Transcripts For CSPAN3 Discussion On World War II In The Central Pacific 20240622

Announcer coming up next, author Sharon Tosi Lacey talks about american strategy in the pacific. Highlighting the battle of saipan. She explains how u. S. Army soldiers and marines worked together during the campaign. She described their successes and failures. The event ran an hour and a half. It was hosted by the new York Military affairs symposium. Sharon tosi lacey thank you very much for having me. I want to thank my mom, daughter and husband for being here to support me. One of the earlier mend mentioned that there were four general smiths in the pacific. 3 were involved in the operations. I titled that chapter a tale of three smiths. I will talk to you about the battle of saipan. I look at the Lessons Learned as the military drove through the Central Pacific in world war ii. We traced their development and amphibious warfare as they go from the canal to the gilberts and ultimately a chronology. Trying to build on the mistakes they continued to make. Saipan is the most interesting of the bowels. Until that point, aquatic canal guadalcanal, nobody really knew what they were doing. The army and the marines conducted separate operations. People often refer to the campaign and the marshals as the perfect campaign. And perfected Amphibious Landing operations here there were a minimal number of problems. They patted themselves on the back. Then we come to saipan. For the first time you have army and Marine Forces operating not only together on the same ground but for longer than three or four days. Except for guadalcanal, the operations had been two or three days. This suited marine tactics. Getting quick, take a lot of casualties upfront and get off the island quickly. Save the casualties later on. For the army, they were more slow and methodical. One of the things i look at is to see if theres a difference between the two methods. Truthfully you take the same number of castle days. About 21 casualties and every one of the battles. There was a virtual no difference. Saipan was perfectly suited for army tactics. A long, slow slog for almost a month. The thing that was different was that the fifth Corps Commander was a marine and convinced you could take any army in the pacific and three days. Because we have perfected the mechanics, saipan is where the culture of the armies and marines began clashing. Personalities took a bigger role in how the forces got along. The far everyone was trying to figure it out. In saipan things came to a head and had repercussions that went on, i would argue it would not be until iraq that we would settle these joint differences and they would put army forces under marines again. Why saipan . Why the marianas islands . They had been talking about the marianas islands since 1943. Admiral king was pretty confident that a marianas were they came to defeating japan were the key to defeating japan because of lines of communication. For the first time at saipan which did not have great anchorages for the navy, they started focusing on airbases. The marianas were in the range of the b29 bombers. Taking the airbases meant we could hit tokyo at will. The general agreed, he wanted to get his bombers over tokyo. You had both generals on the same side of an argument. This was backed up by the joint Strategic Survey committee. That advocated for the Central Pacific as being the main effort with the southwest pacific supporting. Imagine how this went over with macarthur. He was sure that whatever he was was the center of gravity. They argued because abundant conference and came to a tentative agreement. You would think things would be settled. We go to the cairo conference in december 1943. Roosevelt and churchill were in agreement, the marianas were to be the next big battle. The recent successes in the gilberts and the marshals had another admiral advocating lets move this up. They are expecting us in december. If we can hit them earlier, we can catch them by surprise. We know they are doing a lot of building. Lets get them before they build defenses. Content was not having any of that. He and another general almost came to blows over this. The other general wrote later after macarthur exploded at him i could see macarthur for what he was. A magnetic personality with an and tendons a tendency to pontificate. General George Marshall was advocating for the marianas, which surprised macarthur. The one thing he did not direct was how to divide the resources. He told nimitz and mccarthy to divide the resources. That went as well as could be expected. Here is the philippines. Macarthur wanted to march across here because he felt he had a moral obligation to the philippine people. He said they are paying in blood for our blunder. The marianas islands are right here. You can see what type of access you have to japan, everything. Finally, the joint chiefs told them you both present your proposals, you advocate your position and we will make our decision on how well you advocated. The joint chiefs decided they would go to the marianas, the carolines, palau, with the Central Pacific receiving most resources. They were supporting the Central Pacific but it would get quick victories. They decided that an operation would commence on the 15th of june. The largest amphibious operation until that point. It would be dwarfed by the operation in okinawa the next year. There would be three landings. Guam had a special place in the army and navys heart. It had belonged to the United States. It fell to the japanese on the 10th of december. As macarthur felt about the philippines, the navy felt about guam. Their guys were taken down without firing many shots. Most of their rifles were marked for training purposes only. That is how poorly guarded it was. I had the privilege of meeting a pow from guam he celebrated his 100th birthday a few weeks ago. He was taken prisoner and spent the war in a japanese prisoner of war camp in japan. His entire feeling was that someone had to be the pow. If not me, someone else. I have never met anyone with a zen attitude, losing over five years of his life. I he went back for his 99th birthday. Most pows i met very zen. The navy felt a moral obligation. To do these three landings they would have three divisions and an army brigade. On the 22nd of february, the fast Carrier Force 58 did some strikes on saipan to soften up the target. Also to fly reconnaissance. The day they were flying reconnaissance was cloudy so they did not get great pictures. Anyone who has dealt with intelligence knows that black and white pictures are difficult to discern what is what on the ground. They could see fortifications going up for what they were not sure what extent. They did destroy between 135 and 168 japanese planes and ships. The destruction of the airplanes was important because if we could have air superiority and superiority of the sea lanes, that would give us a nn extra edge over the japanese because we knew that the japanese production could not replace their planes. The americans were pumping out one plane per hour. The americans were very smart. They would cycle there experienced pilots back to be instructors. The japanese used their pilots until they died. They knew that the more planes and airmen they could shoot down, the less effective the air force would be. They could not replace the men or the planes. That would feed into the kamikaze strategy they utilized in okinawa. They did not have any other way to use the men. The intelligence was mediocre but they could not risk of doing more. In march, macarthur led an attack in palau 150 japanese planes and they sank 150,000 tons of shipping. Everything the japanese used to reinforce these islands had to come in from elsewhere. Whenever we sank their shipping, there was nothing to replace it with. They did not have Natural Resources and were relying on resources from territories they captured. In april, they destroyed another 93 planes on truck. The other thing they decided on in going through the philippines and through the marianas, it stretch the japanese offenses and force them to divide the resources and divide their attention. Our army and navy just overwhelmed them. Lets talk about the marianas. They are the northernmost islands in micronesia. 15 volcanic islands. Only the three southernmost islands saipan, tinian, and guam, had military value. They were essentially located in range for american bombers. The small garrison had about 400 navy and marines and civilians on it and they were taken on december 10. The marianas were the first tier of the defense of the islands. That is where the japanese expected to hold the americans and not let them break through. The marianas, philippines and then okinawa was the next tier of defense. If the americans could take the marianas, they only admitted it to each other the japanese high command knew that they were doomed if the americans took it. What do the marianas look like . Unlike some the islands in the past, the flat coral islands and the gilberts and marshals, the marianas were covered with vegetation and caves and had limestone cliffs which were lush. 70 of the island was under sugar cultivation. Those sugar canes range about seven feet high so you can imagine being a combat loaded marine. Trying to navigate through that. If you are a defender, that gives you good cover. It provided concealment for the defenders. Lots of biting creatures and critters and things carrying diseases lived in there as well. It is not like you went through and you only had to worry about the enemy. You had to worry about everything else. In the pacific diseases caused , as many casualties as bullets did. There were lots of diseases the doctors had not seen before. Trying to defend against those things was not easy. The other thing, there were 30,000 civilians living on saipan. We had not had to invade an island with that large a civilian population. That changes the calculation of what you can do. You cannot blanket bomb it. When you that most of the civilians did not necessarily sympathize with the japanese. They were not going to help us, they were just trying to keep their heads down and survive. Most of them lived on the western coastal plain. That was where our preinvasion bombing and we knew the landings would come. There were the three largest towns they are. The narrow beaches that we could use for landing ended on cliffs. Not exactly ideal if you are trying to storm from the sea. The only beaches they could come at were, there was a few here. Wherever there is green. All the beaches ended either in cliffs, marshes or cane fields. The seventh mile ridgeline down the island here. One mountain in the south and one mountain in the north. Does give defenders clear views and fields of fire. Date called the area between death valley for obvious reasons. Its amazing to think about guys voluntarily walking through that. The best landing beaches were over here. The japanese knew it and we knew it. There were three airfields. One airfield in the south. One airfield in the west. And a small incomplete airfield , in the north. We did not want to give them any airfields. There was a robust red system in south. When you start moving up the ridgeline, there was practically no roads. The intelligence photos they had taken in march showed lots of movement and feverish preparations by the japanese. Until that point they had paid less than scrupulous attention to what was going on in saipan. After the gilberts and marshalls fell, the marianas became more important. They started sending material and men to build up the defenses. What did the japanese look like there . The highest ranking man was off the tylan off the island at the top of off the island at the time, on guam. He left the Division Commanders in charge. In the japanese military, if we thought that the rivalry was bad between marines and army in the u. S. , it was nothing compared to the japanese army. They were so mistrustful and they barely spoke to each other. They could have been fighting two different wars. The Lieutenant General saito was a 43rd division commander. He was in charge pretty much of the island and was the cavalry officer and was assigned to the army in china. He had not seen any combat during world war ii to this point. Because of where he had been in china. In april 1944 he took command of the division in saipan. Also there was the vice admiral nagumo. This is an interesting guy. I have heard him called the most experienced and worst naval officer in the Japanese Navy. He had been the commandant of the Naval War College and was considered an expert and can conducted the air attack in pearl harbor. He failed to follow through and destroy the american fleet. He lost for carriers at midway. He commanded the third fleet of guadalcanal. After that, they said maybe we should gave him shore duty and taken off the ship. He was given a training suite they gave him the 14th air fleet in saipan which is a nice way to say you can do the least damage here. His command was administrative. Not a Tactical Command. Similarly in the army, we had general robert richardson. Until saipan, that was Holland Smiths status. More of administrative. The 43rd division arrived in late may 1944. Along the way they last 1400 men. They came without organic artillery. The American Navy was getting good at sinking the ships filled with reinforcements. Some of the men arrived with no weapons. Their ships had been sunk and they managed to get on another one. One ship was filled with 4100 reinforcements. We hit it and only 1200 survived. That is the type of beating we were giving then. They called them the remnants and the survivors that accidentally ended up in saipan. When they got there in they did may 1944, not know they were coming in a few weeks. These guys did not have time to train or get organized. The was a total of about 30,000 and that included korean laborers and marine and navy and these stragglers. The u. S. Intelligence estimates put it at only 900011,000. We were not expecting what we found. They built the majority of their senses on the beaches. The idea to this point had been if we can stop the defenders at the beach, we dont have to worry. They planned to do a bunch of ring defenses but they ran out of time. That is a good thought because we know that the Landing Forces is most vulnerable when it is landing. But once they punched through, there was nothing to stop them from rolling you up. The terrain was the best defensive measure they had. That was better obstacles the manmade obstacles. There was no layered defense and they had lost all the construction material. We were sinking 100,000 times here and there. Oddly after looking at the , beaches, they did not focus their defenses here even though they knew this was the most probable landing site. It was the only logical landing site. Since none of the commanders survived, we dont know what goes into their thinking. The japanese did a version of the army green book, the Army Official history of the war. The marines did there red book well in the japanese did 72 , volumes. They are just starting to be translated slowly and its giving us a treasure trove. Its very slow and cumbersome. Money affects everything as well. Despite the february attack when the task force had hit them, they still believed that macarthur was where the main attacks were going to come. Everyone there feared macarthur. If they came to saipan, they thought the earliest would be july or august and they would more than likely not come until november. They were thinking we have got plenty of time until these guys come. They could not have been more wrong. Lets talk about the americans. You had admiral spruance. That is a picture of him smiling. As the most cheerful he ever looked. He replaced halsey at midway and they used to switch up commands. It was the third fleet under halsey and the fifth fleet under spruance that way the japanese thought we had an extra fleet we didnt have. Personality wise, could not be more different. Admiral halsey was flamboyant and well met. And spruance was more spartan. He led the fleet at gilberts and marshalls. His sailors referred to him as old frozen face. His one indulgence was long walks every day. He worked at a standup desk in his office and had no chairs because he reasoned people would not stay there more than 10 minutes of people could not sit down. The man was brilliant. Strategic and tactical and he had the ability to get along with the most difficult people. During this operation, he had the most difficult of people to get along with. I would take old frozen face with his ability. Underneath him was admiral Richmond Kelly turner. He was the chief of naval war plans at pearl harbor and was accused of withholding intel which is an ongoing debate of who knew what. I dont think we will ever settle the pearl harbor debate. He commanded the amphibious forces in the gilberts and marshalls. And his nickname was terrible turner. He had an explosive temper and he wanted to be a marine. He would suit up and want to go land with the marines. Gillian smith on tarawa told him, i do not think so. Although he and Holland Smith got along, that was one of the burrs under his saddle is that Holland Smith commanded until the battle started. He did training and administrative staff. Until the Landing Force landed turner got the Tactical Command while the forces were landing. And then it was turned over to whoever the commander was on the ground. Holland smith was cut out completely. Interestingly he was very close , with spruance and nimitz. They were such Close Friends that they are all buried together in Golden Gate National cemetery. And their wives are at their feet. He met his match in Holland Smith. One of the people turner worked for called him the meanest man but the most competent naval officer. Unlike spruance, turner was a heavy drinker. But it never seems to affect his performance. He was throwing back every night. Nimitz decided and spruance decided as long as he kept performing as he did, they would not make a big deal about it. General Holland Smith claimed he had no idea how he couldve gotten a nickname because he thought he was the gentlest man and loved everyone as long as you were a marine. He was the father of amphibious warfare. Had a monumental ego and hated everyone who was not a marine. He was the personification of paranoid does not mean you dont have any enemies. He was convinced the army and navy were constantly plotting to do away with his marines. He saw behind every rock, he saw some kind of conspiracy against his marines. He was on staff during world war i, he was not in combat. This wrinkled with him. He saw himself as the marine equivalent of patton. The man who was going to lead them in battle. Marshall was the Army Historian and met him. He had observed Holland Smith. He was forbidden from landing on tarawa. His marines were getting slaughtered and he was stuck on a ship offshore watching the army moving way too slowly at macon where there was no enemy. There were some Army Soldiers trying to take down a sniper. He grabs a rifle and threw it down and said i got him. Marshall said it was as obnoxious and grandstanding at plant i had ever seen by any officer. Marshall called in a bully and something of a sadist and a child her head. The only army officer he had anything nice to say about was pistol pete charles corlette who commanded before he went to the european theater. This is an apocryphal story. I do not want to find out it isnt true. It is too good a story. Holland smith wanted to land on kwajalein and corlette said if you set foot of my island, i will have you arrested. After the battle, Holland Smith was giving a press conference and talking about how the marines had done wonderfully. They swept across the island and the army as usual was too slow even though they had taken the island in two or three days. Corlett overheard and broke in to the press conference. He said i dont know how you knew what we were doing because you never left your ship. He was the father of amphibious warfare. He was a brilliant trainer. He had never been in charge of combat troops. He had one tactic up the middle. During the landings on tarawa general Gillian Smith wanted to land artillery on a nearby island. On tarawa there were all the tiny coral islands. So the artillery could cover the landing. He threw that out. There was an interview done with julian smith years later and he was saying how it could have saved many of his man because it would lay down a sheet of fire as they were coming in. The interviewer asked why Holland Smith said no. I have never heard such sadness in a mans voice. He said i dont know, i will never know. This is a man who watched his men being torn to pieces knowing there is something he couldve done. He also did not like macon when ralph smith planned. The defenses were in the center so he wanted to land his defenses abreast and rollup the japanese from the flank. He threw up his hands and said that is ridiculous. He said thats way too complicated. His idea was you go up the middle and you go fast. Any island can be taken in three days or you are an idiot. The Second Marine Division commander was Thomas Watson who commanded the third brigade in the marshalls. His nickname was terrible tommy. Are you seeing a pattern . He was impatient and did not tolerate laziness, incompetence or failure in leadership. Major general Harry Schmidt had been the assistant commandant of the marine corps. He served as first tour in the marianas. He was familiar with saipan and he was one of five marine corps generals who had sons serving in the marines at that time. Including the then commandant. Now we get to Holland Smiths nemesis. I do not think he knew he was his nemesis. Its not as fun to have an enemy of the enemy doesnt know he is the enemy. This is Major General ralph smith. This is a man who was quiet and bookish. After the war, he went to the hoover center. He spoke french which meant the , army sent him to the pacific. He was taught to fly by Orville Wright himself and he held the 13th pilot license issued in the United States. He won two silver stars in world war i. He was everything Holland Smith thought he was except without the temper. He was a very eventempered, quiet man. I think that was one of the things that set Holland Smith off. People who are bullies they like , people who argue back. That is why smith did not slam corlett, corlett got right back in his face. If ralph smith had gotten in his face, he would have backed off. His fatal flaw was he wanted to gives commanders a chance. This was a National Guard division. We will talk about them in more detail about the problems the 27th had. He was methodical and was not given to outbursts. Sla marshall said his extreme consideration for all other mortals would keep him from being rated the great captain. He died in 1998. The age of 104, the largest surviving general from world war ii. There was also the 77th division, which would remain in hawaii. The Third Division would eventually attack guam. There were not part of saipan. These units were all in hawaii training but they did not train together. Which seems ludicrous now having grown up with joint forces. During the Second Marine Division, they had come up with the idea of mounting mortars on the back of their Landing Craft tanks. They thought they can have these mortars going back and forth across the beach giving another level of fire for the men. The idea was admiral harry hills and it would protect the flanks and give them more fire power when they are landing. There was an accident during training and two of them sank. Three of them fell off the cable sweeping 25 marines off the deck. The marines would sit under it playing cards and so forth. The Second Marine Division seems to be cursed during their training. In another incident, a spark caused a round to explode and six fully loaded lsts exploded. 500 marines were killed or wounded. They were able to replace the lsts which is a miracle. During tarawa, they only had three in total. Now they could replace six on short notice. They could not replace 500 trained marines. They could replace the bodies but there is no time to get these guys trained. The Second Marine Division was going in a little bit behind the eight ball. The 27th division, i will focus briefly on them. They are central to the main story of saipan. Most of the soldiers were a mixture of regular army, National Guard, and draftees. The National Guard divisions were special cases. They had strengths and weaknesses. One of their strengths was that they would Stay Together forever they trained together, lived together and tended to be , closely bonded. They tended to protect each other. The negative of that was they lived together, trained together and so forth. And you could have someone who is a private the National Guard and he was the boss of the captain in the same unit. The officers were sometimes reluctant to do the things officers need to do to keep discipline and good order. One of the big failings of ralph smith is he did not replace the leadership. All nine of the battalion commanders at this point were still National Guard commanders. Two of the three regimental commanders were National Guard. One had been killed in macon. Holland smith accused the unit of leaving their commanders body out there lying in the field, that was a lie. The staff log shows they recovered and buried his body the same day. That was one of the things Holland Smith spewed out a doubt 27th to show their feelings. Not only do you have the battalion commanders, which meant they did not have the same level of schooling as activeduty officers. The g2, g3 and g4, none of them had been to the required schools. Anyone in the military knows that my personal officer has been to the schools but my Operations Officer has not. If i can fault ralph smith for anything, it was giving these guys, these leaders a Second Chance and not replacing them as soon as he could. They did do advanced amphibious training. But they never embarked on the amphibious track vehicles because everyone was worried about breaking them. They were doing training that would only go up until getting on the vehicle. If anyone knows about landing, the vehicles are hard to get on and off. That is the riskiest part and the part they could not rehearse. As the operation was reserved, the 27th had 21 separate plans of what they might do and how they might he employed. They could go anywhere. Two saipan, guam tinian. The three most likely were supporting saipan or guam. They trained to those but they had to keep in mind 21 separate plans they might be called on to do. It made their combat loading difficult. You did not know how to configure it. You will configure it differently if you are a supporting unit or invading unit leading the attack. Holland smith said he claimed he made them successful at lincoln. Macon. Despite his lack of confidence in them, he never visited their training in hawaii. He was so worried about how they would perform, he did not give them personal attention. He said they had inadequate staff. They had a staff that was not trained. They knew that Holland Smith hated them and hated their unit. Lets look at the plan of attack. There was going to be three separate landings. A Northern Attack force on saipan, followed by tinian, and then guam. Turner was going to be the Expeditionary Task force commander in the north. Unlike in the past Holland Smith , would take command after landing which he had been waiting for. This was his moment. Many doubted his ability because he had never done this before. Having dealt with him, they knew he was not a very creative thinker when it came to attacks. And he was convinced it would only take three days to take the entire island and he did not plan, what if the japanese do not fold up . If we have to fight for more than three days. He had never thought that longterm. They only had two months to plan and train. They split the staff. The red staff took care of the operation on saipan while the blue staff worked with the expeditionary force. Theoretically, it was a joint staff and there was Army Officers in the g1 and g4 but not a single one in the g3 which meant that the fifth corps plan did not take into account army culture. It was completely a marine mindset. Holland smith, he thought he could take any island in three days. The plan would be for the second and fourth Marine Division to land adjacent and they always did two regiments forward and one reserve and two divisions forward and one in reserve and so forth. You can see that right here. The sixth, eighth, and the 23rd and 25th year. The 27th would remain offshore as a floating reserve. If he didnt want to use the army, Holland Smith saw this as a chance to prove the marines did not need army troops on the ground with them. It was a Marine Operation and he did not need the army. I will leave them there as a reserve. There were a few beach options. The second in the north and the fourth in the south. The dividing line was right here. This was a huge town by saipan standards. The second would move north and they would secure mount tapotch au. They would take the airfield and this part down here. They would come across here and everyone would move north. Up here, we went have a demonstration force. A fake landing to try to draw out japanese defenders and make them think the main Landing Forces are coming in there. That was the 24th and 29th marine regiments. All three divisions planned and trained separately. All the divisions were Battle Tested and their recruits were trained by veterans. The least Battle Tested entity was the fifth corps staff. None of them had actually been in battle. The Marine Division had 22,000 men. The Army Division only had 16,400. That will be important later when you realize the disparity is pretty enormous. No training instructions and no inspections from smith, as i said. The most formidable defense would be the terrain. The mountainous terrain they would have to move across. The cane fields, marshes and so forth. For the 27th, this would be the first time the entire division fought together. Their other two divisions had been one of regiment fighting. They did have one regiment that was not at all tested not Battle Tested. One month before the operation they did not have hydrographic information or maps. If you remember from tarawa, it was hydrographic information that turned out to be one of the biggest flaws of that operation. By may 12, they still did not have maps. Like in guadalcanal, they had no maps, either. Some handdrawn ones. They had no photos of the landing beaches until the 26th of may. They were not telling him blind but they were not going in very well prepared. The Holland Smith plan only called for three days of battle. His stubbornness and lack of creative thinking would not let him even brook the idea that the marines would not be able to take this force in three days. What did the landing look like . It is pretty impressive when you see your ships covering the horizon. You can see this is a town, how small the beaches were before they hit the fields and so forth. They had accused the underwater demolition team, a fairly new entity, to verify there were no obstacles and verify typography. That is something that came out of tarawa. Making sure the boats would not hit coral underneath. They piloted the landing boats but the japanese saw these guys coming in and went on to the reef and put up flags to mark where they would fire. Four days of naval bombardment which was much shorter and really did nothing. The japanese defenses were dug in on the reverse slopes. The bombardment was more of a psychological effect. It did not take down any of the japanese defenses. It destroyed 200 aircraft on the three islands. It did give us air superiority which is always a nice thing when youre landing troops. In a japanese diary that was captured said for about two hours, the enemy planes ran amok and left leisurely. Amidst the inaccurate antiaircraft fire all we could , do was watch helplessly. This naval gunfire had a huge psychological toll in the japanese defenders. The artillery pieces they had guarding the beach were on wheels. They were able to pull them back during the bombardment and move them back. One of the artillery men wrote in his diary after watching this, i have come to the place where i will die. Naval gunfire supporting the attack is too terrible forward. Here you can see the landing beaches. There is the town of charah kanoa. There is the town and that was supposed to be the dividing line between the two divisions. June 15, the brigades embarked and circled. It turns out there was a japanese regiment there but they never fired. The japanese thought there was a chance the americans would land on the east coast in the bay. They split their forces to hedge their bet. That was good for the american forces. There were still heavy casualties and a Second Marine Division drifted off course. Everybody drifted north, which meant there was a huge gap that opened up between the two divisions which you dont want. It was right in this area. They had to close that night. 20,000 marines landed the first day and the beachhead was 10,000 yards long, 1000 yards deep and they took 2000 casualties and only 2 3 of their objective. Day one, Holland Smith was already behind on his timetable. That first night, you can see where the big gap at opened up and they were lucky. The fourth Marine Division each battalion was in a different war that night depending where they were. The fourth Marine Division was patrolling and ran into a lot of small japanese units. The Second Marine Division were under attack the entire night. It is fortuitous the japanese did not realize how big the gap was and attack them on the flanks. A fullscale attack happened against the second at 3 00 in the morning and they repelled and killed about 700 japanese that night. Spinning the beachhead. The first day, a realized we need to expand the beachhead. Holland smith had to bring the 27th on shore. Because they had not done all their objectives the first day they decided to postpone the landings on guam. There was more japanese ships in the area them the anticipated and wanted to take care of that first. Holland smith landed the 27th on the night of the 16th and small pieces. They literally landed scattered. A regimen here and a regiment there. The 165th and they were told to take aslito airfield by the next morning. Holland smith does not trust this unit. He thinks they are poorly trained. Hes giving them one of his foremost important targets in less than seven hours after they land. If that is not a recipe for success, i do not know what is. The fourth Marine Division was pretty tied up. They had repeated tank attacks and one thing that changed in the previous three operations as the army had landed a light tanks. For saipan, after observing the japanese using medium and heavy tanks, they decided to use medium tanks. And it was a good thing they did because the japanese had tank battles all day with them. The fourth Marine Division ended up killing over 25 enemy tanks. The 27th moved through the village and several cane fields and a ridge and they were within 200 yards of the airfield. That was the 165th division. The 105th them landed but they had no equipment until june 25 because of japanese air and ships that came in. The ships with their equipment took off to safer pastures and left them without unloading. They were pretty useless for little while there. The 165th took the airfield on the 15th. 18th. They rechristened it conroy field who was the commander who died. It took them in next to day. They did take the airfield. By the 18th, the americans have most of the southern part except for the ridge in the extreme southern part. The marines pivoted north to roll up the island while the army mops up in the south. Out in the ocean, a task force had met the japanese fleet. What ensued was officially called the battle of philippine sea. It was also referred to as the great Mariana Turkey shoot. For five hours, the americans grand roughshod over the japanese. They killed 425 japanese aircraft and they killed 65 of the remaining 100 japanese planes the neck today. This really broke the back of the Japanese Naval air power. They sank three carriers and damaged a fourth and sank two oil tankers. The japanese did not have the same logistic line we had our not able to replace any of that. For that reason, the navy and air was not a factor for the rest of the war. Other than the kamikazes, they really did not play a part. You see this pilot here, he became an ace in one day. Five planes shot down. He was not the only one. These are some pictures just , tearing up the Japanese Navy and air force. For the next several days, now that they did not have to worry about japanese air or naval bombardment, they could breathe easier. They began rolling up north. And now they were moving through what they call death valley. They wanted to force the japanese as far north as they could so they could consolidate them. They did not want to leave anything behind. They wanted to kill or capture. During the pivot north, 2 battalions each were going to stay behind down here and mop up nafutan point. Holland smith decided there is not many japanese down there. He said they only needed a battalion, not 2 or 4 battalions. He said one should be enough. He sent the rest north. This is the crux of one of the issues later at this point, the 105th was under corps control. Holland smith told ralph smith that one battalion would stay so we ordered the second to stay. Technically, the 105th was under core control so he didnt have authority. It did not matter that Holland Smith gave the same order an hour or so later. Ralph smith did not have the authority to give that order. More seeds sown in what would later blow up. It took that battalion until june 27. Clear that there was a couple of thousand japanese down there. They were really 30,000 japanese total on the island and they thought they were only 11,000. It made sense there would be more here than they thought for the march north, what was left of the 27th minus the one battalion was in the middle Army Divisions were smaller, over 4000 soldiers smaller than the Marine Division. You had the fourth Marine Division to the right and the Second Marine Division to the left. Whenever you are doing a forward movement, what is most important . The middle. So why on earth would Holland Smith put a smaller unit and a unit that he doesnt have any confidence in but he puts them in the strong point in the middle. To make matters worse, the 27th was a couple of hours late to the line of departure. It held up the actual attack. Again it did not endear them to , Holland Smith. This gives you an idea of where they are. This is death valley and this is looking up into the line departure. The 27th was stretched through death valley. This illustrates it the best. The division dividing lines were here and here. They were in a deep valley with part of their unit on each of the cliffs on either side. Nobody walked the terrain when they drew the division line. Instead of putting an entire division here and having a lie at the base of the cliff. The army which is a smaller force has their men divided into three with no way to tie in. They drew this with a map, not a photo. Anyone who has done map reading you can look at the elevation , but there is nothing like seeing the drop. It could be a slope or a steep cliff. Half of the 106th was at the bottom and the other half was at the top of the cliff. As a regimental commander, that is a nightmare. What kind of control can you have . As they were moving forward plus this is the worst terrain. This is where the japanese were dug in along the cliff side because thats the high ground. The army was much slower. Its easier to see in color. A u formed. The army troops lagged behind. By the night of the 23rd of june the 165th regiment was 700 yards behind the front line of the marines they had only moved 700 yards ahead and the 106th had only moved 100 yards ahead. The marines had advanced over a mile. This was a pretty huge gap that was forming. The 106 had advanced 100 yards but a shell hit one of the ammo dumps and forced them back. Holland smith never came up or visited the terrain. He decided the only possible reason for this to be the 27th did not want to fight because they were cowards and he had to relieve ralph smith. Now we come to the fun part. Smith versus smith. Holland smith had had deep disdain for ralph smith and for the 27th. He used to claim that they only took the island because of his personal leadership on the third day when 90 of the japanese were dead anyway. He claimed that the untested soldiers in their first battle just fired recklessly. Every soldier in his first tunnel fires recklessly. The marines were doing it the same. For the marines, he said they are little inexperienced but he says the army are cowards. They dont have any fire discipline. He visited the 27th on the airfield at the 18th and never came to see them again. Members of his staff came up twice but never reported back what they saw on the terrain. He sends a request that he wants to relieve ralph smith. These were his reasons, for ordering the battalion at na futan point to remain where they ,are under corps control. Turner and spruance approved because they only heard Holland Smith. As far as they knew it was accurate reports. He did not even give them a chance to say goodbye to the troops. He literally got the telegram relieving him and was given 30 minutes to pack up his stuff and leave. Could not say goodbye to his staff are truths staff or troops. This is smith and spruance. Spruance is happy there. Jardman was supposed to be the island commander. He was an interesting fellow. And everyone seemed to love him. He was not meant to be a combat commander. He was given the combat command until general George Greiner could arrive and take command. Back in hawaii, the army convened. You can imagine this caused great consternation. There had been reliefs before. There were Something Different in this mostly it was because of the have the authority to relieve the commander. Did he relieve him for reasons that were good enough for the army to never give ralph smith another command. Despite the fact that it only called Army Witnesses was held up as a model of restraint and evenhandedness. That was why general buckner was given command at okinawa. After that, army troops never served under a marine commander again until afghanistan. Many commanders wrote letters to general marshall saying army troops should never serve under Holland Smith again. They had to issue a deceased and sister order the ceaseanddesist order. He said it was the Army Training flu and after the battle and decided to give awards. It was a huge breach of protocol. He was humming his nose at Holland Smith. Filmingthumbing his nose at Holland Smith. They said they frozen their foxholes and so forth. All of this would have died down after the war. You had the reunification fights, cold war heating up. In 1947, Holland Smith published his biography. How many people have red that book . If you have read that book . The only thing that is true or the birthdates. The commandant at the time begged him not to publish this book. Lets keep our heads down on it and not antagonize the other services. When he asked sherrod to goes writer, he said he did not want to get into that. He took aim at everybody. According to Holland Smith, he was the only one with clear eyed vision. Nobody listen to him. He was underappreciated. I was able to reach some letters , and they were asking each other if Holland Smith had lost his mind. Of course, people questioned his stability. This is something that would have died down after the war. If poisoned armymarine relations. Joint training was the first time they glanced at each other without mumbling under their breath. The 27th did have some poor performers. They were all National Guard commanders. Their commander was a kernel who had wendy initial awards went in, he was left off the awards list. Holland smith ordered him to give him a navy cross. It tied ralph smiths hands. You cant relieve a commander who was given the second highest award for bravery. Holland smith never commanded men in battle after this. Ralph smith was given the 95th division. He did a lot with reconstruction after the war. They realized that they needed to get Holland Smith out of here. He was given a training command. He would get very vicious and personal. He wrote to van de graaff saying ralph smith would tear up when he was reprimanded. A man who won two silver stars in world war i learn to fly from all right, you think hes going to tear ou up when he is yelled at. Their last words were, take seven lives to repay your country. One life for 10 of theirs. That night, july 6 Early Morning july 7, 4000 japanese hit the 105th regiment. The regiment was fine artillery shells at 40 shells per minute. That is one show per second. It devolved into hand to hand combat. Later, Holland Smith and sherrod thats where they accuse the army of cowardice saying they frozen their foxholes. There were 4300 japanese kia. You dont kill that many when you are frozen in your foxholes. The tanks finally came in and turned the tide. 406 americans killed and 500 wounded. It would be the last hurrah of the japanese attacks. One final or awaited our men on this island. This is hard to talk about. It is terrific. The civilians had been commenced by the japanese that the americans were the most horrible thing ever if they surrendered they would be killed. The americans drop a lot of leaflets bagging them to surrender, telling them that they would be taking care of. The problem was the leaflets were written in japanese and korean, and the people on the island spoken red at dialect. They couldnt some of the caves had japanese soldiers in them. The japanese soldiers would gunned them down. Others took their families and leapt to their death, bashing their childrens brains out. The marines watched in horror. They could not stop the people. They could not communicate with them. It makes you wonder how good the japanese propaganda was. It makes you realize how isolated people on the island were. We take it for granted that you have all the information in the world at your fingertips. Back then, the only information they would have is what the japanese chose for them to have good. The island was finally secure a lot of marines said it wasnt the combat that haunted them, it was this. The island was secure. The marines and the 27th division locked up. Mopped up. What did the battle of saipan mean . If are going to fight together side by side maybe we should train and plan together. The shift in training focus and the escalating armygreen tension. This was a chance to test army tax tactics versus marine tactics. The initial numbers show the marines had 25 casualties versus 22 for the army. One army officer remarked that Holland Smith measures of success by casualties. Only the marines conducted the actual landing. When you do an Amphibious Landing, the major casualties will be during that landing peering. When you take that out, the marines had 21 casualties, a statistical tie. More than one third of the japanese were killed in the so if Holland Smith measures by casualties, they army did their share and kept up with the marines. Disease became a factor. It had been a huge factor canal. Now they were seeing they were able to use ddt to help combat that. They had to start taking their malaria pills again. Rumors about what happened to you when you took your malaria pills were so bad. A doctor i spoke to said he used to have to they would give them malaria pills at one end and nan a doctor would examine their malice to make sure they would swallow the pills. They would tuck it in their cheek. There were all kinds of rumors about what it would do to your male potency and so forth. He said that he could not convince these guys that malaria was a lot worse than anything these pills could do to you. The armymarine tensions commanders said the army shouldnt serve under the marines again. In the after action review, colin smith starts off by saying that all around corporation was splendid to. In the report, he takes a slam at the 27th in saying the 27th division lacked leadership training and failed to meet the standard. He couldnt leave it there. They also realized they needed a different training focus. He said we have to plan there were going to have to maneuver largescale forces. Japanese side, they lost their home island defenses they were vulnerable, and they had lost her naval air cover. The biggest of all was this one general tojo and his resigned. This is the point where most japanese if they were honest with themselves, knew that the war was lost but nobody was going to come out and say that. The naval advisor to the emperor said in the aftermath of saipan, hell is upon us. With that, i will take your questions. Hold on. Thank you for an enlightening presentation. I have one brief comment in question. You mention the accident for the second and fourth marines. It happened in 1943. Half a dozen lsts full of ammo and fuel blew up and killed sailors. They did not declassify it until 1960. There were 250 marines killed, and the navy had not reported that in the initial casualties because they were marines. Lt. Colonel lacey the marines took 500 casualties killed and wounded, you are absolutely right. Everyone says, what is there still to write about world war ii . We are still getting stuff declassified and finding interesting tidbits. Announcer it was only 10 years ago that we were translating the japanese green books. We found out why the japanese did not state a counterattack that first night when we held a 50 yard beachhead. Their entire command had been killed. They got caught changing from one shelter to another by an artillery shell. Unlike americans, you could not just replace command. That area, he did not seem to have the same tensions between the marines and army. Lt. Colonel lacey he only had a few marines under him. They were concentrated in the Central Pacific. There is a book that came out called macarthurs marines. Scheffler i said that personality comes it, also. For all of his faults, macarthur was good at getting people to do what he wanted. Get them to go along with what he wanted. You talked about the percentages being the same, 21 , 22 for the army versus marines based on the different strategies they use. Given hindsight, could the strategies have been implemented differently so the percentages of casualties would have been different . Also, what is the lesson to be learned tactically or strategically as far as which procedure of moving quickly, getting casualties upfront, or moving slowly and methodically getting casualties on the back end. When would a commander make the decision on which strategy to use . Lt. Colonel lacey that is a good question. It comes down to having Situational Awareness and that you have to adapt your strategy and tactics to match what you are facing at that time. A lot is predicated on good intelligence. If they had known that the japanese only had the small defenses, you would want to put as many forces on the island as quickly as you could to break through the defenses and then mop up. Looking at the sheer size of training, some of the islands they fought on were only a square mile. You can only fight on that for so long. There are only so many places they can hide. It is understanding the terrain you are facing, the enemy you are facing, and so forth. I dont want to say one is better than the other because you should be prepared to do both. As a commander, you have to be tactically adept. You have to be able to change her mind quickly based on what is on the ground. No plan survives First Contact with the enemy. You have to vary tactics. I will not say one is better than the other. For some place where you had no other way to do it except a huge push at the beginning. It was not going to be a long slog. What was the other part of your question . Is there anything that they could have done to reduce casualty . I think in death valley, someone going to look at the terrain and not splitting the division in the valley and up on the the cliff, that would match your firepower. I think not having your smallest force in the middle, at your strong point. In combat, having 40006000 fewer men is huge. They had another battalion there was detached from them. I think it all comes down to understanding what you were doing. You are going to take a certain level of casualties. In okinawa, there was criticism on buckner for being too slow. Saying that he cause more casualties. His casualty rate was about the same as saipan. He was adapting it to the terrain and the enemy they faced. The other thing you could do to reduce it is take out enemies and equipment of front. Have a naval and air bombardment. The best enemy to face is the enemy who is not there. Okinawa finally got it right with the naval bombardment about how to take out some of these emplacements. I think having sheets of fire in front of your men is the best way to keep them alive when they are landing. Another thing that was the result of the battle on saipan [inaudible] and the penetrating of actual outer defenses of the japanese empire was when tojo was relieved, there was a decision that they would never again waste japanese troops in honorable death bonsai charges and would simply fight a war of attrition. This took place a couple of months later on peleilu. Which once again, the marines thought was only about the size of iwo jima. A little more. They expected to take only three days. Announcer it took a month and destroyed the first Marine Division. [inaudible] lt. Colonel lacey its interesting. In okinawa, that was there entire defense was a battle of attrition. They let them land unmolested. They still staged two huge bonsai attacks. They just could not help them selves. The Operations Officer was advocating for the war of attrition. Let them come to us. Lets fight this war in defense. Then you had general cho, who was the executive officer and was whispering in the commanders year. Let me do one bonsai attack. They ended up wasting several battalions of men doing that. Also, i have read many accounts of the campaigns in the pacific. Many of them are definitely oriented, i guess you would say towards u. S. Marines viewpoints. I cant say that anything i have read about saipan, even if it is written from the marines viewpoint, has so completely accepted the fact that the army were total cowards and did not perform well. There was conflict and a lot of discussion about that. You seem to take the view of reforming the attitude toward this conflict with a vengeance towards the army against the marine view. I wonder if in some way you are doing what you felt Howland Smith was doing towards the army to redress this account. Couldnt you say that some of this conflict came simply from what we frequently we now call the fog of war. Bad intelligence going in, that bad analysis of the met map situation, where it is death valley and so forth. You said it yourself that it was difficult to decide from these blackandwhite photographs. Could these be more mistakes based on the socalled fog of war . Lt. Colonel lacey im not sure what you are asking because i am not indicting the marines in any way. It is smith that i have issue with mostly because of his , actions immediately after the war. I am not disparaging the marines and saying that the army were the only ones that one anything. The marines were bleeding and dying alongside them. In the book, the guy in the foxholes could care less what uniform was in the hole next to them as long as he was able to shoot straight. Im not sure what youre saying about rehabbing the army. I am looking at it from the point of view from the action of reports of the time and contrasting it to what Holland Smith and sherrod were writing afterwards, which have been shown in many ways to be total lies. I have not said that it is a leadership issue. I acknowledged they had problem. I have not been able to get harry daily. No one seems to know where his papers went. It kills me because he has interviews, the only interviews ralph gave. He shouldve been out there front and center defending his men. He was told by marshall to let it go, but he took that to an extreme of never talking about it. Not for his own sake, not to rehabilitate himself, but for the men under him. Of course situations will change. Of course you can only make decisions with what you have. I think thats what i tried to show they can only make certain , decisions on the ground. There are other think you can do. If you have poor intelligence, every commander knows that if you have a chance to a serve the to observe the terrain you want to do that because maps and pictures dont tell you everything. I chose my dissertation on this book because every account was from the marines point of view. The army point of view was the marines did this and the army was here. I was trying to look at, what did they do together, can we find the middle ground . One truth, the other truth, and the actual truth is somewhere in the middle. That is why i went back to the actual action report to build the narrative. So there was not emotion in it. Again, Holland Smith is not a pure villain. Brilliant trainer. Brilliant developer of amphibious warfare. Not brilliant at combat command. Similarly, ralph smith, not always an angel. A little bit too nice. A little bit too reticent. I fault him for not defending his men and their action on the ground that night. [inaudible] lt. Olonel lacey if you are reading a book on the Central Pacific and you look at the bibliography in the back, if it has courtland brass has one of the references but does not have howling mad versus the army, dont read that book because they only looked at one side of it. The experience of saito in china was typical of the commanders of the japanese army. What way would you say the experience in china hindered or helped them in island warfare . Lt. Olonel lacey it definitely hindered them. Island warfare is a very different kind of battle. In china, they were fighting a war that you would see in europe. They are fighting largescale battles, attacking cities, so forth. Your best chance of stopping defenders is at the waterline. Once they land, you are pretty much toast. Lets face it. Once they get past the initial defenses, especially if you are not able to get reinforcements in, it is just a matter of time. Whoever controls watsrer and air the water and the air controls the battle. Once they landed the beachhead they control the battle. In your research, was there something in his childhood or something in the fact that he did not serve in world war i . Lt. Olonel lacey he did not get into west point and joined the marines instead. [laughter] i think that is a little too simplistic. Right. In the beginning, after pearl harbor, the marshall and the army went to all the National Guard units and took a lot of deadwood out of it. Obviously they did not seem to get it all out. Lt. Olonel lacey the 27th with one of the first ones sent overseas. While they are clearing out in clearing out the deadwood they had packed up and gone. , at 65yearold privates hanging out because the National Guard was the center of their social life. The armory is where you hung out. When you die your son inherited , your spot. It was different than it is now. There was no money. A lot of times National Guard lieutenants were drilling with pieces of wood. They were the first men sent overseas after pearl harbor to help guard the hawaiian islands. They did not have the time to do the arrow weeding out that they should have done. They were able to replace at the soldier level. That is where i fault ralph smith for not clearing out or replacing at least half of the battalion commanders. His feeling was it is not right for me to really someone before they have a chance to prove themselves in battle. Because they are sending in a regiment here, a battalion there, he did not have a chance in his mind to it evaluate all of them. Then they went to quattro canal yeah. Professor, about 20 years ago i did a documentary on Women Veterans of world war ii. And of the comments made to me one by a woman who had been stationed in hollandia was that macarthur was known to be, by the community out there, a great lover of the photo op. Where there was a photo op to be had, he would opt for that over operation strategy. Do you agree with that or not . Im just interested in what you think of that. Lt. Olonel lacey there was a remark Holland Smith made about macarthur. He said that over in the southwest pacific area macarthur had full rein to pick his own targets and he picked the easiest ones he could. His famous landing, i have returned, wading through the waves, they took three opportunities to get that shot corncob pipe and all. He was not averse to photo ops. [inaudible] lt. Colonel lacey he felt an obligation to the philippines and the people he left behind. I do not want to speak for him but i think it was a source of shame for him. He left all of those soldiers behind and they trusted him when he said that he will keep you safe. When he said i will return, he was serious about that. I can fault macarthur for a lot of things, but his sincerity in wanting to free the philippines again and anybody who knows the philippines now they adore macarthur there. He was also very conscious of being the Senior Army Commander in the pacific, which witches was a naval operation, so he wanted to make sure that no one forgot about him and his forces. Yes . A lot of those men had been stationed in the area. The philippines are a known quantity, whereas most of these other islands are completely alien. I have two questions. What became of the 27th Infantry Division . The second question is more involved. You mentioned that some of your sources have been declassified. What is the process the state of world war ii Historical Resources . How long do we have to wait . Is there a magic number . Lt. Colonel lacey the biggest thing was when they declassified magic, the code breaking and all that stuff. Most of the stuff that is still classified is intelligence and nuclear. I dont think we will see the nuclear stuff declassified. It depends on the intel. If it reveals methodology and some of it has not been declassified because no one asked to open it. It is a case of we dont know we have because no one has looked at it. I opened up some things from guadalcanal that were unclassified, but i actually had to break the seal on it. It was deposited there after the invasion. No one had ever opened it. My dad was a marine. I have on my desk a photo of Chesty Puller on my desk that he had on his desk. In it was orders written by Chesty Puller. On it was a thumb print of guadalcanal mud. As a historian, it is one of those moments that you get a chill up your spine. Im Holding History right here. Some of it has not been declassified. Most of it is in the intel and nuclear range. Most of the operational stuff has been declassified. Most are on 25 or 50 year automatic declassification. It is a matter of teasing them out. Anyone familiar with the National Archives can no you can spend a few months there and only go through a few boxes. They went and fought in okinawa. They were in a reserve capacity. Okinawa is a different kettle of worms. Kettle of fish. Hi, professor. I enjoyed your presentation. Lt. Colonel lacey i cant see you. Where are you . Oh, hello. I would like your thoughts on the fact the japanese government has never apologized for their atrocities. Never apologized or tragedies. The rape of nanking, john wayne being killed in iwo jimqa. Lt. Lt. Colonel lacey it is an organization that brings veterans on flights to washington d. C. They have a luncheon and they take them on to her. Ur. I was a keynote speaker in california and i met a veteran of guam. I got very involved reading about the p. O. W. Community. I know the japanese government has been bringing american pows back and giving them feasts and banquets and apologizing in their way for what they did. One thing that was really great he was an officer. He was not allowed to do hard labor. He was a Civil Engineer and had no military training either. Used to do farming. He asked one interpreter to get him a calculus book. He was an engineer so he did calculus for fun. He worked every problem in the book. When he went back, the interpreter, who was 90 years old, and still alive, was able to say thank you, saying that you kept me focused on certain parts of my life. I think they have been doing some things. I dont think you are ever going to hear an apology. It is war. We have moved on. That type of thing. [inaudible] lt. Colonel lacey no. Nanking, i dont think you will ever see an acknowledgement of that. There is a good documentary that the husband of a friend of mine did. He found an entire trove of japanese footage and photos that had never been developed. I dont think we will see an apology. The japanese people are very and lightened now. The mindset now is different from the mindset then. I dont think we can get in the head it is hard for the modern eyes to understand the japanese peoples mindset then. They were fairly isolated. The only information they had was what they were given. It is very hard for the western mind to understand glorification of death, that there is no shame in death, there is no fear of death. So, in their minds, killing is not necessarily an atrocity. In fact, for the pows, being taken prisoner is a bigger shame and atrocity than killing the prisoners. [inaudible] lt. Colonel lacey right, but i cant answer for what they would do with that. I can only answer from what i know. Thank you. [applause] i want to point out that my book makes wonderful christmas gifts, wedding presents, anniversary presents. Thank you. [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] while congress is out for the holiday break, American History tv is in prime time on cspan three, featuring a different history topic every night. Monday, the Manhattan Project the First Nuclear weapon in world war ii. Tuesday, a symposium on the debate between James Baldwin and William F Buckley junior about the american dream. Wednesday, highlights of our 2015 cspan to her. Thursday, examine the text of the declaration of independence and the emphasis on preserving the document. Friday, we are to cover the welcoming seller celebration. Watch our special primetime edition of American History tv starting at monday 8 00 p. M. Eastern. Tune in every week and as we tell americas story on American History tv on cspan three. Like many of us, first families take vacation time. Like president s and first ladies, a good reading can be the perfect companion for your summer journeys to what better book than one that appears inside the personal life of every first lady in American History . First ladies, president ial historians on the lives of 45 iconic american women. Inspiring stories of fascinating women who survived the scrutiny of the white house, a great summertime available from Public Affairs as a hardcover or ebook to your favorite bookstore or online bookseller. In 1945, 70 years ago, allied forces liberated nazi concentration camps here on American History tv, we have been hearing holocaust stories from those who live them. These interviews are part of the oral History Collection of the United States Holocaust Memorial museum in washington dc up next, the tale of brief imprisonment at a nazi labor camp. His surprise release when he falsely claimed to have tuberculosis, and living in hiding with his parents. Only his mother is looted the nazis. And frank also in hiding just down the street were not as fortunate. This is about 90 minutes. The name was ger