real pleasure for me to welcome an old friend, jim steinberg, jim, who heads the Maxwell School is formally going to introduce secretary sherman. But i wanted to say my personal greetings to secretary sherman. And thanks for her remarkable service. I mean, this is a hard time to be a public servant. And you carry it with such dignity and sophistication. Were grateful for that. Wendy, thank you very much. I apologize to everybody you had to walk through a little bit of a construction site downstairs. Weve only been in this building about a year. Not everything is quite yet working. And some things have failed. So right now, you had to walk around. But i do apologize for that. But i think you wont have any problems in here. Let me again say how pleased i am to have this opportunity to work with jim steinberg. Our lives have intertwined for 35 years, 30 years. Hes held up a lot better than i have. And ive watched his taillights most of my professional career. And so its now a real pleasure that we have a chance to be partners. Csis and the Maxwell School are partnering here in washington. Its a real privilege for that. And i look forward to much more to come. Of course, its a real honor to welcome someone as important and distinguished as secretary sherman. So jim, let me turn to you and lets get this going for real. Thank you all for coming. Thank you, john, and thanks to everybody here at csis for this Remarkable Partnership weve launched. Its a tremendous opportunity for all of us. Its great to be part of the initial family in this wonderful facility and working with such great people. Its just its started off so well and we have so much to do in the future. So thank you for that. I want to thank all our friends here for the very important conference on trying to understand the domestic political environment in iran, and the speakers, and the Foreign Ministry that have been involved in the project. Im especially honored to be here to introduce the honorable wendy sherman, our speaker this afternoon. As john said, there are a lot of remarkable Public Servants in this cabinet, but wendy is an extraordinary one. Its a privilege for me to have known her through so many different terms in that remarkable career. I promised no stories, but it goes back to the days when she was working for then congresswoman mccull ski, through her life. What has been particularly remarkable is her strong commitment to advancing american diplomacy over the last 20plus years. And ive had the privilege of working with her during the Clinton Administration, first with secretary christopher, and then with secretary albright. And the work that we did together during those important times dealing with other challenging regimes in the past. And one of the things that has been a constant through the last 20 years for secretary sherman is her working on the important issues of the questions of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and trying to build a structure and a set of diplomatic approaches to deal with this very important challenge. Both her role during the Clinton Administration as the coordinator for north korea policy, working with very distinguished american former secretary of defense bill perry, her work on the socalled grand talent commission, the commission on the prevention of weapons of mass instruction, proliferation, where she played such an Important Role to provide a path forward for our policy. And now, of course, undersecretary for Political Affairs in leading the iran communications. This deep knowledge that she has of the issues, combined with a real diplomat sense of how to advance u. S. Interests in ways that deal with the broader challenges that the country faces which is why we are so fortunate, the president and secretary kerry and others, are so fortunate to have her in this difficult and challenging position. I can think of no one better positioned to help achieve the important objective, not just for the United States but the world as a whole. So i ask you to join me in welcoming undersecretary wendy sherman. [ applause ] good afternoon, everybody. You can tell how important this is to me to do it, because as jim and john know, i just got off of a plane from lima, peru. So thats how important you all are that im here to do this, these remarks. Im really delighted to be here, and to see so many people that i know who are working so hard on one of the greatest challenges of our time. As dean steinberg said i like saying that, dean steinberg, that sounds nice. Jim and i became acquainted more than a quarter of a century ago. Some would say it says a lot about our ability to create success. But that said, we got to know each other quite well. And for those of you who have not had the pleasure of working with jim, i can tell you that he is incredibly smart, witty, warm. Just ask his two daughters. And despite the fact that his brain has been picked regularly by president s, National Security advisers, secretaries of state, it remainschockfull of wise thoughts. And we are grateful for being brought here together. I also want to thank our host, dr. John hamre. He may have been following jim steinbergs taillights, but ive been following his. John hem amre is one of the wis men of this town. I was sitting on the defense policy board, where he ran a meeting of 25 formers, and i was the low person on the totem pole. One of two women out of 25, i must say. But nonetheless, every former secretary of state, every former secretary of defense, and all of us, all of us, followed john hamres lead. He is just an extraordinary public servant. I want to congratulate csis on this spectacular new facility. Just the slight upgrade from your previous digs. Csis is renowned for organizing conferences such as this, where men and women who make policy are able to dialogue with people who actually have time to think about policy. And that is a healthy and most necessary mix. I thank as well our friends from the carnegie corporation, and also, ambassador kovall, and representatives of the Norwegian Institute of national affairs. In recent decades, norway has played a truly unique part in some of the more uplifting moments in middle east diplomacy. Theyre hard to find from time to time. So grateful for the role that norway continues. For less than two weeks ago, norway helped to organize the gaza construct. They have continued involvement in an arena where good ideas and common sense are as valuable as they are rare. So thank you very much. Now, as i understand it, the major purpose of this extraordinary symposium is to analyze the nuclear negotiating strategy of the Islamic Republic of iran. Im strongly tempted to just remain silent, and have you spell out that strategy for me. Because the more i know about it, the better. Of course, i could, and you probably wish that i would seize the chance to speculate publicly myself about the motives and decisionmaking processes of the people who sit across from me and our team in our discussions. But as it will come as no surprise, that is an opportunity i will pass up. Since the Nuclear Talks have begun, i have suffered a twisted ankle, a broken nose, and a ruptured pinkie finger made famous on the front page of the new york times, and i dont want to this afternoon invite dental surgery by having to eat my words. So i will be very careful. To be honest, several weeks ago when i first received dean steinbergs invitation, i was, quite frankly, not sure whether this would be a good or bad moment to speak openly about the negotiating process. And indeed, quite frankly, timing remains an issue. As you know, the talks involving iran in the p51 as our friends prefer e3plus 3 have been extended. I dont want to say anything today that would jeopardize our chance to bring those deliberations to a successful close. As Madelyn Albright once observed, a wonderful secretary of state, a dear friend and Business Partner to boot at one point in my life, negotiations are like mushrooms, and often they do best in the dark. There are, however, many aspects that can be explored and fully in keeping with the focus of our gathering, which is blessed with an outstanding array of experts on relations between iran, and particularly the west. To begin, id like to simply emphasize how important the p5 plus 1 negotiations are. An iran equipped with nuclear arms would add an unacceptable element of instability and danger to a part of the globe that already has a surplus of both. If tehran had such a weapon, other countries in the region might well pursue the same goal, generating a potentially catastrophic arms race, intensifying the sectarian divide that is a major source of middle east tension, and undermining the global nonproliferation regime that president obama has consistently sought to reinforce. That is why the president has pledged to ensure that iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon. Our preference is to achieve this goal by diplomatic means. But make no mistake, our bottom line is unambiguous, crystal clear, and quite frankly, written in stone. Iran will not, shall not, obtain a nuclear weapon. A major step in the right direction of that pursuit was taken last january when we began implementing a negotiating framework called the joint plan of action. In return for a limited sanctions relief, iran committed while talks are under way to freeze and even roll back key components of its nuclear activities. Specifically, iran has halted the expansion of its overall enrichment capacity, put a cap on its stockpile of low enriched uranium, stopped the production of uranium enriched to 20 , agreed not to make further advances at the heavy water reactor, and opened the door to unprecedented daily access for International Inspectors to facilities in the area. At the time the joint plan was announced, many observers expressed profound doubt that iran would abide by its commitments. But according to the iaea, the International Atomic energy agency, iran has done what it promised to do. The result is a Nuclear Program that is more constrained and transparent than it has been in many years. In turn, the p5 plus 1 has provided limited sanctions relief. More extensive relief will come when, and only when we are able to arrive at a comprehensive deal that addresses the concerns of the world community. Such a plan if fully implemented would give confidence that irans Nuclear Program will be exclusively peaceful and would enable the iranian people to look forward to a much brighter future. We are aware, of course, that this negotiating process, shall we say, controversial. Some worry that it will fail. Others seem to fear that it will succeed. Many have questions and doubts. As our discussions have gone forward, the Obama Administration has consulted regularly with members of congress, and with our many overseas partners, including israel and the gulf states. We have heard a variety of concerns and done our best to answer hard questions regarding the possible nature and implications of a potential deal while reaffirming our enduring commitment to the security of the region. These conversations have been and continue to be quite valuable, and taken together have reinforced our conviction that although every alternative has risks, the decision to fully explore diplomatic solution is the right one. There does, however, remain much hard work to be done. As we approach the november 24th deadline, the valuable safeguards included in the joint plan of action are still in place. Our goal now is to develop a durable and comprehensive arrangement that will effectively block all of irans potential paths to physical material for a nuclear weapon. Such an arrangement would bar iran from producing fuel for a weapon with either uranium or plutonium. Through inspections and monitoring, it would also offer the best method to prevent the covert processing of these materials, and make any effort by tehran to turn away from its obligations, so visible and so timeconsuming, that the attempt would not succeed. Given the stakes, it should be no surprise that our talks have moved forward at a deliberative pace, which is diplospeak for, not so fast. Last week my p1 plus one colleagues and i were in vienna once again, confined to a hotel that happens to be located in vienna, while subsisting on endless cups of coffee and a hotel buffet that specializes in turkey schknitsel. The iranian delegation is headed by the chief negotiator. Both sides are assisted by teams of technical experts who help us understand the full range of our options. From the beginning, our talks have been ser yours and businesslike. They have also occurred in a variety of venues and formats. To date, we have met in geneva, new york, vienna. We have had bilaterals, tri laterals, weve devoted some sessions to broad principles and others to the very laborious task of the defining parameters. Weve met at various levels. And sometimes secretary kerry takes the american chair. Its no secret that among the p15 plus 1 governments, there exists some major differences on prominent issues in the world. But with respect to irans Nuclear Program, solidarity has been our watch word. We are all working towards the same goal. To that end, our group has proposed to iran a number of ideas that are equitable, enforceable, and consistent with tehrans express desire for a viable civilian Nuclear Program, and taking into account the scientific knowhow and economic needs. Irans Supreme Leader has repeatedly said that his government has neither the aspiration nor the intention of building a nuclear weapon. Indeed, he has said that such a project would be forbidden under islam. So our proposals are consistent with irans own publicly stated position. If iran truly wants to resolve its differences with the international community, and facilitate the lifting of economic sanctions, it will have no better chance than between now and november 24th. This is the time to finish the job. Will that happen . I dont know. I can tell you that all the components of a plan that should be acceptable to both sides are on the table. We have made impressive progress on issues that originally seemed intractable. We have cleared up misunderstandings and held exhaustive discussions on every element of a possible text. However, like any complicated and technically complex diplomatic initiative, this is a puzzle with many interlocking pieces. Because of this, it would be a mistake to focus inordinate attention on any one issue at the expense of all others. Every piece is critical, whether it involves infrastructure, or stockpiles, or research, or types of equipment, or questions of timing, or sequencing. But one area that has drawn much comment, in part because of irans own public statements, concerns the size and scope of the Islamic Republics uranium enrichment capacity. Irans leaders would very much hope that the world would conclude that the status quo, at least on this pivotal subject, should be acceptable. But obviously, it is not. If it were, we would never have needed to begin this painstaking and difficult negotiation. The Security Council imposed sanctions on iran for a reason, and that is because the government violated its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty, engaged in secret Nuclear Weapons related activities, and was less than transparent in reporting to international agencies. That past has created a thick cloud of doubt that cannot be dissipated by tehrans words and promises alone. The world would decide to suspend and then lift Nuclear Related sanctions only if and when iran takes convincing and verifiable steps to show that its Nuclear Program is and will remain entirely peaceful. That is a reasonable standard that iran can readily meet. It is the standard that iran must meet. And it is the key to ending irans international isolation. The Obama Administration recognizes that in diplomacy, it is sometimes a good idea to widen the agenda, so the tradeoff on one issue can be provided by flexibility on another. Given the turbulence royiling i the middle east today, its understandable. However, all parties have agreed that this should be a single tract negotiation, with its own defined set of participants, its own logic, and a clear bottom line. We are concentrating on one job, and one job only, and that is ensuring that iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. I should note, however, in separate and dedicated meetings on the margins of each of our talks, i and members of my team raise our concerns regarding the status of u. S. Citizens missing or detained in iran. Nothing matters more to me as undersecretary of state than ensuring the fair treatment of american citizens. They should be allowed to return without delay to their families, and we must do all we can to find answers regarding the whereabouts and wellbeing of robert leavenson, and bring him home, too. Whether or not a nuclear deal is reached, the United States will continue to voice its longstanding concerns about iranian policies that undermine regional stability, or that are inconsistent can global norms and values. We will hold them accountable for all aspects of their human rights records. As is the case with any country, engagement on one issue does not require, and will not lead to, silence on others. In his inaugural address, more than 50 years ago, president john kennedy asked in the cold war context whether a beach head of cooperation might one day push back the jungle of suspicion separating east from west. Today, there are those in the United States who disbelieve almost everything iranian leaders say. And there are many in iran who question whether america will live up to whatever commitments we make. Clearly there exists, if not a jungle, then at least a forest of distrust on both sides. Given what has happened in past decades, how could there not be. But i can affirm to you this afternoon that the United States will not accept any arrangement we cant verify, and that we wont make any promises we cant keep. Just as we will demand good faith, so will we demonstrate good faith. Last fall the president of the United States and the leaders of iran decided to test the possibilities of direct negotiations on the nuclear issue. Both faced resistance, and criticism for taking this bold step. And yet, both still chose to accept the risks of diplomacy over the even greater uncertainties of other options. We do not yet know what the full consequences of this decision will be. But the world is clearly better off now than it would have been if the leaders on both sides had ignored this opening. With all that is going on in the middle east today, an iranian Nuclear Program that was not frozen, but instead rushing full speed ahead toward larger stockpiles, more uranium enrichment capacity, the production of weapons grade plutonium, and less transparency would hardly have been a stabilizing factor. Although our negotiating process today hasnt fulfilled our highest hopes, it has still exceeded the expectation of many observers. Make no mistake, developing a consensus on a comprehensive plan will require some extraordinarily difficult decisions, and we should all appreciate that. This negotiation is the very opposite of easy. But the potential benefits are quite extraordinary. And it is vital that we understand that as well. Because the acceptance and implementation of a comprehensive plan will improve prospects for people everywhere. It will reduce anxiety and enhance security throughout the middle east. It will make possible an era of greater prosperity without any loss of dignity for the people of iran. It will protect our allies and partners from a new and dangerous threat. It will lessen the incentive for a Regional Nuclear arms race, and thereby strengthen the International Nuclear proliferation regime. It will make our own citizens safer. And it will demonstrate yet again the potential for clear diplomacy to arrive at Winwin Solutions achievable in no other way. In sum, compared to any alternatives, diplomacy can provide a more sustained endurable resolution to the issues generated by Irans Nuclear activities. Almost 800 years ago, the persian poet saed advised listeners to, qu