Transcripts For CSPAN3 Former 20240706

British writer diana, i regret we cant be with you in person this evening at the Ronald Reagan President Foundation institute. But we are here both spirit and virtually our foundation. Toby philanthropies is proud to support George Shultz fellowships and lecture series. We established this program in december of 2020 in honor of georgias hundredth birthday. It was pleased to have his legacy enshrined in this manner. One short month later, we said goodbye to him, as you all know, George Shultz had an illustrious career in government academe and in the business world. He was a mentor to many myself. He was also my journalist friend, taught our privilege to play a part in distinguished scholars together for a series of roundtable such as this evenings program, which honors georgias life leadership and legacy. We look forward to a future occasion where we can meet with you in person. Thank you for being here this evening. My name is Anthony Eames and i am the director scholarly initiatives here at the Ronald Reagan president ial foundation, an institute. And its my privilege to welcome you to this evenings ambassadors roundtable. The latest program in our George P Shultz memorial lecture series. The series is made possible by a generous gift from our partners at toby philanthropy. And in particular, id like express my gratitude to shaina pen executive director toby philanthropies for being with us this evening evening. Now, the Ronald Reagan institute is the home, the Ronald Reagan president ial foundation in washington, d. C. Our mission is to ensure that president reagans timeless principles continue to inform the scholarly and policy in our nations capital, our center for peace, through our center for freedom and democracy. And our center for Civics Education and opportunity. Are by president reagans warning that freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction extinction. Our fourth pillar, the center for scholarly initiatives, seeks to better understand president reagans effect on history and cultivates a rising generation of scholars and the Academic Community to engage in the work of the institute institute. Now, apart from president reagan, his first lady, nancy, its difficult to think of anyone who better embody the work of the institute than secretary. One of two individuals to hold four cabinet posts. Secretary shultz, his life in Public Service could across a wide range of domestic and Foreign Policy issues. And yet he had the uncanny knack for being on not only on, but leading on the right side of history whether it was to liberate the pacific in world war two, working for the desegregation of our schools in negotiating an end to the arms race. And on his 100th birthday. Secretary shultz attributed all his successes to one simple lesson, one simple rule that trust is the coin of the realm realm. And upon secretary shultzs acceptance of president reagans invitation to serve as secretary of state, he began building that trust at camp david, their very first lunch and. At that very first lunch, he promised. Mr. President , im working for you, and im going to make use of the talent at the state department to get our job done. Trust and talent. Two words that describe secretary shultzs department. And to words that also speak to the esteemed career of our ambassadors here. This. Ambassador richard burt served in three positions under secretary shultz. First is the director of political military affairs. Then as the assistant secretary for and canadian affairs. And finally, as the ambassador to west germany, the end of the cold war secretary. Ambassador wolfowitz also served in three positions under secretary shultz. First, as is director policy planning. Then as the assistant secretary for east asian and pacific affairs. And finally, as to indonesia, ambassador edelman was secretary shultzs right hand man, special assistant in the state department, would go on to serve as ambassador to turkey and ambassador to finland in the clinton administration. I could go on about all of their achievements in the private sector, but only have an hour here tonight. So why not get into the conversation moderated by your own director of the Ronald Reagan institute . Roger zakheim. Please join me in welcoming our evenings panelists to the stage. Thank you, anthony. That was a fantastic introduction, everybody. Just random applause. Anthony, our director of scholarly initiatives. Its been a great job. So pleased to have him here. Welcome, ambassador. It is wonderful and slightly overwhelming to have all of you on stage together and were going to take the next 50 minutes or so to explore the legacy of secretary. At the end, open it up to questions from the audience before us. Im going to start with ambassador edelman only because im a little less intimidated, very bad judgment, poor judgment that. Youre not the first to say that, ambassador wolfowitz. But i want to get the perspective, eric, if you dont mind, what was like sitting in the secretarys office and and give us a sense of his perspective and how he approached his role as secretary of state in foggy bottom and how he approached the Foreign Service and leading the state Department American Foreign Policy. Well, thank you, roger and thank you for inviting me to be a part of this event in washington. Events like this, i frequently that i have syndrome, but never more than tonight. I. I was the special in George Shultz office from pretty much the moment arrived. I had been working actually for jerry bremer, who i see in the audience. I had been part of the secretariat staff, jerry was the executive secretary of the department and secretary shultz arrived, and there were a couple of special assistants who had been serving for al haig, who stayed on tony wayne and mike clawson, both of whom went on to distinguished Foreign Service careers in their own right. And i was brought on as the third most junior of the three special assistants. I think it was one of louis cantors as mr. Says, who said, no man is a hero to his valet. But George Shultz, i think, was the exception that proves the rule, because for the next two years, from 82 to 84, i carried George Shultz bags around the world as he conducted american diplomacy. And it really was, i think, you know, a kind of master class because all those secretaries, shultz had limited experience, international affairs. He had enormous experience as a multiple time cabinet secretary, as a director, Domestic Affairs in the white house dean of the Business School at the university of chicago. So he brought a wealth of experience and, understanding of management to the job. And it was very interesting watching him, you know, as he took on his job. One of the first things he asked me to do was to do a study of how he was spending his time in the first few months in office how much of his time he was spending in interagency meetings at the white house, how much time he was spending in internal meetings, travel, meeting with foreign dignitaries, etc. And the reason was, i mean, if most important thing in National Security affairs, washington, is the president s time, the most valuable thing, the second most valuable thing is probably the time of the secretary of state. And he wanted to be very systematic and measured about how he used his time. He also did something which really stuck with me through the rest of my career was theres always when someone comes into a new office, a temptation to say, i want to rearrange things. Im going to reorganize things. Im going to move the pieces around. And secretary shultz actually this in his memoirs, he made it a point to take several months to understand the organization and in being before he started making a number of personnel moves and i think that allowed him to get a sense of what the organization did. Well, what it didnt do so well from point and point of view. What he needed more of and what maybe he needed less of. And then he started to make some moves. I think paul went from being director of policy to being assistant secretary for east asia. He made other as well. But i was particularly struck by his determination. Going back to anthonys point to get the most out of the Foreign Service that he could in service of. The president s agenda. And he never lost sight of the that he worked for Ronald Reagan. And that Ronald Reagan was the boss and. He was there to facilitate the president s National Security policy. And i think he understood something about the career Foreign Service, which has subject matter expertise, enormous value, but which by its nature, is a kind of a strategic organization. Foreign Service Officers are essentially rewarded for managing relationships, smoothing the rough edges off their diplomats. Thats theyre meant to do. But it it does not necessarily them to think about the national in a kind of strategic way. And i think of all the secretary of state who i served, absorbed or observed in 30 years in government, i think no filled the role of of state more effectively than than George Shultz because he brought in talented political folks made use of people like paul and rick who had enormous accomplishments as assistant secretaries, put them in important diplomatic posts and bond and then and in jakarta but also made of career Foreign Service officers like jerry jerry to the netherlands at a particularly difficult time when the United States was trying to deploy pershings and click arms to europe to balance the soviet ss 20 deployments. I dont think theres anybody who got more out of the organization and it more than sum of its parts than George Shultz was. Peter baker in the room. I want to make sure you heard that last point. A little inside baseball joke on what . Well move on. Thank you, eric. Ambassador burt. Eric was talking just a moment ago about how secretary shultz knew how to leverage Foreign Service officers at the same time, how to bring in the right talent. The assistant secretaries, the regional, of course, you consequential, important member of his team is that place where you have that interaction, where. Share with us some your thoughts about secretary shultzs organizational approach and how you experience it when working for him and inside foggy bottom. Well, i will let me just say, first of all, im delighted to be here tonight. And i understand looking around this room and seeing some familiar faces that unfortunately im going to have to tell the truth. Some people were present at in the era. But i know that sort of important question, and i think it on from what eric was saying. I remember very shortly after first meeting secretary shultz, we were in his in his, you know, big black cadillac limo coming back from a from a meeting at at the white house. And i was kind of it was a somebody who wanted to get to know this guy establish a relationship with him back Time Magazine and had a had a a story the week before saying once al haig had been one of haigs favorite aides. Richard was sure to go so realized, hey, i got to build a relationship with this guy or im toast and im going to find myself back with the new york or something. So i was kind of casting about for something to say to him. I said, you know, mr. Secretary under al, he brought in a lot of his sort of loyal group people. He who were obviously working with him nato long standing relationships, a knowing were, well, i know this, you an arrived with anybody why is that . And he said you know, he said rick, i am an institutionalist and ive had tremendous jobs you know, in academe me the university of chicago is said back to all he was very, very proud of a respectful relationship and. His and other academic business and government jobs. And he said, you know, he you dont carry group around with you that that doesnt i found youve got to get the bureau prissy on your side youve got to cultivate them and make them loyalty. You first of all, youre going to understand the issues that much more quickly. But more importantly, they learn they learn that they can trust. And i think that was a really important nugget of his success because youre right, there were people like paul and i and some others who were leaders in the department during the shultz era. But what was really quite remarkable, and i can say this as somebody worked in the ag era, but also the baker era, shultz created sort of culture of loyalty and respect amongst the professionals, amongst the Foreign Service that was really. And eric talks, about his sort of time studies. He doing but as eric at the end of his tenure started thinking about how do i pay the Foreign Service . How do i build a stronger, more capable Foreign Service . And so he put a lot of effort into Foreign Service institute, for instance, in roslyn as an example of that. But theres one other element, though, thats important, because it wasnt all relying on the bureaucracy. He had a really remarkable network of influence. I would say. And and i hear a bit disagree with eric because. He of course, he he didnt come into the department as a Foreign Policy, but he had some relationships which were, for example, before he even arrived at the department, i got a report that he in a hot tub in palo alto with Helmut Schmidt and this was this was you know, at a critical time as eric was saying. But we were in the process of trying to implement the famous double track decision trying to get, you know, missiles deployed in europe and and arms control negotiation underway with the soviets and and the germans were in the very middle of this and were critical for. And so heres a guy who parachutes into the state department and hes hes meeting with probably most influential and best informed you know german in the world. And then i remember very shortly and ill stop i promise right now but it dont scare shortly after after i got into the into the european job, i got a summons to go to the seventh floor and see the secretary and and at time i was the assistant secretary state for european affairs. Just, just european. And he said, rick, whats whats going on in the relationship with canada and remember, i tried to deploy in europe. Im to deal with a pipeline problem and dispute with Margaret Thatcher and, helmut kohl and my jaw dropped. And i said, mr. Secretary, can i get back to you. And he said, please do it. He said, but i want you to know my am i tea room mate for a guy named john turner . John turner, one of the most influential and important canadian politicians, and he called George Shultz and said, george, do you know how screwed up u. S. Canadian relations are . And ill tell you, we within three months under george schultzs leadership, we not only changed the name of the bureau european and canadian affairs, we brought in a Deputy Assistant secretary to focus on canada and under shultz leadership set up four meetings between secretary of state and the Canadian Foreign minister. A year and within three years we had solved probably ten or 12 of the most difficult trade and and investment issues in that relation and Environmental Issues and that relationship that that says it all as far as im about shultz as somebody who could use his relationships and use his intellectual leadership and his knowledge of the internal bureaucracy to really get a lot done. Paul i you have some notes here, so i want one. Make sure you get to them. Perhaps i could just ask you in your comments to hit on a third piece which hasnt fully been developed. We had eric talking about how officials worked within the organization. Rick just talked in terms of he brought in others and managed and came in with this knowledge hit on the president because he he had this advance saying president reagans agenda despite his amazing experience coming into the job and is unique ability to get the best out of a bureaucracy. But in the end it was always to advance president reagan perhaps it on him you saw that and stuck by pointing here we go. Its i think shultz would wouldnt take this amiss that i say he was lucky to have reagan as the president and he took every advantage he could have that and he understood that he worked for reagan, not in the sense that he did everything reagan told him to do without disputing it. In fact, i dont know any secretary of state who actually stood up to a president and said he was going to resign if he was forced to take a polygraph. Thats what shultz did. He stood up to reagan on irancontra and really blew that one up, almost blew the whole relationship between the two of them. But he was prepared to stand up to the when he was convinced he was wrong. He did that actually once in the philippines, i was involved where reagan, i think, misled by one of his white house staff who had been on the election observer team, said that correctly, by the way that the embassy in manila is totally in bed. Corey aquino you cant trust what say. So reagan comes out and says, well, there was fraud on both sides. That was a terrible thing to. And shultz went to the white house i think with senator lugar, with nsa intercepts showing exactly what was going that they were shuttling stuff around the country and and military aircraft and talking about it on the radio. So he was not but he understood that his job involved carrying the president s policy persuading the president of a policy that he thought was correct and if he thought they were wrong, either up or leave. But he also understood that that was the of all of us as assistant. And i think more than other secretary of state that im aware of, he really managed department through the regional bureaus and through powerful people like. It can be and valley. He was not above using valets for important things by the way he was not above anything. He was very much down to earth. And it was wonderful but i to me part of his secret was basically saying that there are two kinds. You need somebody in those who really knows the substance, who are experts, because they get very complicated. Even George Kennan complained about when he had previous job as head of policy planning that the bureaus think they have all the knowledge and if any outsider to come in and tell them differently, theyll just read you out of it. So he needed people could meet with the career bureaucracy on an equal level, but he also needed people in those positions who understood the president s policies were prepared to carry them out. So least in my time, he had sort of 5050 split. He had i dont quiz me on the names, but he had myself rick, chad crocker, all of us. He called noncareer professionals. And then he had some outstanding career people in other jobs and. I of course, im but i think it worked very well and it was fantastic opportunity to work for him when when he was approaching hundredth birthday, i did a in the wall street journal. I thought of it as my birthday card for George Shultz. And i tried to emphasize since i knew was going to write about his role with the soviet union, that played a major role in bringing democracy, the philippines democracy to south korea, democracy to taiwan, all which are countries that supposedly were at asian values and didnt like democracy and eventually, i would say even the the transformation in indonesia, ten years after his tenure had a lot to do with what reagan he had started. Anyway, that was my birthday card. I concluded it by saying, well, hopefully we have a few more years of George Shultz, but at least well always have his legacy in in his model. And unfortunately, i a eulogy three months later about the legacy in the model we have it and with this major it seems to be going on about reagan himself an a fantastic book to advertise my will will inboden called reagan the peacemaker which having parts of it already everyone should get a hold of it i think its understanding George Shultz is an important part of understanding. Reagan was not an accident. He was a deeply thoughtful man. And that is deeply historic results as well. Eric, im curious just to build on what. Paul just outlined. I you noted how he wanted to know how he was spending his time and any thoughts about how he prepared and built a relationship with the president and how we approach the president. Its a great book. Reagan in his own hand, which talks about how secretary shultz, shultz that he would sit by the president s side and then go through paperwork and have this real candid and honest conversation. But what did you see from from then is very important, valid. Youre not going away from this one. Well, first, you know, ricks point, having been a cabinet officer previously and certainly as secretary of treasury, he did certainly have a network of acquaintances, friends. Lee kuan yew was, another one in pauls neck that was sent to study with lee kuan yew by George Shultz. Well, and henry kissinger, whom he maintained a very close relationship with throughout his time in office, and of course, subsequently and he also had a preexisting. With president reagan because he had been and he was in palo alto at stanford. So he he knew that he knew the president a bit. And he always wanted to make sure the president knew that he was trying to make the president s, even when he disagreed with him as as as paul was saying. I mean, i would say on iran contra, i think he was trying to keep the president from getting impeached and and, you know, was willing to stand up. Luckily, he had a great Foreign Service officer working for him at the time. Charlie shultz with charlie hill, who who probably was the best note taker i ever, you know, had anything to do with charlie had been my boss in tel aviv before. I went to work for secretary shultz. It had an uncanny ability, these great notes, which probably kept a lot of people out of jail during the irancontra and that the the president , i think, really appreciated and to pauls point, what he in George Shultz then that he had someone of immense experience that that he had something who was willing to stand up to him and argue with him when he thought he was wrong. But in the of the day would execute the president policies. And i think one of the president s great that he doesnt enough credit for and i think will understand is that the president was able to manage tensions, manage disagreements inside his own administer nation and there was a kind of strategic objective that everybody was trying to get to. The president famously said that, you know, theres no limit to what you can accomplish if you dont worry about who gets the credit. And secretary shultz had that engraved on sitting in his inner office and would refer to it constantly, including with the assistant secretaries. I think that, you know, that was something that the president understood their relationship work. Now, its striking because you think about state and defense that include i mean, the tenure of of those cabinet secretaries was lasted obviously you know well into the second term. Youre grinning eric what i just hit on unintentionally. Well no its just obviously the relationship with secretary weinberger was, you know, a bit tense at times, thankfully. And i when he came into office being diplomatic a diplomat. Well, i remember when he first came into office and i was in the room and it when people said this and they said, well, you know, the relationship with weinberger, haig, weinberger, a really bad relationship. He said, no, cant used to work for me. I can make this work. The beginning of another round of rick. I want to come back to this issue, though, between, you know, the relations between shultz and reagan, because theres really very critical my view for understanding now, in the end, the was and was so successful in managing soviet union because you know in 1983 the u. S. Soviet relationship soviet unions relationship with the west as a whole was complete dangerous meltdown en masse. You you not only had all the tension over the deployment of the missiles in europe and huge demonstrations that looked like you antivietnam demonstrations in this country in the 1960s, you had the Nuclear Freeze movement. And with the u. S. Congress, you are you you had a you had brain dead soviet leadership. You know, you you know, where they kept dying and they kept literally and yeah and and you had some scary stuff with able archer and ideas that somehow maybe the russians thought there was to be a preemptive attack or maybe it was a kgb cover story and of course and ill remember it because i spent a couple of days, nights up all night long. Right. Three weeks before were going to the the going to be deployed in europe you get khl Double Oh Seven minus the the russians shoot down the Korean People go that sort of death. Com three and and so George Shultz recognized he had to get his arms around this relationship and he couldnt do it without you know a strong support and buy in if the president and what that really started i mean after we averted all these of you know crisis sense in the in the late 83 into the 84 into 84 period of 85 period is shultz starts to think about how how do we manage this relationship and, what do we do . And he came up with the idea of and i would call it the the model is famous model. Its the Constant Gardener model. And you first of all, youve got to have somebody you can talk to. Theres got to be some sort of dialog there. Youve got to, of course, maintain a strong Domestic Support for a really viable defense policy, both offensive and then, of course the strategic defense initiative. But theres to be a kind of process that you put into place. And i remember time that shop shultz himself kind of for emulated this format and it was this fame became the famous part process for talking to talking to the russians with security arms control what they called regional issues. And it was there really basically is a polite term for their, you know, their adventurous policies in different regions, the economic relationship said theres something in for them. And, of course, what was important for the president , human rights. But the sorry secretary spent hours with president getting him to buy into this. And when he was finally ready, we we put together this speech, invited all the the the the Diplomatic Community into the white house and presented this kind of concept. And it and coincided it was interesting. It basically coincided gorbachev right. So there was actually somebody you could actually begin to talk about. But there was this framework. So when gorbachev arrived, it come next. Then it wasnt just to be, you know, random. There was there was a framework. I do i would tell one little anecdote here. Because of the of a lot of seven, there was a meeting the there was a commemoration of the austrian state treaty in vienna and and the president said that he was going to send shultz to that ceremony and wanted him to talk to gromyko at the ceremony and raise the airliner, downing the airliner. And this was in the midst of all of Everything Else was saying earlier, and it was going on. And gromyko said, if that happens im walking out. So there were hundreds press people around meeting and it was just waiting for this. We were all sitting on pins, needles and, gromyko of course you are meeting with gromyko usually lasted about 6 hours and he did 5 hours of the talking and he launches into statement and interrupts him and says, im sorry, foreign minister, but im under instruction by my president to raise this terrible incident, which soviet aircraft down a civilian airliner and gromyko grabbed his charity and he stood up. He stood up and we were all and its happening and and he any any any sort of growled and it shows of any well known of course is buddha sort of a kind of thing looked at him not threatening so why dont you down and well talk a minute and then ill give the floor and gromyko looked at him for about 30 seconds and said. Diplomacy, can i go ahead . Can i tell a gromyko story too . But as long as not 6 hours, were good. So you know, everyone thinks secretary shultz was so polite to everyone all the time. And, you know, as his valet you saw him in is less you polite moments and. I remember very distinctly in 82 just after coming into office, he was getting ready to meet with gromyko for the first time at the Un General Assembly in new york and september and rick among, others briefed him. Hes being briefed constantly by people. And i and rick may actually be a witness to this story. And all of the briefings began the same way you are the night secretary of state who has met with gromyko, you know, with the message essentially being his experienced mr. Secretary and you were not and after this about five times he turned and said to no one in particular next who tells me im the ninth secretary of state to meet punch the face shultz the marine comes out paul im something may pick up on a thread in ricks comments the thinking piece that i dont know the things happened so quickly these days you dont get the sense that you have cabinet secretaries, anybody in government that is kind of spent spending time putting time aside to really think and explore and develop like the construct that rick was just telling, sharing with us. Maybe reflect on that, perhaps how it impacted your working relationship with secretary shultz and the thoughtfulness in which, you know, youre doing all this in and dealing with the soviet union. But there was a lot going on within your portfolio, how you deal with china, japan and elsewhere. In fact, paul nitze, who was very close to shultz as little i dont think its a memoir, its book called the tension between opposites and, the opposites, action and thinking and by the time you to that level in government i probably have to make 35 tough decisions every 4 hours, which doesnt give much time for thought. But shultz would try maybe not once a week, but a couple of times a month set aside some time to think about the larger picture. And i remember when the israelis were besieging beirut and shultz was trying negotiate an exit for the plo and he was working 24 seven on this negotiation, he set aside 4 hours on a saturday. I was then head of policy planning at east asia. He said, okay, paul, youre in charge. The seminar with, he told me who was going to come. Henry kissinger, eric shapiro of dupont who was a good friend of his. Bob ames of the cia, who was a real middle expert. Because i want people to think about what happens when the is when plo leaves im working on getting them out and the result was that as soon as the people left he had a proposal to give to reagan to to basically take control of the middle east Peace Process discussions because everyone had idea of what to do after the israelis left, reagan had a plan that had been out with him at camp david, actually, because of shultz foresight and that sort of scholarly part of him, which i think actually pretty deep, because remember chicago, we had Milton Friedman as a colleague he had lee kuan yew, an instructor. In fact, he sent me out to east asia quite explicitly. He said, i believe he sent more than i believe. I know he said to Prime Minister lee, this young man has a lot to learn about. Asia, would you give him a few hours . Ill take the instant if i get the 3 hours and i got 3 hours. So it was fantastic and people because his government before was domestic just how much he had traveled around the world especially for victor and so things up because he he really a teacher and a student at harvard and it made a huge difference. And i stick with you, paul, because i another blasting element of his in time as secretary of state. This commitment to human rights record on that is the fourth piece here. Obviously that was a big part of what you were focusing on when you assistant secretary share with us kind of how he prioritized and how he deftly kind of integrated into into the diplomacy. Well the whole philippine excursion, if you want to call it that, was probably the most fascinating part of my career and. This let me begin by if you screwed up would tell you and it wasnt a comfortable place be just say it that way and i we were in in new york at the u. N. He was at the u. N. I was accompanying and one of my deputies gave our first testimony talking about need for reform in the philippines. And it sort of correctly labeled in the press as us distancing itself from marcos. So i got a call charlie hill of secretary to see you right away that sound good to begin with and shultz said are you guys going to just do the marcos what carter did to the shah, which of course in our circles was a major sin. And fortunately we talked a lot about this internally, especially with my friend the late guest seager, who was the asia guy for reagan. And there was a pretty good consensus both at state and defense in the white house staff, that this had that marcos had to reform. And if he didnt reform, we were going to have a much bigger and i remember giving this back to shultz and what i thought pretty convincing argument. And i guess the telling part of the argument was i said guest and seager supports this and he knows how the president feels. So he had that kind of reassurance then from that point on, he said about beginning a basically a seminar session for the president with some discussions, including one that i remember quite vividly. It around the dining room in the family quarters and the point got through to you know when the point had gotten through to reagan because he threw his head and came up with an anecdote he said, what was it somebody said about having no boots on on polish staircases, which was a reference, i believe, to voltaire made to the french revolution. Somewhere in the president s mind, he realized he was dealing with a revolutionary situation. Put the two things together, and i actually believe, except for that unfortunate excursion with the fall on both sides, reagan was completely on board the policy of putting pressure on marcos to either reform or resign. And in the final moments when bonilla, i guess there were a Million People in the streets and the plaza protesting marcos and we in crisis mode, there was a meeting and as the meeting, reagan came down camp david for the meeting and shultz quite brilliantly. And by the way, i think is part of his good for human psychologists could give you some more anecdotes on that one if you want to give me the time. But shultz said the one thing we have to do, mr. President , is not make carters mistake. He immediately had the president with him. Yeah, we have to tell mark that was persuasive. You have to throw marcos is welcome in United States. And of course, that wasnt an easy thing to do. It made all the difference in him out and then the final thing was when the final final when we had sent paul laxalt out because we knew that marcos was saying the embassy doesnt speak for the president. We sent the president the best friend to speak for the president. And in the crisis, marcos called up, wanted to speak to laxalt because he was hearing the state department saying he should step down. And he said to laxalt, im this what is it, my friend, the president and laxalt said, the president said, you must not use force, marcos said, if i dont use force, i have to leave. And laxalt then basically he made up the words, but he had the presence instruct him to do it. I think its to cut and cut cleanly. And there was a long silence on the other end and finally laxalt said, mr. President , are you still . And marcos said, yes, im just so terribly disappointed. Were going to pivot to questions from the audience just a minute. But we cant let the ambassadors leave this conversation without asking to become policymakers again. You all this experience so, much of what you were discussing, rhymes with what were presented with today in europe. Allies is to indopacific china. We didnt get to japan, china. But that was obviously a piece that you wrestle with. Lets just down the line and whether it be taiwan and dealing with the Chinese Communist party or how were dealing with russia and putins aggression and war in ukraine, channel secretary shultz and and and kind of how he would have kind of come to you and said ric, you know, what are we going to do . How are we going to counter putin . How are we going to bring, you know, sustain the ukrainian country sovereignty and freedom fall . You know, you could play the portfolio for for china and but give us a sense how kind of shultzs legacy would inform some of the challenges having today. Well, i mean, this this in very well because it was the one i guess the one argument i guess similar point i would say was critical for for shultz. And i talked about his his institutional ism. We talked about his ability to be both a policymaker and a thinker, as well as. An implementer, somebody a man action. But he really, in the in the in my experience really understood the both the importance. On the one hand of allies and on other on how you sustain those relationships and how this goes and and the about trust being the coin of the realm that was bryce harlow quote that he told me when in that era when he first came to washington met bryce harlow who was at that time one of the Great Washington washington establishment figures. And and that is particularly true, i think, in terms of the russia and ukraine conflict is. It would be the requirement absolute essential requirement to build a trusting relation ships with our key allies to go through this process because theres a i dont to go into spin into policy here but theres a paradox in terms where we are kind of yeah, its a paradox. The sense that in a way the that nobody anticipated how remarkably success small and courageous and capable the ukrainians would be in this conflict. But the fact that they have been so courageous and successful has raised the stakes weve got now somebody who is a corner rat, somebody who is, you know talking about radiological weapons, somebody who could seriously think about nuclear escalation. And so it makes makes it absolutely imperative that we hang together and we can only that through through establishing the kind of transparency and trust and confidence in each other and. Its its its its its its so far id say im pretty, im pretty im impressed with the ability or the of our key allies to to work with us. But its going to require its going to be its going to be its going to be tougher. Its easier. And so i think that the shultz doctrine, you will of of understanding that youre not going to do this unilaterally, but in the case of particularly i think, dealing with with russian revanchism is is going to require a strong united alliance. Rick just solved europe ball solved solved china will roger youve got to understand theres nothing never faced anything like china before think thats the first thing i would say we never had so much dependance an adversary as we have on china. Weve never had an adversary that had it so, so deep into. The American Economy and Americans Society that the consensus of nba basketball, its brand new situation. Youve got to think. Having said that, lets at the past. Okay i think he say one of our great breakthroughs and i believe this was to rebalance us relations basically to the chinese. Youre not our first concern. Japan is our first concern. And it was done a very subtle way, but it was picked it was missed by the american press, but it was picked up by the asians like that and i think it was picked up by the chinese. And when you negotiate with them, you dont go begging you go telling them what youre willing to do and what not willing to do, which reagan he did very firmly when they were begging for a trip by reagan in 83, and reagan basically said, ill come, but after you send your guy here so that that still applies, i think he would say true japan is not even close to china these days. But think about the fact theyre what 1. 2 billion chinese at a japan korea indonesia the united australia. I think youre already over billion and then take the billion indians whatever you think about india these days. But it still is a major factor in the whole equation and figure out how to force the chinese to realize that they dont own the world and theyre not going to be allowed to own the world and i think what he might say, because this line about trust being the coin, the realm, he really applied very in the case of the soviet union, where you might think the last thing youd agree on was human rights. But they did this amazing deal to get the pentagons. List. They were called out of the embassy in on a promise that. If we kicked them out the the soviets would let them leave which is trusting a lot. But i think in part he was they were thinking if we cant get them to agree on letting out the soviet union, they wont agree on anything but so it was, in a sense, an easy issue, but it required a lot of and i think if he were here today, he might repeat what he said in an article in the wall street journal, which, needless to say, i love, because im disappointed i kissinger, i admire a lot. But he hasnt had a bad word say about xi jinping that i can find. Shultz said that xi jinping is as i think the word was shredded. The hong kong agreement. If xi jinping wants to get back in a decent relationship with us, thats a place to build trust. I dont think its going to happen under him, but maybe his successor and maybe successor is going to happen before his fourth term. I hope. All right. Well, we know its going to be a while given events this week. Eric, why dont you wrap it up and then well to questions so which is trackable, which interactive problem do you want me to solve you all . I got both unsolved as well, so i would actually say if if secretary schultz were alive, i think actually he would be pressing the case for human rights in iran and putting it at the center of our approach to iran rather than feckless to get back into the joint comprehensive plan of agreement with iran. One of the things i think he did very effectively and might have thoughts on this but really already addressed it in a way when he came office, there was a lot of criticism of president reagan because, the unit of account for success with the soviet was have you reached an arms control yet . And there had not obviously been. And the other problem, of course, was the jamal pipeline that rick and paul both talked about. So he had a policy that was really kind of arms control and sanctions in and which is basically what our policy is towards iran today. Yeah, but what he did was create a much bigger framework for dealing with the soviet starting with human rights which as he said all the time was always the first issue he would address with his soviet counterparts. Drove the Foreign Service crazy, you know, because that was the last thing anybody in the Foreign Service wanted. As i said, theyre all the Foreign Service officers trying to manage the bilateral relationship. This was an irritant. Why are you guys why are you starting with an irritant . Because he understood how important human rights were in the context of the us soviet relationship and how the soviet union worked. So he had this broader agenda which was human rights, arms control had a part, but also russian regional behavior, the trouble they were stirring up in around the world and the economics and what he called the people to people dimension and. I think he would look at the situation today and say we have to recalibrate our approach to iran and we have to address all behavior across all dimensions. Thats ambassador edelmans wisdom. He took up iran and not north korea. And his last to solve. Lets go to questions from the audience. Lets go. We got jon hill on yeah thanks. You got a microphone behind you if you dont mind. Just a little bone to pick with rick bird. I took his job at the state department 20 years after him, and for the first year of doing the job, people say youre doing okay, but youre no rick bird. So that was a hard thing to live up to filling your shoes there at paul mill. But so my question nice picture of me they still its its bigger than everybody. Rex yeah. All the all all your we have these tiny postage stamps. My is shultz as a cabinet member as a team player, i served in government when you know we were to get the interagency cooperating again. Eric you and i worked quite hard this with state and defense talking to each other, but i dont ever look in his memoirs. I didnt get much of a sense of shultz as a player on a team and how he interacted the with the National Security advisor the pentagon, other agencies. Can you comment on that and your experiences with him who wants to take that one. Well ill do it just very briefly thats a really good question. I need to think about it a little. But i mean he again, we go back to the sort of seminal point that he understood the importance having a deep and productive relationship with the president understood the importance of working with the National Security council and the National Security adviser and think, in my experience, the person that he really invested in at a critical period was was bud mcfarlane and and you know there a quite a quite a cast of characters who played that role the the reagan presidency. So some were and some were more capable than others. And the nsc of gave a strong and then weak but especially during the mcfarlane era i think on at least on eastwest issues, because mcfarlane himself was interested in and in in arms control issues and, and the soviet u. S. Soviet relationship. He did spend a lot of time and they usually were in sync. I just want to footnote here its really sdi, right . Because mcfarlane absolutely. And a word on sdi here too, because i see kenny edelman back here whos done some important and writing was a important player in that in that period as well. But but you know, both George Shultz and this is this is my my and kenny comment on this but i think both George Shultz and bud saw the sdi as a really critical to leverage the soviets and they particularly felt i think you know at that there was an opportunity and in that famous meeting in iceland to to make this giant step towards you know the darker not necessarily the total elimination but a substantial reduction in Ballistic Missile deployments that that that is a good example of where i think they were they they converged. One little quick footnote here, though. The the the relationship with with with weinberger both during during one year haig and under shultz was poisonous. And it was unfortunate and it was counterproductive too quick. Yeah and that weekend of the philippines, shultz pulled together a small group in his living room without a lot room and made sure to invite weinberger. So by the time they went to see the president he went on the same page and one of one other thing i used to have to fight with colleagues to get seats on the airplane. My interagency colleagues and always supported me. So we always had myself, a cia person and a c person and the odd person and. So we became known as the gang of four, which was appropriate for the region. All right. So whats at the at the assistant secretary level . We have time for just a couple of questions. Wait, i didnt get a chance. The valet didnt get to answer to john. Question go ahead, ambassador. So, john, i would take a bit of issue with the premise of your question, which is what is the normal state of affairs in an interagency, you know, deliberations. And at the tail end of my career when, i was working for bob gates when he was secretary defense. He said frequently in my earshot, you know, most of my career, secretary of state, defense and National Security guys are have not been on speaking terms and and unfortunately is the case more often than not. But i do think and rick and and paul will recall this even in the worst of times there was a regular shultz weinberger lunch with bill casey usually to the three of them would meet sometimes. But mcfarlane would attend as well. The National Security adviser. But they had a weekly lunch even in the absolute worst of times. And so there was, you know, continued communication even when there was, you know, great great differences between the agencies, the principals break bread, solve problem on rumsfeld. They kept tradition continued. Last question. Who wants to have a go with the ambassadors here. Look at that. Well, weve blown style. Yeah, sounds great. Please join in thanking this distinguished group of investors as we remember, George Shultz. Cspans American History tv continues. You can find the full schedule on your Program Guide or cspan. Org history. Welcome to this vir