>> we will have another event on moscow's war in ukraine. we have done over a half dozen of these, maybe a dozen of these, since moscow's invasion 10 months ago. we have a terrific panel with us today. we have deborah kagan energy fellow, at the transatlantic leadership network. we have dousman analyst. we have west clarks, the former supreme allied commander for europe. we have former minister of defense from ukraine at the risha center. we are going to start -- eurasia center. you will -- wrote a provocative article on the need to retake crimea. we will start with him. you wrote this article on not just in the importance but viability of ukraine taking back crimea. you know the west has been cautious in providing weapons out of concern for provoking the kremlin. please tell us why and how ukraine can take back the peninsula. >> thank you into laughter one. thank you for highlighting that article. i do not know people will read it. first of all i think the fear of provoking kremlin should be out of the agenda now. the kremlin is engaged in a war which is the largest war in europe since world war ii. constant concerns to not provoke. we heard this from your. we have been engaged in european security or politics or anything to do with ukraine, is honestly sorry for my language of sicken tired of remote -- provoke criminal. appeasement does not work. the fear does not work with kremlin. that argument should be off the table. i can tell you that ukrainians are not using that argument at all. for us it does not work. that is the first remark. indeed, we hear from many observers from journalists, print -- politicians, from analysts that crimea should be not part of this campaign. or, they are worried that being part of this campaign this world will take longer than needed. whatever they assume when they say that longer than needed. the arguments are military difficulty. the escalation risks and reintegration complications. some people say it is non-essential because ukraine can continue developing with crimea being so far a matter of dispute. which we do not believe it is a dispute. we believe it is outright occupation. there is nothing to dispute here. some suggest that we bargain crimea for peace. it does not include the understanding the essence of this work. we do believe that crimea is essential. we are certain that until crimea is liberated, ukraine will not be safe. world is not going to be safe in european community and eurasian community will not be safe. from crimea, russia, putin's regime projects power to many rations. russians have turned crimea into a massive military base. which they are going to use to attack ukraine. which they do right now, but they will use and tell the owner. the black sea factor. the black sea is a massive geopolitical topic. crimea is critical for russia to control the black sea. the assumed territorial waters of ukraine and exclude economic zone of ukraine. what was associated with crimea is now russian. when you look at controlling which country has which chunk of black see, russia has a small spot. with crimea they controlled the northern part of the black sea and the whole see of itself. many analysts do not comprehend the meaning on the seas in overall politician economic life and strategic meaning. one of the examples is the food crisis which we have now around the world. it is directly connected to the occupation of the black sea and crimea. many people need to completely reassess at the meaning of this region for global security. we believe liberation of crimea is possible. we are planning to continue to liberate ukraine, including crimea. we do not think they can be divided. if there are a number of arguments about this. one is the strategic precedent. the crimea occupation will set up a very important precedent. the help which ukraine receives from the global community in the fight against russian occupation is about setting up a proper strategic pressed -- president. the world order intact and not allow such things as we experienced not happen. without crimea and addressing it. the strategic presence will -- president will not be complete. it will set up a negative presidents. even though ukraine received massive support from the democratic community, we would still keep crimea intact and russia can keep it. which is the wrong message. that is one important part. the other important part is a strategy needs to be consistent. we are either fighting against imperial, totalitarian, russian regime, or we do not. since we do, that should be complete. we need to be can -- consistent. if russia needs to be responsible for its actions, and needs to be responsible completely. not part way. we liberate most of it, but not all of it. that is the wrong strategy and we should not follow it. there is a lot of discussion about lots of wrong narratives, which are persistent in the information space of the west. particularly, some were sent by russians and they rooted in the understanding of the crimean issues. one of the biggest ones is crimea has special meaning for russia. it has special historic connection. that is why there is an explanation of why crimea has to long to rush despite international law. while this is a fake argument and it is invalid and irrelevant. in the article i explained why. crimea is not closer to russia than any other former parts of the empire. we can discuss many. it has been part of russia, but it has not always been part of it. it became part of ukraine. there is a massive amount of people which would be happy to see it returned to the democratic world. just to conclude, that many details about how crimea is going to be liberated. whether there is a diplomatic solution. whether there is military solution. we can discuss this all. there are options, but i have to say that the most important thing is need to be very consistent with the strategy. we need to have a strategic determination. whatever the way crimea or has to be to liberated, it must be. there should not be any doubts about that. thank you. >> thank you. beside having been sacked in europe, you have been the most prominent commentators since moscow's february invasion. you believe ukraine can take back crimea or take steps back towards taking a back? if yes, how would this proceed? if not, what weapon systems what they need to do this? mr. clark: it is a pleasure to be with you to discuss this. i think this issue of crimea is central to the discussion and strategic objectives of the war. russia crossed the line in 2014 with the invasion of ukraine and its seizure of crimea. it has been under sanctions sense for the illegal occupation. the united states and most powers of the world and the aftermath of world war i tried to set up a legal structure. a collapsed in 1933, 34. the league of nations, the united states brought it back with the united nations. after world war ii it served us well, and putin has not only challenged it, but moved against it. as the administration, u.s. administration says this is about the instruction of the international community. we have to see it through to its conclusion. can you regain control of crimea ? the answer is yes. does it have what it needs to do that? not yet. i think the administration has crossed a major threshold with sending the bradley five -- fighting vehicles and discussion of m1 tanks. there's more to be done, but ukraine needs the ability, not only to defend itself, which we are providing with nasams and patriots and ukraine has artfully done with its own air defense. that needs to be strengthened, but ukraine needs offense of capabilities. this starts with winning the counter fire battle. more artillery, longer-range weapons and greater command-and-control and intelligence support. it also requires the longer-range drones like the switchblade 600. if you can win the counter fire battle, you can advance. to advance union not only strong, courageous infantrymen ukraine created, but we need armored vehicles, self-propelled artillery, attack helicopters, and aircraft. it is time for ukraine to get access to western aircraft. if the suites give a vague and, it's fine. we should be providing f-16s, a tems, switchblade 600 drones. it is time for them to get the m1 tank, the leo part, the challenger two. they need to be introduced with substantial maintenance behind them. the united states needs to mobilize its own industrial base so we are not having to draw out u.s. equipment. but, we are strengthening ourselves as a show of determinants and indication to russia that you cannot out matches. thank you. >> thank you very much. deborah. france, germany and u.s. are announcing they are sending more armored personnel carriers. or advanced apcs. germany is sending patriots following the u.s.. what impact would this have on ukraine's war effort? it looks like france, finland and others are strongly encouraging germany to send those tanks. the german foreign minister was in kyiv and went to kharkiv with that ukraine farm -- foreign minister. if they are talking about germany providing more aid to ukraine? what is going on and what impact will have? ms. cagan: i do not want to be accused of dissing allies, but let me say i will build on what the general said. this requires firmer u.s. leadership, and allies as a rule of thumb are not going to stick their neck out unless the u.s. does so first. that is what global leadership is about. germany finally did the right thing on a couple weapon systems, but it took in a -- an enormous amount of cajoling and other countries willing to face publicly. which is more embarrassing for germany. that is why is they finally turned the corner. i think before germany considers sending battle tanks, the u.s. will have to make it very clear they want them to do this. this is going back to what the general said about if the u.s. does not say we want to send in battle tanks, there will be around side next week -- a ramp side next week. it would be very useful and important and prudent for the secretary to say we need countries to send battle tanks ukraine. we need countries to start expecting they will need aircraft to fight this war. we need to stop playing games as the former minister said about using crimea as a negotiating chip. to which i would say it is the equivalent of saying let's let germany keep the land and call a day. no one was going to do that during world war ii. should not be willing to do it now. we should not be rewarding people for bad behavior. -- people for bad behavior. there is more the allies can do. there is a lot more allies are doing behind the scenes, that they are not taking credit for. finland has found 11 -- totaling 109 billion euros. at country of 5.5 million, that is substantial. part of the issue is finland are now putting pressure on germany so they can send their weapons to ukraine. i think what you have is to thing. i think the you need the united states to have a much heavier advance, gloved or on gloved. we walk the dime and go to the next stage. the second part of this is you want to see some separation and side of the alliance. not in a badly, but a good way. they're speaking up and telling germany you have this industrial base, you have the capability of saying yes and moving forward. they are not afraid to put it on germany publicly. the fundamental change where we were before. they're doing it to france, which i think resulted in france taking a new position. we will talk about community, but that community under the surface is a good thing. reporter: that is a -- >> andre is not the only one writing thought-provoking pieces. he wrote a piece saying russia needs to lose the war of aggression in ukraine. some western leaders nervous about this. they believe a successful ukrainian offensive would help put rally support for this work. why do you think putin offered the -- christmas cease fire? zagorodnyuk: to answer this, yes and no it the same time. no because putin has no problem with ordinary russians. ordinary russians they believe that nato, led by the united states, attacked us. you are going to destroy us. we are taking into account that your power and forces defend yourself successfully. in addition people do not trifle him. people in russia do not decide anything. we are not a democracy or dictatorship. there is a part of the people of russia he is liking very much. he indicated young residents. we do not have the capacity to organize a revolution. part of which could be dangerous. the more problematic thing that he really thinks about his actions territory. it is moot and top 10,000 is for him. they are disappointed in him. he was involved in a crime, because he is losing, so for maintaining loyalty seems safe. but this may change and putin understands. if he starts winning, the situation will become much safer for him. it is why he is so active and trying and take partial victors like in the don's creation. if putin wins, this will have the elite around him. he will become more dangerous the world and our own country. there is no space for people. people give him attention. he is more criminal, but no one respects him. but putin relies in the potential of the threat of himself from discontent of the elites. it evens the terminal, and builds a state. i do not know if you know this word [foreign language] it is a state of terror. the most famous are -- a lot -- [foreign language] another low in another state. this is putin's message. hello guys, i have other people besides you. be careful i have them. about christmas, this is just one of the manifestations of his ways. it was a message to the leaders of the west. look, i am peaceful. i do not want to the war. so the ukrainians just fear. they will show a sphere. -- fear. nobody trusts him. not in ukraine or russia. >> thank you. for our listening option, they were like a police/paramilitary organization which a presidential guard dominated russian politics and terrorized the other elites in moscow. >> there is much talk about a new mobilization to launch from -- you see a new offensive coming, and what would be the result? mr. clark: i see an offensive coming. i believe there on it defense of but they are attempting to bleed ukraine while putin has time to mobilize and work his next forces of action. i think his strategic offensive in the string or lease summer by russia is a distinct possibility. where it falls remains to be determined. probably not in the south because it would require re-crossing the river. it could happen belarus for again in the east. will it have the full strength and modernized equipment and russian first offensive? probably not. you can be sure behind the scenes russia is scrambling to rebuild those forces, begging around, north korea and china for assistance. those nations are looking at the west to see the response. i think the strength of this offensive is indeterminable at this time. i do foresee that russia is not going to remain on the strategic defensive. >> how might a major ukraine offensive begins ukraine impact defense against belarus or the donbass region? zagorodnyuk: we need to understand that the operation korea will happen when we liberate the rest of the country. which means russia will spend massive amount of its available forces in an attempt to occupy or defend the positions. we do believe that there would be trying, but we need to understand that russian capabilities as a whole, not just crimean capabilities and other capabilities. they have back and forth time, and until we address the issue of the bridge and their cooperation on the roads which connect crimea to the mainland. the troops will be blocked in crimea. the will be much more difficult to move them. we do believe that russian forces are exist -- exhausted. we see them not being able to achieve any operational goals. their achievements and some progress they made in the donbass is not convincing. they are struggling, and that is assuming they forgot about all other directions and focused on one. when we push them out of the rest of ukraine, we believe there will be none in the state to defend crimea. herbst: what you are suggesting is in the near term ukraine might take steps to make supplies to ukraine -- crimea difficult by cutting the land bridge and taking down the bridge over the straits. is that what -- zagorodnyuk: the planning crimea could be different. plan a crimea could be different. there are a number of options. the fact that crimea -- russia is using land bridge as a military court or for their equipment is impacting the state of capabilities in crimea. we need to address that issue. >> it is a great vulnerability for the kremlin. let me ask you on the current situation. ukraine continues to hold a blackline. there was a plan to take it out a month ago. the air clip -- russians are claiming they have it. there military bloggers are saying it is not true. what is the situation? zagorodnyuk: i have to remind you that the first deadline to take donbass was ninth of may. that is not the first time they decided to refocus on one operational directive. it did not work out. it does not work out now. we have lots of people in so the door. we have troops there, we have correspondence there. there are pictures from that town. the same thing. claims it takes from -- this is not true. they are trying to surround it, trying to advance their comments --, but it is not successful. herbst: deborah. kevin mccarthy just became speaker. in the process, reportedly made a commitment to cut u.s. assistance ukraine. do believe a small minority of republicans are in a position to do that? bob gates wrote an op-ed on some -- sending more advanced weapons to achieve victory sooner since putin is counting on western support away. he noted growing strength in europe for providing for ukraine. do you think this is news about the alleged commit underscores the wisdom for the recommendation from rice and gates? ms. cagan: it underscores the wisdom in something else. the united states has not done a very good job of strategic communication. he has done a good job would be telling these members of congress, not only on the right, but the left that here is the investment that we are making ukraine versus investment we would have to be making an hour military in terms of not only equipment but backup. they are not talking about this is probably the largest instance of burden sharing on allies in 35 to 40 years. when you look at per capita, the amount of equipment that has been supplied ukraine and other assistance is more than we have seen within data -- nato previously. we are not committing them. and i talked to members of congress and staff. when i talked to american on the street. they are unaware of what our other allies are doing. they're totally unaware of how the u.s. military is learning from this war and changing its dynamics of how its equipment and what's the next generation of equipment. i read a very good article this week on how the army is looking forward to see how bradley's perform in ukraine. if they are looking at their next generation of fighting vehicles. they made improvement in the third and fourth version. they want to see what happens in ukraine. none of this is being broadcast lightly. i think it is something that has to be said to the american people because -- and the middle of a war we should not be talking about cost savings, but it is inevitable. especially with high inflation in the country and people entrenched in isolation. if we are going to have that conversation, we need to be honest and tell the american people here is you're saving. this is now this -- a generation of weapon system that will be more successful against china because what happens in ukraine. we were able to get ukraine the innovation tech bad for modern warfare. you cannot get in the middle of the nevada desert or training. you can only get this in real time. i think there are heads of's services that are aware of this and are taking advantage of we are not telling this to congress , and we are not telling it to the people. shame on us for not getting this word out. herbst: deborah since you are so good on nuclear stuff. i'll throw a curve at you now. you talked about the fear of escalation as when why the creation and other countries and nato have reluctance to send arms to ukraine. russian media are full of let's use nukes on the west. one of the biggest blow v-8 or's on russian tv had on his program a retired general. while these guys were all saying using nudes -- new skins:, great britain or france. he said this is nonsense if native forces were attacking russia, then our nuclear doctrine said we should use nukes to defend the state. this is crazy talk. -- otherwise this is crazy talk. how do you interpret that this general center on russian tv? what does this mean we should understand this? ms. cagan: i think he was perfectly rational. i heard comments about moving nukes into crimea. i do not think people understand what is required to support nuclear weapons. what kind of special forces you need to use them, how you protect to the warhead, how the warheads are uploaded and used, what kind of safety and general forces. these are not things you can roll out you can just roll out before you can -- line -- we have seen it close by. the second thing is russia has been told by china, by india, by pakistan and iran that use of nuclear weapons would undermine their architecture of having their nuclear deterrence be a threat to their enemies. and there is an uneasy detente between pakistan kashmir and elsewhere. it is based on not using these, but threats. china understands its efficacy of its deterrence is based on a threat to use it but not have somebody run off and undercut china's largest threat it had in the indo pacific. even iran, who likes to keep this going needs to not only israel but many the gulf states would rather someone not talk about using these weapons. then it undermines the fear that around likes to conjure up in the labonte and elsewhere. . i go back to the issue. i do not think escalation is the reason why the u.s. into other countries of not doing more. i think it is more fundamental fear of what happens when putin loses. i think it is more fundamental. i think ukraine can win and putin can lose. i do not think people are having an easy time wrapping their arms around this concept. on nuclear weapons i am not worried about this. i do not think it is as easy or fruitful for putin as some think it would be. >> we need to come to you and then turn to audience questions. there seems to be growing in fighting and russian elites about the war. and growing criticism of the war from hawks. it is good politics to conduct a new mobilization. twitter has been a fire with the possible or fake fsb order that would prevent draft age russian men from leaving. this seems to be preparation for mobilization. if moscow launches a new offensive, does it rests on success? what would it take russia to end its aggression? zagorodnyuk: i am not sure they can give advice to mr. bruton. -- mr. putin. my only advice is to commit suicide. i am afraid mobilization is something he will do. he has no choice. he says he stopped mobilization, but he lives. he will do it more and more. because he cannot, he can only have a highly motivated or better army of ukraine, with the army of the last century, increasing by force and consisting of poorly trained soldiers. the only steps he can use is stalin's tactic to overwhelm them with the corpses of his soldiers, the only way he is successful, so of course you have a new mobilization, and if you want to stop putin's aggression in ukraine, if you want to stop him therefore to protect yourself, so, two things. pray for ukrainian soldiers. and give ukraine offensive weapons. give ukraine offensive weapons. otherwise, you will not stop him. president zelenskyy was absolutely right when he said that your help is not charity. ukraine is fighting for the entire western world, for democracy against the tyranny. it is very similar to the situation of world war ii, when the war was for the freedom of people. i think that the probability of using, of putin using nuclear weapons is overestimated. it is real, but it's not so high as it looks. because, if he is losing, if he is losing, i think they will not let him to do it. they do not want to die. they do not want to die together with him. they support him when he is a winner, they won't support him when he is losing. keep in mind that putin's victory will lead to a terrible threat to the world, just as hoefler did not stop that hilerr did not stop, so putin will not stop. his goal is the destruction of not only ukraine, but the destruction of all the countries which were part of the ussr zone of influence, and the weakening of the west, changing the balance of power, increasing his power, so it is putin is an existential threat for western civilization or let's say the world civilization. you can't stop him. only defeating him. it is the only way. for example, when ukrainians liberate all their territories, including crimea, 100%, if they do it, and after this, we will have something like a peace agreement between putin from one side and ukraine in the world on the other side. it is not a piece. it is a cease-fire. because he will find new resources. he will reorganize his army and he will attack again. the only stable piece is destroying of this military, that this criminal state, as it was done in 1945 with another war criminal. >> thank you. i think we all would agree that we need to stop putin in ukraine because he is an existential threat for the west. we turn to audience questions and have a series of questions on the taking of crimea and another on the same subject. i will not go through the mall, because there are a bunch. they are about how crimea might be taken back. i think this has addressed a little bit, but i will give you the opportunity to addresses. how do you see ukraine taking back crimea? if you could briefly recap. >> we don't believe putin will go for negotiations about that. we don't think putin will go for any real negotiations, other than to drag out time. but certainly not on crimea, so we think a diplomatic solution is possible, but possible when those leaders will come to putin. whatever the scenario will be. then we do believe military solution is possible. we believe russian forces will be exhausted by the time when we are getting to crimea. it is possible to limit their capabilities. it is possible to neutralize the influence of the black sea fleet, because it is relying on its sole capability on some ships, and yeah, so it would be joint forces campaign in different directions, which would address this issue, and of course we do need assault weapons come and we do need the support from the international community, but one of the reasons we are here and talking about that is to convince the international community that the measures about winning this war are not the real measures. we should be absolutely clear about the victory, and we just cannot let russia stay as a constant threat and the black sea region in the south of ukraine and crimea for its potential another season of the campaign. >> thank you. we have a question for general clark. it is, do you think that retaking crimea is possible without armor from the west? and given the size of pro-russian inhabitants, is, it possible? ukraine does need armor from the west as i said in my opening remarks. >> i think that ukraine, the government itself will have to work on the plan for the reoccupation. crimea has been ethnically cleansed, so any evidence that was there in 2013 is not there today. the tartar's have been isolated and worn out. -- run out. russia has moved in. this is typical of the way russia works. so there will have to be a plan for the reintegration of crimea into ukraine, and i am convinced that many of those russians who have moved in, they would welcome being part of ukraine, rather than be part of an isolated and dictatorial russia. john, i want to mention two things we have not focused on while i have the floor here. one is we have not really used the legal weapon effectively. we need to mobilize international legal support for the indictment of vladimir putin and his lieutenants. it is that simple. they have violated international law, and if international law has meaning, we need american leaders, european leaders, and others, because they say if this happens, how will we talked to putin and negotiate with him? the answer is he is a criminal. you can't trust anything he says. he has lied repeatedly. so has lavrov. this is not a real question. this is a concern about whether international law has meaning, and this is the clearest case for using international law and reestablishing its strength in the 21st century. the second thing we are not doing is we are not working the information war against russia's populace, or i should say against putin. he is able to put the lies fourth, mobilize, accuse this of being a war against nato and so forth. we don't see any impact or significant effort to changing the minds of ordinary russians. maybe a tough sell, but it is an essential element of moving forward. if we can destabilize russian popular support for putin, it makes everything that follows much easier. >> thank you. two excellent points. gordon brown of the u.k. out a strong op-ed on going after the criminal leadership in the international courts. ok. we have a question from stuart. i think that is for you, but whoever may want to comment on this, and andre too. he said general clark made a point on providing weapon systems and standardizing types that complicates maintenance and supply efforts and suggest selecting one weapon schism in each category, for example, the swedes provide aircraft in the germans provide tanks and so on. does that make sense in your opinion? >> sure, it might simplify logistics, but it does not really make sense in this case, because none of these countries have sufficient types required to be this'll supplier, so i think the burden is on the west -- to be the sole supplier, so the burden is on the west to establish the logistics chain. look, this might have been really hard in the 1950's, 1960's, 1970's, but with modern communications, with amazon and companies like amazon, it is very easy to connect the customer to the provider. there is software out there now and you can get the parts that are needed and you put separate units together around specific weapon systems. you train what we would say that operators in the second and third echelon mechanics on the specific systems, and then you run the parts requirements back to control points. i would say this also, it is way past time for the allied nations to establish contract maintenance support inside ukraine. there is no reason why this is not done. it makes no sense to pull stuff back to poland. let's get a maintenance system that works inside ukraine and get that equipment that needs to be repaired back in the hands of the troops in an expeditious manner. >> thank you. here is a question from joe. i think this is for you. it was mentioned that nonproductive narratives still permeate the western information space regarding crimea, so his questions are, are there different narratives that might help increase support for ukraine in the global south? and perhaps, more important topic, how can ukraine population be psychologically prepared for rejoining ukraine after eight plus years of occupation in kremlin propaganda? >> it is almost nine years. yeah, yes, of course the reintegration should be an effort and should be a full campaign for integration, because there are lots of things that happened during that time, and we have to be very careful. we have to be sensitive to certain issues and direct in result about other issues. obviously it will be difficult, but with good planning and good support, it is possible. the important thing is that most of the people in crimea, and particularly in some areas and some entrepreneurs, and a lot of people who just want to live a normal life, i mean they are struggling they are now because crimea is currently under to tele terrien occupation with no freedom and no rule of law. -- totalitarian occupational no freedom and no rule of law. there is massive pressure on the small businesses there. in fact, there is a de facto genocide of crimean tartar's because they have been subjected to serious human rights violations. so there will be a lot of people waiting for this, so we cannot just say that what we see on tv, particular russian tv is truth. so no, we need to address all issues and there must be a full campaign in a full campaign and policy research effort about the reintegration and reoccupation. regarding the narratives, in the global south generally, the attitude to this war is subjected to a misunderstanding about the strategic picture, generally. we see that in many different channels. we see that on tv in india in arab countries and many other places. people don't understand lots of things and there are a lot of narratives, so addressing that is generally understanding the war as a whole, but we need to show the presidence. one of the one centered around crimea is that for years is the fact that annexation russia declared it as russian. it actually mean something and we should change our policy and approach because of the effect, a defect of the world accepted the annexation. there have been sanctions and officially there has been a rejection of crimea as part of russia and massive participation in the crimean platform, but the regime was very weak and it did not work and they have countless loopholes, and basically there was no active plan on how to liberate crimea, so there are lots of politicians who said that's a reality and we should not do anything violent like a military campaign because russia says it is its own and included officially in the structure. guess what happened? russia annexed four more regions using the exact same mechanism as with crimea. so what we need to show to everybody is if you are allowing these things to happen they will continue. it only means that putin will continue whatever works for him and he will repeat it somewhere else and so one and we need to explain this to the whole world because that is a reality. thank you. >> ok, we have so many questions and little time. we have one from john for you. what are the prospects for the removal of putin and who might succeed him? >> will, let's first say it will not be the revolution. i do not believe in it at all, but of course it will be elections because he will never allow elections. it could be the palace coup. i think it is the only good scenario for rationale. who will replace him? it does not matter because anybody, even somebody from his very, very close team come this person or this group of persons, they will have to come they will have is a main goal to excuse themselves. they don't care about ukraine. they don't care about russia. they care only about themselves and about their billions. the billions they have stolen during their professional careers. so, any person who replaces putin will make serious steps back from his aggression and toward the west, and in this case, in this case, it will be very important which position, which will be the position of the west. if you, if you say, ok, currently you are liberated all ukrainian lands, you agree to pay reparations, so it is ok. it will be your decision. you must demand the militarization. you must demand the control of the nuclear weapons, and i think that if you are strong enough, those who would replace bruton -- putin will agree with you. >> thank you. ok. we have two minutes left. i would turn the conversation to you. you set us off. you can conclude your remarks and that would be welcome here. >> for me, it is simple, the global community, particular western community playing a crucial role in helping ukraine to win needs to be absolutely clear about the format of winning. there should not be any doubts that putin needs to lose and ukraine needs to win and that includes crimea. there are no half measures, as i said. there is no let's do it, but crimea is some special case or something else. because that will actually set up a very wrong president -- so the strategic objectives will be achieved by ourselves, because the would be some negative consequences for the history to come, and we cannot afford that. ukrainians are not going to do that, so ukraine is absolutely determined about that and we welcome the global community to join us in this vision and address the concerns and discuss this as much as possible and study the possible campaigns, do any diplomatic measures, etc., but we are not going to accept some of the statements which we hear from some observers, ok, let's just leave crimea out. that's use it and not touch it. and so that is the conclusion. let's address honestly and look at this and be very clear and consistent about our strategy with this war. thank you. >> thank you. with that, our hour is up. i would like to thank our wonderful panel for this terrific conversation. i would like to thank everybody for turning in. we will be doing more on moscow's war in ukraine in the weeks to come, certainly by the end of