Transcripts For CSPAN3 Fall Of The Berlin Wall 20140828

On weekends cspan 3 is home to American History tv with programs that tell our nations story. The civil wars 150th anniversary, visiting battlefields and key events. American artifacts touring museums and Historic Sites to discover what artifactsry valley. History book shelf for the best known history writers. The presidency looking at the policies and legacies of our nations commanderinchief. Lectures in history with top college professors. And our new series, real america featuring archival government and educational films from the 1930s through the 70s. Cspan 3 created by the cable tv industry and funded by your local cable or satellite provider. To mark the 25th anniversary of the fall of the berlin wall a panel of historians discuss the end of the cold war. Constructed in 1961, the wall began to fall on november 9th, 1989, after months of protests an political liberalization in pro soviet Eastern Europe. This event is hosted by the society for historians of American Foreign relations. From cspan 3s American History tv, this is just under two hour hours. S. Welcome, everyone. Its wonderful to see you all here gathered at this Plenary Session which is basically commemorating the 25th anniversary of the fall of the berlin wall. Im Richard Immerman from Temple University and it is my honor and pleasure to share as the chair and moderator. For those of us who have been coming to schaefer meetings for four decades or even more, its a little short of remarkable that were marking 25 years since the fall of the berlin wall. Its remarkable because on the one hand we can recall that event so vividly, but on the other hand, it sometimes seems like it took place a lifetime ago. Its also remarkable because for those of us who pursued our degrees and published our first books during the preceding decades, in some cases before the construction of the wall [ laughter ] its collapse seemed so unimaginable. In fact, if i can indulge you for a second, the year before the collapse, i organized a conference on job foster dulles. No one was more associated with the cold war. Some of you were there. There was lots of talk about the integration of europe. The soviets new thinking. Glasnost. Perestroika but no one was talking about the reunification of germany. This was the time john gadddes began their conferences on soviet and american relations. First time scholars got together. And Scott Armstrong had just come up with the idea of this thing called a National Security archive. But an end to the cold war . Not a chance. No discussion of it at all. Consequently whats not remarkable is that were really not much closer now than we were then to reaching a consensus on the fundamental questions regarding the events in germany at the time and then, of course, the aftermath. These questions concerned the drivers whether they be individual, state or international. These questions concerned the consequences whether they be international, state or individual. And these questions concerned the significance, the legacy, also in terms of individual, states and international. And while we have not reached any consensus, there are none in our profession, in our guild more qualified to articulate the terms of the debate and move the conversation forward than our three speakers tonight. None of them really need any introduction. But ill introduce them anyway. And ill do it all at once in order, in the order in which they will speak. Which i think i can sort out now. So that we can both ensure that theres maximum time for our general conversation as well as their opening remarks. Mary elise sarotte newest book will appear this autumn on the 25th anniversary of the fall of the wall. Her last book which im sure were all familiar with, 1989 was a Financial Times book of the year and won a prize, the d prize for german and European Studies and as, aaa s shulman prize for distinguished scholarship on communist Foreign Policy. Princeton university will publish an updated Anniversary Edition in the autumn of 2014. So they actually gets a doubleheader. Mary serves as dean professor and history of International Relations at the university of Southern California and currently on leave as a visiting professor of government and history at harvard. Shes a former humbolt scholar, white house fellow and is a lifetime member of the council on foreign relations. Melvyn leffler is a professor of American History at the university of virginia and a faculty fellow of the governing america in a Global Era Program at uvas miller center. Hes the author of several books on the cold war. And on u. S. Relations with europe, including for the soul of mankind, which won the george lewis prize from the American Historical Association and preponerance of power. In 2002 and 2003 he was a professor at oxford. Mel has been the recipient of fellowships from the council on foreign relations, the United States institute of peace, the Woodrow Wilson center, and the Norwegian Nobel Institute and, of course, he served as president of schaefer. In 2010 mel and arnie west collaborated the history of the cold war and most recently he coauthored on certain times American Foreign policy after the cold war. Hes now editing, coediting a book on come partive strategy making and writing about the Foreign Policy of the george w. Bush administration. Our last speaker will be Jeffrey Engel. Jeff is founding director of the center for president ial history at Southern Methodist university. Prior to accepting that appointment, he held a postdoctoral fellowship and taught at the university of wisconsin, yale, the university of pennsylvania, haverford and texas a m. He was the 52 professor at the bush school and the director of programming for the skocroft institute for teaching and membership. While as texas a m he received a silver star award for teaching and membership, distinguished Teaching Award from a Ms Association of former students and a University System chancellors teaching excellence award. Among the numerous articles and books he has written or editted. He was schaefers 2012 lecturer and recipient of norwegian nobel price fellowship. Hes currently writing when the world seemed new, george h. W. Bush and the surprising end to the cold war. Mary. Thank you very much richard. Thank to you the society for inviting me to speak. And also its great that cspan is here so many more people can join us in their discussion today from their homes. Of course the people here have an advantage. The society wisely gave you two free drinks before you had to start listening to me so im hoping that will blunt intelligent of your skeptical and penetrating questions. So i have just a few minutes to tell you a little bit about the fall of the wall, and then my colleagues will talk a little bit more about legacy and interpretation. As richard was kind enough to mention i have a book coming out on this topic in the fall and it will be the anniversary itself is november 9th. So youll be seeing a lot of media coverage, i hope, of my book but certainly of the 25th anniversary of the fall of the wall and its great that schaefer has chosen to make this Plenary Session where we talk about the significance of this event. One of the things that is oops. Significance of this event. One of the things that is oops. One thing thats important to me a lot of great events dont have great causes. After my last book i got a lot of unexpected questions. 1989 is actually about the Foreign Policy that followed the collapse of the berlin wall. So in that book i just summar e summarized in a few pages the way the wall came down and the bulk of the book is about the International Politics afterwards. I would go out and give talks about that book and get up and say im here to talk about the Foreign Policy that followed the unintentional opening of the berlin wall and sometimes i wouldnt even get to that sentence. People would stop me. What do you mean unintentional opening of the berlin wall. Sometimes i would get a lot more poignant questions. Dont you know reagan opened the wall in 1987. The first time i got that question i was kind of shocked. By the fourth or fist time i was no longer shocked and i realized that theres not a lot in languages other than german about the short term events that brought down the berlin wall. Theres a lot of excellent scholarship about the causes for the fall of the wall but the proximate causes, the short term events are not wellknown in the nongerman speaking world and so i decided for the anniversary to try to put together that story as best i could and then of course as always happens when you start researching something it becomes more complicated than you expected. So let me just giant of gallop through some of the ideas in my book and then if we have questions we can talk more about them. I want to talk a little bit about the precursor to the night of november 9, 1989 when the wall opens. And then a tiny bit about how we think about these events, memory and legacy, themes that my colleagues will emphasize as well. So its important to say that the first unexpected event actually happened not in berlin but in moscow which is to say there were a rapid series of deaths in 2 1 2 years there were four leaders of the soviet union, of course, after breznev died. Margaret thatcher remarked at the second funeral the soviets they know how to do a funeral im definitely coming back next year. It turned out she wasnt wrong. So after that embarrassing sequence of events the politburo was willing to take a risk on a man in their 50s and that man turned out to be Mikhail Gorbachev. Mikhail gorbachev comes to power in march of 1985. Of course, he not only institutes glasnost and perestroika but begins a series of meetings with president Ronald Reagan. So Mikhail Gorbachev ascension to power is unexpected and reform is unexpected and matched by level of interest by Ronald Reagan. George h. W. Bush in contrast is much more skeptical of gorbachev. His National Security adviser always liked to point out that either gorbachev was a fraud on which the United States was a fraud or gorbachev was for real and he may have good intentions but kobe dispatched with a single bullet and the soviet union had the ability to destroy the United States. The bush team once it took office, once george h. W. Bush became president , when im speaking of bush im speaking about george h. W. Bush was much more cautious. One of my surprises is how much tension there was between the reagan team and bush team. Political scientists who are not interested in this topic but work on president ial transitions used the reaganbush transition as a particularly vicious one. Some scholars described it as bush fired everyone. I was surprised to see bush documents saying mush for brains reaganites. You see a little attempt to return to a more traditional cold war stance. But dramatic events made it clear 1989 wont be a traditional cold war year. These protests in Tiananmen Square. 1989 in retrospect looks different in china than europe. I would ask you to bear this in mind as we talk about the wall today. We of course, all know that the cold war in europe ended peacefully but the people at the time did not know this. As events unfolded the images on ninds of protesters and demonstrators were images from Tiananmen Square, the lone figure standing in front of tanks. Try to keep that image in mind as we talk about 1989. The fall of the berlin wall was not a foregone conclusion. Tiananmen square is still a forbidden zone in the peoples republic of china. So the question, of course, is what would happen in Eastern Europe as gorbachevs reforms gradually created new opportunities. Would there be a similar kind of violence as there had been in china . That was an open question in the summer of 1989 in cold war europe. This is a map of cold war europe. So in summer of 1989 the beginning of the end and the Eastern Europe didnt recognize this quickly enough. The beginning of the end came when hungary decided to allow hungarians to cross into austria. In the first instance the hungarians prevented east germans from leaving. There was an existing treaty between hungary and east germany and the hungarians at first respected it. But then hungary decided to let east germans leave as well and they flood out in mass numbers. This is a photo from the east German Secret Police archives. This is a photo of abandoned vehicles. They had to go down the vehicles and collect these. People waited as long as 16 years to purchase these vehicles. And so abandoning it was quite a dramatic statement and there were so many of them the secret police had to collect them at depots such as this one in czechoslovakia. This was a massive exodus. And it tested even the people who were at home. Some of the people who had stayed home had to justify staying at home. Indeed the phrase stay at home was a term of insult. So suddenly this massive exodus where east germans would go down into hungary, cross the border in austria and come back up to east germany threatened the existence of the east german ruling regime itself which they anticipated would not be case. The east german ruling regime took a series of steps that ultimately culminated even though it did not wish for this to happen in the opening of the berlin wall. So in response to this massive exodus, the east german ruling regime demonstrated the theory of albert hirschman. He had formulated People Living under a dictatorship have three choice. You can either find some way to exit. Or you can find some way to protest and use your voice. Or you can basically stay quiet and be loyal. And for much of east germany loyalty was the popular choice but then thanks to the hungarians exit became possible. However the east german regime decided unwisely to close its own borders to prevent any further exit and since exit then moves to longer an option and loyalty no longer seemed a good option voice became the dominant option and the number of protests and the size of protests was increased dramatically throughout east germany most notably in the cities of dresden. Since the media was under censorship, any images had to be smuggled out. And the east german regime realizing that it created a new monster essentially planned a Tiananmen Square event on the night of october 9, 1989 in the city of leipzig. There was distribution of machine guns with bullets. Just the level of preparations for a bloody and violent event on october 9, 1989 in leipzig. And that event might have happened and we might talk about the two tiananmens in 1989 but for the fact that the demonstrators in leipzig behaved in two unexpected ways. Their numbers were massive. Their numbers were over 100,000 and they were peaceful and nonviolent and deployed troops instead of firing them began joining their ranks and i described that process based on interviews with Police Officers and others in the course of the book. It was a remarkable event. It has not been understood as it should be because of a key stepping stone on to the collapse of the wall. Because the smugglers smuggled out video images of the failure of the regime to carry out its planned tiananmen and when those made to it western broadcasters and broadcast back to Eastern Europe that fueled the confidence of east germans even more. The protest actually took place around the leipzig center city ring road. The marchers gathered here and marching around this way. This was supposed to be the location where what would essentially have been civil war in germany would have started. But the protesters overwhelmed the police and the deployed army forces and able to circle the entire ring road successfully on the night of october 9th. From there the power of this peaceful revolution kept growing and growing and the regime found itself more and more under siege. The hard line leader of east germany was ousted and replaced by his crown prince, a man named avon krince. He knew things had gone badly wrong so he thought ill do things differently. Ill still maintain control but ill talk a good game in public. So in public ill say things that make it sound like im going institute reforms but ill maintain the power of the state over peoples lives and certainly over their ability to travel. The state still has to give permission if anyone wants to leave on my watch. So he decided to issue minor changes to existing travel laws mainly as a sop to all these crowds that were protesting but the announcement of this minor and basically fraudulent change was so badly botched that the journalists in the room thought it was a real change and theres quite remarkable video footage of this press conference that is arguably the worst press conference in the world where the east german spokesman goes from bad to worse and in his efforts to explain whats going on and before he even finishes speaking he starts back pedalling. Before he does that reporters start rushing out to file reports saying the wall is open. So when east germans hear those reports which are not actually accurate, its part of this new found selfconfidence inspired by gorbachev, inspired by the success of the Solidarity Movement in poland, what happened in leipzig they stormed the wall. The critical point that night, the point where the berlin wall first opens is this location. This is a Border Crossing or was a Border Crossing in the north of divided berlin. It was the largest Border Crossing between the two halves that divided berlin. This is an aerial photo from about 1985. In this photo west ber insulin at the top. On the other side of this bridge. East berlin is down here. This is the entrance to the checkpoint. If you were to come in a car you have to go over here to these car procession lanes before you can go up final barrier and guard post and go over to the west, and the pedestrians would be processed in these houses and its a huge called off area. This whole area is the checkpoint. And this becomes a critical point because there are a number of checkpoints but the other ones, the residences had been given over to secret police employees. They were not likely to storm the wall. This was kind of out of the way in the north and this was where what were known as the political undesirables lived. This was a bad neighborhood. Those political undesirables showed up in large numbers on the night of november 9th, 1989, and they started basically trying to get into the Border Crossing just saying, you should let us pass the wall is open. Border guards were baffled. They had no instruction. When they called their superiors, the superiors said business as usual keep the gates closed. This became a dramatic development. A map of divide berlin. This thick line represents the berlin wall. Similar things start happening at all the inner berlin divided points. All kinds of reports start coming in to the center, massive crowds are showing up and all of them are convinced the wall is open. No odds to this effect and the headquarters keep saying keep the gates closed, business as usual, keep the gates closed. It becomes harder and harder for the Border Guards who are facing hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands of people who are starting to fear for their own safety to do so. Is this man who opens the wall in the practical sense. Not the man who opens the wall in the sense of reagan or gorbachev. He folds and says well shoot these people or open up. His name is harold yager. He was in charge of the night watch. A deputy officer. But it was on his watch that this came to a head. This is his personnel file photo. Shows his age roughly as it would have been in 1989. And he after hours of being told business as usual, when he tells his superiors its not business as usual there are 20,000 people here, his superiors call him a coward and he snaps and decides to open the wall. So this man is actually in sort of the most specific narrow sense the man who opens the wall and is almost completely unknown. He put himself out of a job and he actually after the wall came down ended up unemployed and for a while even just driving a taxi in berlin and now lives on a small pension in the outskirts of berlin. So that is just a very brief summary and some of the dramatic unexpected events that led to the short term collapse of the wall. Let me make a few very general remarks and then ill hand over to my colleagues about reaction and memory. Whats interesting to me is how this is treated now in germany. Here in the United States we have a number of very, very grand memorials to the collapse of the berlin wall. There are very big installations of pieces of the berlin wall at the george h. W. Bush president ial library, at the Ronald Reagan library, at the capitol, in fulton, missouri but actually in west germany there is no major memorial to the fall of the wall. There are attempts to build one but very controversial and beset with delays. Theres more going on here than just what Museum Experts call beyond the beauty problem. Thats when you try to memorialize an unattractive site. Seems more is going on than that and this has to go with the ongoing controversy how do we interpret this event and its legacy. Theres so much disagreement weve not reached a point where we can adequately memorialize it. It sfepeaks to our lack of a clr understanding. Or you had some kind of order by the east german regime because great events must have great causes and must have been decided and east german regime must of decided. The agency of local actors. As i was writing this book this wasnt a story of elite politics since there was no order to open the wall, i had to look elsewhere for my main character, so to speak. Now its true this was a story of revolution from below, the fact that the people wanted the wall to be opened mattered as well but that problem is a causal explanation because people wanted the wall to be opened from the moment it was built in 1961 and yet it didnt fall until 1989. It was fascinating to me as i described history from the middle, people like harold yager, midlevel east german bureaucrat, people who unintentionally contributed to these events not these great political leaders. This is a recent photo. Instead of a memorial there theres basically nothing. I took this picture because i got a tip from a friend that all of the remaining traces in clueding the former east german land lines those vehicle lanes i pointed out the you were going to be ripped up so a Discount Grocery store could go in. I ran over and took a picture of the lane numbers and few lane numbers that were still there before they got ripped up. If you go there now to where the berlin wall opened theres now a Discount Grocery store. By way of compensation some local historical societies decided there should be some informational panels but those were installed on the cheap. You can see one fell prey to vandalism. This is supposed to be a picture of people crossing the wall on the night of the 9th but somebody put a sticker on it, peeled it off and that was the end of it. So this is the site where berlin opened. It amazes me at this event, thats right, this site, thats what marks this event. So, i think that theres a lot of food for thought here. On the one hand we have a triumphant memorials for the fall of the wall where germans are hesitant to celebrate this triumphant and there are longer term consequences of this thinking which well discuss more that they feed into a mistaken perception that the United States was, in fact, the author, the sole author of these events, that it rapidly and at little cost brought down the wall through a dictatorship and fueled the thought the United States can repeat the performance. We need a better understanding of what happened in this event. We need to understand the role of chance. And the agency of local actors. And we need to have a more nuanced understanding of the role of the United States and u. S. Foreign policy in this event. Thank you very much for listening to me and i look forward to the discussion. [ applause ] so, over the years ive learned the importance of stressing my most significant point first. So i want to tell you that despite what richard implied, i did not publish my first book before the construction of the wall. [ laughter ] as we learn more and more about the history leading up to the demise of the wall, as we learn more and more of the texture about that event from people like mary and jeff, i think we understand the technical history, the empirical history a lot better. My desire is to try to step back and to ask myself and to ask all of you to think about what actually on the 25th anniversary should we be commemorating . What is there to celebrate . What lessons are to be drawn . Actually, about five years ago, approaching the 20th anniversary, Jeffrey Engel invite ad group of scholars down to texas a m to discuss the meaning of the fall of the berlin wall. And jim sheehan was there to talk about the meaning of the fall of the berlin wall in Eastern Europe and my good friend came and talked about the meaning of the fall of the wall in china, bill talbin came and talked about the meaning of the fall of the wall in russia. And i talked about the meaning of the fall in the United States. At that conference, which i think jeff is going to talk a little bit more about in a few minutes, at that conference i was very much impressed by the divergent meanings attached to the fall of the wall. Jeff explained the demise of the wall signified the triumph and efficacy of european inat the at the integration and multilateral institutions. In russia the fall of the wall signified the need to avoid naive leadership. In china the fall of the wall meant the need to reactivate economic reform and to avoid political liberalization. And i talked about the meaning of the fall of the berlin wall in the United States. And here i emphasize that it meant the triumph of freedom over tyranny. It confirmed the redemptive role of the United States. And the universal appeal of freedom. The wall coming down. This view was very widespread and it was very dangerous. It encouraged the use of military power and armed force. It nurtured illusory hopes of a democratic peace. It inspired naive assumptions about benevolence of european regulated markets. This view was widely shared amongst prudent men like george h. W. Bush, amongst prominent democrats like the clintons, amongst conservatives like Donald Rumsfield and dick chen injuries and among neocons. Initially bush 41, as jeff and others have so well emphasized was cautious and prudent. But by the time of the 1992 president ial campaign, president bush 41 could not resist the temptation to take credit for the events of 1989 and 1990. He liked to say during the campaign, we brought about the fall of the iron curtain and the death of imperial communism. In 1992 the republican platform actually went further. It proclaimed quote, the fall of the berlin wall marks a change in the way people live. We republicans saw clearly the dangers of collectivism, not only the military threat, but the deeper threat to the soul of people bound in dependence. End quote. Indeed, the dismantling of the wall and the ensuing collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the ussr discredited government and further inspired the belief in the utility and superiority of free markets. Not only among republicans. Here in the United States the Clinton Administration actually went much further than its predecessors in dismantling government regulation over capital flows and financial markets. The depression fire wall between commercial and Investment Banking was repealed. Robert rubin, Larry Summers and Alan Greenspan were determined not to regulate, not to regulate the expanding sectors of the financial economy like derivative trading and securitization of mortgages. They forced other governments to deregulate financial controls as a condition for free trade pacts and as a condition for securing Financial Assistance during the Asian Financial crisis of the late 1990s. After 9 11, memories of the berlin wall coming down whetted the appetites and encouraged officials to use strength. Displace of u. S. Power would be met with enthusiasm. Memories of the jubilation of berliners of 1989 made them think that the toppling of saddam would be greeted with the same enthusiasm as the dismantling of the wall. On november 9th, 2001, bush 43 declared World Freedom day. He said, quote, like the fall of the berlin wall, and the defeat of totalitarianism in central and Eastern Europe, freedom will triumph in this war against terrorism. And a little over a year later, observing the videos of the toppling of saddams statue, secretary of defense rumsfeld declared quote, watching iraqis one cannot think, one cannot help but think of the fall of the berlin wall and the collapse of the iron curtain. Such notions inspired the hubris that formed the National Security strategy statement of 2002. You all remember the quotation in the introduction, the great struggles of the 20th century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the fors of freedom in a single sustainable model for national success. Freedom, democracy and Free Enterprise, end quote. Now that we know the history of the wall coming down, now that we know the contingency of the event and the agency of ordinary people, what should we be thinking about . What, in fact, should we be commemorating . What are the larger lessons that we should draw . Is it the universal appeal of freedom . Is it the free markets. Is it power and containment. What lessons should we draw . This is what i think we should draw. First, we should acknowledge and affirm the appeal of fundamental human rights. We should applaud the energy and recognize the agency of the nongovernmental organizations championing human rights in civil society. We should emphasize the significance of the helsinki agreements in reestablishing the legitimacy and universality of the rights inscribed in the 1948 declaration and lets remember what that declaration affirmed. The right life, liberty and the security of person. The right of every person to equality before the law. The right to be free from arbitrary arrests. The right to be free of arbitrary interference with privacy. The right to freedom of movement and travel. The right to own property. The right to express ones self freely. The right to enjoy social security, gainful employment, educational opportunity, and a minimum standard of living. Those are the fundamental rights that had such wide appeal to the peoples of east berlin, east germany, Eastern Europe and ultimately the soviet union. Second, i think we should emphasize and celebrate the attractiveness of a social market economy, not a Free Enterprise economy. Indeed it was the principals of the social market that werein incoporated. It meent combining free markets with limited local government regulation and social equity and social welfare safety net. In the struggle between Free Enterprise and communism, the social market won the cold war. Not with standing the Reagan Thatcher assault on government regulation. Not with standing the rise of neoliberalism, we should remember that the social safety net did not erode, did not erode in the 1980s. Indeed elsewhere ive shown that social spending was crucial to the ability of the west to absorb the shock of the 1970s. The social market, not the free market, so to speak, won the cold war. Third, we should acknowledge the efficacy of Super National institutions and european integration. The berlin wall came down because of francogerman reconciliation and because of the coal and Steel Community and Common Market and because of hopes inspired by the prospective european union. The berlin wall came down because of the resilience of western economies and because of the appeal of the culture of mass consumption. And i think its very important to emphasize that u. S. Power were essential back drops for the success of western European Economic integration. Fourth, we should emphasize and commemorate new norms of international conduct, the renunciation of force and honoring of selfdetermination. These were the norms that gorbachev embraced. That embrace was the precondition for the wall coming down. Fifth, we should applaud the efficacy and the agency of wise leaders. Reagan, bush, and most of all gorbachev. Reagan grasped that negotiating from strength meant negotiating, meant reaching out and ultimately understanding the adversary. Bush grasped that prudence and selfrestraint were critical. He understood that he must not overreach, he must not provoke a clamp down. That he must do what he could to help avoid a repeat of budapest 1956, prague 58 and recent events of tiananmen. Cole grasped the opportunity to reunite germany and realized a united germany had to be embedded within Super National institutions. And mitteron pressed ahead with his championing of the monetary union. He under stood that it was a prerequisite to coopting prospective german power and to reassure germanys neighbors. Most of all, we should honor gorbachev. He embraced new norms of conduct. Reconceived the meaning of security for his country and in understood the priority of domestic reform even if he did not know how to bring it about. Sixth and last, we should acknowledge the complex interactions between human agency, structural developments like globalization and the communicatio Communications Revolution and contingent events like a Spokes Person misstating conclusions of a meeting. We need to strive for synthesize and complexity as a precondition for skaccurate lessons and appropriate meanings. As we reassess we can also acknowledge that the leaders made mistakes. We can acknowledge that not all the promise of the wall coming down was realized. Partly because of the conservative instincts of cole and bush and partly because of the inkcoherence and ambiguity and gorbechevs mission. Mostly because in International Affairs challenges are too complex and competing pressures too formidable for statesmen to achieve perfection. I still think on the 25th anniversary of the wall, there means much to celebrate. The end of the division of germany and europe. The end of the cold war. The end of a nuclear arms race. The end of a bad century of war, depression, and totalitarianism. In on editorial on november twelfth, 1989, i think the editors of the New York Times prut t put the events in proper perspective. The editors wrote, quote, crowds of young people danced on top of the hated berlin wall thursday night. They danced for joy. They danced for history. They distanced because of the tragic cycle of catastrophe, exbracing two world wars, a holocaust and a cold war seemed at long last to be nearing an end. We too can still rejoice about such matters, thanks. [ applause ] you can all rejoice that were nearly done. Let me begin by first thanking the Program Committee in doing their excellent job of creating a fascinating conference. Thanks to the cochairs. Also to our president for helping organize this and our oncoming president , of course, tim borselman for this opportunity and thank you to my fellow panelists for giving a lot to discuss once im done. 25 years ago the world changed. The impossible happened. Something holy unexpected seized global attention and fundamentally altered a people, a continent and the entire world system with consequences that continue to reverberate to this day. I speak, of course, of what happened on june 4th, 1989 the i day that polish voters rejected their community government. Moscows influence was no more. A homegrown polish democracy took its place. Perhaps this is not the moment that you thought i was referring to from 25 years ago. You must be thinking of december 2nd, 1989 when soviet and american officials set a a summit for the end of the cold war or perhaps may 2 when hunga hungaryans mdismantled. My first point is that berlin is not the whole story. It is important but also one peak on the inconnected waves of 1989. To be the moment when the cold war that gripped humanity for half a century truly came to an end. To further this point when you were asked to consider what was the most significant event of 1989 you would think of tienemem square. Long after we in this room have all gone to that great big archive in the day, historians will still note and long remember june 4th of 1989 on the very day polish voters stood up. Chinas growing Reform Movement went down and he said to his colleagues, we can afford to shed some blood. Just try as much as possible not to kill everyone. China, of course, has not been the same since. The moment that dengs tanks toppled the godess, the free market if you will without the freedom. Chinese leaders live in fear in they fail to uphold the end of their bargain. Failing to offer prosperity. Perhaps you prefer your history of 1989 more shall we say colonial. More eurocentrik. Let me offer gorbevcev in his request to save the socialist em he loved through a revolution, he wound up ushering the soviet union to the grave. It was the single most profound articlation of a new world order since Woodrow Wilson further cementing the authors position as the worlds most popular man at least outside of russia. As the New York Times said, quote, imagine an alien space ship approached earth and send the message take me to your leader, who would that be, without doubt gorbechev. Stop and consider that quote for a moment. Gorbechev, 1989. The worlds leader. He with a the worlds leader. No wonder therefore that jealously feared him as 1989. Peristriok was a dangerous rues upon taking office. Now i will return to bush momentarily but first let me say the striking thing about gorbechev for all of his visionary speeches, his most important words were uttered behind closed doors. 1989 is often recalled as the year in which so much happened. I contend however it is what did not happen. The decisions not made or rather the moments where leaders chose in the to act that made all the difference. A quarter century most of our citizens have forgotten just how dangerous the demise of the soviet union really was. Bomb gat bob gates who was at that time deputy security advisor who would warn anybody there that never before in Human History had a major empire collapsed without a great power war ensuing. Never before in Human History had chaos not filled a power vacuum. With crowds serging around the world in 1889, it all the makings of a chaotic year and is most often told of the year of a series of crowds. Crowds marched and regimes fell. It makes us feel good thinking that democracy and people have real power. Hit hitchcock summed up this thinking saying that gorbechev did not give them freedom in 1989. They took it. Dont get me wrong, crowds matter but their success and failure ultimately rested in the hands of leaders who kept crowds under control Eastern Europes crowds marched but in doing so they actually turned power of events back in the hands of the very leaders who survived. The leaders when viewing the marchers had one fateful decision to make. To fire or topple. To douse the flames or to let them burn. Thankfully, of krcourse, Easter Europe told the safer panel. Looking back, asking what it all means, it seems to be clear that gorbechevs greatest moment was not a stirring speech but instead when he told Eastern Europe that moscow would no longer support their use of violence against their own people. This would not be 1953. This would not be 1968. This would not be 1956. He had said no in these. He abored becoming physically ill in 1889 when soviet police violentlydisbursed a crowd of georgia protesters. 20 died. The moment terrified him. Why . Because he had not ordered the crack down. He had not ordered the violence. He, the most powerful in the soviet union had less power when crowds and police crashed than the lowliest soldier scared and armed with a gun or the least subdued protester wielding eye rock. Either could start the kchaos that could ultimately destroy the world. All that occurred in 1989 happened after tienemen square. At the moment that the rest of the world shunned chinese visitors following that, eastern germany publically invited chinese officials to teach them about what he call crowd control. Honikcer used teinemen was a warning. Bush wrote in his diary quote if we mishandle this and get out in front, you would invite crack down and negative reaction that could result in bloodshed. Bush therefore responded by doing and saying as little as possible. Left he rile up hard liners, practicing what i call hip oe kratic dip loemocracy. He believed action carried more risk than potential game. Because he fundamentally believed history flowed in washingtons direction and that the stream of history would continue to flow in that direction, washingtons, so long as he did nothing to change its course. Democracy was on the rise. Markets were in vogue and freedoms was on the march. 25 years ago we were all lucky. Lucky that soldiers did not fire on their own swarming crowd but it was not all luck. It was also the luck of leaders bent on keeping kie owit at bay. East germany was gone, absolutely gone within a year. So to the soviet union did not have the stomach to fire on their own crowds gathered in protest. Too it too was gone by years end. Chinas regime remains to this day offering the troubling lesson that those who accept reform saw their states topple. The regime that sent in the tanks, survive. What then is the ultimate lesson of 1989. We all know the fell assy but taking a story from 1989 was an intertwined global affair with the lesson that there were multiple lessons. When one think of 1989 and why it matters depens on ones view. The central lesson for them was that they won reagan singlehandedly spent soviets thoot ground. Singlehandedly tore the wall down brick by brick. I would like to think he took his shirt off like putin because he did he believe , the world wants to be like us. Deep in their hearts Everyone Wants to be free. All suppressed people need is just a little push with a Little American military force and we should be greeted as liberators. We saw how well that turned out in 2003. Repression works so long as the leaders are tough enough to crack down and crack down heart. The crowds that formed on the far side of the iron curtain did not want to be american. Leaders in brussels interest paris concluded that they instead really wanted to be european and wanted to join the european union. The lesson is that that integration works. So long as europeans stick together, peace and prosperity will reign. So long as they stick together. What of the russians . Their lesson is the clearest of all. 1989 was the moment that gorbechev received economic collapse and expansion. Vladimir putin has called it the single greatest tragedy of russian history. His take away from 1989 and what drives his policy today is that russians should never ever trust the west again. Ultimate opinion is that whale there is much to celebrate from 1989 are not wholly optimistic. It is that true change occurs when real leaders are let the chain of the hif story run its course but leaders sadly able to resist the able to speed history along are sadly rare. Especially those who are intoxicated by the power at their command. Another lesson that collectivism is easily undermined by jealous and nationalism and that violence can keep it at bay for a while the least. Finally it is how one stands on the issues of 1989 depens on where one sit. Was he told his inner circle before ordering the crack down quote, were not afraid to shed a little blood. You carry these things out you see and the westerners forget. I think ultimately deng was only partly right. The world does not forget, it simply remembers what it wants. Thank you. [ applause ] now those who probably intended to defect from the beginning have defected. Knees athese are the stay hi. We can have an opportunity. Im sure many of you have questions or comments. If you will raise your hand and please identify yourself, it will be easier for us and it will certainly be easier to facilitate the filming. Please go to the microphone. Ive written extensively on american policy ford poland during this period. I wanted to thank you all for your insightful comments. I never want to follow leftler after he talks. It was wonderful. Im also very happy that dr. Engel reminded us of the two things that happened on june 4th, right . There are two options. There is the polish option, there is the tienemen option. In washington they thought of tienemen. Id like to think the polish experience opened the door for others to take power. As a comment to dr. Engel, there were reformers ahead of gorbechev in a way in Eastern Europe. I think that should be remembered. E he embraced this change. The fear in poland was that he would call for shots but he would be removed as gorbechev would have. I think its important to remember that he had partners also. My question is to mary. You talked about unintentional actions of the middle. Also at the same time the agency of local actors. So my question is what did you discover about why on october 9th those guards didnt shoot those those members did not shoot. Its a choice, an a, its embracing a path that rejects what youre told to do as well as why yager did the same thing, right . The motivations of these middle leaders i think is important and something that i dont quite understand. So i ask you to sort of respond to that and explain why they took the step not to act, not to shoot when given the order that night on the eleventh sorry the 9th or october or november. Thank you. Jeff, did you want to say anything. I like your work. I would like to recommend to all of you greg dombers fourth coming book. I have learned so much from you about what happened in poland. Im looking forward to seeing the book as well. Thank you tofor your question which gives me an opportunity to talk more about the book. When i set out to right the book, i needed to figure out the locus of the agency. As i said it was not among the elite political leaders whom i had previously worked. Since there had not been an elite decision to tear down the wall. I tried to look at it from a bottom up story with the crowd succeeding ands as i mentioned while that was true, it not sufficient. It was not enough to say people wanted the wall to come down yet it didnt come down until 1989 so i ended up unexpectedly focusing on this middle tier. This gets to your question about the difference between unintentional action and agency. I found that the agency of local actors is extremely significant but that agency was at times unintended that the spokes american at the press conference did not intend to botch the announceme announcement. I looked at leaders but also loyalists and people who thought what they were doing they were going to save the regime and those were midlevel bureaucrats who provided the wording of the decision that turned out to be very unwise. The deputy passport officer. So what was amazing to me is that there were many loyalists involved who were trying inaffectively to save ytheir regime. The agency was important but not the same as their intentionalty what i did was a huge number of interviews. I interviewed yager and asked him about his motivations. The causes were many but they all came together at that moment. As a historian have really seen momo causality. Important events rarely happen for one reason. So there was a combination of events and a huge number of protesters and handing over leaflets saying no violence and won over the armed guard whos had been told to expect a mob. The guards felt betrayed. Also at the Senior Leadership level, had problem getting berlin on the phone so they had received orders during the day to crack down at a certain point. All important decisions from the center. They were having trouble doing so because they realize their elite Party Leaders wanted to know nothing about the bloodshed so they could disavow it. Local leaders at that point began to feel themselves being left in the lurch and were not willing to go forward with it. So theres a whole bunch of factor thats come together. Similarly with harold yager whos an amazing figure chbl. He had been working at that Border Crossing for 25 years and nothing unusual had ever happened. You have to imagine let me go back to his picture. You have to imagine youve been sitting there for 25 years. Youve a dep hit control officer on the night watch given 25 events of service. Youre an exemplary servant of the regime. Even though you know your state is crumbling youre ready to show up for a 24 hour night shift and goes through the night and into the next day. When he called his superiors and they called him a coward. That moment that got his backup and that combined with his certainly fear of people saying open the wall. The protesters were peaceful. He was suspected of having cancer and he had undergone tests and was set to get the results the next day. It turned out he didnt have cancer but he didnt know that. In that moment where he was fed up, he turns to his people and says should we shoot all of these people or should we open up so they open up. The things im saying to you thats a fascinating about the questions weve raised about memory and legacy. Its a great question. One of the things i think is really fascinating about marys story in particular which she tells really remarkably which i have an advanced copy of is the difference between what happened there and teinemen. The world remembers that event as occurring on the night of june fourth when the tanks and armor personnel carriers rolled in and machine guns opened up. There had been a series of attempts over the previous week by the chinese regime to take back the square by force without the use of deadly force. At each stage they had been repulsed by the people of them who had physically peled anyone who had justed to enter teinemen so the soldiers had been beaten up by a week at this point. So its not first moment of violence. It was a choice that occurred after continued violence and escalated. So one could only think what would have happened if the soldiers who were staring down the crowd, if the crowd had actually been hulling rocks or a week at that point. What would their reaction had been . I think it would have been far different i think. Jeff and john. You get creeky after a while. Its nice to be back in chafer after all of these years. Youre one of the people who published the construction of the berlin wall, correct. It was very enjoyable and thought provoking set of presentations. A couple of points, i think this is directed at mel, maybe im stretching my point but maybe it was a good thing we had the soviet union around for americans to have a friendly face. Is there a connection . I dont know. And a general question when will we see the end of the america trying to see the world in its own image in terms of interpreting complex events that happened. Im thinking of right now and listening to your political leaders, yours not mine it seems the rhetoric goes around and around and stops with how great we are and how everyone should be in fact embracing our values and what we have to do to change and save the world. Throws t those are two questions. Jeff im not exactly sure what you meant by was it a good idea for the United States. Exemplary idea that the soviet un beyoion and the unite states were involved for a long time. There was an enemy and corporate capitalism, dloebal capitalism, whatever you want to call it that working men an women were happier than their enslaved counterparts. Well, i think its important simply to realize the initial context of the world war where rather than american officials being happy that there was a clear model that the ut western capitalism was superior. The real context of the origins of the world war was the question after world war ii about the vitality of communism. So i think that american officials preferred to have the situation that existed after 1990 than what had existed before. So no, i dont think they liked have the soviet union around as a framework. As for the rhetorical yes, i think american official and the American Media and quite a few historians and scholars have m disseminated an exceptional view of triumphan ism. Many people have taken issue with it. Our views, i dont think have prevailed in the large context of American Public thinking about the end of the keld war. With a i think is important though is for us to carry on. That is to continue to try to communicate our views. I think a very good example of this has happened in the last two weeks so some of you who read the New York Times and the new republic know that bob kagin has written an incredibly influential essay about the what we should learn from the experience of the 20th century from world war i to world war ii about american leadership. The bottom line cagin argues whats necessary to have a peaceful, stable, democratic world order for the United States as it has done in the part to assert power and leadership. Allegedly president obama called bob cag. N to the white house to discuss this. I know for a fact Hillary Clinton had dinner with bob cagin to discuss this article. I would wager the majority of people in this room do not quite agree with that story. Not that its totally wrong in my opinion but that it has pretty significant problems. I suggest anyone who agrees with it should read it and try to publish something about it. We have a choance to do that. His article appeared in the new republic. Hes a well known intellectual. Maybe thats why he got it in the new republic. Other people can write and try to communicate a counter view. If were unhappy with the exceptionalism. Thats what we historians should try to do without getting caught in our own oideological bias. I will make half of the panel cold. I was a freshman when the wall fell. At least you werent there when the wall went up. I dent know where my parents were. Let me play the role of splitter you suggested there was a contrast. Where do we put romania in that . I think the roam anians like to be different. I think we have to put them in a third category because we should recall that chesku did not have opportunity to act as he wanted. He was forced to flee when he didnt want. It was him and hon. Honiker saying that gorbechev had gone too far and hold fast to the soviets roots. Roam anian is the first place where cancan see interaction between the crowd and regime. The violence had a occurs from christmas and after ends up being villager versus villager different by ethic conflict. I would say romania is a precursor to ugoslavia and communist regimes had done a great job at destroying tensions during the tragedy. I teach at boston university. My name is david mayers. When we try to sort out the erosion of soviet power in Eastern Europe and its collapse, how important is our understanding of faith based accident in particular the Catholic Church. Poel land, we can sure theres a rehearsal for what happened. It was the proddestants who played an active role. It was local perishers, peace prayer groups at churches. Certainly the role of the Catholic Church cant be overstated. The choice of the role of the church was significant but more complex than i originally thought t. The kind of superficial narrative sheltered dissidents i went and actually interviewed former church based zi dissidents they had mixed feelings because they said the secret police tolerated the churches giving us shelter because it made surveillance easier. It was basically one stop shopping for them. Then you could observe the churches. You had church staff that came stazi agents. We had shelter though and a space to meet. Some of the ministers really cared and supported us. On the hole the churand space w crucial space to shelter dissidents but the ironiy is that the stizi permitted that space to exist as long as the activity did not become too active in 1889, when that level explodes exponentially the stazi is not ready for it. The other factor that came into play, some of the dissidents would say im not religious at all but i walked into a church and it was the only place in my country where people said what they thought. I participated hardly in these graups even though im not a person of faith. With you get down if the nittygritty details. There were people involved in faith based organizations and their actions werent pabased o faith. The church was important as a shelter and managed to be more valuable than the stazi surveillance that accompanied them. I want to talk about the different nature of national prp perfections and traditional perfections of exceptionalism. Here we have the prototypical american who has a different view in what it means the church had a influential role in events than people in western europe at the time. The church is a social position and the evangelicals who are supporting Church Movements are driven by a sense of faith of the the people who they are interagenti interacting with are using the church most often as a vehicle for organizing in social dissent though not being animated by a desire for freedom themselves. Its an important lesson that with the exception of vatican city it is just about the most religion city in the world so it makes us more prone that more people around the world who are organized by religion are acting on the same level of that so Many Americans are. The strongest visual i got from that night was there was an usual amount of drinking that went on that night. Passing around champagne and snaps and beer. Whatever was available. Some of that occurred in the United States where people went out on their lawns in my neighborhood. I lived in a liarish catholic neighborhood, a lot of people did go out. That was kind of a celeb toor night. The doctor told me that the range over that occurred 14 hours after you stop drinking. There was a lot of commentary and oped pieces that this was the end of the short century after that event. It started in 1914 and ended in 1989. That quickly was eclipsed 11 years later with the idea of 9 11 is the start of the 21st century. I was wondering if there is any commentary of is this the end of the 20th century. Is it a formidable and important event that supersedes what naps later. Thanks. Im sure my colleagues her have a lot to say on this issue. I mean simply stated, yes, i think it is the end to the short century. I think its a good framework to see the events of 1989 symbolizing the end to many things. I would say the next decade is a decade of transition and youre right that after 9 11 we Start Talking about a new century and a new war on terrorism whatever that might mean. So yes, in many important ways, i think its the end of the century. But as so many of us have been writing during the last 10, 15, 20 years, there are other important developments that transcend the world war that are happening parallel to the world war that intersected times with the world war that affect the cold war and are very important. Issues of democracy and globalizition and so forth. Part of the answer to your question revolves around what do you think in terms of the International History they are the most essentially issues of the 20th century. If you think it is demographic growth or disease or globalization then youre going tf a different view. If you think it is the end of the world war or tote tal tal i annism in 1991 as an appropriate book end. Let me put a different spin on that but it put it in different contest. Its very easy to look at 1989 as the end of the 20th sent youry. Trends t trends that are crucial for the United States and allies to be able to see a future beyond the cold war in many ways that the soviets are not. This is important to look back and see what 1989 meant as an ending point and 9 11 was not that important because the trends that spawned 911 still continue and proliferate of globalization and integration of ideas trends of media flowing which in 1989 allows it to flow in a larger part of the world. In 18 nae i was surprised in researching my previous book in 1889 about a disconnect that saw. There were all of these econvenient from interethe live east berlin. When i lacked frooked from the , i didnt. The predominate cold war Security Organization in the old war was nato. Today it is still euro. But what spraysed me was the miss match between the dramatic and perhaps the Biggest Surprise for me, we saw in cold war europe this dividing line between eastern and western europe. The fact that russia esent stsey got left on the periphery with nato expanding into Eastern Europe which means theres a dividing line that got moved eastward. I came to see 1989 not to see it was an end because this thing creates all kind of issues because when you get to 9 11 youre trying to respond 9 11 with cold war institutions. If you look at the 9 11 report one of the reasons the ut wnite states was prepared to deal with 9 11 was because the institutions were perpetuated by the institutions of the cold war. I actually came to see 1989 not so much as an ending because there is so much perpetuation into the 21st century. We are living today with challenges of the 21th century and looking and the institutions that are newly relevant. I dont actually see the war as a end of the 20th century as we get in a brave new world. Let me say one more thing. In 1989 the essence is 1946 in his way. His vision is that were finally going to war off of our neck. Consequently i think for him there was a sense in which 1989 is a chance to final dlo what w were trying to do and do it right. Nowhere in bushs vision, know where in there is a state of nonstate actors and that he can only conceive in the United States because when one can conside considers how to defend themselves. They are simply more powerful than other nonstate actors which bush was not ready to integrate into his global view because that was not the view of 1945. Just one thing in terms of mcof it if i can comment. I taught at the Army War College this last spring. In the course of the conversation we were talking about 1989 and talking about 2011, talked about the trends of the 20th century. Were not going to be talking about 1989 so much. Were going to be talking about 1979 much more than 1989. I was actually interested in the conversation. Jeff, you mentioned that 1989 was when the world changed. It was a global affair. There was a big chunk of the globe that has not been discussed at all tonight. I mean we basically went from europe to china. From europe to china so as i said, im just sort of raising this. Its made me think about this periodization a lot, particularly in terms of what began and what ended at different times. I dont in any way challenge the views that 1889 constitutes an end to the era of the 20th century but it seems to me something began before theend that trigger events trirgs Something Different and nab quarter sent youry from now if im not intelligence committee, i may be thinking about 1989 very differently. When i think of 1979 i presume youre referring to events in the middle east. Afghanistan is pretty close. Theres a common denominator there which i think is most likely prevalent in the Career Trajectories of most of your students at the Army War College that they had spent time learning about radical islam. So my suggestion, i guess is that we should make sure that the next ten years are a conflict against some place really innocuous like ice land then well be able to see ice land as a really important place 60 years from now which it may be. Does anybody here from iceland . It was very popular. Im very frsometimes when i these complex historical events like the end of the cold war it reminds me of a quote between the danish and forgot everything i ever knew. I would like to thank your three panelists for their points to the three figures that has been identified. And the question is very simple. Its about the historiography. Professor emerman just maybe touched upon it, but if there is one thing about the historiography of this important event, which you have thought very long and hard about that you could change, what would it be . So if there is one thing about the historiography surrounding this it event and the end of the cold war, 1989, that you could change, what would it be . Thanks. Well, im still trying to figure out which one of us is mad, which one of us is dead and which one of us is forgotten. So ill let you go first. Im not sure i can address that. But i think when we try to periodize things, jeff, richard, youre quite right. There are always continuities and discontinuities. So things that started in the 1970s and 80s are going to be important after 1989. It seems to me if you think about some of the basic issues such as the nature of the configuration of power in the International System. The configuration of power in the International System was absolutely transformed in between 1989 and 1992. I would say that that change is far more significant than the fact that nato continued in a new form. The fact that the soviet union and the warsaw pact disappeared and american strength was predominant was extraordinarily important. The other thing is that for, you know depending on how you want to define it, 50 years or 70 years, there were competing ways. Competing models of political economy. Whats really important about 1989, 1990, 91, as symbolic years was that that those years demonstrated to all human kind that the communist model was no longer a viable alternative way of life. Yes so thats related to then the rise of islamism as a possible alternative framework. But the destruction of communism as a framework for ordering the political economies of societies is really important everywhere. Now its not just the events in berlin, but its also obviously the trajectory and the reconfiguration of the political economy of china during these years. These things intersect. But on the whole, you have two huge transformations. The transformation in the structure of power in the International System, transformation in the perception of the viability of certain political economies. Those are huge, huge changes that i think help to define the 20th century. Can i just say one thing real quick . Sure. So just briefly, i think you asked if i understood your question, you asked what about the historiography would i like to change . What i would like to change is there is a lot of writing about the cold war and end of the cold war that talks about europe without talking about the europeans. The berlin wall coming down that doesnt involve berliners, the end of the German Division that doesnt involve germans. Im trying to show the significance of their agency. Our Foreign Policy does go badly awry when we forget the agency and local actors. Ill give a quotation from a former activist i interviewed. This is a woman who was a very active protester in east germany for years, before the wall came down. And she said, it still amazes me when i read history books about the history that i live, the history i made. I read these history books, and they say the wall fell and it gave us our freedom. She said, we fought for our freedom, and then the wall fell. And shes right. And so i would like to bring that understanding, that there was this peaceful revolution and that it mattered and that it was causal into the historiography, that the people on the Ground Fighting for their freedom and then the wall fell. So before i bring this session to a close, which im sure that well all continue the discussion, i should mention that i was negligent at the beginning. I meant to mention that many of you noticed that james wilson was supposed to be on this session